proj/gentoo: Initial commit

This commit represents a new era for Gentoo:
Storing the gentoo-x86 tree in Git, as converted from CVS.

This commit is the start of the NEW history.
Any historical data is intended to be grafted onto this point.

Creation process:
1. Take final CVS checkout snapshot
2. Remove ALL ChangeLog* files
3. Transform all Manifests to thin
4. Remove empty Manifests
5. Convert all stale $Header$/$Id$ CVS keywords to non-expanded Git $Id$
5.1. Do not touch files with -kb/-ko keyword flags.

Signed-off-by: Robin H. Johnson <robbat2@gentoo.org>
X-Thanks: Alec Warner <antarus@gentoo.org> - did the GSoC 2006 migration tests
X-Thanks: Robin H. Johnson <robbat2@gentoo.org> - infra guy, herding this project
X-Thanks: Nguyen Thai Ngoc Duy <pclouds@gentoo.org> - Former Gentoo developer, wrote Git features for the migration
X-Thanks: Brian Harring <ferringb@gentoo.org> - wrote much python to improve cvs2svn
X-Thanks: Rich Freeman <rich0@gentoo.org> - validation scripts
X-Thanks: Patrick Lauer <patrick@gentoo.org> - Gentoo dev, running new 2014 work in migration
X-Thanks: Michał Górny <mgorny@gentoo.org> - scripts, QA, nagging
X-Thanks: All of other Gentoo developers - many ideas and lots of paint on the bikeshed

13 files changed, 553 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..36b4ca294699
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
+
+strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
+resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
+result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
+argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
+
+This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
+has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
+would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
+upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
+(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
+
+Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
+rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
+larger than the maximum configured body length.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
+index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644
+--- a/src/wps/httpread.c
++++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
+@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ 					if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
+ 						goto bad;
+ 					h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
++					if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
++					    h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
++						wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++							   "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
++							   h->chunk_size);
++						goto bad;
++					}
+ 					/* throw away chunk header
+ 					 * so we have only real data
+ 					 */
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..79c5af8906fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser
+
+The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the
+length of the information elements (int left) could end up being
+negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack
+buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing
+so, resulting in segmentation fault.
+
+This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service
+attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses
+hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based
+drivers).
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c
+index 6d4177c..314e244 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wmm.c
++++ b/src/ap/wmm.c
+@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (left < 0)
++		return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */
++
+ 	/* extract the tspec info element */
+ 	if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
+ 		hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..91627fb7b7f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit
+ and Confirm
+
+The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
+checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
+overflow when processing an invalid message.
+
+Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
+processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
+make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
+message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index f2b0926..a629437 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 	BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ 	u16 offset;
+ 	u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
++	size_t prime_len, order_len;
++
++	if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
++		ret->ignore = TRUE;
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
++	prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
++	order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
++
++	if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
++			   (unsigned int) payload_len,
++			   (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
++		goto fin;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ 	    ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
+@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
+ 	int offset;
+ 
++	if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
++		ret->ignore = TRUE;
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
++	if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
++			   (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
+ 	 *	prf
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5dca20b2771b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
+ and Confirm
+
+The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
+checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
+overflow when processing an invalid message.
+
+Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
+processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
+make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
+message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ 	EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
+ 	int res = 0;
++	size_t prime_len, order_len;
+ 
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
+ 
++	prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
++	order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
++
++	if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
++			   (unsigned int) payload_len,
++			   (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
+ 	if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ 	    ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ 	    ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
+ 	int offset;
+ 
++	if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
++			   (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
+ 	/* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
+ 	grp = htons(data->group_num);
+ 	ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4d2f9d8aefeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
+ reassembly
+
+The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
+Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
+prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
+have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
+as a huge positive integer.
+
+In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
+before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
+potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index a629437..1d2079b 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ 	 * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
+ 	 */
+ 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++		if (len < 2) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++				   "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
++			ret->ignore = TRUE;
++			return NULL;
++		}
+ 		tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
+ 			   "total length = %d", tot_len);
+ 		if (tot_len > 15000)
+ 			return NULL;
++		if (data->inbuf) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++				   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
++			ret->ignore = TRUE;
++			return NULL;
++		}
+ 		data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
+ 		if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7edef099eb59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
+ reassembly
+
+The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
+Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
+prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
+have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
+as a huge positive integer.
+
+In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
+before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
+potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ 	 * the first fragment has a total length
+ 	 */
+ 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++		if (len < 2) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++				   "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
++			return;
++		}
+ 		tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
+ 			   "length = %d", tot_len);
+ 		if (tot_len > 15000)
+ 			return;
++		if (data->inbuf) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++				   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
++			return;
++		}
+ 		data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
+ 		if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a601323f14da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
+
+The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding
+whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
+fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
+for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
+triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
+due to invalid buffer allocation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ 	/*
+ 	 * we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
+ 	 */
++	lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
+ 	len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
+ 	if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
+ 		resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-5/0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-5/0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d03eb484fc28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-5/0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From fc880b11ed70ff9dcf8be48621f75d354cc5094d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 15:33:55 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Avoid misaligned read of an NDEF field
+
+The 32-bit version of payload length field may not be 32-bit aligned in
+the message buffer, so use WPA_GET_BE32() to read it instead of ntohl().
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/wps/ndef.c |    2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c
+index 8d1ce1e..5604b0a 100644
+--- a/src/wps/ndef.c
++++ b/src/wps/ndef.c
+@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
+ 	} else {
+ 		if (size < 6)
+ 			return -1;
+-		record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos);
++		record->payload_length = WPA_GET_BE32(pos);
+ 		pos += sizeof(u32);
+ 	}
+ 
+-- 
+1.7.9.5
+
diff --git a/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-5/0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-5/0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1f624c8dad46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/2015-5/0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From df9079e72760ceb7ebe7fb11538200c516bdd886 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 21:57:28 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser
+
+It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up
+wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload
+length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to
+2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large
+payload length value and the record type filter reading up to about 20
+bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the process.
+This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32 bytes of
+heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow of the
+same length which would most likely result in the process termination.
+In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there
+would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result in an
+infinite loop in ndef_parse_records().
+
+Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of service
+attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or
+sending them during NFC connection handover if the application providing
+the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the
+received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC stack
+that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing,
+hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included
+here.
+
+Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that
+detects integer overflow. (CID 122668)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c
+index 5604b0a..50d018f 100644
+--- a/src/wps/ndef.c
++++ b/src/wps/ndef.c
+@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
+ 		if (size < 6)
+ 			return -1;
+ 		record->payload_length = WPA_GET_BE32(pos);
++		if (record->payload_length > size - 6)
++			return -1;
+ 		pos += sizeof(u32);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
+ 	pos += record->payload_length;
+ 
+ 	record->total_length = pos - data;
+-	if (record->total_length > size)
++	if (record->total_length > size ||
++	    record->total_length < record->payload_length)
+ 		return -1;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/net-wireless/hostapd/files/hostapd-conf.d b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/hostapd-conf.d
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7d05735eb3b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/hostapd-conf.d
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Space separated List of interfaces which needs to be started before
+# hostapd
+INTERFACES="wlan0"
+
+# Space separated list of configuration files
+CONFIGS="/etc/hostapd/hostapd.conf"
+
+# Extra options to pass to hostapd, see hostapd(8)
+OPTIONS=""
diff --git a/net-wireless/hostapd/files/hostapd-hlr_auc_gw-openssl.patch b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/hostapd-hlr_auc_gw-openssl.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1e88859b8e00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/hostapd-hlr_auc_gw-openssl.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 58e115b86928000475b734a4345862afe11d6352 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 12:56:31 +0000
+Subject: Fix hlr_auc_gw build with OpenSSL
+
+Commit 983c6a606bc839248ea0c69090e60c095a655bc6 ('OpenSSL: Replace
+internal HMAC-MD5 implementation') forgot to make inclusion of md5.o
+conditional for hlr_auc_gw build.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+---
+diff --git a/hostapd/Android.mk b/hostapd/Android.mk
+index 5c69bd1..54b139c 100644
+--- a/hostapd/Android.mk
++++ b/hostapd/Android.mk
+@@ -795,8 +795,10 @@ OBJS += src/crypto/random.c
+ HOBJS += src/crypto/random.c
+ HOBJS += src/utils/eloop.c
+ HOBJS += $(SHA1OBJS)
++ifneq ($(CONFIG_TLS), openssl)
+ HOBJS += src/crypto/md5.c
+ endif
++endif
+ 
+ ifdef CONFIG_RADIUS_SERVER
+ L_CFLAGS += -DRADIUS_SERVER
+diff --git a/hostapd/Makefile b/hostapd/Makefile
+index 520ae89..d718c15 100644
+--- a/hostapd/Makefile
++++ b/hostapd/Makefile
+@@ -792,8 +792,10 @@ OBJS += ../src/crypto/random.o
+ HOBJS += ../src/crypto/random.o
+ HOBJS += ../src/utils/eloop.o
+ HOBJS += $(SHA1OBJS)
++ifneq ($(CONFIG_TLS), openssl)
+ HOBJS += ../src/crypto/md5.o
+ endif
++endif
+ 
+ ifdef CONFIG_RADIUS_SERVER
+ CFLAGS += -DRADIUS_SERVER
+--
+cgit v0.9.2
diff --git a/net-wireless/hostapd/files/hostapd-init.d b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/hostapd-init.d
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..eafbc6046c73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/hostapd-init.d
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+#!/sbin/runscript
+# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+# $Id$
+
+pidfile="/run/${SVCNAME}.pid"
+command="/usr/sbin/hostapd"
+command_args="-P ${pidfile} -B ${OPTIONS} ${CONFIGS}"
+
+extra_started_commands="reload"
+
+depend() {
+	local myneeds=
+	for iface in ${INTERFACES}; do
+		myneeds="${myneeds} net.${iface}"
+	done
+
+	[ -n "${myneeds}" ] && need ${myneeds}
+	use logger
+}
+
+start_pre() {
+	local file
+
+	for file in ${CONFIGS}; do
+		if [ ! -r "${file}" ]; then
+			eerror "hostapd configuration file (${CONFIG}) not found"
+			return 1
+		fi
+	done
+}
+
+reload() {
+	start_pre || return 1
+
+	ebegin "Reloading ${SVCNAME} configuration"
+	kill -HUP $(cat ${pidfile}) > /dev/null 2>&1
+	eend $?
+}
diff --git a/net-wireless/hostapd/files/hostapd.service b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/hostapd.service
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8f0ee8e8f744
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-wireless/hostapd/files/hostapd.service
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Hostapd IEEE 802.11 AP, IEEE 802.1X/WPA/WPA2/EAP/RADIUS Authenticator
+After=network.target
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/hostapd /etc/hostapd/hostapd.conf
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target