new versions of sudo

Signed-off-by: Raphaël Marichez <falco@gentoo.org>

7 files changed, 759 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/app-admin/sudo/Manifest b/app-admin/sudo/Manifest
index 1296c45..3324ff6 100644
--- a/app-admin/sudo/Manifest
+++ b/app-admin/sudo/Manifest
@@ -2,10 +2,19 @@ AUX patch.sudo-1.6.8p9.logging.c.diff 1539 RMD160 0bdfff8770e4937692f8dda82c2d64
 AUX sudo 223 RMD160 4bc9a3e5d2dfd73bb1f14e5bad3b644ba80758d3 SHA1 fa6377c699ff2061c77cb87737fa2b4aaa8e8b9f SHA256 3f8dae2c663ed62bbe19e9b3e24f0e206fd1a4929bbafdff2e577e1aed9f2b58
 AUX sudo-1.6.8_p12-ssh_client.diff 1815 RMD160 1ec5b9858bceee2292dd88167eb8e3760b46da2b SHA1 f54690102a0e669a34089acf2d0c37d4dd86ae67 SHA256 4d51ab9e7de3a6b5d222e4de2ec1eb3a17d35abbbf4182fc36d8b3d91c5b8bfc
 AUX sudo-1.6.8_p8-ldap-tls_cacert.diff 542 RMD160 cff54e31749796f732ce176b568797999325715e SHA1 3e7e493055998034d2b5a91160041e93d2246556 SHA256 2bc04b2b3ccd20f0ca545b74ca7ac68b708a1852af2fe2c620e78a92a45c2b23
+AUX sudo-1.6.9_p13-ssh_client.diff 1859 RMD160 719abc2137f210f3119438a39ccf874eee2293d3 SHA1 92b68a369fbff210ec9cb711a8d322cb853c204a SHA256 aa9489035fa78dc0f796345fd9a7aa10a7e5b5318e9ddfe3fa8ddbede8ed3235
+AUX sudo-1.6.9_p16-ssh_client.diff 1859 RMD160 719abc2137f210f3119438a39ccf874eee2293d3 SHA1 92b68a369fbff210ec9cb711a8d322cb853c204a SHA256 aa9489035fa78dc0f796345fd9a7aa10a7e5b5318e9ddfe3fa8ddbede8ed3235
+AUX sudo-1.7.0_rc1-ssh_client.diff 2144 RMD160 c755821682ba47390120611fb138e32f32687056 SHA1 9292713f7ad1963a4962cadc6f9677b49753b047 SHA256 cc6be42d991fd02cf521abd9bc5cd5b3a5178dded8d7497bb3b2cabd764839fc
 AUX sudo-ldap_timelimit.diff 2550 RMD160 b34a41e3fc4016ff182ed1800e0f1b0f82d3bfdf SHA1 c3c15eea9cf2e552010e27d0282246fa770d2fae SHA256 fc6eedb3435edbf5ccfcd5f62d8f31a78bf01afbb519c6b40bbe1329d82d6cea
 AUX sudo-skeychallengeargs.diff 567 RMD160 906ee43a7c2f21d1cf5130eac5c98ef0833154fd SHA1 b0efbedc72a1ed85c74ba10e343a68368e76c3e9 SHA256 dd2f4fdba26be6c3b4af15f3b6e18efa19375e1f9c579cdc2c76ee1adcce5e1d
 AUX sudoers 1612 RMD160 f61c372791112feecae7e0a762a9aa9f30285099 SHA1 b27d644dcd9d7d3727db9355a81cebf7deaa6a7a SHA256 4ff5355e2d1dcac48bdd8420982a5b437546cd40b3dc445f9fbfb9464a4af1a0
 DIST sudo-1.6.8p12.tar.gz 585643 RMD160 d7ff9f18ca0973615258c2e975300b94567451d5 SHA1 a79631e9e1c0d0d3f2aa88ae685628e5fde61982 SHA256 56f7d86032538a4a98d90af3742903a09ba16d6db82b593e4a47605f87fa581a
-EBUILD sudo-1.6.8_p12-r1.ebuild 6676 RMD160 b04da97519ece66fefa1f4079a8eb590f922a68f SHA1 864c3bdb6bdce8f8ad1537b68f6af27e8cddce83 SHA256 8d32748e74745b87106cbad2983bc0cd6fbde4b02e0ee00c99c3435f3c07ef89
+DIST sudo-1.6.9p13.tar.gz 589079 RMD160 eb2a4d835553061f9a15d71abee83a5574215c28 SHA1 0e84a265bb18772bc99d0f37c65dd6564962a6c4 SHA256 c54b8f10eca330cb3181e4a16bd743b145d4fcf9d1d85df6127d7e9979d4a805
+DIST sudo-1.6.9p16.tar.gz 593175 RMD160 b36b1ecc4383a6e411a8f0c2e90f9bfb6df4a220 SHA1 6c9248441eb6f5d56a9ba3545b83fceb875bd4ee SHA256 634e2b596bc6fc6a9143e00387ae79941980f548c9a20ea651ce755cc4e35f6a
+DIST sudo-1.7.0rc1.tar.gz 736445 RMD160 1d226161876a3e290f30eba067ee8fbecef6cd66 SHA1 4a83cadd37aab864cbf21efd9e39996a73cbb210 SHA256 b1cb268376f9c8ce0e69567b3e53bfa09618d825df8e4ad1273ff196eba36952
+EBUILD sudo-1.6.8_p12-r1.ebuild 6675 RMD160 402017649c8360ee2153eb61bd04ee3390d9d1f5 SHA1 0554e036e26378b2443c287cf1f1bd4450fca796 SHA256 6f8c73062a59edbb81120add56bad7f6e4b841647767d6f11db0512aca0e90f0
+EBUILD sudo-1.6.9_p13.ebuild 5956 RMD160 281921b4b421bf2373d264f485ed09c83f6b4193 SHA1 50f29dbf598c327faff26e12431d06f321989bf8 SHA256 f708be67b6d9ff03f18d11e1d6cf9f5334a670414b250276162a727fec9f1b9f
+EBUILD sudo-1.6.9_p16.ebuild 5990 RMD160 802c6066ffd4e8c225eef83750af372041e84e09 SHA1 bc1c49f7b86928496e558a8ed7cbb0592f07aea2 SHA256 5327c1d887966abcde066665a52cefa143832dae40dc9c8cabfe12e6fe8e93f7
+EBUILD sudo-1.7.0_rc1.ebuild 6444 RMD160 9d466129c9948e9e93adc460518ca7b4203ffcbc SHA1 6ee856110b47016b78649b6a5288885998849b2e SHA256 8b036824daac7db4dbde5269b138d63f10524f95f27647ff55ab8a9c42d9abab
 MISC ChangeLog 16836 RMD160 3a828b9690071c79737bcf44cc1ad989d52156ce SHA1 e036e4312d1f1b329326f8887a0789647c09b438 SHA256 884f594a3cf7e2fa2616d35d25b7f98c1466fb32c3e3979c26d158a6775c36ba
 MISC metadata.xml 501 RMD160 74dd36daa51d7ad5ce1659f0279e1245cd1ef4bc SHA1 e447d21dc61ee4a6de8cc0f66aa28aa422d9990a SHA256 5f399b83a90977486ff92847caa884d16f8b71705fd0d2203acb35f56c9a6db6
diff --git a/app-admin/sudo/files/sudo-1.6.9_p13-ssh_client.diff b/app-admin/sudo/files/sudo-1.6.9_p13-ssh_client.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b53ebbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-admin/sudo/files/sudo-1.6.9_p13-ssh_client.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+diff -uNr -r sudo-1.6.9p13.orig/logging.c sudo-1.6.9p13/logging.c
+--- sudo-1.6.9p13.orig/logging.c	2007-11-25 14:07:38.000000000 +0100
++++ sudo-1.6.9p13/logging.c	2008-05-22 14:40:04.000000000 +0200
+@@ -313,9 +313,9 @@
+ 	    strlcat(evstr, " ", len);		/* NOTE: last one will fail */
+ 	}
+     }
+-    easprintf(&logline, "%sTTY=%s ; PWD=%s ; USER=%s%s ; COMMAND=%s%s%s",
++    easprintf(&logline, "%sTTY=%s ; PWD=%s ; USER=%s%s ; COMMAND=%s%s%s ; SSH_CLIENT=%s",
+ 	message, user_tty, user_cwd, *user_runas, evstr ? evstr : "",
+-	user_cmnd, user_args ? " " : "", user_args ? user_args : "");
++	user_cmnd, user_args ? " " : "", user_args ? user_args : "", user_ssh_client ? user_ssh_client : "" );
+ 
+     mail_auth(status, logline);		/* send mail based on status */
+ 
+diff -uNr -r sudo-1.6.9p13.orig/sudo.c sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.c
+--- sudo-1.6.9p13.orig/sudo.c	2008-02-09 15:44:48.000000000 +0100
++++ sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.c	2008-05-22 14:37:03.000000000 +0200
+@@ -568,6 +568,8 @@
+ 		    user_prompt = *ep + 12;
+ 		else if (strncmp("SUDO_USER=", *ep, 10) == 0)
+ 		    prev_user = *ep + 10;
++		else if (strncmp("SSH_CLIENT=", *ep, 11) == 0)
++		    user_ssh_client = *ep + 11;
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	    }
+diff -uNr -r sudo-1.6.9p13.orig/sudo.h sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.h
+--- sudo-1.6.9p13.orig/sudo.h	2008-02-09 15:44:48.000000000 +0100
++++ sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.h	2008-05-22 14:40:36.000000000 +0200
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+     struct stat *cmnd_stat;
+     char *path;
+     char *shell;
++    char *user_ssh_client;
+     char *tty;
+     char *ttypath;
+     char  cwd[PATH_MAX];
+@@ -136,6 +137,7 @@
+ #define user_gid		(sudo_user.pw->pw_gid)
+ #define user_dir		(sudo_user.pw->pw_dir)
+ #define user_shell		(sudo_user.shell)
++#define user_ssh_client		(sudo_user.user_ssh_client)
+ #define user_ngroups		(sudo_user.ngroups)
+ #define user_groups		(sudo_user.groups)
+ #define user_tty		(sudo_user.tty)
diff --git a/app-admin/sudo/files/sudo-1.6.9_p16-ssh_client.diff b/app-admin/sudo/files/sudo-1.6.9_p16-ssh_client.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b53ebbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-admin/sudo/files/sudo-1.6.9_p16-ssh_client.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+diff -uNr -r sudo-1.6.9p13.orig/logging.c sudo-1.6.9p13/logging.c
+--- sudo-1.6.9p13.orig/logging.c	2007-11-25 14:07:38.000000000 +0100
++++ sudo-1.6.9p13/logging.c	2008-05-22 14:40:04.000000000 +0200
+@@ -313,9 +313,9 @@
+ 	    strlcat(evstr, " ", len);		/* NOTE: last one will fail */
+ 	}
+     }
+-    easprintf(&logline, "%sTTY=%s ; PWD=%s ; USER=%s%s ; COMMAND=%s%s%s",
++    easprintf(&logline, "%sTTY=%s ; PWD=%s ; USER=%s%s ; COMMAND=%s%s%s ; SSH_CLIENT=%s",
+ 	message, user_tty, user_cwd, *user_runas, evstr ? evstr : "",
+-	user_cmnd, user_args ? " " : "", user_args ? user_args : "");
++	user_cmnd, user_args ? " " : "", user_args ? user_args : "", user_ssh_client ? user_ssh_client : "" );
+ 
+     mail_auth(status, logline);		/* send mail based on status */
+ 
+diff -uNr -r sudo-1.6.9p13.orig/sudo.c sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.c
+--- sudo-1.6.9p13.orig/sudo.c	2008-02-09 15:44:48.000000000 +0100
++++ sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.c	2008-05-22 14:37:03.000000000 +0200
+@@ -568,6 +568,8 @@
+ 		    user_prompt = *ep + 12;
+ 		else if (strncmp("SUDO_USER=", *ep, 10) == 0)
+ 		    prev_user = *ep + 10;
++		else if (strncmp("SSH_CLIENT=", *ep, 11) == 0)
++		    user_ssh_client = *ep + 11;
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	    }
+diff -uNr -r sudo-1.6.9p13.orig/sudo.h sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.h
+--- sudo-1.6.9p13.orig/sudo.h	2008-02-09 15:44:48.000000000 +0100
++++ sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.h	2008-05-22 14:40:36.000000000 +0200
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+     struct stat *cmnd_stat;
+     char *path;
+     char *shell;
++    char *user_ssh_client;
+     char *tty;
+     char *ttypath;
+     char  cwd[PATH_MAX];
+@@ -136,6 +137,7 @@
+ #define user_gid		(sudo_user.pw->pw_gid)
+ #define user_dir		(sudo_user.pw->pw_dir)
+ #define user_shell		(sudo_user.shell)
++#define user_ssh_client		(sudo_user.user_ssh_client)
+ #define user_ngroups		(sudo_user.ngroups)
+ #define user_groups		(sudo_user.groups)
+ #define user_tty		(sudo_user.tty)
diff --git a/app-admin/sudo/files/sudo-1.7.0_rc1-ssh_client.diff b/app-admin/sudo/files/sudo-1.7.0_rc1-ssh_client.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e187a05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-admin/sudo/files/sudo-1.7.0_rc1-ssh_client.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+diff -uNr -r sudo-1.7.0rc1.orig/logging.c sudo-1.7.0rc1/logging.c
+--- sudo-1.7.0rc1.orig/logging.c	2008-03-18 21:00:52.000000000 +0100
++++ sudo-1.7.0rc1/logging.c	2008-05-22 16:12:11.000000000 +0200
+@@ -613,6 +613,7 @@
+ #define	LL_GROUP_STR	"GROUP="
+ #define	LL_ENV_STR	"ENV="
+ #define	LL_CMND_STR	"COMMAND="
++#define	LL_ENV_SSH_CLIENT	"SSH_CLIENT="
+ 
+ /*
+  * Allocate and fill in a new logline.
+@@ -642,6 +643,8 @@
+ 	len += sizeof(LL_USER_STR) + 2 + strlen(runas_pw->pw_name);
+     if (runas_gr != NULL)
+ 	len += sizeof(LL_GROUP_STR) + 2 + strlen(runas_gr->gr_name);
++    if (user_ssh_client != NULL)
++	len += sizeof(LL_ENV_SSH_CLIENT) + 2 + strlen(user_ssh_client);
+     if (sudo_user.env_vars != NULL) {
+ 	size_t evlen = 0;
+ 	struct list_member *cur;
+@@ -710,6 +713,13 @@
+ 	    strlcat(line, user_args, len) >= len)
+ 	    goto toobig;
+     }
++    if (user_ssh_client != NULL) {
++	if (strlcat(line, " ; ", len) >= len ||
++	    strlcat(line, LL_ENV_SSH_CLIENT, len) >= len ||
++	    strlcat(line, user_ssh_client, len) >= len)
++	    goto toobig;
++	efree(evstr);
++    }
+ 
+     return (line);
+ toobig:
+diff -uNr -r sudo-1.7.0rc1.orig/sudo.c sudo-1.7.0rc1/sudo.c
+--- sudo-1.7.0rc1.orig/sudo.c	2008-05-03 02:53:20.000000000 +0200
++++ sudo-1.7.0rc1/sudo.c	2008-05-22 16:10:26.000000000 +0200
+@@ -632,6 +632,8 @@
+ 		    prev_user = *ep + 10;
+ 		else if (strncmp("SUDO_ASKPASS=", *ep, 13) == 0)
+ 		    user_askpass = *ep + 13;
++		else if (strncmp("SSH_CLIENT=", *ep, 11) == 0)
++		    user_ssh_client = *ep + 11;
+ 		break;
+ 	    }
+     }
+diff -uNr -r sudo-1.7.0rc1.orig/sudo.h sudo-1.7.0rc1/sudo.h
+--- sudo-1.7.0rc1.orig/sudo.h	2008-05-03 02:53:20.000000000 +0200
++++ sudo-1.7.0rc1/sudo.h	2008-05-22 16:08:30.000000000 +0200
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
+     struct stat *cmnd_stat;
+     char *path;
+     char *shell;
++    char *user_ssh_client;
+     char *tty;
+     char *ttypath;
+     char *host;
+@@ -161,6 +162,7 @@
+ #define runas_gr		(sudo_user._runas_gr)
+ #define user_role		(sudo_user.role)
+ #define user_type		(sudo_user.type)
++#define user_ssh_client		(sudo_user.user_ssh_client)
+ 
+ /*
+  * We used to use the system definition of PASS_MAX or _PASSWD_LEN,
diff --git a/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.6.9_p13.ebuild b/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.6.9_p13.ebuild
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..acc0bc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.6.9_p13.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2008 Gentoo Foundation
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.6.9_p13.ebuild,v 1.10 2008/05/13 17:20:53 jer Exp $
+
+inherit eutils pam confutils
+
+DESCRIPTION="Allows users or groups to run commands as other users"
+HOMEPAGE="http://www.sudo.ws/"
+SRC_URI="ftp://ftp.sudo.ws/pub/sudo/${P/_/}.tar.gz"
+LICENSE="Sudo"
+SLOT="0"
+KEYWORDS="alpha amd64 ~arm hppa ia64 ~m68k ~mips ppc ppc64 ~s390 ~sh sparc ~sparc-fbsd x86 ~x86-fbsd"
+IUSE="pam skey offensive ldap selinux"
+
+DEPEND="pam? ( virtual/pam )
+	ldap? ( >=net-nds/openldap-2.1.30-r1 )
+	skey? ( >=sys-auth/skey-1.1.5-r1 )
+	virtual/editor
+	virtual/mta"
+RDEPEND="selinux? ( sec-policy/selinux-sudo )
+	ldap? ( dev-lang/perl )
+	${DEPEND}"
+DEPEND="${RDEPEND} sys-devel/bison"
+
+S=${WORKDIR}/${P/_/}
+
+pkg_setup() {
+	confutils_use_conflict skey pam
+}
+
+src_unpack() {
+	unpack ${A}; cd "${S}"
+
+	# falco's patch for logging and pam
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-ssh_client.diff
+
+	# compatability fix.
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-skeychallengeargs.diff
+
+	# additional variables to disallow, should user disable env_reset.
+
+	# NOTE: this is not a supported mode of operation, these variables
+	#       are added to the blacklist as a convenience to administrators
+	#       who fail to heed the warnings of allowing untrusted users
+	#       to access sudo.
+	#
+	#       there is *no possible way* to foresee all attack vectors in
+	#       all possible applications that could potentially be used via
+	#       sudo, these settings will just delay the inevitable.
+	#
+	#       that said, I will accept suggestions for variables that can
+	#       be misused in _common_ interpreters or libraries, such as
+	#       perl, bash, python, ruby, etc., in the hope of dissuading
+	#       a casual attacker.
+
+	# XXX: perl should be using suid_perl.
+	# XXX: users can remove/add more via env_delete and env_check.
+	# XXX: <?> = probably safe enough for most circumstances.
+
+	einfo "Blacklisting common variables (env_delete)..."
+		sudo_bad_var 'PERLIO_DEBUG'   # perl, write debug to file.
+		sudo_bad_var 'FPATH'          # ksh, search path for functions.
+		sudo_bad_var 'NULLCMD'        # zsh, command on null-redir. <?>
+		sudo_bad_var 'READNULLCMD'    # zsh, command on null-redir. <?>
+		sudo_bad_var 'GLOBIGNORE'     # bash, glob paterns to ignore. <?>
+		sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONHOME'     # python, module search path.
+		sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONPATH'     # python, search path.
+		sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONINSPECT'  # python, allow inspection.
+		sudo_bad_var 'RUBYLIB'        # ruby, lib load path.
+		sudo_bad_var 'RUBYOPT'        # ruby, cl options.
+		sudo_bad_var 'ZDOTDIR'        # zsh, path to search for dotfiles.
+	einfo "...done."
+
+	# prevent binaries from being stripped.
+	sed -i 's/\($(INSTALL).*\) -s \(.*[(sudo|visudo)]\)/\1 \2/g' Makefile.in
+
+	# remove useless c++ checks
+	epunt_cxx
+}
+
+src_compile() {
+	local line ROOTPATH
+
+	# FIXME: secure_path is a compile time setting. using ROOTPATH
+	# is not perfect, env-update may invalidate this, but until it
+	# is available as a sudoers setting this will have to do.
+	einfo "Setting secure_path..."
+
+		# why not use grep? variable might be expanded from other variables
+		# declared in that file. cannot just source the file, would override
+		# any variables already set.
+		eval `PS4= bash -x /etc/profile.env 2>&1 | \
+			while read line; do
+				case $line in
+					ROOTPATH=*) echo $line; break;;
+					*) continue;;
+				esac
+			done`  && einfo "	Found ROOTPATH..." || \
+				ewarn "	Failed to find ROOTPATH, please report this."
+
+		# remove any duplicate entries
+		ROOTPATH=$(cleanpath /bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/opt/bin${ROOTPATH:+:${ROOTPATH}})
+
+		# strip gcc path (bug #136027)
+		rmpath ROOTPATH '*/gcc-bin/*'
+
+	einfo "...done."
+
+	# XXX: --disable-path-info closes an info leak, but may be confusing.
+	# XXX: /bin/vi may not be available, make nano visudo's default.
+	econf --with-secure-path="${ROOTPATH}" \
+		--with-editor=/bin/nano \
+		--with-env-editor \
+		$(use_with offensive insults) \
+		$(use_with offensive all-insults) \
+		$(use_with pam) \
+		$(use_with skey) \
+		$(use_with ldap ldap_conf_file /etc/ldap.conf.sudo) \
+		$(use_with ldap) || die
+
+	emake || die
+}
+
+src_install() {
+	emake -j1 DESTDIR="${D}" install || die
+	dodoc BUGS CHANGES HISTORY PORTING README TROUBLESHOOTING \
+		UPGRADE sample.sudoers sample.syslog.conf
+
+	if use ldap; then
+		dodoc README.LDAP schema.OpenLDAP
+		dosbin sudoers2ldif
+
+		cat - > "${T}"/ldap.conf.sudo <<EOF
+# See ldap.conf(5) and README.LDAP for details\n"
+# This file should only be readable by root\n\n"
+# supported directives: host, port, ssl, ldap_version\n"
+# uri, binddn, bindpw, sudoers_base, sudoers_debug\n"
+# tls_{checkpeer,cacertfile,cacertdir,randfile,ciphers,cert,key
+EOF
+
+		insinto /etc
+		doins "${T}"/ldap.conf.sudo
+		fperms 0440 /etc/ldap.conf.sudo
+	fi
+
+	pamd_mimic system-auth sudo auth account password session
+
+	insinto /etc
+	doins "${FILESDIR}"/sudoers
+	fperms 0440 /etc/sudoers
+}
+
+# remove duplicate path entries from $1
+cleanpath() {
+	local i=1 x n IFS=:
+	local -a paths;	paths=($1)
+
+	for ((n=${#paths[*]}-1;i<=n;i++)); do
+		for ((x=0;x<i;x++)); do
+			test "${paths[i]}" == "${paths[x]}" && {
+				einfo "	Duplicate entry ${paths[i]} removed..." 1>&2
+				unset paths[i]; continue 2; }
+		done; # einfo "	Adding ${paths[i]}..." 1>&2
+	done; echo "${paths[*]}"
+}
+
+# add $1 to default env_delete list.
+sudo_bad_var() {
+	local target='env.c' marker='\*initial_badenv_table\[\]'
+
+	ebegin "	$1"
+		sed -i 's#\(^.*'${marker}'.*$\)#\1\n\t"'${1}'",#' "${S}"/${target}
+	eend $?
+}
+
+rmpath() {
+	declare e newpath oldpath=${!1} PATHvar=$1 thisp IFS=:
+	shift
+	for thisp in $oldpath; do
+		for e; do [[ $thisp == $e ]] && continue 2; done
+		newpath=$newpath:$thisp
+	done
+	eval $PATHvar='${newpath#:}'
+}
+
+pkg_postinst() {
+	use ldap && {
+		ewarn "sudo uses the /etc/ldap.conf.sudo file for ldap configuration."
+	}
+}
diff --git a/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.6.9_p16.ebuild b/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.6.9_p16.ebuild
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85c47ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.6.9_p16.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2008 Gentoo Foundation
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.6.9_p16.ebuild,v 1.2 2008/05/11 17:22:36 flameeyes Exp $
+
+inherit eutils pam confutils
+
+DESCRIPTION="Allows users or groups to run commands as other users"
+HOMEPAGE="http://www.sudo.ws/"
+SRC_URI="ftp://ftp.sudo.ws/pub/sudo/${P/_/}.tar.gz"
+LICENSE="Sudo"
+SLOT="0"
+KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~hppa ~ia64 ~m68k ~ppc ~ppc64 ~s390 ~sh ~sparc ~sparc-fbsd ~x86 ~x86-fbsd"
+IUSE="pam skey offensive ldap selinux"
+
+DEPEND="pam? ( virtual/pam )
+	ldap? ( >=net-nds/openldap-2.1.30-r1 )
+	skey? ( >=sys-auth/skey-1.1.5-r1 )
+	virtual/editor
+	virtual/mta"
+RDEPEND="selinux? ( sec-policy/selinux-sudo )
+	ldap? ( dev-lang/perl )
+	pam? ( sys-auth/pambase )
+	${DEPEND}"
+DEPEND="${RDEPEND} sys-devel/bison"
+
+S=${WORKDIR}/${P/_/}
+
+pkg_setup() {
+	confutils_use_conflict skey pam
+}
+
+src_unpack() {
+	unpack ${A}; cd "${S}"
+
+	# falco's patch for logging and pam
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-ssh_client.diff
+
+	# compatability fix.
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-skeychallengeargs.diff
+
+	# additional variables to disallow, should user disable env_reset.
+
+	# NOTE: this is not a supported mode of operation, these variables
+	#       are added to the blacklist as a convenience to administrators
+	#       who fail to heed the warnings of allowing untrusted users
+	#       to access sudo.
+	#
+	#       there is *no possible way* to foresee all attack vectors in
+	#       all possible applications that could potentially be used via
+	#       sudo, these settings will just delay the inevitable.
+	#
+	#       that said, I will accept suggestions for variables that can
+	#       be misused in _common_ interpreters or libraries, such as
+	#       perl, bash, python, ruby, etc., in the hope of dissuading
+	#       a casual attacker.
+
+	# XXX: perl should be using suid_perl.
+	# XXX: users can remove/add more via env_delete and env_check.
+	# XXX: <?> = probably safe enough for most circumstances.
+
+	einfo "Blacklisting common variables (env_delete)..."
+		sudo_bad_var 'PERLIO_DEBUG'   # perl, write debug to file.
+		sudo_bad_var 'FPATH'          # ksh, search path for functions.
+		sudo_bad_var 'NULLCMD'        # zsh, command on null-redir. <?>
+		sudo_bad_var 'READNULLCMD'    # zsh, command on null-redir. <?>
+		sudo_bad_var 'GLOBIGNORE'     # bash, glob paterns to ignore. <?>
+		sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONHOME'     # python, module search path.
+		sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONPATH'     # python, search path.
+		sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONINSPECT'  # python, allow inspection.
+		sudo_bad_var 'RUBYLIB'        # ruby, lib load path.
+		sudo_bad_var 'RUBYOPT'        # ruby, cl options.
+		sudo_bad_var 'ZDOTDIR'        # zsh, path to search for dotfiles.
+	einfo "...done."
+
+	# prevent binaries from being stripped.
+	sed -i 's/\($(INSTALL).*\) -s \(.*[(sudo|visudo)]\)/\1 \2/g' Makefile.in
+
+	# remove useless c++ checks
+	epunt_cxx
+}
+
+src_compile() {
+	local line ROOTPATH
+
+	# FIXME: secure_path is a compile time setting. using ROOTPATH
+	# is not perfect, env-update may invalidate this, but until it
+	# is available as a sudoers setting this will have to do.
+	einfo "Setting secure_path..."
+
+		# why not use grep? variable might be expanded from other variables
+		# declared in that file. cannot just source the file, would override
+		# any variables already set.
+		eval `PS4= bash -x /etc/profile.env 2>&1 | \
+			while read line; do
+				case $line in
+					ROOTPATH=*) echo $line; break;;
+					*) continue;;
+				esac
+			done`  && einfo "	Found ROOTPATH..." || \
+				ewarn "	Failed to find ROOTPATH, please report this."
+
+		# remove any duplicate entries
+		ROOTPATH=$(cleanpath /bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/opt/bin${ROOTPATH:+:${ROOTPATH}})
+
+		# strip gcc path (bug #136027)
+		rmpath ROOTPATH '*/gcc-bin/*'
+
+	einfo "...done."
+
+	# XXX: --disable-path-info closes an info leak, but may be confusing.
+	# XXX: /bin/vi may not be available, make nano visudo's default.
+	econf --with-secure-path="${ROOTPATH}" \
+		--with-editor=/bin/nano \
+		--with-env-editor \
+		$(use_with offensive insults) \
+		$(use_with offensive all-insults) \
+		$(use_with pam) \
+		$(use_with skey) \
+		$(use_with ldap ldap_conf_file /etc/ldap.conf.sudo) \
+		$(use_with ldap) || die
+
+	emake || die
+}
+
+src_install() {
+	emake -j1 DESTDIR="${D}" install || die
+	dodoc BUGS CHANGES HISTORY PORTING README TROUBLESHOOTING \
+		UPGRADE sample.sudoers sample.syslog.conf
+
+	if use ldap; then
+		dodoc README.LDAP schema.OpenLDAP
+		dosbin sudoers2ldif
+
+		cat - > "${T}"/ldap.conf.sudo <<EOF
+# See ldap.conf(5) and README.LDAP for details\n"
+# This file should only be readable by root\n\n"
+# supported directives: host, port, ssl, ldap_version\n"
+# uri, binddn, bindpw, sudoers_base, sudoers_debug\n"
+# tls_{checkpeer,cacertfile,cacertdir,randfile,ciphers,cert,key
+EOF
+
+		insinto /etc
+		doins "${T}"/ldap.conf.sudo
+		fperms 0440 /etc/ldap.conf.sudo
+	fi
+
+	pamd_mimic system-auth sudo auth account password session
+
+	insinto /etc
+	doins "${FILESDIR}"/sudoers
+	fperms 0440 /etc/sudoers
+}
+
+# remove duplicate path entries from $1
+cleanpath() {
+	local i=1 x n IFS=:
+	local -a paths;	paths=($1)
+
+	for ((n=${#paths[*]}-1;i<=n;i++)); do
+		for ((x=0;x<i;x++)); do
+			test "${paths[i]}" == "${paths[x]}" && {
+				einfo "	Duplicate entry ${paths[i]} removed..." 1>&2
+				unset paths[i]; continue 2; }
+		done; # einfo "	Adding ${paths[i]}..." 1>&2
+	done; echo "${paths[*]}"
+}
+
+# add $1 to default env_delete list.
+sudo_bad_var() {
+	local target='env.c' marker='\*initial_badenv_table\[\]'
+
+	ebegin "	$1"
+		sed -i 's#\(^.*'${marker}'.*$\)#\1\n\t"'${1}'",#' "${S}"/${target}
+	eend $?
+}
+
+rmpath() {
+	declare e newpath oldpath=${!1} PATHvar=$1 thisp IFS=:
+	shift
+	for thisp in $oldpath; do
+		for e; do [[ $thisp == $e ]] && continue 2; done
+		newpath=$newpath:$thisp
+	done
+	eval $PATHvar='${newpath#:}'
+}
+
+pkg_postinst() {
+	use ldap && {
+		ewarn "sudo uses the /etc/ldap.conf.sudo file for ldap configuration."
+	}
+}
diff --git a/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.7.0_rc1.ebuild b/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.7.0_rc1.ebuild
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0036a0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.7.0_rc1.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2008 Gentoo Foundation
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.7.0_rc1.ebuild,v 1.2 2008/05/11 17:22:36 flameeyes Exp $
+
+inherit eutils pam confutils
+
+MY_P=${P/_/}
+MY_P=${MY_P/beta/b}
+
+case "${P}" in
+	*_beta* | *_rc*)
+		uri_prefix=beta/
+		;;
+	*)
+		uri_prefix=""
+		;;
+esac
+
+DESCRIPTION="Allows users or groups to run commands as other users"
+HOMEPAGE="http://www.sudo.ws/"
+SRC_URI="ftp://ftp.sudo.ws/pub/sudo/${uri_prefix}${MY_P}.tar.gz"
+LICENSE="Sudo"
+SLOT="0"
+KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~hppa ~ia64 ~m68k ~ppc ~ppc64 ~s390 ~sh ~sparc ~sparc-fbsd ~x86 ~x86-fbsd"
+IUSE="pam skey offensive ldap selinux"
+
+DEPEND="pam? ( virtual/pam )
+	ldap? ( >=net-nds/openldap-2.1.30-r1 )
+	skey? ( >=sys-auth/skey-1.1.5-r1 )
+	virtual/editor
+	virtual/mta"
+RDEPEND="selinux? ( sec-policy/selinux-sudo )
+	ldap? ( dev-lang/perl )
+	pam? ( sys-auth/pambase )
+	${DEPEND}"
+DEPEND="${RDEPEND} sys-devel/bison"
+
+S=${WORKDIR}/${MY_P}
+
+pkg_setup() {
+	confutils_use_conflict skey pam
+}
+
+src_unpack() {
+	unpack ${A}; cd "${S}"
+
+	# falco's patch for logging and pam
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-ssh_client.diff
+
+	# compatability fix.
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-skeychallengeargs.diff
+
+	# additional variables to disallow, should user disable env_reset.
+
+	# NOTE: this is not a supported mode of operation, these variables
+	#       are added to the blacklist as a convenience to administrators
+	#       who fail to heed the warnings of allowing untrusted users
+	#       to access sudo.
+	#
+	#       there is *no possible way* to foresee all attack vectors in
+	#       all possible applications that could potentially be used via
+	#       sudo, these settings will just delay the inevitable.
+	#
+	#       that said, I will accept suggestions for variables that can
+	#       be misused in _common_ interpreters or libraries, such as
+	#       perl, bash, python, ruby, etc., in the hope of dissuading
+	#       a casual attacker.
+
+	# XXX: perl should be using suid_perl.
+	# XXX: users can remove/add more via env_delete and env_check.
+	# XXX: <?> = probably safe enough for most circumstances.
+
+	einfo "Blacklisting common variables (env_delete)..."
+		sudo_bad_var() {
+			local target='env.c' marker='\*initial_badenv_table\[\]'
+
+			ebegin "	$1"
+			sed -i 's#\(^.*'${marker}'.*$\)#\1\n\t"'${1}'",#' "${S}"/${target}
+			eend $?
+		}
+
+		sudo_bad_var 'PERLIO_DEBUG'   # perl, write debug to file.
+		sudo_bad_var 'FPATH'          # ksh, search path for functions.
+		sudo_bad_var 'NULLCMD'        # zsh, command on null-redir. <?>
+		sudo_bad_var 'READNULLCMD'    # zsh, command on null-redir. <?>
+		sudo_bad_var 'GLOBIGNORE'     # bash, glob paterns to ignore. <?>
+		sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONHOME'     # python, module search path.
+		sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONPATH'     # python, search path.
+		sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONINSPECT'  # python, allow inspection.
+		sudo_bad_var 'RUBYLIB'        # ruby, lib load path.
+		sudo_bad_var 'RUBYOPT'        # ruby, cl options.
+		sudo_bad_var 'ZDOTDIR'        # zsh, path to search for dotfiles.
+	einfo "...done."
+
+	# prevent binaries from being stripped.
+	sed -i 's/\($(INSTALL).*\) -s \(.*[(sudo|visudo)]\)/\1 \2/g' Makefile.in
+
+	# remove useless c++ checks
+	epunt_cxx
+}
+
+src_compile() {
+	local line ROOTPATH
+
+	# FIXME: secure_path is a compile time setting. using ROOTPATH
+	# is not perfect, env-update may invalidate this, but until it
+	# is available as a sudoers setting this will have to do.
+	einfo "Setting secure_path..."
+
+		# why not use grep? variable might be expanded from other variables
+		# declared in that file. cannot just source the file, would override
+		# any variables already set.
+		eval `PS4= bash -x /etc/profile.env 2>&1 | \
+			while read line; do
+				case $line in
+					ROOTPATH=*) echo $line; break;;
+					*) continue;;
+				esac
+			done`  && einfo "	Found ROOTPATH..." || \
+				ewarn "	Failed to find ROOTPATH, please report this."
+
+		# remove duplicate path entries from $1
+		cleanpath() {
+			local i=1 x n IFS=:
+			local -a paths;	paths=($1)
+
+			for ((n=${#paths[*]}-1;i<=n;i++)); do
+				for ((x=0;x<i;x++)); do
+					test "${paths[i]}" == "${paths[x]}" && {
+						einfo "	Duplicate entry ${paths[i]} removed..." 1>&2
+						unset paths[i]; continue 2; }
+				done; # einfo "	Adding ${paths[i]}..." 1>&2
+			done; echo "${paths[*]}"
+		}
+
+		ROOTPATH=$(cleanpath /bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/opt/bin${ROOTPATH:+:${ROOTPATH}})
+
+		# strip gcc path (bug #136027)
+		rmpath() {
+			declare e newpath oldpath=${!1} PATHvar=$1 thisp IFS=:
+			shift
+			for thisp in $oldpath; do
+				for e; do [[ $thisp == $e ]] && continue 2; done
+				newpath=$newpath:$thisp
+			done
+			eval $PATHvar='${newpath#:}'
+		}
+
+		rmpath ROOTPATH '*/gcc-bin/*'
+
+	einfo "...done."
+
+	# XXX: --disable-path-info closes an info leak, but may be confusing.
+	# XXX: /bin/vi may not be available, make nano visudo's default.
+	econf --with-secure-path="${ROOTPATH}" \
+		--with-editor=/bin/nano \
+		--with-env-editor \
+		$(use_with offensive insults) \
+		$(use_with offensive all-insults) \
+		$(use_with pam) \
+		$(use_with skey) \
+		$(use_with ldap ldap_conf_file /etc/ldap.conf.sudo) \
+		$(use_with ldap) || die
+
+	emake || die
+}
+
+src_install() {
+	emake -j1 DESTDIR="${D}" install || die
+	dodoc ChangeLog HISTORY PORTING README TROUBLESHOOTING \
+		UPGRADE sample.sudoers sample.syslog.conf
+
+	if use ldap; then
+		dodoc README.LDAP schema.OpenLDAP
+		dosbin sudoers2ldif
+
+		cat - > "${T}"/ldap.conf.sudo <<EOF
+# See ldap.conf(5) and README.LDAP for details\n"
+# This file should only be readable by root\n\n"
+# supported directives: host, port, ssl, ldap_version\n"
+# uri, binddn, bindpw, sudoers_base, sudoers_debug\n"
+# tls_{checkpeer,cacertfile,cacertdir,randfile,ciphers,cert,key
+EOF
+
+		insinto /etc
+		doins "${T}"/ldap.conf.sudo
+		fperms 0440 /etc/ldap.conf.sudo
+	fi
+
+	pamd_mimic system-auth sudo auth account password session
+
+	insinto /etc
+	doins "${FILESDIR}"/sudoers
+	fperms 0440 /etc/sudoers
+}
+
+pkg_postinst() {
+	if use ldap; then
+		ewarn
+		ewarn "sudo uses the /etc/ldap.conf.sudo file for ldap configuration."
+		ewarn
+		if egrep -q '^[[:space:]]*sudoers:' "${ROOT}"/etc/nsswitch.conf; then
+			ewarn "In 1.7 series, LDAP is no more consulted, unless explicitly"
+			ewarn "configured in /etc/nsswitch.conf."
+			ewarn
+			ewarn "To make use of LDAP, add this line to your /etc/nsswitch.conf:"
+			ewarn "  sudoers: ldap files"
+			ewarn
+		fi
+	fi
+}