Initial checkin of 2.6-7.1 patchset.

10 files changed, 25328 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/0000_README b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/0000_README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e3e31d890c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/0000_README
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+README
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+This patchset is to be the 2.6 series of hardened-sources.
+It includes both SELinux and GRSecurity, as well as enhancements to each.
+Also included are additional hardening features useful in either system
+(note that with this release that GRSecurity and SELinux can also be used 
+in tandem.
+
+
+
+Patchset Numbering Scheme
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+1XXX 	Base patches
+ 2XX 	GRSecurity extras
+ 3XX 	SELinux extras
+2XXX 	Universal hardening features
+3XXX 	Netdevrand
+
+Invididual Patch Descriptions:
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Patch: 1000_grsecurity-2.0.1-2.6.7.patch
+from: Brad Spengler, http://grsecurity.net
+desc: GRSecurity for 2.6.7
+
+Patch: 1300_linux-2.6.4-selinux-hooks.patch
+from: Joshua Brindle <method@gentoo.org>
+desc: PaX hooks for SELinux
+
+Patch: 1305_linux-2.6.4-selinux-ipaddr.patch
+from: Joshua Brindle <method@gentoo.org>
+desc: Support for SELinux to log an IP address of the origin of an abuse
+
+Patch: 1310_linux-2.6.5-extra_sec_ops.patch
+from: Joshua Brindle <method@gentoo.org>
+desc: Adds additional secondary ops to selinux
+
+Patch: 2005_modules_off-2.6.3.patch
+from: Michal Purzynski <albeiro@zeus.polsl.gliwice.pl>
+desc: Support for disabling module loading via sysctl
+
+Patch: 2010_tcp-stealth-2.6.7.patch
+from: Updated for 2.6.7 by Michal Purzynski <albeiro@zeus.polsl.gliwice.pl>
+desc: Stealth TCP features
+
+Patch: 2015_tcp-nmap-freak.patch
+from: Updated for 2.6.7 by Michal Purzynski <albeiro@zeus.polsl.gliwice.pl>
+desc: More stealth TCP features, targetted blocking nmap syn/fin scan
+and OS detection
+
+Patch: 3000_netdev-random-core-2.6.7.patch
+from: Michal Purzynski <albeiro@zeus.polsl.gliwice.pl>
+desc: Core functionality for netdev random
+
+Patch: 3005_netdev-random-drivers-2.6.7.patch
+from: Michal Purzynski <albeiro@zeus.polsl.gliwice.pl>
+desc: Patch to allow network drivers to contribute to system entropy
diff --git a/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/1000_grsecurity-2.0.1-2.6.7.patch b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/1000_grsecurity-2.0.1-2.6.7.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a73f97c51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/1000_grsecurity-2.0.1-2.6.7.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,22024 @@
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/Makefile linux-2.6.7/Makefile
+--- linux-2.6.7/Makefile	2004-06-16 01:19:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/Makefile	2004-06-25 23:36:20.000000000 -0400
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ VERSION = 2
+ PATCHLEVEL = 6
+ SUBLEVEL = 7
+-EXTRAVERSION =
++EXTRAVERSION = -grsec
+ NAME=Zonked Quokka
+ 
+ # *DOCUMENTATION*
+@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@
+ 
+ 
+ ifeq ($(KBUILD_EXTMOD),)
+-core-y		+= kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/
++core-y		+= kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ grsecurity/
+ 
+ vmlinux-dirs	:= $(patsubst %/,%,$(filter %/, $(init-y) $(init-m) \
+ 		     $(core-y) $(core-m) $(drivers-y) $(drivers-m) \
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c linux-2.6.7/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c	2004-06-16 01:18:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
+ #include <linux/namei.h>
+ #include <linux/uio.h>
+ #include <linux/vfs.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/fpu.h>
+ #include <asm/io.h>
+@@ -179,6 +180,11 @@
+ 	struct file *file = NULL;
+ 	unsigned long ret = -EBADF;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ #if 0
+ 	if (flags & (_MAP_HASSEMAPHORE | _MAP_INHERIT | _MAP_UNALIGNED))
+ 		printk("%s: unimplemented OSF mmap flags %04lx\n", 
+@@ -189,6 +195,13 @@
+ 		if (!file)
+ 			goto out;
+ 	}
++
++	if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
++		fput(file);
++		ret = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+ 	down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flags, off);
+@@ -1274,6 +1287,10 @@
+ 	   merely specific addresses, but regions of memory -- perhaps
+ 	   this feature should be incorporated into all ports?  */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
++#endif
++
+ 	if (addr) {
+ 		addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(addr), len, limit);
+ 		if (addr != (unsigned long) -ENOMEM)
+@@ -1281,8 +1298,16 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Next, try allocating at TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE.  */
+-	addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE),
+-					 len, limit);
++
++	addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++		addr += current->mm->delta_mmap;
++#endif
++
++	addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(addr), len, limit);
++
+ 	if (addr != (unsigned long) -ENOMEM)
+ 		return addr;
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.7/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-16 01:19:53.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
+ #include <linux/user.h>
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -288,6 +289,9 @@
+ 	if (!child)
+ 		goto out_notsk;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
++		goto out;
++
+ 	if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
+ 		ret = ptrace_attach(child);
+ 		goto out;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.7/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c	2004-06-16 01:19:03.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -56,6 +57,142 @@
+ 	__reload_thread(pcb);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->pc = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++	int err;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
++		if (regs->pc >= current->mm->start_code &&
++		    regs->pc < current->mm->end_code)
++		{
++			if (regs->r26 == regs->pc)
++				return 1;
++
++			regs->pc += current->mm->delta_exec;
++			return 4;
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
++		unsigned int ldah, ldq, jmp;
++
++		err = get_user(ldah, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++		err |= get_user(ldq, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
++		err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((ldah & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x277B0000U &&
++		    (ldq & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0xA77B0000U &&
++		    jmp == 0x6BFB0000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long r27, addr;
++			unsigned long addrh = (ldah | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL) << 16;
++			unsigned long addrl = ldq | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL;
++
++			addr = regs->r27 + ((addrh ^ 0x80000000UL) + 0x80000000UL) + ((addrl ^ 0x8000UL) + 0x8000UL);
++			err = get_user(r27, (unsigned long*)addr);
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			regs->r27 = r27;
++			regs->pc = r27;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */
++		unsigned int ldah, lda, br;
++
++		err = get_user(ldah, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++		err |= get_user(lda, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
++		err |= get_user(br, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((ldah & 0xFFFF0000U)== 0x277B0000U &&
++		    (lda & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0xA77B0000U &&
++		    (br & 0xFFE00000U) == 0xC3E00000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr = br | 0xFFFFFFFFFFE00000UL;
++			unsigned long addrh = (ldah | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL) << 16;
++			unsigned long addrl = lda | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL;
++
++			regs->r27 += ((addrh ^ 0x80000000UL) + 0x80000000UL) + ((addrl ^ 0x8000UL) + 0x8000UL);
++			regs->pc += 12 + (((addr ^ 0x00100000UL) + 0x00100000UL) << 2);
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation */
++		unsigned int br;
++
++		err = get_user(br, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++
++		if (!err && (br & 0xFFE00000U) == 0xC3800000U) {
++			unsigned int br2, ldq, nop, jmp;
++			unsigned long addr = br | 0xFFFFFFFFFFE00000UL, resolver;
++
++			addr = regs->pc + 4 + (((addr ^ 0x00100000UL) + 0x00100000UL) << 2);
++			err = get_user(br2, (unsigned int *)addr);
++			err |= get_user(ldq, (unsigned int *)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(addr+8));
++			err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned int *)(addr+12));
++			err |= get_user(resolver, (unsigned long *)(addr+16));
++
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if (br2 == 0xC3600000U &&
++			    ldq == 0xA77B000CU &&
++			    nop == 0x47FF041FU &&
++			    jmp == 0x6B7B0000U)
++			{
++				regs->r28 = regs->pc+4;
++				regs->r27 = addr+16;
++				regs->pc = resolver;
++				return 3;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
++			printk("<invalid address>.");
++			break;
++		}
++		printk("%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
+ 
+ /*
+  * This routine handles page faults.  It determines the address,
+@@ -133,8 +270,34 @@
+  good_area:
+ 	si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
+ 	if (cause < 0) {
+-		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
++		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++			if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || address != regs->pc)
++				goto bad_area;
++
++			up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++			switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++			case 2:
++			case 3:
++				return;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++			case 4:
++				return;
++#endif
++
++			}
++			pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->pc, (void*)rdusp());
++			do_exit(SIGKILL);
++#else
+ 			goto bad_area;
++#endif
++
++		}
+ 	} else if (!cause) {
+ 		/* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */
+ 		if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE)))
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/Kconfig linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/Kconfig
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/Kconfig	2004-06-16 01:18:59.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/Kconfig	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@
+ 
+ config X86_ALIGNMENT_16
+ 	bool
+-	depends on MWINCHIP3D || MWINCHIP2 || MWINCHIPC6 || MCYRIXIII || X86_ELAN || MK6 || M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || MVIAC3_2
++	depends on MWINCHIP3D || MWINCHIP2 || MWINCHIPC6 || MCYRIXIII || X86_ELAN || MK8 || MK7 || MK6 || MPENTIUM4 || MPENTIUMIII || MPENTIUMII || M686 || M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || MVIAC3_2
+ 	default y
+ 
+ config X86_GOOD_APIC
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c	2004-06-16 01:18:56.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -597,19 +597,40 @@
+ 	int			cpu;
+ 	struct desc_struct	save_desc_40;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long		cr3;
++#endif
++
+ 	cpus = apm_save_cpus();
+ 	
+ 	cpu = get_cpu();
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3);
++#endif
++
+ 	save_desc_40 = cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8];
+ 	cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc;
+ 
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
+ 	local_save_flags(flags);
+ 	APM_DO_CLI;
++#endif
++
+ 	APM_DO_SAVE_SEGS;
+ 	apm_bios_call_asm(func, ebx_in, ecx_in, eax, ebx, ecx, edx, esi);
+ 	APM_DO_RESTORE_SEGS;
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
+ 	local_irq_restore(flags);
++#endif
++
+ 	cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3);
++#endif
++
+ 	put_cpu();
+ 	apm_restore_cpus(cpus);
+ 	
+@@ -639,20 +660,40 @@
+ 	int			cpu;
+ 	struct desc_struct	save_desc_40;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long		cr3;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	cpus = apm_save_cpus();
+ 	
+ 	cpu = get_cpu();
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3);
++#endif
++
+ 	save_desc_40 = cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8];
+ 	cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc;
+ 
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
+ 	local_save_flags(flags);
+ 	APM_DO_CLI;
++#endif
++
+ 	APM_DO_SAVE_SEGS;
+ 	error = apm_bios_call_simple_asm(func, ebx_in, ecx_in, eax);
+ 	APM_DO_RESTORE_SEGS;
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
+ 	local_irq_restore(flags);
++#endif
++
+ 	cpu_gdt_table[smp_processor_id()][0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3);
++#endif
++
+ 	put_cpu();
+ 	apm_restore_cpus(cpus);
+ 	return error;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c	2004-06-16 01:18:56.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -358,6 +358,10 @@
+ 	if (this_cpu->c_init)
+ 		this_cpu->c_init(c);
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL)
++	clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_SEP, c->x86_capability);
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Disable the PN if appropriate */
+ 	squash_the_stupid_serial_number(c);
+ 
+@@ -554,7 +558,7 @@
+ 	set_tss_desc(cpu,t);
+ 	cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_TSS].b &= 0xfffffdff;
+ 	load_TR_desc();
+-	load_LDT(&init_mm.context);
++	_load_LDT(&init_mm.context);
+ 
+ 	/* Set up doublefault TSS pointer in the GDT */
+ 	__set_tss_desc(cpu, GDT_ENTRY_DOUBLEFAULT_TSS, &doublefault_tss);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S	2004-06-16 01:19:02.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -266,6 +266,11 @@
+ 	movl TI_flags(%ebp), %ecx
+ 	testw $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, %cx
+ 	jne syscall_exit_work
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK
++	call pax_randomize_kstack
++#endif
++
+ /* if something modifies registers it must also disable sysexit */
+ 	movl EIP(%esp), %edx
+ 	movl OLDESP(%esp), %ecx
+@@ -293,6 +298,11 @@
+ 	movl TI_flags(%ebp), %ecx
+ 	testw $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, %cx	# current->work
+ 	jne syscall_exit_work
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK
++	call pax_randomize_kstack
++#endif
++
+ restore_all:
+ 	RESTORE_ALL
+ 
+@@ -600,7 +610,7 @@
+ 	pushl $do_spurious_interrupt_bug
+ 	jmp error_code
+ 
+-.data
++.section .rodata,"a",@progbits
+ ENTRY(sys_call_table)
+ 	.long sys_restart_syscall	/* 0 - old "setup()" system call, used for restarting */
+ 	.long sys_exit
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/head.S linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/head.S
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/head.S	2004-06-16 01:18:57.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/head.S	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -48,6 +48,12 @@
+ 
+ 
+ /*
++ * Real beginning of normal "text" segment
++ */
++ENTRY(stext)
++ENTRY(_stext)
++
++/*
+  * 32-bit kernel entrypoint; only used by the boot CPU.  On entry,
+  * %esi points to the real-mode code as a 32-bit pointer.
+  * CS and DS must be 4 GB flat segments, but we don't depend on
+@@ -92,9 +98,9 @@
+ 
+ 	movl $(pg0 - __PAGE_OFFSET), %edi
+ 	movl $(swapper_pg_dir - __PAGE_OFFSET), %edx
+-	movl $0x007, %eax			/* 0x007 = PRESENT+RW+USER */
++	movl $0x067, %eax			/* 0x067 = DIRTY+ACCESSED+PRESENT+RW+USER */
+ 10:
+-	leal 0x007(%edi),%ecx			/* Create PDE entry */
++	leal 0x067(%edi),%ecx			/* Create PDE entry */
+ 	movl %ecx,(%edx)			/* Store identity PDE entry */
+ 	movl %ecx,page_pde_offset(%edx)		/* Store kernel PDE entry */
+ 	addl $4,%edx
+@@ -104,8 +110,8 @@
+ 	addl $0x1000,%eax
+ 	loop 11b
+ 	/* End condition: we must map up to and including INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END */
+-	/* bytes beyond the end of our own page tables; the +0x007 is the attribute bits */
+-	leal (INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END+0x007)(%edi),%ebp
++	/* bytes beyond the end of our own page tables; the +0x067 is the attribute bits */
++	leal (INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END+0x067)(%edi),%ebp
+ 	cmpl %ebp,%eax
+ 	jb 10b
+ 	movl %edi,(init_pg_tables_end - __PAGE_OFFSET)
+@@ -164,7 +170,7 @@
+ 	movl %cr0,%eax
+ 	orl $0x80000000,%eax
+ 	movl %eax,%cr0		/* ..and set paging (PG) bit */
+-	ljmp $__BOOT_CS,$1f	/* Clear prefetch and normalize %eip */
++	ljmp $__BOOT_CS,$1f + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET	/* Clear prefetch and normalize %eip */
+ 1:
+ 	/* Set up the stack pointer */
+ 	lss stack_start,%esp
+@@ -379,31 +385,39 @@
+ 	iret
+ 
+ /*
+- * Real beginning of normal "text" segment
++ * This starts the data section.
+  */
+-ENTRY(stext)
+-ENTRY(_stext)
++.data
++ready:	.byte 0
+ 
+-/*
+- * BSS section
+- */
+-.section ".bss.page_aligned","w"
++.section .data.swapper_pg_dir,"a",@progbits
+ ENTRY(swapper_pg_dir)
+ 	.fill 1024,4,0
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ENTRY(kernexec_pg_dir)
++	.fill 1024,4,0
++#endif
++
++.section .rodata.empty_zero_page,"a",@progbits
+ ENTRY(empty_zero_page)
+ 	.fill 4096,1,0
+ 
+ /*
+- * This starts the data section.
+- */
+-.data
++ * The IDT has to be page-aligned to simplify the Pentium
++ * F0 0F bug workaround.. We have a special link segment
++ * for this.
++ */
++.section .rodata.idt,"a",@progbits
++ENTRY(idt_table)
++	.fill 256,8,0
+ 
++.section .rodata,"a",@progbits
+ ENTRY(stack_start)
+ 	.long init_thread_union+THREAD_SIZE
+ 	.long __BOOT_DS
+ 
+-ready:	.byte 0
+-
++/* This is the default interrupt "handler" :-) */
+ int_msg:
+ 	.asciz "Unknown interrupt or fault at EIP %p %p %p\n"
+ 
+@@ -445,8 +459,8 @@
+ 	.align L1_CACHE_BYTES
+ ENTRY(boot_gdt_table)
+ 	.fill GDT_ENTRY_BOOT_CS,8,0
+-	.quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff	/* kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
+-	.quad 0x00cf92000000ffff	/* kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
++	.quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff	/* kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
++	.quad 0x00cf93000000ffff	/* kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
+ 
+ /*
+  * The Global Descriptor Table contains 28 quadwords, per-CPU.
+@@ -457,7 +471,13 @@
+ 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x0b reserved */
+ 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x13 reserved */
+ 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x1b reserved */
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_PCI_BIOS)
++	.quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff	/* 0x20 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
++#else
+ 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x20 unused */
++#endif
++
+ 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x28 unused */
+ 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x33 TLS entry 1 */
+ 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x3b TLS entry 2 */
+@@ -466,27 +486,32 @@
+ 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x53 reserved */
+ 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x5b reserved */
+ 
+-	.quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff	/* 0x60 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
+-	.quad 0x00cf92000000ffff	/* 0x68 kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
+-	.quad 0x00cffa000000ffff	/* 0x73 user 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
+-	.quad 0x00cff2000000ffff	/* 0x7b user 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	.quad 0xc0cf9b400000ffff	/* 0x60 kernel 4GB code at 0xc0400000 */
++#else
++	.quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff	/* 0x60 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
++#endif
++
++	.quad 0x00cf93000000ffff	/* 0x68 kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
++	.quad 0x00cffb000000ffff	/* 0x73 user 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
++	.quad 0x00cff3000000ffff	/* 0x7b user 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
+ 
+ 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x80 TSS descriptor */
+ 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x88 LDT descriptor */
+ 
+ 	/* Segments used for calling PnP BIOS */
+-	.quad 0x00c09a0000000000	/* 0x90 32-bit code */
+-	.quad 0x00809a0000000000	/* 0x98 16-bit code */
+-	.quad 0x0080920000000000	/* 0xa0 16-bit data */
+-	.quad 0x0080920000000000	/* 0xa8 16-bit data */
+-	.quad 0x0080920000000000	/* 0xb0 16-bit data */
++	.quad 0x00c09b0000000000	/* 0x90 32-bit code */
++	.quad 0x00809b0000000000	/* 0x98 16-bit code */
++	.quad 0x0080930000000000	/* 0xa0 16-bit data */
++	.quad 0x0080930000000000	/* 0xa8 16-bit data */
++	.quad 0x0080930000000000	/* 0xb0 16-bit data */
+ 	/*
+ 	 * The APM segments have byte granularity and their bases
+ 	 * and limits are set at run time.
+ 	 */
+-	.quad 0x00409a0000000000	/* 0xb8 APM CS    code */
+-	.quad 0x00009a0000000000	/* 0xc0 APM CS 16 code (16 bit) */
+-	.quad 0x0040920000000000	/* 0xc8 APM DS    data */
++	.quad 0x00409b0000000000	/* 0xb8 APM CS    code */
++	.quad 0x00009b0000000000	/* 0xc0 APM CS 16 code (16 bit) */
++	.quad 0x0040930000000000	/* 0xc8 APM DS    data */
+ 
+ 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0xd0 - unused */
+ 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0xd8 - unused */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c	2004-06-16 01:19:22.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <linux/stddef.h>
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
+ #include <linux/thread_info.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ /* Set EXTENT bits starting at BASE in BITMAP to value TURN_ON. */
+ static void set_bitmap(unsigned long *bitmap, unsigned int base, unsigned int extent, int new_value)
+@@ -62,9 +63,16 @@
+ 
+ 	if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
++	if (turn_on) {
++		gr_handle_ioperm();
++#else
+ 	if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
++#endif
+ 		return -EPERM;
+-
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
++	}
++#endif
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If it's the first ioperm() call in this thread's lifetime, set the
+ 	 * IO bitmap up. ioperm() is much less timing critical than clone(),
+@@ -115,8 +123,13 @@
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	/* Trying to gain more privileges? */
+ 	if (level > old) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
++		gr_handle_iopl();
++		return -EPERM;
++#else
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ 			return -EPERM;
++#endif
+ 	}
+ 	regs->eflags = (regs->eflags &~ 0x3000UL) | (level << 12);
+ 	/* Make sure we return the long way (not sysenter) */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c	2004-06-16 01:19:42.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -102,6 +102,19 @@
+ 		retval = copy_ldt(&mm->context, &old_mm->context);
+ 		up(&old_mm->context.sem);
+ 	}
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	if (!mm->context.user_cs_limit) {
++		mm->context.user_cs_base = 0UL;
++		mm->context.user_cs_limit = ~0UL;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
++		cpus_clear(mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
++#endif
++
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -154,7 +167,7 @@
+ {
+ 	int err;
+ 	unsigned long size;
+-	void *address;
++	const void *address;
+ 
+ 	err = 0;
+ 	address = &default_ldt[0];
+@@ -211,6 +224,13 @@
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (ldt_info.contents & 2)) {
++		error = -EINVAL;
++		goto out_unlock;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	entry_1 = LDT_entry_a(&ldt_info);
+ 	entry_2 = LDT_entry_b(&ldt_info);
+ 	if (oldmode)
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/process.c linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/process.c	2004-06-16 01:18:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/process.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@
+ 	struct task_struct *tsk;
+ 	int err;
+ 
+-	childregs = ((struct pt_regs *) (THREAD_SIZE + (unsigned long) p->thread_info)) - 1;
++	childregs = ((struct pt_regs *) (THREAD_SIZE + (unsigned long) p->thread_info - sizeof(unsigned long))) - 1;
+ 	struct_cpy(childregs, regs);
+ 	childregs->eax = 0;
+ 	childregs->esp = esp;
+@@ -454,9 +454,8 @@
+ int dump_task_regs(struct task_struct *tsk, elf_gregset_t *regs)
+ {
+ 	struct pt_regs ptregs;
+-	
+-	ptregs = *(struct pt_regs *)
+-		((unsigned long)tsk->thread_info+THREAD_SIZE - sizeof(ptregs));
++
++	ptregs = *(struct pt_regs *)(tsk->thread.esp0 - sizeof(ptregs));
+ 	ptregs.xcs &= 0xffff;
+ 	ptregs.xds &= 0xffff;
+ 	ptregs.xes &= 0xffff;
+@@ -509,10 +508,18 @@
+ 	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ 	struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + cpu;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long flags, cr3;
++#endif
++
+ 	/* never put a printk in __switch_to... printk() calls wake_up*() indirectly */
+ 
+ 	__unlazy_fpu(prev_p);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3);
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Reload esp0, LDT and the page table pointer:
+ 	 */
+@@ -523,6 +530,10 @@
+ 	 */
+ 	load_TLS(next, cpu);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3);
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Save away %fs and %gs. No need to save %es and %ds, as
+ 	 * those are always kernel segments while inside the kernel.
+@@ -688,6 +699,10 @@
+ 	struct desc_struct *desc;
+ 	int cpu, idx;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long flags, cr3;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (copy_from_user(&info, u_info, sizeof(info)))
+ 		return -EFAULT;
+ 	idx = info.entry_number;
+@@ -721,8 +736,17 @@
+ 		desc->a = LDT_entry_a(&info);
+ 		desc->b = LDT_entry_b(&info);
+ 	}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3);
++#endif
++
+ 	load_TLS(t, cpu);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3);
++#endif
++
+ 	put_cpu();
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+@@ -776,3 +800,29 @@
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK
++asmlinkage void pax_randomize_kstack(void)
++{
++	struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + smp_processor_id();
++	unsigned long time;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++	if (!pax_aslr)
++		return;
++#endif
++
++	rdtscl(time);
++
++	/* P4 seems to return a 0 LSB, ignore it */
++#ifdef CONFIG_MPENTIUM4
++	time &= 0x3EUL;
++	time <<= 1;
++#else
++	time &= 0x1FUL;
++	time <<= 2;
++#endif
++
++	tss->esp0 ^= time;
++	current->thread.esp0 = tss->esp0;
++}
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-16 01:19:03.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-25 14:08:27.000000000 -0400
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <linux/user.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/audit.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -264,6 +265,9 @@
+ 	if (pid == 1)		/* you may not mess with init */
+ 		goto out_tsk;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
++		goto out_tsk;
++
+ 	if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
+ 		ret = ptrace_attach(child);
+ 		goto out_tsk;
+@@ -342,6 +346,17 @@
+ 			  if(addr == (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[5]) break;
+ 			  if(addr < (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[4] &&
+ 			     ((unsigned long) data) >= TASK_SIZE-3) break;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++			  if(addr >= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0] &&
++			     addr <= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[3]){
++				long reg   = (addr - (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0]) >> 2;
++				long type  = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 4*reg)) & 3;
++				long align = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 2 + 4*reg)) & 3;
++				if((type & 1) && (data & align))
++					break;
++			  }
++#endif
+ 			  
+ 			  if(addr == (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[7]) {
+ 				  data &= ~DR_CONTROL_RESERVED;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c	2004-06-16 01:19:03.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -74,18 +74,18 @@
+    doesn't work with at least one type of 486 motherboard.  It is easy
+    to stop this code working; hence the copious comments. */
+ 
+-static unsigned long long
++static const unsigned long long
+ real_mode_gdt_entries [3] =
+ {
+ 	0x0000000000000000ULL,	/* Null descriptor */
+-	0x00009a000000ffffULL,	/* 16-bit real-mode 64k code at 0x00000000 */
+-	0x000092000100ffffULL	/* 16-bit real-mode 64k data at 0x00000100 */
++	0x00009b000000ffffULL,	/* 16-bit real-mode 64k code at 0x00000000 */
++	0x000093000100ffffULL	/* 16-bit real-mode 64k data at 0x00000100 */
+ };
+ 
+ static struct
+ {
+ 	unsigned short       size __attribute__ ((packed));
+-	unsigned long long * base __attribute__ ((packed));
++	const unsigned long long * base __attribute__ ((packed));
+ }
+ real_mode_gdt = { sizeof (real_mode_gdt_entries) - 1, real_mode_gdt_entries },
+ real_mode_idt = { 0x3ff, 0 },
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c	2004-06-16 01:19:22.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@
+ 
+ 	code_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_text);
+ 	code_resource.end = virt_to_phys(_etext)-1;
+-	data_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_etext);
++	data_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_data);
+ 	data_resource.end = virt_to_phys(_edata)-1;
+ 
+ 	parse_cmdline_early(cmdline_p);
+@@ -1197,6 +1197,15 @@
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++static int __init setup_pax_softmode(char *str)
++{
++	get_option (&str, &pax_softmode);
++	return 1;
++}
++__setup("pax_softmode=", setup_pax_softmode);
++#endif
++
+ #include "setup_arch_post.h"
+ /*
+  * Local Variables:
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c	2004-06-16 01:19:22.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -367,7 +367,17 @@
+ 	if (err)
+ 		goto give_sigsegv;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL
++	restorer = frame->retcode;
++#else
+ 	restorer = &__kernel_sigreturn;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		restorer -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ 	if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
+ 		restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
+ 
+@@ -450,7 +460,18 @@
+ 		goto give_sigsegv;
+ 
+ 	/* Set up to return from userspace.  */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL
++	restorer = frame->retcode;
++#else
+ 	restorer = &__kernel_rt_sigreturn;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		restorer -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ 	if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
+ 		restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
+ 	err |= __put_user(restorer, &frame->pretcode);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c	2004-06-16 01:20:04.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mman.h>
+ #include <linux/file.h>
+ #include <linux/utsname.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/ipc.h>
+@@ -49,6 +50,11 @@
+ 	int error = -EBADF;
+ 	struct file * file = NULL;
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+ 	if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ 		file = fget(fd);
+@@ -56,6 +62,12 @@
+ 			goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
++		fput(file);
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	error = do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
+ 	up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+@@ -106,6 +118,77 @@
+ 	return err;
+ }
+ 
++unsigned long
++arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
++		unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
++{
++	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++	unsigned long start_addr, start_mmap, task_unmapped_base, task_size = TASK_SIZE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++#endif
++
++	if (len > task_size)
++		return -ENOMEM;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
++#endif
++
++	if (addr) {
++		addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
++		vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
++		if (task_size - len >= addr &&
++		    (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start))
++			return addr;
++	}
++	start_addr = addr = mm->free_area_cache;
++	start_mmap = PAGE_ALIGN(task_size/3);
++	task_unmapped_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) {
++		start_mmap += mm->delta_mmap;
++		task_unmapped_base += mm->delta_mmap;
++	}
++#endif
++
++	if (!(flags & MAP_EXECUTABLE) && start_addr < start_mmap)
++		start_addr = addr = start_mmap;
++	else if ((flags & MAP_EXECUTABLE) && start_addr >= start_mmap)
++		start_addr = addr = task_unmapped_base;
++
++full_search:
++	for (vma = find_vma(mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
++		/* At this point:  (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */
++		if (task_size - len < addr) {
++			/*
++			 * Start a new search - just in case we missed
++			 * some holes.
++			 */
++			if (start_addr != task_unmapped_base) {
++				start_addr = addr = task_unmapped_base;
++				goto full_search;
++			}
++			return -ENOMEM;
++		}
++		if (!vma || (addr + len <= vma->vm_start && (addr + len <= mm->start_brk || start_mmap <= addr))) {
++			/*
++			 * Remember the place where we stopped the search:
++			 */
++			mm->free_area_cache = addr + len;
++			return addr;
++		}
++		if (addr < start_mmap && addr + len > mm->start_brk) {
++			addr = start_mmap;
++			goto full_search;
++		} else
++			addr = vma->vm_end;
++	}
++}
+ 
+ struct sel_arg_struct {
+ 	unsigned long n;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c	2004-06-16 01:20:26.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
+ extern const char vsyscall_int80_start, vsyscall_int80_end;
+ extern const char vsyscall_sysenter_start, vsyscall_sysenter_end;
+ 
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL
+ static int __init sysenter_setup(void)
+ {
+ 	unsigned long page = get_zeroed_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
+@@ -63,3 +64,4 @@
+ }
+ 
+ __initcall(sysenter_setup);
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/trampoline.S linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/trampoline.S
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/trampoline.S	2004-06-16 01:19:13.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/trampoline.S	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
+ 	inc	%ax		# protected mode (PE) bit
+ 	lmsw	%ax		# into protected mode
+ 	# flush prefetch and jump to startup_32_smp in arch/i386/kernel/head.S
+-	ljmpl	$__BOOT_CS, $(startup_32_smp-__PAGE_OFFSET)
++	ljmpl	$__BOOT_CS, $(startup_32_smp+__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET-__PAGE_OFFSET)
+ 
+ 	# These need to be in the same 64K segment as the above;
+ 	# hence we don't use the boot_gdt_descr defined in head.S
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c	2004-06-16 01:19:01.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/version.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_EISA
+ #include <linux/ioport.h>
+@@ -59,18 +60,13 @@
+ asmlinkage void lcall7(void);
+ asmlinkage void lcall27(void);
+ 
+-struct desc_struct default_ldt[] = { { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 },
++const struct desc_struct default_ldt[] = { { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 },
+ 		{ 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 } };
+ 
+ /* Do we ignore FPU interrupts ? */
+ char ignore_fpu_irq = 0;
+ 
+-/*
+- * The IDT has to be page-aligned to simplify the Pentium
+- * F0 0F bug workaround.. We have a special link segment
+- * for this.
+- */
+-struct desc_struct idt_table[256] __attribute__((__section__(".data.idt"))) = { {0, 0}, };
++extern struct desc_struct idt_table[256];
+ 
+ asmlinkage void divide_error(void);
+ asmlinkage void debug(void);
+@@ -108,13 +104,15 @@
+ 			 unsigned long ebp)
+ {
+ 	unsigned long addr;
++	int i = kstack_depth_to_print;
+ 
+-	while (valid_stack_ptr(task, (void *)ebp)) {
++	while (i && valid_stack_ptr(task, (void *)ebp)) {
+ 		addr = *(unsigned long *)(ebp + 4);
+ 		printk(" [<%08lx>] ", addr);
+ 		print_symbol("%s", addr);
+ 		printk("\n");
+ 		ebp = *(unsigned long *)ebp;
++		--i;
+ 	}
+ }
+ #else
+@@ -240,14 +238,23 @@
+ 		show_stack(NULL, (unsigned long*)esp);
+ 
+ 		printk("Code: ");
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
+ 		if(regs->eip < PAGE_OFFSET)
+ 			goto bad;
++#endif
+ 
+ 		for(i=0;i<20;i++)
+ 		{
+ 			unsigned char c;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			if(__get_user(c, &((unsigned char*)regs->eip)[i+__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET])) {
++#else
+ 			if(__get_user(c, &((unsigned char*)regs->eip)[i])) {
+ bad:
++#endif
++
+ 				printk(" Bad EIP value.");
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+@@ -270,8 +277,13 @@
+ 
+ 	eip = regs->eip;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	eip += __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
++#else
+ 	if (eip < PAGE_OFFSET)
+ 		goto no_bug;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (__get_user(ud2, (unsigned short *)eip))
+ 		goto no_bug;
+ 	if (ud2 != 0x0b0f)
+@@ -279,7 +291,13 @@
+ 	if (__get_user(line, (unsigned short *)(eip + 2)))
+ 		goto bug;
+ 	if (__get_user(file, (char **)(eip + 4)) ||
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		__get_user(c, file + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET))
++#else
+ 		(unsigned long)file < PAGE_OFFSET || __get_user(c, file))
++#endif
++
+ 		file = "<bad filename>";
+ 
+ 	printk("------------[ cut here ]------------\n");
+@@ -441,6 +459,22 @@
+ 	if (!(regs->xcs & 3))
+ 		goto gp_in_kernel;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) {
++		struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
++		unsigned long limit;
++
++		down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
++		limit = mm->context.user_cs_limit;
++		if (limit < TASK_SIZE) {
++			track_exec_limit(mm, limit, TASK_SIZE, PROT_EXEC);
++			up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
++			return;
++		}
++		up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	current->thread.error_code = error_code;
+ 	current->thread.trap_no = 13;
+ 	force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
+@@ -452,8 +486,16 @@
+ 	return;
+ 
+ gp_in_kernel:
+-	if (!fixup_exception(regs))
++	if (!fixup_exception(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		if ((regs->xcs & 0xFFFF) == __KERNEL_CS)
++			die("PAX: suspicious general protection fault", regs, error_code);
++		else
++#endif
++
+ 		die("general protection fault", regs, error_code);
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ static void mem_parity_error(unsigned char reason, struct pt_regs * regs)
+@@ -886,7 +928,7 @@
+ 	_set_gate(idt_table+n,15,3,addr,__KERNEL_CS);
+ }
+ 
+-static void __init set_call_gate(void *a, void *addr)
++static void __init set_call_gate(const void *a, void *addr)
+ {
+ 	_set_gate(a,12,3,addr,__KERNEL_CS);
+ }
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S	2004-06-16 01:19:01.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -2,7 +2,12 @@
+  * Written by Martin Mares <mj@atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz>;
+  */
+ 
++#include <linux/config.h>
++
+ #include <asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h>
++#include <asm-i386/page.h>
++#include <asm-i386/segment.h>
++
+ #include <asm/thread_info.h>
+ 
+ OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf32-i386", "elf32-i386", "elf32-i386")
+@@ -11,26 +16,16 @@
+ jiffies = jiffies_64;
+ SECTIONS
+ {
+-  . = 0xC0000000 + 0x100000;
+-  /* read-only */
+-  _text = .;			/* Text and read-only data */
+-  .text : {
+-	*(.text)
+-	SCHED_TEXT
+-	*(.fixup)
+-	*(.gnu.warning)
+-	} = 0x9090
+-
+-  _etext = .;			/* End of text section */
+-
+-  . = ALIGN(16);		/* Exception table */
+-  __start___ex_table = .;
+-  __ex_table : { *(__ex_table) }
+-  __stop___ex_table = .;
+-
+-  RODATA
++  . = __PAGE_OFFSET + 0x100000;
++  .text.startup : {
++	BYTE(0xEA) /* jmp far */
++	LONG(startup_32 + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET - __PAGE_OFFSET)
++	SHORT(__BOOT_CS)
++	}
+ 
+   /* writeable */
++  . = ALIGN(32);
++  _data = .;
+   .data : {			/* Data */
+ 	*(.data)
+ 	CONSTRUCTORS
+@@ -42,25 +37,29 @@
+   . = ALIGN(4096);
+   __nosave_end = .;
+ 
+-  . = ALIGN(4096);
+-  .data.page_aligned : { *(.data.idt) }
+-
+   . = ALIGN(32);
+   .data.cacheline_aligned : { *(.data.cacheline_aligned) }
+ 
+-  _edata = .;			/* End of data section */
+-
+   . = ALIGN(THREAD_SIZE);	/* init_task */
+   .data.init_task : { *(.data.init_task) }
+ 
++  . = ALIGN(4096);
++  .data.page_aligned : { *(.data.swapper_pg_dir) }
++
++  _edata = .;			/* End of data section */
++
++  __bss_start = .;		/* BSS */
++  .bss : {
++	*(.bss.page_aligned)
++	*(.bss)
++	LONG(0)
++	}
++  . = ALIGN(4);
++  __bss_stop = .; 
++
+   /* will be freed after init */
+   . = ALIGN(4096);		/* Init code and data */
+   __init_begin = .;
+-  .init.text : { 
+-	_sinittext = .;
+-	*(.init.text)
+-	_einittext = .;
+-  }
+   .init.data : { *(.init.data) }
+   . = ALIGN(16);
+   __setup_start = .;
+@@ -89,9 +88,13 @@
+   .altinstructions : { *(.altinstructions) } 
+   __alt_instructions_end = .; 
+  .altinstr_replacement : { *(.altinstr_replacement) } 
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
+   /* .exit.text is discard at runtime, not link time, to deal with references
+      from .altinstructions and .eh_frame */
+   .exit.text : { *(.exit.text) }
++#endif
++
+   .exit.data : { *(.exit.data) }
+   . = ALIGN(4096);
+   __initramfs_start = .;
+@@ -101,17 +104,67 @@
+   __per_cpu_start = .;
+   .data.percpu  : { *(.data.percpu) }
+   __per_cpu_end = .;
++
++  /* read-only */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++  __init_text_start = .;
++  .init.text (. - __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) : AT (__init_text_start) {
++	_sinittext = .;
++	*(.init.text)
++	_einittext = .;
++	*(.exit.text)
++	. = ALIGN(4*1024*1024) - 1;
++	BYTE(0)
++  }
+   . = ALIGN(4096);
+-  __init_end = .;
++  __init_end = . + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
+   /* freed after init ends here */
+-	
+-  __bss_start = .;		/* BSS */
+-  .bss : {
+-	*(.bss.page_aligned)
+-	*(.bss)
++
++/*
++ * PaX: this must be kept in synch with the KERNEL_CS base
++ * in the GDTs in arch/i386/kernel/head.S
++ */
++  _text = .;			/* Text and read-only data */
++  .text : AT (. + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) {
++#else
++  .init.text : {
++	_sinittext = .;
++	*(.init.text)
++	_einittext = .;
+   }
+-  . = ALIGN(4);
+-  __bss_stop = .; 
++  . = ALIGN(4096);
++  __init_end = .;
++  /* freed after init ends here */
++
++  _text = .;			/* Text and read-only data */
++  .text : {
++#endif
++
++	*(.text)
++	SCHED_TEXT
++	*(.fixup)
++	*(.gnu.warning)
++	} = 0x9090
++
++  _etext = .;			/* End of text section */
++  . += __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
++  . = ALIGN(16);		/* Exception table */
++  __start___ex_table = .;
++  __ex_table : { *(__ex_table) }
++  __stop___ex_table = .;
++
++  . = ALIGN(4096);
++  .rodata.page_aligned : {
++	*(.rodata.empty_zero_page)
++	*(.rodata.idt)
++	}
++
++  RODATA
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++  . = ALIGN(4*1024*1024);
++#endif
+ 
+   _end = . ;
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/mm/fault.c	2004-06-16 01:18:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/mm/fault.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
+ #include <linux/vt_kern.h>		/* For unblank_screen() */
+ #include <linux/highmem.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/unistd.h>
++#include <linux/compiler.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -199,6 +202,27 @@
+ 
+ asmlinkage void do_invalid_op(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long);
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++/* PaX: called with the page_table_lock spinlock held */
++static inline pte_t * pax_get_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address)
++{
++	pgd_t *pgd;
++	pmd_t *pmd;
++
++	pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
++	if (!pgd || !pgd_present(*pgd))
++		return 0;
++	pmd = pmd_offset(pgd, address);
++	if (!pmd || !pmd_present(*pmd))
++		return 0;
++	return pte_offset_map(pmd, address);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * This routine handles page faults.  It determines the address,
+  * and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate
+@@ -219,6 +243,11 @@
+ 	int write;
+ 	siginfo_t info;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	pte_t *pte;
++	unsigned char pte_mask1, pte_mask2;
++#endif
++
+ 	/* get the address */
+ 	__asm__("movl %%cr2,%0":"=r" (address));
+ 
+@@ -262,6 +291,91 @@
+ 	if (in_atomic() || !mm)
+ 		goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if (unlikely(!(tsk->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || (error_code & 5) != 5))
++		goto not_pax_fault;
++
++	/* PaX: it's our fault, let's handle it if we can */
++
++	/* PaX: take a look at read faults before acquiring any locks */
++	if (unlikely((error_code == 5) && (regs->eip == address))) {
++		/* instruction fetch attempt from a protected page in user mode */
++		switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++		case 3:
++			return;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++		case 2:
++			return;
++#endif
++
++		}
++		pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->eip, (void*)regs->esp);
++		do_exit(SIGKILL);
++	}
++
++	spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++	pte = pax_get_pte(mm, address);
++	if (unlikely(!pte || !(pte_val(*pte) & _PAGE_PRESENT) || pte_exec(*pte))) {
++		pte_unmap(pte);
++		spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++		goto not_pax_fault;
++	}
++
++	if (unlikely((error_code == 7) && !pte_write(*pte))) {
++		/* write attempt to a protected page in user mode */
++		pte_unmap(pte);
++		spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++		goto not_pax_fault;
++	}
++
++	pte_mask1 = _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_USER | ((error_code & 2) << (_PAGE_BIT_DIRTY-1));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
++	if (likely(cpu_isset(smp_processor_id(), mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask)) && address >= get_limit(regs->xcs))
++		pte_mask2 = 0;
++	else
++		pte_mask2 = _PAGE_USER;
++#else
++	pte_mask2 = (address >= get_limit(regs->xcs)) ? 0 : _PAGE_USER;
++#endif
++
++	/*
++	 * PaX: fill DTLB with user rights and retry
++	 */
++	__asm__ __volatile__ (
++		"orb %2,%1\n"
++#if defined(CONFIG_M586) || defined(CONFIG_M586TSC)
++/*
++ * PaX: let this uncommented 'invlpg' remind us on the behaviour of Intel's
++ * (and AMD's) TLBs. namely, they do not cache PTEs that would raise *any*
++ * page fault when examined during a TLB load attempt. this is true not only
++ * for PTEs holding a non-present entry but also present entries that will
++ * raise a page fault (such as those set up by PaX, or the copy-on-write
++ * mechanism). in effect it means that we do *not* need to flush the TLBs
++ * for our target pages since their PTEs are simply not in the TLBs at all.
++
++ * the best thing in omitting it is that we gain around 15-20% speed in the
++ * fast path of the page fault handler and can get rid of tracing since we
++ * can no longer flush unintended entries.
++ */
++		"invlpg %0\n"
++#endif
++		"testb $0,%0\n"
++		"xorb %3,%1\n"
++		:
++		: "m" (*(char*)address), "m" (*(char*)pte), "q" (pte_mask1), "q" (pte_mask2)
++		: "memory", "cc");
++	pte_unmap(pte);
++	spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++	return;
++
++not_pax_fault:
++#endif
++
+ 	down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 
+ 	vma = find_vma(mm, address);
+@@ -358,6 +472,34 @@
+ 		if (is_prefetch(regs, address))
+ 			return;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++			if ((error_code == 4) && (regs->eip + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE == address)) {
++				switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++				case 3:
++					return;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++				case 2:
++					return;
++#endif
++
++				}
++			}
++#endif
++
++			if (address >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE) {
++				pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->eip, (void*)regs->esp);
++				do_exit(SIGKILL);
++			}
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		tsk->thread.cr2 = address;
+ 		/* Kernel addresses are always protection faults */
+ 		tsk->thread.error_code = error_code | (address >= TASK_SIZE);
+@@ -408,6 +550,13 @@
+ 
+ 	if (address < PAGE_SIZE)
+ 		printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference");
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	else if (init_mm.start_code + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET <= address && address < init_mm.end_code + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET)
++		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code",
++				 tsk->comm, tsk->pid, tsk->uid, tsk->euid);
++#endif
++
+ 	else
+ 		printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel paging request");
+ 	printk(" at virtual address %08lx\n",address);
+@@ -509,3 +658,249 @@
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ }
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->eip = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when gcc trampoline was detected
++ *         3 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++	static const unsigned char trans[8] = {6, 1, 2, 0, 13, 5, 3, 4};
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
++	int err;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
++		unsigned long esp_4;
++
++		if (regs->eip >= current->mm->start_code &&
++		    regs->eip < current->mm->end_code)
++		{
++			err = get_user(esp_4, (unsigned long*)(regs->esp-4UL));
++			if (err || esp_4 == regs->eip)
++				return 1;
++
++			regs->eip += current->mm->delta_exec;
++			return 3;
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++	do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #1 */
++		unsigned char mov1, mov2;
++		unsigned short jmp;
++		unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret;
++		unsigned short call;
++
++		err = get_user(mov1, (unsigned char *)regs->eip);
++		err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
++		err |= get_user(mov2, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5));
++		err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6));
++		err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned short *)(regs->eip + 10));
++		err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp);
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-2));
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((mov1 & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
++		    (mov2 & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
++		    (mov1 & 0x07) != (mov2 & 0x07) &&
++		    (jmp & 0xF8FF) == 0xE0FF &&
++		    (mov2 & 0x07) == ((jmp>>8) & 0x07) &&
++		    (call & 0xF8FF) == 0xD0FF &&
++		    regs->eip == ((unsigned long*)regs)[trans[(call>>8) & 0x07]])
++		{
++			((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov1 & 0x07]] = addr1;
++			((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov2 & 0x07]] = addr2;
++			regs->eip = addr2;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #2 */
++		unsigned char mov, jmp;
++		unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret;
++		unsigned short call;
++
++		err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip);
++		err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
++		err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5));
++		err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6));
++		err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp);
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-2));
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
++		    jmp == 0xE9 &&
++		    (call & 0xF8FF) == 0xD0FF &&
++		    regs->eip == ((unsigned long*)regs)[trans[(call>>8) & 0x07]])
++		{
++			((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1;
++			regs->eip += addr2 + 10;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #3 */
++		unsigned char mov, jmp;
++		char offset;
++		unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret;
++		unsigned short call;
++
++		err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip);
++		err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
++		err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5));
++		err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6));
++		err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp);
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-3));
++		err |= get_user(offset, (char *)(ret-1));
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
++		    jmp == 0xE9 &&
++		    call == 0x55FF)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			err = get_user(addr, (unsigned long*)(regs->ebp + (unsigned long)(long)offset));
++			if (err || regs->eip != addr)
++				break;
++
++			((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1;
++			regs->eip += addr2 + 10;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #4 */
++		unsigned char mov, jmp, sib;
++		char offset;
++		unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret;
++		unsigned short call;
++
++		err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip);
++		err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
++		err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5));
++		err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6));
++		err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp);
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-4));
++		err |= get_user(sib, (unsigned char *)(ret-2));
++		err |= get_user(offset, (char *)(ret-1));
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
++		    jmp == 0xE9 &&
++		    call == 0x54FF &&
++		    sib == 0x24)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			err = get_user(addr, (unsigned long*)(regs->esp + 4 + (unsigned long)(long)offset));
++			if (err || regs->eip != addr)
++				break;
++
++			((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1;
++			regs->eip += addr2 + 10;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #5 */
++		unsigned char mov, jmp, sib;
++		unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret, offset;
++		unsigned short call;
++
++		err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip);
++		err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
++		err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5));
++		err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6));
++		err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp);
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-7));
++		err |= get_user(sib, (unsigned char *)(ret-5));
++		err |= get_user(offset, (unsigned long *)(ret-4));
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
++		    jmp == 0xE9 &&
++		    call == 0x94FF &&
++		    sib == 0x24)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			err = get_user(addr, (unsigned long*)(regs->esp + 4 + offset));
++			if (err || regs->eip != addr)
++				break;
++
++			((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1;
++			regs->eip += addr2 + 10;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++	return 1; /* PaX in action */
++}
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
++		unsigned char c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned char*)pc+i)) {
++			printk("<invalid address>.");
++			break;
++		}
++		printk("%02x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at SP: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
++		unsigned long c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned long*)sp+i)) {
++			printk("<invalid address>.");
++			break;
++		}
++		printk("%08lx ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/mm/init.c linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/mm/init.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/mm/init.c	2004-06-16 01:19:44.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/mm/init.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ #include <asm/tlb.h>
+ #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+ #include <asm/sections.h>
++#include <asm/desc.h>
+ 
+ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct mmu_gather, mmu_gathers);
+ unsigned long highstart_pfn, highend_pfn;
+@@ -415,6 +416,10 @@
+ #endif
+ 	__flush_tlb_all();
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	memcpy(kernexec_pg_dir, swapper_pg_dir, sizeof(kernexec_pg_dir));
++#endif
++
+ 	kmap_init();
+ 	zone_sizes_init();
+ }
+@@ -509,7 +514,7 @@
+ 	set_highmem_pages_init(bad_ppro);
+ 
+ 	codesize =  (unsigned long) &_etext - (unsigned long) &_text;
+-	datasize =  (unsigned long) &_edata - (unsigned long) &_etext;
++	datasize =  (unsigned long) &_edata - (unsigned long) &_data;
+ 	initsize =  (unsigned long) &__init_end - (unsigned long) &__init_begin;
+ 
+ 	kclist_add(&kcore_mem, __va(0), max_low_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT); 
+@@ -608,6 +613,42 @@
+ 		totalram_pages++;
+ 	}
+ 	printk (KERN_INFO "Freeing unused kernel memory: %dk freed\n", (__init_end - __init_begin) >> 10);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	/* PaX: limit KERNEL_CS to actual size */
++	{
++		unsigned long limit;
++		int cpu;
++		pgd_t *pgd;
++		pmd_t *pmd;
++
++		limit = (unsigned long)&_etext >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++		for (cpu = 0; cpu < NR_CPUS; cpu++) {
++			cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].a = (cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].a & 0xFFFF0000UL) | (limit & 0x0FFFFUL);
++			cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].b = (cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].b & 0xFFF0FFFFUL) | (limit & 0xF0000UL);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_BIOS
++		printk(KERN_INFO "PAX: warning, PCI BIOS might still be in use, keeping flat KERNEL_CS.\n");
++#endif
++
++		}
++
++	/* PaX: make KERNEL_CS read-only */
++		for (addr = __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; addr < __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET + 0x00400000UL; addr += (1UL << PMD_SHIFT)) {
++			pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
++			pmd = pmd_offset(pgd, addr);
++			set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL));
++		}
++		memcpy(kernexec_pg_dir, swapper_pg_dir, sizeof(kernexec_pg_dir));
++		for (addr = __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; addr < __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET + 0x00400000UL; addr += (1UL << PMD_SHIFT)) {
++			pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
++			pmd = pmd_offset(pgd, addr);
++			set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) & ~_PAGE_RW));
++		}
++		flush_tlb_all();
++	}
++#endif
++
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c	2004-06-16 01:18:57.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include "pci.h"
+ #include "pci-functions.h"
+-
++#include <asm/desc.h>
+ 
+ /* BIOS32 signature: "_32_" */
+ #define BIOS32_SIGNATURE	(('_' << 0) + ('3' << 8) + ('2' << 16) + ('_' << 24))
+@@ -33,6 +33,12 @@
+  * and the PCI BIOS specification.
+  */
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_PCI_BIOS)
++#define __FLAT_KERNEL_CS 0x20
++#else
++#define __FLAT_KERNEL_CS __KERNEL_CS
++#endif
++
+ union bios32 {
+ 	struct {
+ 		unsigned long signature;	/* _32_ */
+@@ -55,7 +61,7 @@
+ static struct {
+ 	unsigned long address;
+ 	unsigned short segment;
+-} bios32_indirect = { 0, __KERNEL_CS };
++} bios32_indirect = { 0, __FLAT_KERNEL_CS };
+ 
+ /*
+  * Returns the entry point for the given service, NULL on error
+@@ -96,7 +102,9 @@
+ static struct {
+ 	unsigned long address;
+ 	unsigned short segment;
+-} pci_indirect = { 0, __KERNEL_CS };
++} pci_indirect = { 0, __FLAT_KERNEL_CS };
++
++#undef __FLAT_KERNEL_CS
+ 
+ static int pci_bios_present;
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c	2004-06-16 01:20:03.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -41,6 +41,17 @@
+ #undef SET_PERSONALITY
+ #define SET_PERSONALITY(ex, ibcs2)	elf32_set_personality()
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk)	((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 0x08048000UL : 0x4000000000000000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk)		IA32_PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk)		((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - IA32_PAGE_SHIFT)
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk)		IA32_PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk)		((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - IA32_PAGE_SHIFT)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk)	IA32_PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk)	((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - IA32_PAGE_SHIFT)
++#endif
++
+ /* Ugly but avoids duplication */
+ #include "../../../fs/binfmt_elf.c"
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h	2004-06-16 01:20:19.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -295,7 +295,14 @@
+ #define ELF_ARCH	EM_386
+ 
+ #define IA32_PAGE_OFFSET	0xc0000000
+-#define IA32_STACK_TOP		IA32_PAGE_OFFSET
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK
++#define __IA32_DELTA_STACK	(current->mm->delta_stack)
++#else
++#define __IA32_DELTA_STACK 0UL
++#endif
++
++#define IA32_STACK_TOP		(IA32_PAGE_OFFSET - __IA32_DELTA_STACK)
+ 
+ /*
+  * The system segments (GDT, TSS, LDT) have to be mapped below 4GB so the IA-32 engine can
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c	2004-06-16 01:19:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -433,6 +433,11 @@
+ 
+ 	flags = a.flags;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+ 	if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ 		file = fget(a.fd);
+@@ -454,6 +459,11 @@
+ 	struct file *file = NULL;
+ 	unsigned long retval;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+ 	if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ 		file = fget(fd);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-16 01:20:25.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/user.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+@@ -1314,6 +1315,9 @@
+ 	if (pid == 1)		/* no messing around with init! */
+ 		goto out_tsk;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
++		goto out_tsk;
++
+ 	if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
+ 		ret = ptrace_attach(child);
+ 		goto out_tsk;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c	2004-06-16 01:19:36.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+ #include <linux/highuid.h>
+ #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/shmparam.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -27,7 +28,7 @@
+ 			unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
+ {
+ 	long map_shared = (flags & MAP_SHARED);
+-	unsigned long start_addr, align_mask = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
++	unsigned long start_addr, align_mask = PAGE_SIZE - 1, task_unmapped_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+ 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ 
+@@ -38,6 +39,15 @@
+ 	if (REGION_NUMBER(addr) == REGION_HPAGE)
+ 		addr = 0;
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++		task_unmapped_base += mm->delta_mmap;
++	if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && addr && filp)
++		addr = mm->free_area_cache;
++	else
++#endif
++
+ 	if (!addr)
+ 		addr = mm->free_area_cache;
+ 
+@@ -56,9 +66,9 @@
+ 	for (vma = find_vma(mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
+ 		/* At this point:  (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */
+ 		if (TASK_SIZE - len < addr || RGN_MAP_LIMIT - len < REGION_OFFSET(addr)) {
+-			if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
++			if (start_addr != task_unmapped_base) {
+ 				/* Start a new search --- just in case we missed some holes.  */
+-				addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++				addr = task_unmapped_base;
+ 				goto full_search;
+ 			}
+ 			return -ENOMEM;
+@@ -185,6 +195,11 @@
+ 	unsigned long roff;
+ 	struct file *file = 0;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+ 	if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ 		file = fget(fd);
+@@ -222,6 +237,11 @@
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
++		addr = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	addr = do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
+ 	up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c	2004-06-16 01:20:04.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mm.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+@@ -70,6 +71,54 @@
+ 	return pte_present(pte);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->cr_iip = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	int err;
++
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
++		if (regs->cr_iip >= current->mm->start_code &&
++		    regs->cr_iip < current->mm->end_code)
++		{
++#if 0
++			/* PaX: this needs fixing */
++			if (regs->b0 == regs->cr_iip)
++				return 1;
++#endif
++			regs->cr_iip += current->mm->delta_exec;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
++			printk("<invalid address>.");
++			break;
++		}
++		printk("%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ void
+ ia64_do_page_fault (unsigned long address, unsigned long isr, struct pt_regs *regs)
+ {
+@@ -125,9 +174,31 @@
+ 		| (((isr >> IA64_ISR_W_BIT) & 1UL) << VM_WRITE_BIT)
+ 		| (((isr >> IA64_ISR_R_BIT) & 1UL) << VM_READ_BIT));
+ 
+-	if ((vma->vm_flags & mask) != mask)
++	if ((vma->vm_flags & mask) != mask) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (mask & VM_EXEC)) {
++			if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || address != regs->cr_iip)
++				goto bad_area;
++
++			up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++			switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++			case 2:
++				return;
++#endif
++
++			}
++			pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->cr_iip, (void*)regs->r12);
++			do_exit(SIGKILL);
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		goto bad_area;
+ 
++	}
++
+   survive:
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault, make
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c	2004-06-16 01:19:36.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -50,6 +50,17 @@
+ #undef ELF_ET_DYN_BASE
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (TASK32_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk)	(((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk)		(((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk)		(((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk)	PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk)	(((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
++#endif
++
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/config.h>
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c	2004-06-16 01:19:13.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -52,6 +52,17 @@
+ #undef ELF_ET_DYN_BASE
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (TASK32_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk)	(((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk)		(((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk)		(((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk)	PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk)	(((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
++#endif
++
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/config.h>
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c	2004-06-16 01:19:44.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@
+ 	do_color_align = 0;
+ 	if (filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED))
+ 		do_color_align = 1;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
++#endif
++
+ 	if (addr) {
+ 		if (do_color_align)
+ 			addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
+@@ -96,6 +101,13 @@
+ 		    (!vmm || addr + len <= vmm->vm_start))
+ 			return addr;
+ 	}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp))
++		addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + current->mm->delta_mmap;
++	else
++#endif
++
+ 	addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+ 	if (do_color_align)
+ 		addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/mm/fault.c	2004-06-16 01:19:02.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/mips/mm/fault.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -27,6 +27,24 @@
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/ptrace.h>
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
++			printk("<invalid address>.");
++			break;
++		}
++		printk("%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * This routine handles page faults.  It determines the address,
+  * and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-16 01:18:58.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
+ #include <linux/personality.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/compat.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -114,6 +115,9 @@
+ 	if (pid == 1)		/* no messing around with init! */
+ 		goto out_tsk;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
++		goto out_tsk;
++
+ 	if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
+ 		ret = ptrace_attach(child);
+ 		goto out_tsk;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c	2004-06-16 01:19:52.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include <linux/shm.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ int sys_pipe(int *fildes)
+ {
+@@ -104,6 +105,13 @@
+ {
+ 	if (len > TASK_SIZE)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp))
++		addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + current->mm->delta_mmap;
++	else
++#endif
++
+ 	if (!addr)
+ 		addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+ 
+@@ -123,12 +131,23 @@
+ {
+ 	struct file * file = NULL;
+ 	unsigned long error = -EBADF;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ 		file = fget(fd);
+ 		if (!file)
+ 			goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
++		fput(file);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++
+ 	flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+ 
+ 	down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c	2004-06-16 01:19:11.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/swap.h>
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/types.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c	2004-06-16 01:20:26.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -656,9 +656,7 @@
+ 
+ 			down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 			vma = find_vma(current->mm,regs->iaoq[0]);
+-			if (vma && (regs->iaoq[0] >= vma->vm_start)
+-				&& (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
+-
++			if (vma && (regs->iaoq[0] >= vma->vm_start)) {
+ 				fault_address = regs->iaoq[0];
+ 				fault_space = regs->iasq[0];
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c	2004-06-16 01:19:52.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/unistd.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/traps.h>
+@@ -54,7 +56,7 @@
+ static unsigned long
+ parisc_acctyp(unsigned long code, unsigned int inst)
+ {
+-	if (code == 6 || code == 16)
++	if (code == 6 || code == 7 || code == 16)
+ 	    return VM_EXEC;
+ 
+ 	switch (inst & 0xf0000000) {
+@@ -140,6 +142,139 @@
+ 			}
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (instruction_pointer(regs) = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected
++ *         3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
++	int err;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
++		if (instruction_pointer(regs) >= current->mm->start_code &&
++		    instruction_pointer(regs) < current->mm->end_code)
++		{
++#if 0
++			/* PaX: this needs fixing */
++			if ((regs->gr[2] & ~3UL) == instruction_pointer(regs))
++				return 1;
++#endif
++			regs->iaoq[0] += current->mm->delta_exec;
++			if ((regs->iaoq[1] & ~3UL) >= current->mm->start_code &&
++			    (regs->iaoq[1] & ~3UL) < current->mm->end_code)
++				regs->iaoq[1] += current->mm->delta_exec;
++			return 4;
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation */
++		unsigned int bl, depwi;
++
++		err = get_user(bl, (unsigned int*)instruction_pointer(regs));
++		err |= get_user(depwi, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+4));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if (bl == 0xEA9F1FDDU && depwi == 0xD6801C1EU) {
++			unsigned int ldw, bv, ldw2, addr = instruction_pointer(regs)-12;
++
++			err = get_user(ldw, (unsigned int*)addr);
++			err |= get_user(bv, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(ldw2, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
++
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if (ldw == 0x0E801096U &&
++			    bv == 0xEAC0C000U &&
++			    ldw2 == 0x0E881095U)
++			{
++				unsigned int resolver, map;
++
++				err = get_user(resolver, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+8));
++				err |= get_user(map, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+12));
++				if (err)
++					break;
++
++				regs->gr[20] = instruction_pointer(regs)+8;
++				regs->gr[21] = map;
++				regs->gr[22] = resolver;
++				regs->iaoq[0] = resolver | 3UL;
++				regs->iaoq[1] = regs->iaoq[0] + 4;
++				return 3;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++	if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
++		return 1;
++#endif
++
++	do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */
++		unsigned int ldi1, ldi2, bel, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(ldi1, (unsigned int *)instruction_pointer(regs));
++		err |= get_user(ldi2, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+4));
++		err |= get_user(bel, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+8));
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+12));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((ldi1 == 0x34190000U || ldi1 == 0x34190002U) &&
++		    ldi2 == 0x3414015AU &&
++		    bel == 0xE4008200U &&
++		    nop == 0x08000240U)
++		{
++			regs->gr[25] = (ldi1 & 2) >> 1;
++			regs->gr[20] = __NR_rt_sigreturn;
++			regs->gr[31] = regs->iaoq[1] + 16;
++			regs->sr[0] = regs->iasq[1];
++			regs->iaoq[0] = 0x100UL;
++			regs->iaoq[1] = regs->iaoq[0] + 4;
++			regs->iasq[0] = regs->sr[2];
++			regs->iasq[1] = regs->sr[2];
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
++			printk("<invalid address>.");
++			break;
++		}
++		printk("%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long code,
+ 			      unsigned long address)
+ {
+@@ -165,8 +300,38 @@
+ 
+ 	acc_type = parisc_acctyp(code,regs->iir);
+ 
+-	if ((vma->vm_flags & acc_type) != acc_type)
++	if ((vma->vm_flags & acc_type) != acc_type) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++		if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (acc_type & VM_EXEC) &&
++		    (address & ~3UL) == instruction_pointer(regs))
++		{
++			up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++			switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++			case 4:
++				return;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++			case 3:
++				return;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++			case 2:
++				return;
++#endif
++
++			}
++			pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)instruction_pointer(regs), (void*)regs->gr[30]);
++			do_exit(SIGKILL);
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		goto bad_area;
++	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault, make
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-16 01:19:02.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/user.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+@@ -202,6 +203,9 @@
+ 	if (pid == 1)		/* you may not mess with init */
+ 		goto out_tsk;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
++		goto out_tsk;
++
+ 	if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
+ 		ret = ptrace_attach(child);
+ 		goto out_tsk;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c	2004-06-16 01:20:04.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ #include <linux/utsname.h>
+ #include <linux/file.h>
+ #include <linux/unistd.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/ipc.h>
+@@ -165,12 +166,23 @@
+ 	struct file * file = NULL;
+ 	int ret = -EBADF;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+ 	if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ 		if (!(file = fget(fd)))
+ 			goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
++		fput(file);
++		ret = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	ret = do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
+ 	up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c	2004-06-16 01:19:03.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+ #include <linux/highmem.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/pagemap.h>
++#include <linux/compiler.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
++#include <linux/unistd.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -51,6 +56,363 @@
+ unsigned long pte_errors;	/* updated by do_page_fault() */
+ unsigned int probingmem;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++void pax_syscall_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
++{
++	vma->vm_mm->call_syscall = 0UL;
++}
++
++static struct page* pax_syscall_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type)
++{
++	struct page* page;
++	unsigned int *kaddr;
++
++	page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
++	if (!page)
++		return NOPAGE_OOM;
++
++	kaddr = kmap(page);
++	memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
++	kaddr[0] = 0x44000002U; /* sc */
++	__flush_dcache_icache(kaddr);
++	kunmap(page);
++	if (type)
++		*type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
++	return page;
++}
++
++static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
++	close:		pax_syscall_close,
++	nopage:		pax_syscall_nopage,
++};
++
++static void pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
++{
++	memset(vma, 0, sizeof(*vma));
++	vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
++	vma->vm_start = addr;
++	vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
++	vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
++	vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
++	vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
++	insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
++	++current->mm->total_vm;
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->nip = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when patched GOT trampoline was detected
++ *         3 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         4 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         5 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
++ *         6 when sigreturn trampoline was detected
++ *         7 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
++	int err;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
++		if (regs->nip >= current->mm->start_code &&
++		    regs->nip < current->mm->end_code)
++		{
++			if (regs->link == regs->nip)
++				return 1;
++
++			regs->nip += current->mm->delta_exec;
++			return 5;
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++	do { /* PaX: patched GOT emulation */
++		unsigned int blrl;
++
++		err = get_user(blrl, (unsigned int*)regs->nip);
++
++		if (!err && blrl == 0x4E800021U) {
++			unsigned long temp = regs->nip;
++
++			regs->nip = regs->link & 0xFFFFFFFCUL;
++			regs->link = temp + 4UL;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
++		unsigned int b;
++
++		err = get_user(b, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++
++		if (!err && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
++			regs->nip += (((b | 0xFC000000UL) ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++			return 3;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #1 */
++		unsigned int li, b;
++
++		err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++		err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++		if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
++			unsigned int rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr;
++			unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
++
++			addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++			err = get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int*)addr);
++			err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
++			err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int*)(addr+12));
++			err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+16));
++			err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int*)(addr+20));
++			err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int*)(addr+24));
++			err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+28));
++
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if (rlwinm == 0x556C083CU &&
++			    add == 0x7D6C5A14U &&
++			    (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++			    (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++			    mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U &&
++			    (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++			    (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++			    bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++			{
++				regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++				regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++				regs->nip = regs->ctr;
++				return 4;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++#if 0
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #2 */
++		unsigned int lis, lwzu, b, bctr;
++
++		err = get_user(lis, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++		err |= get_user(lwzu, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++		err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+8));
++		err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+12));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((lis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U &&
++		    (lwzu & 0xU) == 0xU &&
++		    (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U &&
++		    bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++		{
++			unsigned int addis, addi, rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr;
++			unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
++
++			addr = regs->nip + 12 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++			err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int*)addr);
++			err |= get_user(addi, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
++			err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int*)(addr+12));
++			err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int*)(addr+16));
++			err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int*)(addr+20));
++			err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+24));
++			err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int*)(addr+28));
++			err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int*)(addr+32));
++			err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+36));
++
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U &&
++			    (addi & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x396B0000U &&
++			    rlwinm == 0x556C083CU &&
++			    add == 0x7D6C5A14U &&
++			    (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++			    (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++			    mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U &&
++			    (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++			    (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++			    bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++			{
++				regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 
++				regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++				regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++				regs->nip = regs->ctr;
++				return 4;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #3 */
++		unsigned int li, b;
++
++		err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++		err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++		if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
++			unsigned int addis, lwz, mtctr, bctr;
++			unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
++
++			addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++			err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int*)addr);
++			err |= get_user(lwz, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
++			err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+12));
++
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U &&
++			    (lwz & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x816B0000U &&
++			    mtctr == 0x7D6903A6U &&
++			    bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++			{
++				unsigned int r11;
++
++				addr = (addis << 16) + (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				addr += (((lwz | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++
++				err = get_user(r11, (unsigned int*)addr);
++				if (err)
++					break;
++
++				regs->gpr[PT_R11] = r11;
++				regs->ctr = r11;
++				regs->nip = r11;
++				return 4;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++	do { /* PaX: sigreturn emulation */
++		unsigned int li, sc;
++
++		err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++		err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++		if (!err && li == 0x38000000U + __NR_sigreturn && sc == 0x44000002U) {
++			struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++			unsigned long call_syscall;
++
++			down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++			up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			if (likely(call_syscall))
++				goto emulate;
++
++			vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
++
++			down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			if (current->mm->call_syscall) {
++				call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				goto emulate;
++			}
++
++			call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
++			if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				return 1;
++			}
++
++			pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall);
++			current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall;
++			up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++emulate:
++			regs->gpr[PT_R0] = __NR_sigreturn;
++			regs->nip = call_syscall;
++			return 6;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */
++		unsigned int li, sc;
++
++		err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++		err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++		if (!err && li == 0x38000000U + __NR_rt_sigreturn && sc == 0x44000002U) {
++			struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++			unsigned int call_syscall;
++
++			down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++			up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			if (likely(call_syscall))
++				goto rt_emulate;
++
++			vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
++
++			down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			if (current->mm->call_syscall) {
++				call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				goto rt_emulate;
++			}
++
++			call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
++			if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				return 1;
++			}
++
++			pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall);
++			current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall;
++			up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++rt_emulate:
++			regs->gpr[PT_R0] = __NR_rt_sigreturn;
++			regs->nip = call_syscall;
++			return 7;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
++			printk("<invalid address>.");
++			break;
++		}
++		printk("%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * Check whether the instruction at regs->nip is a store using
+  * an update addressing form which will update r1.
+@@ -111,7 +473,7 @@
+ 	 * indicate errors in DSISR but can validly be set in SRR1.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (TRAP(regs) == 0x400)
+-		error_code &= 0x48200000;
++		error_code &= 0x58200000;
+ 	else
+ 		is_write = error_code & 0x02000000;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_4xx */
+@@ -205,15 +567,14 @@
+ 	} else if (TRAP(regs) == 0x400) {
+ 		pte_t *ptep;
+ 
+-#if 0
++#if 1
+ 		/* It would be nice to actually enforce the VM execute
+ 		   permission on CPUs which can do so, but far too
+ 		   much stuff in userspace doesn't get the permissions
+ 		   right, so we let any page be executed for now. */
+ 		if (! (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
+ 			goto bad_area;
+-#endif
+-
++#else
+ 		/* Since 4xx supports per-page execute permission,
+ 		 * we lazily flush dcache to icache. */
+ 		ptep = NULL;
+@@ -233,6 +594,7 @@
+ 		if (ptep != NULL)
+ 			pte_unmap(ptep);
+ #endif
++#endif
+ 	/* a read */
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* protection fault */
+@@ -278,6 +640,38 @@
+ 
+ 	/* User mode accesses cause a SIGSEGV */
+ 	if (user_mode(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++		if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) {
++			if ((TRAP(regs) == 0x400) && (regs->nip == address)) {
++				switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++				case 2:
++				case 3:
++				case 4:
++					return;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++				case 5:
++					return;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++				case 6:
++				case 7:
++					return;
++#endif
++
++				}
++
++				pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->nip, (void*)regs->gpr[1]);
++				do_exit(SIGKILL);
++			}
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		info.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
+ 		info.si_errno = 0;
+ 		info.si_code = code;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc64/kernel/syscalls.c linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc64/kernel/syscalls.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc64/kernel/syscalls.c	2004-06-16 01:19:42.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc64/kernel/syscalls.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -177,6 +177,11 @@
+ 	struct file * file = NULL;
+ 	unsigned long ret = -EBADF;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ 		if (!(file = fget(fd)))
+ 			goto out;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc64/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc64/mm/fault.c	2004-06-16 01:19:44.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/ppc64/mm/fault.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -75,6 +76,54 @@
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->nip = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
++	int err;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
++		if (regs->nip >= current->mm->start_code &&
++		    regs->nip < current->mm->end_code)
++		{
++			if (regs->link == regs->nip)
++				return 1;
++
++			regs->nip += current->mm->delta_exec;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
++			printk("<invalid address>.");
++			break;
++		}
++		printk("%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * The error_code parameter is
+  *  - DSISR for a non-SLB data access fault,
+@@ -202,6 +251,25 @@
+ 
+ 	/* User mode accesses cause a SIGSEGV */
+ 	if (user_mode(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++		if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) {
++			if ((regs->trap == 0x400) && (regs->nip == address)) {
++				switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++				case 2:
++					return;
++#endif
++
++				}
++
++				pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->nip, (void*)regs->gpr[1]);
++				do_exit(SIGKILL);
++			}
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		info.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
+ 		info.si_errno = 0;
+ 		info.si_code = code;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-16 01:20:26.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
+ #include <linux/smp.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+@@ -322,6 +323,11 @@
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) {
++		pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
++		goto out_tsk;
++	}
++
+ 	if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH)
+ 	    || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) {
+ 		if (ptrace_attach(child)) {
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c	2004-06-16 01:19:13.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+ #include <linux/utsname.h>
+ #include <linux/smp.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/ipc.h>
+@@ -55,6 +56,13 @@
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 	if (ARCH_SUN4C_SUN4 && len > 0x20000000)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp))
++		addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + current->mm->delta_mmap;
++	else
++#endif
++
+ 	if (!addr)
+ 		addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+ 
+@@ -228,6 +236,11 @@
+ 	struct file * file = NULL;
+ 	unsigned long retval = -EBADF;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ 		file = fget(fd);
+ 		if (!file)
+@@ -246,6 +259,12 @@
+ 	if (len > TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE || addr + len > TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE)
+ 		goto out_putf;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
++		fput(file);
++		retval = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+ 
+ 	down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c	2004-06-16 01:19:17.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@
+ 	struct file * file = NULL;
+ 	unsigned long retval, ret_type;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (flags & MAP_NORESERVE) {
+ 		static int cnt;
+ 		if (cnt++ < 10)
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c	2004-06-16 01:19:11.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/pagemap.h>
++#include <linux/compiler.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+ #include <asm/segment.h>
+@@ -220,6 +224,269 @@
+ 	return safe_compute_effective_address(regs, insn);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++void pax_emuplt_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
++{
++	vma->vm_mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL;
++}
++
++static struct page* pax_emuplt_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type)
++{
++	struct page* page;
++	unsigned int *kaddr;
++
++	page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
++	if (!page)
++		return NOPAGE_OOM;
++
++	kaddr = kmap(page);
++	memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
++	kaddr[0] = 0x9DE3BFA8U; /* save */
++	flush_dcache_page(page);
++	kunmap(page);
++	if (type)
++		*type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
++
++	return page;
++}
++
++static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
++	close:		pax_emuplt_close,
++	nopage:		pax_emuplt_nopage,
++};
++
++static void pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
++{
++	memset(vma, 0, sizeof(*vma));
++	vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
++	vma->vm_start = addr;
++	vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
++	vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
++	vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
++	vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
++	insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
++	++current->mm->total_vm;
++}
++
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->pc = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++	int err;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
++		if (regs->pc >= current->mm->start_code &&
++		    regs->pc < current->mm->end_code)
++		{
++			if (regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] + 8UL == regs->pc)
++				return 1;
++
++			regs->pc += current->mm->delta_exec;
++			if (regs->npc >= current->mm->start_code &&
++			    regs->npc < current->mm->end_code)
++				regs->npc += current->mm->delta_exec;
++			return 4;
++		}
++		if (regs->pc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec &&
++		    regs->pc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec)
++		{
++			regs->pc -= current->mm->delta_exec;
++			if (regs->npc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec &&
++			    regs->npc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec)
++				regs->npc -= current->mm->delta_exec;
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
++		unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, jmpl;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
++		err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4));
++		err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U)
++		{
++			unsigned int addr;
++
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++			addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1];
++			addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFE000U) ^ 0x00001000U) + 0x00001000U);
++			regs->pc = addr;
++			regs->npc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	{ /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */
++		unsigned int ba;
++
++		err = get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
++
++		if (!err && (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) {
++			unsigned int addr;
++
++			addr = regs->pc + 4 + (((ba | 0xFFC00000U) ^ 0x00200000U) + 0x00200000U);
++			regs->pc = addr;
++			regs->npc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	}
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #3 */
++		unsigned int sethi, jmpl, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
++		err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4));
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned int addr;
++
++			addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr;
++			addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFE000U) ^ 0x00001000U) + 0x00001000U);
++			regs->pc = addr;
++			regs->npc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 1 */
++		unsigned int sethi, ba, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
++		err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4));
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U || (ba & 0xFFF80000U) == 0x30680000U) &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned int addr, save, call;
++
++			if ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U)
++				addr = regs->pc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFC00000U) ^ 0x00200000U) + 0x00200000U) << 2);
++			else
++				addr = regs->pc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFF80000U) ^ 0x00040000U) + 0x00040000U) << 2);
++
++			err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)addr);
++			err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
++			    (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
++			    nop == 0x01000000U)
++			{
++				struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++				unsigned long call_dl_resolve;
++
++				down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
++				up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (likely(call_dl_resolve))
++					goto emulate;
++
++				vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
++
++				down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (current->mm->call_dl_resolve) {
++					call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
++					up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++					if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++					goto emulate;
++				}
++
++				call_dl_resolve = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
++				if (!vma || (call_dl_resolve & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++					up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++					if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++					return 1;
++				}
++
++				pax_insert_vma(vma, call_dl_resolve);
++				current->mm->call_dl_resolve = call_dl_resolve;
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++emulate:
++				regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++				regs->pc = call_dl_resolve;
++				regs->npc = addr+4;
++				return 3;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 2 */
++		unsigned int save, call, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc-4));
++		err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4));
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
++		    (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned int dl_resolve = regs->pc + ((((call | 0xC0000000U) ^ 0x20000000U) + 0x20000000U) << 2);
++
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] = regs->pc;
++			regs->pc = dl_resolve;
++			regs->npc = dl_resolve+4;
++			return 3;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
++			printk("<invalid address>.");
++			break;
++		}
++		printk("%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ asmlinkage void do_sparc_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, int text_fault, int write,
+ 			       unsigned long address)
+ {
+@@ -283,6 +550,29 @@
+ 		if(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
+ 			goto bad_area;
+ 	} else {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++		if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && text_fault && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
++			up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++			switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++			case 2:
++			case 3:
++				return;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++			case 4:
++				return;
++#endif
++
++			}
++			pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->pc, (void*)regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]);
++			do_exit(SIGKILL);
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		/* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */
+ 		if(!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC)))
+ 			goto bad_area;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/mm/init.c linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/mm/init.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/mm/init.c	2004-06-16 01:19:22.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/mm/init.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -337,17 +337,17 @@
+ 
+ 	/* Initialize the protection map with non-constant, MMU dependent values. */
+ 	protection_map[0] = PAGE_NONE;
+-	protection_map[1] = PAGE_READONLY;
+-	protection_map[2] = PAGE_COPY;
+-	protection_map[3] = PAGE_COPY;
++	protection_map[1] = PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC;
++	protection_map[2] = PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC;
++	protection_map[3] = PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC;
+ 	protection_map[4] = PAGE_READONLY;
+ 	protection_map[5] = PAGE_READONLY;
+ 	protection_map[6] = PAGE_COPY;
+ 	protection_map[7] = PAGE_COPY;
+ 	protection_map[8] = PAGE_NONE;
+-	protection_map[9] = PAGE_READONLY;
+-	protection_map[10] = PAGE_SHARED;
+-	protection_map[11] = PAGE_SHARED;
++	protection_map[9] = PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC;
++	protection_map[10] = PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC;
++	protection_map[11] = PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC;
+ 	protection_map[12] = PAGE_READONLY;
+ 	protection_map[13] = PAGE_READONLY;
+ 	protection_map[14] = PAGE_SHARED;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c	2004-06-16 01:19:36.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -2149,6 +2149,13 @@
+ 	BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_shared, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED));
+ 	BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_copy, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_COPY));
+ 	BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_readonly, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_shared_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC));
++	BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_copy_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC));
++	BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_readonly_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY_NOEXEC));
++#endif
++
+ 	BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_kernel, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL));
+ 	page_kernel = pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL);
+ 	pg_iobits = SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_WRITE | SRMMU_REF;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/itlb_base.S linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/itlb_base.S
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/itlb_base.S	2004-06-16 01:18:58.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/itlb_base.S	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -41,7 +41,9 @@
+ 	CREATE_VPTE_OFFSET2(%g4, %g6)			! Create VPTE offset
+ 	ldxa		[%g3 + %g6] ASI_P, %g5		! Load VPTE
+ 1:	brgez,pn	%g5, 3f				! Not valid, branch out
+-	 nop						! Delay-slot
++	and		%g5, _PAGE_EXEC, %g4
++	brz,pn		%g4, 3f				! Not executable, branch out
++	nop						! Delay-slot
+ 2:	stxa		%g5, [%g0] ASI_ITLB_DATA_IN	! Load PTE into TLB
+ 	retry						! Trap return
+ 3:	rdpr		%pstate, %g4			! Move into alternate globals
+@@ -74,8 +76,6 @@
+ 	nop
+ 	nop
+ 	nop
+-	nop
+-	nop
+ 	CREATE_VPTE_NOP
+ 
+ #undef CREATE_VPTE_OFFSET1
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-16 01:20:18.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
+ #include <linux/smp.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/asi.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -173,6 +174,11 @@
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, (long)request)) {
++		pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
++		goto out_tsk;
++	}
++
+ 	if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH)
+ 	    || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) {
+ 		if (ptrace_attach(child)) {
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c	2004-06-16 01:19:36.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+ #include <linux/ipc.h>
+ #include <linux/personality.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/ipc.h>
+@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@
+ {
+ 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ 	struct vm_area_struct * vma;
+-	unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE;
++	unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE, task_unmapped_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+ 	unsigned long start_addr;
+ 	int do_color_align;
+ 
+@@ -72,6 +73,12 @@
+ 	if (filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED))
+ 		do_color_align = 1;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++		task_unmapped_base += mm->delta_mmap;
++	if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
++#endif
++
+ 	if (addr) {
+ 		if (do_color_align)
+ 			addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
+@@ -101,8 +108,8 @@
+ 			vma = find_vma(mm, PAGE_OFFSET);
+ 		}
+ 		if (task_size < addr) {
+-			if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
+-				start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++			if (start_addr != task_unmapped_base) {
++				start_addr = addr = task_unmapped_base;
+ 				goto full_search;
+ 			}
+ 			return -ENOMEM;
+@@ -319,11 +326,22 @@
+ 	struct file * file = NULL;
+ 	unsigned long retval = -EBADF;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ 		file = fget(fd);
+ 		if (!file)
+ 			goto out;
+ 	}
++
++	if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
++		retval = -EACCES;
++		goto out_putf;
++	}
++
+ 	flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+ 	len = PAGE_ALIGN(len);
+ 	retval = -EINVAL;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c	2004-06-16 01:19:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c	2004-06-25 14:21:03.000000000 -0400
+@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
+ #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h>
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/highuid.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/types.h>
+ #include <asm/ipc.h>
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c	2004-06-16 01:19:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -66,6 +66,11 @@
+ 	struct file *file = NULL;
+ 	unsigned long retval, ret_type;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (flags & MAP_NORESERVE) {
+ 		static int cnt;
+ 		if (cnt++ < 10)
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c	2004-06-16 01:20:04.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/pagemap.h>
++#include <linux/compiler.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -310,6 +314,361 @@
+ 	unhandled_fault (address, current, regs);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++static void pax_emuplt_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
++{
++	vma->vm_mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL;
++}
++
++static struct page* pax_emuplt_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type)
++{
++	struct page* page;
++	unsigned int *kaddr;
++
++	page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
++	if (!page)
++		return NOPAGE_OOM;
++
++	kaddr = kmap(page);
++	memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
++	kaddr[0] = 0x9DE3BFA8U; /* save */
++	flush_dcache_page(page);
++	kunmap(page);
++	if (type)
++		*type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
++	return page;
++}
++
++static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
++	close:		pax_emuplt_close,
++	nopage:		pax_emuplt_nopage,
++};
++
++static void pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
++{
++	memset(vma, 0, sizeof(*vma));
++	vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
++	vma->vm_start = addr;
++	vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
++	vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
++	vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
++	vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
++	insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
++	++current->mm->total_vm;
++}
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->tpc = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++	int err;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
++		if (regs->tpc >= current->mm->start_code &&
++		    regs->tpc < current->mm->end_code)
++		{
++			if (regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] + 8UL == regs->tpc)
++				return 1;
++
++			regs->tpc += current->mm->delta_exec;
++			if (regs->tnpc >= current->mm->start_code &&
++			    regs->tnpc < current->mm->end_code)
++				regs->tnpc += current->mm->delta_exec;
++			return 4;
++		}
++		if (regs->tpc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec &&
++		    regs->tpc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec)
++		{
++			regs->tpc -= current->mm->delta_exec;
++			if (regs->tnpc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec &&
++			    regs->tnpc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec)
++				regs->tnpc -= current->mm->delta_exec;
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
++		unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, jmpl;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
++		err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
++		err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++			addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1];
++			addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE000UL) ^ 0x00001000UL) + 0x00001000UL);
++			regs->tpc = addr;
++			regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	{ /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */
++		unsigned int ba;
++
++		err = get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
++
++		if (!err && (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) {
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			addr = regs->tpc + 4 + (((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFC00000UL) ^ 0x00200000UL) + 0x00200000UL);
++			regs->tpc = addr;
++			regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	}
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #3 */
++		unsigned int sethi, jmpl, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
++		err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr;
++			addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE000UL) ^ 0x00001000UL) + 0x00001000UL);
++			regs->tpc = addr;
++			regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #4 */
++		unsigned int mov1, call, mov2;
++
++		err = get_user(mov1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
++		err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
++		err |= get_user(mov2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if (mov1 == 0x8210000FU &&
++		    (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
++		    mov2 == 0x9E100001U)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC];
++			addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((call | 0xFFFFFFFFC0000000UL) ^ 0x20000000UL) + 0x20000000UL) << 2);
++			regs->tpc = addr;
++			regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #5 */
++		unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, or1, or2, sllx, jmpl, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
++		err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
++		err |= get_user(or1, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
++		err |= get_user(or2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+12));
++		err |= get_user(sllx, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+16));
++		err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+20));
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+24));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x0B000000U &&
++		    (or1 & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x82106000U &&
++		    (or2 & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x8A116000U &&
++		    sllx == 0x83287020 &&
++		    jmpl == 0x81C04005U &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = ((sethi1 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or1 & 0x000003FFU);
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] <<= 32;
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G5] = ((sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or2 & 0x000003FFU);
++			addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] + regs->u_regs[UREG_G5];
++			regs->tpc = addr;
++			regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #6 */
++		unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, sllx, or,  jmpl, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
++		err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
++		err |= get_user(sllx, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
++		err |= get_user(or, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+12));
++		err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+16));
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+20));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x0B000000U &&
++		    sllx == 0x83287020 &&
++		    (or & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x8A116000U &&
++		    jmpl == 0x81C04005U &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi1 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] <<= 32;
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G5] = ((sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or & 0x3FFU);
++			addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] + regs->u_regs[UREG_G5];
++			regs->tpc = addr;
++			regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 1 */
++		unsigned int sethi, ba, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
++		err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U || (ba & 0xFFF80000U) == 0x30680000U) &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++			unsigned int save, call;
++
++			if ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U)
++				addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFC00000UL) ^ 0x00200000UL) + 0x00200000UL) << 2);
++			else
++				addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFF80000UL) ^ 0x00040000UL) + 0x00040000UL) << 2);
++
++			err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)addr);
++			err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
++			    (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
++			    nop == 0x01000000U)
++			{
++				struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++				unsigned long call_dl_resolve;
++
++				down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
++				up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (likely(call_dl_resolve))
++					goto emulate;
++
++				vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
++
++				down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (current->mm->call_dl_resolve) {
++					call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
++					up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++					if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++					goto emulate;
++				}
++
++				call_dl_resolve = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
++				if (!vma || (call_dl_resolve & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++					up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++					if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++					return 1;
++				}
++
++				pax_insert_vma(vma, call_dl_resolve);
++				current->mm->call_dl_resolve = call_dl_resolve;
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++emulate:
++				regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++				regs->tpc = call_dl_resolve;
++				regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++				return 3;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 2 */
++		unsigned int save, call, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc-4));
++		err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
++		    (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long dl_resolve = regs->tpc + ((((call | 0xFFFFFFFFC0000000UL) ^ 0x20000000UL) + 0x20000000UL) << 2);
++
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] = regs->tpc;
++			regs->tpc = dl_resolve;
++			regs->tnpc = dl_resolve+4;
++			return 3;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
++			printk("<invalid address>.");
++			break;
++		}
++		printk("%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ asmlinkage void do_sparc64_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ {
+ 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+@@ -347,8 +706,10 @@
+ 		goto intr_or_no_mm;
+ 
+ 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
+-		if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV))
++		if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)) {
+ 			regs->tpc &= 0xffffffff;
++			regs->tnpc &= 0xffffffff;
++		}
+ 		address &= 0xffffffff;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -357,6 +718,34 @@
+ 	if (!vma)
+ 		goto bad_area;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	/* PaX: detect ITLB misses on non-exec pages */
++	if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && vma->vm_start <= address &&
++	    !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (fault_code & FAULT_CODE_ITLB))
++	{
++		if (address != regs->tpc)
++			goto good_area;
++
++		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++		switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++		case 2:
++		case 3:
++			goto fault_done;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++		case 4:
++			goto fault_done;
++#endif
++
++		}
++		pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->tpc, (void*)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS));
++		do_exit(SIGKILL);
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Pure DTLB misses do not tell us whether the fault causing
+ 	 * load/store/atomic was a write or not, it only says that there
+ 	 * was no match.  So in such a case we (carefully) read the
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c	2004-06-16 01:20:04.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@
+ 	struct file *file = NULL;
+ 	unsigned long retval, ret_type;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Do we need it here? */
+ 	set_personality(PER_SVR4);
+ 	if (flags & MAP_NORESERVE) {
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c	2004-06-16 01:18:55.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -185,6 +185,17 @@
+ //#include <asm/ia32.h>
+ #include <linux/elf.h>
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk)	(test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 0x08048000UL : 0x400000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk)		(test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24)
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk)		(test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk)	PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk)	(test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24)
++#endif
++
+ typedef struct user_i387_ia32_struct elf_fpregset_t;
+ typedef struct user32_fxsr_struct elf_fpxregset_t;
+ 
+@@ -361,7 +372,13 @@
+ 		else if (executable_stack == EXSTACK_DISABLE_X)
+ 			mpnt->vm_flags = vm_stack_flags32 & ~VM_EXEC;
+ 		else
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++			mpnt->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS;
++#else
+ 			mpnt->vm_flags = vm_stack_flags32;
++#endif
++
+  		mpnt->vm_page_prot = (mpnt->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) ? 
+  			PAGE_COPY_EXEC : PAGE_COPY;
+ 		insert_vm_struct(mm, mpnt);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c	2004-06-16 01:19:22.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -212,6 +212,11 @@
+ 	if (a.offset & ~PAGE_MASK)
+ 		return -EINVAL; 
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (a.flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (!(a.flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ 		file = fget(a.fd);
+ 		if (!file)
+@@ -1037,6 +1042,11 @@
+ 	unsigned long error;
+ 	struct file * file = NULL;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+ 	if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ 		file = fget(fd);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-16 01:19:09.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -213,6 +213,9 @@
+ 	if (pid == 1)		/* you may not mess with init */
+ 		goto out_tsk;
+ 
++        if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
++                goto out_tsk;
++
+ 	if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
+ 		ret = ptrace_attach(child);
+ 		goto out_tsk;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/kernel/setup64.c linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/kernel/setup64.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/kernel/setup64.c	2004-06-16 01:19:03.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/kernel/setup64.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -43,8 +43,15 @@
+ 
+ unsigned long __supported_pte_mask = ~0UL;
+ static int do_not_nx __initdata = 0;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++unsigned long vm_stack_flags = VM_GROWSDOWN | __VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
++unsigned long vm_stack_flags32 = VM_GROWSDOWN | __VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
++#else
+ unsigned long vm_stack_flags = __VM_STACK_FLAGS; 
+ unsigned long vm_stack_flags32 = __VM_STACK_FLAGS; 
++#endif
++
+ unsigned long vm_data_default_flags = __VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS; 
+ unsigned long vm_data_default_flags32 = __VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS; 
+ unsigned long vm_force_exec32 = PROT_EXEC; 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c	2004-06-16 01:19:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -48,6 +48,11 @@
+ 	if (off & ~PAGE_MASK)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++		goto out;
++#endif
++
+ 	error = -EBADF;
+ 	file = NULL;
+ 	flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+@@ -102,6 +107,15 @@
+ 	
+ 	find_start_end(flags, &begin, &end); 
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp)) {
++		if (begin == 0x40000000)
++			begin += current->mm->delta_mmap & 0x0FFFFFFFU;
++		else
++			begin += current->mm->delta_mmap;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	if (len > end)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c	2004-06-16 01:18:52.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include <linux/vt_kern.h>		/* For unblank_screen() */
+ #include <linux/compiler.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -218,6 +219,63 @@
+ 		(tsk->sighand->action[sig-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->rip = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	int err;
++
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
++		if (regs->rip >= current->mm->start_code &&
++		    regs->rip < current->mm->end_code)
++		{
++			if (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32)) {
++				unsigned int esp_4;
++
++				err = get_user(esp_4, (unsigned int*)(regs->rsp-4UL));
++				if (err || esp_4 == regs->rip)
++					return 1;
++			} else {
++				unsigned long esp_8;
++
++				err = get_user(esp_8, (unsigned long*)(regs->rsp-8UL));
++				if (err || esp_8 == regs->rip)
++					return 1;
++			}
++
++			regs->rip += current->mm->delta_exec;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned char*)pc+i)) {
++			printk("<invalid address>.");
++			break;
++		}
++		printk("%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ int page_fault_trace; 
+ int exception_trace = 1;
+ 
+@@ -303,6 +361,23 @@
+  * we can handle it..
+  */
+ good_area:
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (error_code & 16) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
++		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++		switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++		case 2:
++			return;
++#endif
++
++		}
++		pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->rip, (void*)regs->rsp);
++		do_exit(SIGKILL);
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	info.si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
+ 	write = 0;
+ 	switch (error_code & 3) {
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/keyboard.c linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/keyboard.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/keyboard.c	2004-06-16 01:20:27.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/keyboard.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -606,6 +606,16 @@
+ 	     kbd->kbdmode == VC_MEDIUMRAW) && 
+ 	     value != KVAL(K_SAK))
+ 		return;		/* SAK is allowed even in raw mode */
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP)
++	{
++		void *func = fn_handler[value];
++		if (func == fn_show_state || func == fn_show_ptregs ||
++		    func == fn_show_mem)
++			return;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	fn_handler[value](vc, regs);
+ }
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/mem.c linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/mem.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/mem.c	2004-06-16 01:19:23.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/mem.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include <linux/devfs_fs_kernel.h>
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/device.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/io.h>
+@@ -39,6 +40,10 @@
+ extern void tapechar_init(void);
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++extern struct file_operations grsec_fops;
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * Architectures vary in how they handle caching for addresses
+  * outside of main memory.
+@@ -191,6 +196,12 @@
+ 
+ 	if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, &count))
+ 		return -EFAULT;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++	gr_handle_mem_write();
++	return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
+ 	return do_write_mem(__va(p), p, buf, count, ppos);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -205,6 +216,11 @@
+ 		vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++	if (gr_handle_mem_mmap(offset, vma))
++		return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Don't try to swap out physical pages.. */
+ 	vma->vm_flags |= VM_RESERVED;
+ 
+@@ -298,6 +314,11 @@
+ 	ssize_t written;
+ 	char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++	gr_handle_kmem_write();
++	return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
+ 
+ 		wrote = count;
+@@ -424,7 +445,23 @@
+ 			count = size;
+ 
+ 		zap_page_range(vma, addr, count, NULL);
+-        	zeromap_page_range(vma, addr, count, PAGE_COPY);
++        	zeromap_page_range(vma, addr, count, vma->vm_page_prot);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++		if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++			unsigned long addr_m;
++			struct vm_area_struct * vma_m;
++
++			addr_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
++			vma_m = find_vma(mm, addr_m);
++			if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == addr_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
++				addr_m = addr + vma->vm_mirror;
++				zap_page_range(vma_m, addr_m, count, NULL);
++			} else
++				printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: read_zero bug, %08lx, %08lx\n",
++				       addr, vma->vm_start);
++		}
++#endif
+ 
+ 		size -= count;
+ 		buf += count;
+@@ -573,6 +610,16 @@
+ 
+ static int open_port(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
+ {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++	gr_handle_open_port();
++	return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
++	return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
++}
++
++static int open_mem(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
++{
+ 	return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -581,7 +628,6 @@
+ #define full_lseek      null_lseek
+ #define write_zero	write_null
+ #define read_full       read_zero
+-#define open_mem	open_port
+ #define open_kmem	open_mem
+ 
+ static struct file_operations mem_fops = {
+@@ -679,6 +725,11 @@
+ 		case 9:
+ 			filp->f_op = &urandom_fops;
+ 			break;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++		case 10:
++			filp->f_op = &grsec_fops;
++			break;
++#endif
+ 		case 11:
+ 			filp->f_op = &kmsg_fops;
+ 			break;
+@@ -710,6 +761,9 @@
+ 	{7, "full",    S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO,           &full_fops},
+ 	{8, "random",  S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,           &random_fops},
+ 	{9, "urandom", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,           &urandom_fops},
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	{10,"grsec",   S_IRUSR | S_IWUGO,	    &grsec_fops},
++#endif
+ 	{11,"kmsg",    S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,           &kmsg_fops},
+ };
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/random.c linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/random.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/random.c	2004-06-16 01:18:57.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/random.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -263,9 +263,15 @@
+ /*
+  * Configuration information
+  */
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++#define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 1024
++#define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 256
++#define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 512
++#else
+ #define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 512
+ #define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 128
+ #define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 256
++#endif
+ #define USE_SHA
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -2379,6 +2385,29 @@
+ 	return halfMD4Transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++/* the following function is provided by PaX under the GPL */
++unsigned long get_random_long(void)
++{
++	static time_t rekey_time;
++	static __u32 secret[12];
++	time_t t;
++
++	/*
++	 * Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds
++	 */
++	t = get_seconds();
++	if (!rekey_time || (t - rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) {
++		rekey_time = t;
++		get_random_bytes(secret, sizeof(secret));
++	}
++
++	secret[1] = halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret);
++	secret[0] = halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret);
++	return *(unsigned long *)secret;
++}
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
+ /*
+  * Secure SYN cookie computation. This is the algorithm worked out by
+@@ -2478,3 +2507,25 @@
+ 	return (cookie - tmp[17]) & COOKIEMASK;	/* Leaving the data behind */
+ }
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++unsigned long pax_get_random_long(void)
++{
++	static time_t   rekey_time;
++	static __u32    secret[12];
++	time_t          t;
++
++	/*
++	 * Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds.
++	 */
++	t = get_seconds();
++	if (!rekey_time || (t - rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) {
++		rekey_time = t;
++		get_random_bytes(secret, sizeof(secret));
++	}
++
++	secret[1] = halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret);
++	secret[0] = halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret);
++	return *(unsigned long *)secret;
++}
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c	2004-06-16 01:19:42.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -96,6 +96,12 @@
+ 	case KDSKBENT:
+ 		if (!perm)
+ 			return -EPERM;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
++			return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
+ 		if (!i && v == K_NOSUCHMAP) {
+ 			/* disallocate map */
+ 			key_map = key_maps[s];
+@@ -233,6 +239,13 @@
+ 			goto reterr;
+ 		}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) {
++			return -EPERM;
++			goto reterr;
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		q = func_table[i];
+ 		first_free = funcbufptr + (funcbufsize - funcbufleft);
+ 		for (j = i+1; j < MAX_NR_FUNC && !func_table[j]; j++) 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/drivers/pci/proc.c linux-2.6.7/drivers/pci/proc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/pci/proc.c	2004-06-16 01:19:36.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/drivers/pci/proc.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -565,7 +565,15 @@
+ 
+ static void legacy_proc_init(void)
+ {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	struct proc_dir_entry * entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR, NULL);
++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	struct proc_dir_entry * entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
++#endif
++#else
+ 	struct proc_dir_entry * entry = create_proc_entry("pci", 0, NULL);
++#endif
+ 	if (entry)
+ 		entry->proc_fops = &proc_pci_operations;
+ }
+@@ -594,7 +602,15 @@
+ {
+ 	struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
+ 	struct pci_dev *dev = NULL;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir_mode("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, proc_bus);
++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir_mode("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, proc_bus);
++#endif
++#else
+ 	proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir("pci", proc_bus);
++#endif
+ 	entry = create_proc_entry("devices", 0, proc_bus_pci_dir);
+ 	if (entry)
+ 		entry->proc_fops = &proc_bus_pci_dev_operations;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c linux-2.6.7/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c	2004-06-16 01:19:42.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
+ set_limit(cpu_gdt_table[cpu][(selname) >> 3], size); \
+ } while(0)
+ 
+-static struct desc_struct bad_bios_desc = { 0, 0x00409200 };
++static struct desc_struct bad_bios_desc = { 0, 0x00409300 };
+ 
+ /*
+  * At some point we want to use this stack frame pointer to unwind
+@@ -107,6 +107,10 @@
+ 	struct desc_struct save_desc_40;
+ 	int cpu;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr3;
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * PnP BIOSes are generally not terribly re-entrant.
+ 	 * Also, don't rely on them to save everything correctly.
+@@ -115,12 +119,17 @@
+ 		return PNP_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ 
+ 	cpu = get_cpu();
+-	save_desc_40 = cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8];
+-	cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc;
+ 
+ 	/* On some boxes IRQ's during PnP BIOS calls are deadly.  */
+ 	spin_lock_irqsave(&pnp_bios_lock, flags);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel_noirq(cr3);
++#endif
++
++	save_desc_40 = cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8];
++	cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc;
++
+ 	/* The lock prevents us bouncing CPU here */
+ 	if (ts1_size)
+ 		Q2_SET_SEL(smp_processor_id(), PNP_TS1, ts1_base, ts1_size);
+@@ -156,9 +165,14 @@
+ 		  "i" (0)
+ 		: "memory"
+ 	);
+-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pnp_bios_lock, flags);
+ 
+ 	cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel_noirq(cr3);
++#endif
++
++	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pnp_bios_lock, flags);
+ 	put_cpu();
+ 
+ 	/* If we get here and this is set then the PnP BIOS faulted on us. */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c linux-2.6.7/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c	2004-06-16 01:19:11.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
+ static const char spaces[] = "                "; /* 16 of them */
+ static unsigned scsi_default_dev_flags;
+ static LIST_HEAD(scsi_dev_info_list);
+-static __init char scsi_dev_flags[256];
++static __initdata char scsi_dev_flags[256];
+ 
+ /*
+  * scsi_static_device_list: deprecated list of devices that require
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/drivers/video/vesafb.c linux-2.6.7/drivers/video/vesafb.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/video/vesafb.c	2004-06-16 01:18:57.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/drivers/video/vesafb.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@
+ 	if (vesafb_fix.smem_len > 16 * 1024 * 1024)
+ 		vesafb_fix.smem_len = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
+ 
+-#ifndef __i386__
++#if !defined(__i386__) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
+ 	screen_info.vesapm_seg = 0;
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/Kconfig linux-2.6.7/fs/Kconfig
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/Kconfig	2004-06-16 01:19:36.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/Kconfig	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -815,6 +815,7 @@
+ 
+ config PROC_KCORE
+ 	bool
++	depends on !GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+ 	default y if !ARM
+ 
+ config SYSFS
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_aout.c linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_aout.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_aout.c	2004-06-16 01:19:01.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_aout.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ #include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ #include <linux/personality.h>
+ #include <linux/init.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -118,10 +119,12 @@
+ /* If the size of the dump file exceeds the rlimit, then see what would happen
+    if we wrote the stack, but not the data area.  */
+ #ifdef __sparc__
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize, 1);
+ 	if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize) >
+ 	    current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
+ 		dump.u_dsize = 0;
+ #else
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE, 1);
+ 	if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE >
+ 	    current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
+ 		dump.u_dsize = 0;
+@@ -129,10 +132,12 @@
+ 
+ /* Make sure we have enough room to write the stack and data areas. */
+ #ifdef __sparc__
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_ssize, 1);
+ 	if ((dump.u_ssize) >
+ 	    current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
+ 		dump.u_ssize = 0;
+ #else
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE, 1);
+ 	if ((dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE >
+ 	    current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
+ 		dump.u_ssize = 0;
+@@ -281,6 +286,8 @@
+ 	rlim = current->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur;
+ 	if (rlim >= RLIM_INFINITY)
+ 		rlim = ~0;
++
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, ex.a_data + ex.a_bss, 1);
+ 	if (ex.a_data + ex.a_bss > rlim)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+@@ -309,10 +316,33 @@
+ 		(current->mm->start_brk = N_BSSADDR(ex));
+ 	current->mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++		current->mm->free_area_cache += current->mm->delta_mmap;
++#endif
++
+ 	current->mm->rss = 0;
+ 	current->mm->mmap = NULL;
+ 	compute_creds(bprm);
+  	current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) {
++		current->flags |= PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++		if (N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
++			current->flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++		if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_MPROTECT))
++			current->flags |= PF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++#endif
++
++	}
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef __sparc__
+ 	if (N_MAGIC(ex) == NMAGIC) {
+ 		loff_t pos = fd_offset;
+@@ -399,7 +429,7 @@
+ 
+ 		down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+  		error = do_mmap(bprm->file, N_DATADDR(ex), ex.a_data,
+-				PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
++				PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ 				MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_EXECUTABLE,
+ 				fd_offset + ex.a_text);
+ 		up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_elf.c linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_elf.c	2004-06-16 01:19:22.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_elf.c	2004-06-25 17:44:19.000000000 -0400
+@@ -37,11 +37,17 @@
+ #include <linux/pagemap.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/param.h>
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++#include <asm/desc.h>
++#endif
++
+ #include <linux/elf.h>
+ 
+ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm, struct pt_regs * regs);
+@@ -85,14 +91,22 @@
+ 
+ static int set_brk(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
+ {
++	current->mm->start_brk = current->mm->brk = end;
+ 	start = ELF_PAGEALIGN(start);
+ 	end = ELF_PAGEALIGN(end);
+ 	if (end > start) {
+ 		unsigned long addr = do_brk(start, end - start);
+ 		if (BAD_ADDR(addr))
+ 			return addr;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++		if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++			addr = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGEALIGN(start + current->mm->delta_exec), 0UL, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_MIRROR, start);
++		if (BAD_ADDR(addr))
++			return addr;
++#endif
++
+ 	}
+-	current->mm->start_brk = current->mm->brk = end;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -303,6 +317,7 @@
+ 	unsigned long last_bss = 0, elf_bss = 0;
+ 	unsigned long error = ~0UL;
+ 	int retval, i, size;
++	unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE;
+ 
+ 	/* First of all, some simple consistency checks */
+ 	if (interp_elf_ex->e_type != ET_EXEC &&
+@@ -336,6 +351,11 @@
+ 	if (retval < 0)
+ 		goto out_close;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++#endif
++
+ 	eppnt = elf_phdata;
+ 	for (i=0; i<interp_elf_ex->e_phnum; i++, eppnt++) {
+ 	  if (eppnt->p_type == PT_LOAD) {
+@@ -367,8 +387,8 @@
+ 	     * <= p_memsize so it is only necessary to check p_memsz.
+ 	     */
+ 	    k = load_addr + eppnt->p_vaddr;
+-	    if (k > TASK_SIZE || eppnt->p_filesz > eppnt->p_memsz ||
+-		eppnt->p_memsz > TASK_SIZE || TASK_SIZE - eppnt->p_memsz < k) {
++	    if (k > task_size || eppnt->p_filesz > eppnt->p_memsz ||
++		eppnt->p_memsz > task_size || task_size - eppnt->p_memsz < k) {
+ 	        error = -ENOMEM;
+ 		goto out_close;
+ 	    }
+@@ -458,6 +478,227 @@
+ 	return elf_entry;
+ }
+ 
++#if (defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE)
++static unsigned long pax_parse_softmode(const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata)
++{
++	unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_PAGEEXEC)
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_SEGMEXEC)
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC
++	if (pax_flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
++		pax_flags &= ~PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC
++	if (pax_flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		pax_flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++	if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_EMUTRAMP)
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++	if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_MPROTECT)
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++	if (pax_aslr)
++#endif
++
++	if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_RANDMMAP)
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++	if (pax_aslr)
++#endif
++
++	if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_RANDEXEC)
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_RANDEXEC;
++#endif
++
++	return pax_flags;
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
++static unsigned long pax_parse_hardmode(const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata)
++{
++	unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOPAGEEXEC))
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOSEGMEXEC))
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC
++	if (pax_flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
++		pax_flags &= ~PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC
++	if (pax_flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		pax_flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++	if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOEMUTRAMP))
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++	if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT))
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++	if (pax_aslr)
++#endif
++
++	if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NORANDMMAP))
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++	if (pax_aslr)
++#endif
++
++	if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NORANDEXEC))
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_RANDEXEC;
++#endif
++
++	return pax_flags;
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX
++static int pax_parse_ei_pax(const struct elfhdr * const elf_ex)
++{
++	unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC))
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC
++	if (pax_flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
++		pax_flags &= ~PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC
++	if (pax_flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		pax_flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++	if ((pax_flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) && (elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++	if ((pax_flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) && !(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_MPROTECT))
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++	if (pax_aslr)
++#endif
++
++	if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_RANDMMAP))
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++	if (pax_aslr)
++#endif
++
++	if ((elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_RANDEXEC) && (elf_ex->e_type == ET_EXEC) && (pax_flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT))
++		pax_flags |= PF_PAX_RANDEXEC;
++#endif
++
++	return pax_flags;
++}
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)
++static int pax_parse_elf_flags(const struct elfhdr * const elf_ex, const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata)
++{
++	unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
++	unsigned long i;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX
++	pax_flags = pax_parse_ei_pax(elf_ex);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
++	for (i = 0UL; i < elf_ex->e_phnum; i++)
++		if (elf_phdata[i].p_type == PT_PAX_FLAGS) {
++			if (((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_PAGEEXEC) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOPAGEEXEC)) ||
++			    ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_SEGMEXEC) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOSEGMEXEC)) ||
++			    ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_EMUTRAMP) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOEMUTRAMP)) ||
++			    ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_MPROTECT) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT)) ||
++			    ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_RANDMMAP) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NORANDMMAP)) ||
++			    ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_RANDEXEC) && ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NORANDEXEC) || elf_ex->e_type == ET_DYN || !(elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_MPROTECT))) ||
++			    (!(elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NORANDEXEC) && (elf_ex->e_type == ET_DYN || (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT))))
++				return -EINVAL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++			if (pax_softmode)
++				pax_flags = pax_parse_softmode(&elf_phdata[i]);
++			else
++#endif
++
++				pax_flags = pax_parse_hardmode(&elf_phdata[i]);
++			break;
++		}
++#endif
++
++	if (0 > pax_check_flags(&pax_flags))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	current->flags |= pax_flags;
++	return 0;
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * These are the functions used to load ELF style executables and shared
+  * libraries.  There is no binary dependent code anywhere else.
+@@ -491,7 +732,13 @@
+ 	char passed_fileno[6];
+ 	struct files_struct *files;
+ 	int executable_stack = EXSTACK_DEFAULT;
+-	
++	unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	unsigned long load_addr_random = 0UL;
++	unsigned long load_bias_random = 0UL;
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Get the exec-header */
+ 	elf_ex = *((struct elfhdr *) bprm->buf);
+ 
+@@ -615,6 +862,7 @@
+ 		elf_ppnt++;
+ 	}
+ 
++#if 0
+ 	elf_ppnt = elf_phdata;
+ 	for (i = 0; i < elf_ex.e_phnum; i++, elf_ppnt++)
+ 		if (elf_ppnt->p_type == PT_GNU_STACK) {
+@@ -623,6 +871,7 @@
+ 			else
+ 				executable_stack = EXSTACK_DISABLE_X;
+ 		}
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/* Some simple consistency checks for the interpreter */
+ 	if (elf_interpreter) {
+@@ -689,8 +938,64 @@
+ 	current->mm->end_data = 0;
+ 	current->mm->end_code = 0;
+ 	current->mm->mmap = NULL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DLRESOLVE
++	current->mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL;
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
++	current->mm->call_syscall = 0UL;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++	current->mm->delta_mmap = 0UL;
++	current->mm->delta_exec = 0UL;
++	current->mm->delta_stack = 0UL;
++#endif
++
+ 	current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC;
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)
++	if (0 > pax_parse_elf_flags(&elf_ex, elf_phdata)) {
++		send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
++		goto out_free_dentry;
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++	pax_set_flags(bprm);
++#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS)
++	if (pax_set_flags_func)
++		(pax_set_flags_func)(bprm);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
++		current->mm->context.user_cs_limit = PAGE_SIZE;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++		int cpu = get_cpu();
++
++		current->mm->context.user_cs_base = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++		current->mm->context.user_cs_limit = -SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++		set_user_cs(current->mm, cpu);
++		put_cpu();
++		task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) {
++#define pax_delta_mask(delta, lsb, len) (((delta) & ((1UL << (len)) - 1)) << (lsb))
++
++		current->mm->delta_mmap = pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(current));
++		current->mm->delta_exec = pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(current));
++		current->mm->delta_stack = pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(current));
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Do this immediately, since STACK_TOP as used in setup_arg_pages
+ 	   may depend on the personality.  */
+ 	SET_PERSONALITY(elf_ex, ibcs2_interpreter);
+@@ -699,6 +1004,12 @@
+ 	   change some of these later */
+ 	current->mm->rss = 0;
+ 	current->mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++		current->mm->free_area_cache += current->mm->delta_mmap;
++#endif
++
+ 	retval = setup_arg_pages(bprm, executable_stack);
+ 	if (retval < 0) {
+ 		send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+@@ -753,12 +1064,92 @@
+ 			/* Try and get dynamic programs out of the way of the default mmap
+ 			   base, as well as whatever program they might try to exec.  This
+ 			   is because the brk will follow the loader, and is not movable.  */
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++			if (current->flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
++				load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(current) - vaddr);
++				elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED;
++			} else
++#endif
++
+ 			load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++			/* PaX: randomize base address at the default exe base if requested */
++			if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++				load_bias += ELF_PAGESTART(current->mm->delta_exec);
++#endif
++
+ 		}
+ 
+-		error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot, elf_flags);
+-		if (BAD_ADDR(error))
+-			continue;
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++		if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) && (elf_ex.e_type == ET_EXEC)) {
++			error = -ENOMEM;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++			if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
++				error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot & ~PROT_EXEC, elf_flags);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++			if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++				unsigned long addr, len;
++
++				addr = ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias + vaddr);
++				len = elf_ppnt->p_filesz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr);
++				if (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len)
++					continue;
++				down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				error = __do_mmap_pgoff(bprm->file, addr, len, elf_prot, elf_flags, (elf_ppnt->p_offset - ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr)) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			}
++#endif
++
++			if (BAD_ADDR(error))
++				continue;
++
++			/* PaX: mirror at a randomized base */
++			down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++			if (!load_addr_set) {
++				load_addr_random = get_unmapped_area(bprm->file, 0UL, elf_ppnt->p_filesz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr), (elf_ppnt->p_offset - ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr)) >> PAGE_SHIFT, MAP_PRIVATE);
++				if (BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random)) {
++					up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++					continue;
++				}
++				load_bias_random = load_addr_random - vaddr;
++			}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++			if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
++				load_addr_random = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr), 0UL, elf_prot, elf_flags | MAP_MIRROR, error);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++			if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++				if (elf_prot & PROT_EXEC) {
++					load_addr_random = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr), elf_ppnt->p_memsz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr), PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, 0UL);
++					if (!BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random)) {
++						load_addr_random = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE), 0UL, elf_prot, elf_flags | MAP_MIRROR, error);
++						if (!BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random))
++							load_addr_random -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++					}
++				} else
++					load_addr_random = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr), 0UL, elf_prot, elf_flags | MAP_MIRROR, error);
++			}
++#endif
++
++			up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			if (BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random))
++				continue;
++		} else
++#endif
++
++		{
++			error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot, elf_flags);
++			if (BAD_ADDR(error))
++				continue;
++		}
+ 
+ 		if (!load_addr_set) {
+ 			load_addr_set = 1;
+@@ -769,6 +1160,11 @@
+ 				load_addr += load_bias;
+ 				reloc_func_desc = load_bias;
+ 			}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++			current->mm->delta_exec = load_addr_random - load_addr;
++#endif
++
+ 		}
+ 		k = elf_ppnt->p_vaddr;
+ 		if (k < start_code) start_code = k;
+@@ -779,9 +1175,9 @@
+ 		 * allowed task size. Note that p_filesz must always be
+ 		 * <= p_memsz so it is only necessary to check p_memsz.
+ 		 */
+-		if (k > TASK_SIZE || elf_ppnt->p_filesz > elf_ppnt->p_memsz ||
+-		    elf_ppnt->p_memsz > TASK_SIZE ||
+-		    TASK_SIZE - elf_ppnt->p_memsz < k) {
++		if (k > task_size || elf_ppnt->p_filesz > elf_ppnt->p_memsz ||
++		    elf_ppnt->p_memsz > task_size ||
++		    task_size - elf_ppnt->p_memsz < k) {
+ 			/* set_brk can never work.  Avoid overflows.  */
+ 			send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+ 			goto out_free_dentry;
+@@ -808,6 +1204,16 @@
+ 	start_data += load_bias;
+ 	end_data += load_bias;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++	if (pax_aslr)
++#endif
++
++	elf_brk += PAGE_SIZE + pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), 4, PAGE_SHIFT);
++#undef pax_delta_mask
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Calling set_brk effectively mmaps the pages that we need
+ 	 * for the bss and break sections.  We must do this before
+ 	 * mapping in the interpreter, to make sure it doesn't wind
+@@ -1100,8 +1506,11 @@
+ #undef DUMP_SEEK
+ 
+ #define DUMP_WRITE(addr, nr)	\
++	do { \
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, size + (nr), 1); \
+ 	if ((size += (nr)) > limit || !dump_write(file, (addr), (nr))) \
+-		goto end_coredump;
++		goto end_coredump; \
++	} while (0);
+ #define DUMP_SEEK(off)	\
+ 	if (!dump_seek(file, (off))) \
+ 		goto end_coredump;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_flat.c linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_flat.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_flat.c	2004-06-16 01:18:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_flat.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -541,7 +541,9 @@
+ 				realdatastart = (unsigned long) -ENOMEM;
+ 			printk("Unable to allocate RAM for process data, errno %d\n",
+ 					(int)-datapos);
++			down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 			do_munmap(current->mm, textpos, text_len);
++			up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 			return realdatastart;
+ 		}
+ 		datapos = realdatastart + MAX_SHARED_LIBS * sizeof(unsigned long);
+@@ -562,8 +564,10 @@
+ 		}
+ 		if (result >= (unsigned long)-4096) {
+ 			printk("Unable to read data+bss, errno %d\n", (int)-result);
++			down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 			do_munmap(current->mm, textpos, text_len);
+ 			do_munmap(current->mm, realdatastart, data_len + extra);
++			up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 			return result;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -625,8 +629,10 @@
+ 		}
+ 		if (result >= (unsigned long)-4096) {
+ 			printk("Unable to read code+data+bss, errno %d\n",(int)-result);
++			down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 			do_munmap(current->mm, textpos, text_len + data_len + extra +
+ 				MAX_SHARED_LIBS * sizeof(unsigned long));
++			up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 			return result;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_misc.c linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_misc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_misc.c	2004-06-16 01:19:13.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/binfmt_misc.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -108,9 +108,11 @@
+ 	int retval;
+ 
+ 	retval = -ENOEXEC;
+-	if (!enabled)
++	if (!enabled || bprm->misc)
+ 		goto _ret;
+ 
++	bprm->misc++;
++
+ 	/* to keep locking time low, we copy the interpreter string */
+ 	read_lock(&entries_lock);
+ 	fmt = check_file(bprm);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/buffer.c linux-2.6.7/fs/buffer.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/buffer.c	2004-06-16 01:19:36.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/buffer.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
+ #include <linux/bio.h>
+ #include <linux/notifier.h>
+ #include <linux/cpu.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/bitops.h>
+ 
+ static void invalidate_bh_lrus(void);
+@@ -2231,6 +2232,9 @@
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	err = -EFBIG;
++
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, (unsigned long) size, 1);
++
+         limit = current->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur;
+ 	if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && size > (loff_t)limit) {
+ 		send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/compat.c linux-2.6.7/fs/compat.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/compat.c	2004-06-16 01:19:22.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/compat.c	2004-06-25 14:19:47.000000000 -0400
+@@ -1117,6 +1117,11 @@
+ 	struct file *file;
+ 	int retval;
+ 	int i;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	struct file *old_exec_file;
++	struct acl_subject_label *old_acl;
++	struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
++#endif
+ 
+ 	sched_balance_exec();
+ 
+@@ -1126,6 +1131,20 @@
+ 	if (IS_ERR(file))
+ 		return retval;
+ 
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&current->user->processes, 1);
++
++	if (gr_handle_nproc()) {
++		allow_write_access(file);
++		fput(file);
++		return -EAGAIN;
++	}
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) {
++		allow_write_access(file);
++		fput(file);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++
+ 	bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *);
+ 	memset(bprm.page, 0, MAX_ARG_PAGES*sizeof(bprm.page[0]));
+ 
+@@ -1174,15 +1193,49 @@
+ 	if (retval < 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++	if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) {
++		retval = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) {
++		retval = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	old_acl = current->acl;
++	memcpy(old_rlim, current->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
++	old_exec_file = current->exec_file;
++	get_file(file);
++	current->exec_file = file;
++#endif
++
++	gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
++
+ 	retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs);
+ 	if (retval >= 0) {
+ 		free_arg_pages(&bprm);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++		if (old_exec_file)
++			fput(old_exec_file);
++#endif
++
+ 		/* execve success */
+ 		security_bprm_free(&bprm);
+ 		return retval;
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	current->acl = old_acl;
++	memcpy(current->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
++	fput(current->exec_file);
++	current->exec_file = old_exec_file;
++#endif
++
+ out:
+ 	/* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/
+ 	for (i = 0 ; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) {
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/dcache.c linux-2.6.7/fs/dcache.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/dcache.c	2004-06-16 01:18:58.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/dcache.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@
+  *
+  * "buflen" should be positive. Caller holds the dcache_lock.
+  */
+-static char * __d_path( struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
++char * __d_path( struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
+ 			struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt,
+ 			char *buffer, int buflen)
+ {
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/exec.c linux-2.6.7/fs/exec.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/exec.c	2004-06-16 01:19:13.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/exec.c	2004-06-25 17:43:38.000000000 -0400
+@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+ #include <linux/rmap.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+@@ -62,6 +64,20 @@
+ static struct linux_binfmt *formats;
+ static rwlock_t binfmt_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK)
++unsigned int pax_aslr=1;
++#endif
++
++unsigned int pax_softmode;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS
++void (*pax_set_flags_func)(struct linux_binprm * bprm);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(pax_set_flags_func);
++#endif
++
+ int register_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt)
+ {
+ 	struct linux_binfmt ** tmp = &formats;
+@@ -306,6 +322,10 @@
+ 	if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
+ 		goto out_sig;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (page_count(page) == 1)
++#endif
++
+ 	flush_dcache_page(page);
+ 	pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
+ 
+@@ -321,6 +341,11 @@
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	mm->rss++;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (page_count(page) == 1)
++#endif
++
+ 	lru_cache_add_active(page);
+ 	set_pte(pte, pte_mkdirty(pte_mkwrite(mk_pte(
+ 					page, vma->vm_page_prot))));
+@@ -345,6 +370,10 @@
+ 	int i;
+ 	long arg_size;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	struct vm_area_struct *mpnt_m = NULL;
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
+ 	/* Move the argument and environment strings to the bottom of the
+ 	 * stack space.
+@@ -404,8 +433,24 @@
+ 	if (!mpnt)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (VM_STACK_FLAGS & VM_MAYEXEC)) {
++		mpnt_m = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
++		if (!mpnt_m) {
++			kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt);
++			return -ENOMEM;
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	if (security_vm_enough_memory(arg_size >> PAGE_SHIFT)) {
+ 		kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if (mpnt_m)
++			kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt_m);
++#endif
++
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -431,9 +476,36 @@
+ 			mpnt->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS & ~VM_EXEC;
+ 		else
+ 			mpnt->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++		if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC))
++			mpnt->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(mpnt->vm_flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x7];
++		else
++#endif
++
+ 		mpnt->vm_page_prot = protection_map[mpnt->vm_flags & 0x7];
+ 		insert_vm_struct(mm, mpnt);
+ 		mm->total_vm = (mpnt->vm_end - mpnt->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if (mpnt_m) {
++			*mpnt_m = *mpnt;
++			if (!(mpnt->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
++				mpnt_m->vm_flags &= ~(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
++				mpnt_m->vm_page_prot = PAGE_NONE;
++			}
++			mpnt_m->vm_start += SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++			mpnt_m->vm_end += SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++			mpnt_m->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR;
++			mpnt->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR;
++			mpnt_m->vm_mirror = mpnt->vm_start - mpnt_m->vm_start;
++			mpnt->vm_mirror = mpnt_m->vm_start - mpnt->vm_start;
++			insert_vm_struct(mm, mpnt_m);
++			mpnt_m->vm_pgoff = mpnt->vm_pgoff;
++			mm->total_vm += (mpnt_m->vm_end - mpnt_m->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0 ; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) {
+@@ -441,6 +513,14 @@
+ 		if (page) {
+ 			bprm->page[i] = NULL;
+ 			install_arg_page(mpnt, page, stack_base);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT)
++			if (mpnt_m) {
++				page_cache_get(page);
++				install_arg_page(mpnt_m, page, stack_base + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE);
++			}
++#endif
++
+ 		}
+ 		stack_base += PAGE_SIZE;
+ 	}
+@@ -836,6 +916,30 @@
+ 	}
+ 	current->comm[i] = '\0';
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++	current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++	current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++	current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_RANDEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++#endif
++
+ 	flush_thread();
+ 
+ 	if (bprm->e_uid != current->euid || bprm->e_gid != current->egid || 
+@@ -1073,6 +1177,11 @@
+ 	struct file *file;
+ 	int retval;
+ 	int i;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	struct file *old_exec_file;
++	struct acl_subject_label *old_acl;
++	struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
++#endif
+ 
+ 	file = open_exec(filename);
+ 
+@@ -1082,13 +1191,39 @@
+ 
+ 	sched_balance_exec();
+ 
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&current->user->processes), 1);
++
++	if (gr_handle_nproc()) {
++		allow_write_access(file);
++		fput(file);
++		return -EAGAIN;
++	}
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) {
++		allow_write_access(file);
++		fput(file);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++
++
+ 	bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++	if (pax_aslr)
++#endif
++
++	bprm.p -= (pax_get_random_long() & ~(sizeof(void *)-1)) & ~PAGE_MASK;
++#endif
++
+ 	memset(bprm.page, 0, MAX_ARG_PAGES*sizeof(bprm.page[0]));
+ 
+ 	bprm.file = file;
+ 	bprm.filename = filename;
+ 	bprm.interp = filename;
+ 	bprm.sh_bang = 0;
++	bprm.misc = 0;
+ 	bprm.loader = 0;
+ 	bprm.exec = 0;
+ 	bprm.security = NULL;
+@@ -1117,11 +1252,26 @@
+ 	if (retval < 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++	if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) {
++		retval = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) {
++		retval = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm.filename, &bprm);
+ 	if (retval < 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	bprm.exec = bprm.p;
++
++	gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
++
++	gr_handle_exec_args(&bprm, argv);
++
+ 	retval = copy_strings(bprm.envc, envp, &bprm);
+ 	if (retval < 0)
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -1130,8 +1280,24 @@
+ 	if (retval < 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	old_acl = current->acl;
++	memcpy(old_rlim, current->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
++	old_exec_file = current->exec_file;
++	get_file(file);
++	current->exec_file = file;
++#endif
++
++	retval = gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
++	if (retval < 0)
++		goto out_fail;
++
+ 	retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs);
+ 	if (retval >= 0) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++		if (old_exec_file)
++			fput(old_exec_file);
++#endif
+ 		free_arg_pages(&bprm);
+ 
+ 		/* execve success */
+@@ -1139,6 +1305,14 @@
+ 		return retval;
+ 	}
+ 
++out_fail:
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	current->acl = old_acl;
++	memcpy(current->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
++	fput(current->exec_file);
++	current->exec_file = old_exec_file;
++#endif
++
+ out:
+ 	/* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/
+ 	for (i = 0 ; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) {
+@@ -1296,6 +1470,123 @@
+ 	*out_ptr = 0;
+ }
+ 
++int pax_check_flags(unsigned long * flags)
++{
++	int retval = 0;
++
++#if !defined(__i386__) || !defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	if (*flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	{
++		*flags &= ~PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++		retval = -EINVAL;
++	}
++#endif
++
++	if ((*flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	    &&  (*flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++#endif
++
++	   )
++	{
++		*flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++		retval = -EINVAL;
++	}
++
++	if ((*flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++	    && !(*flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
++#endif
++
++	   )
++	{
++		*flags &= ~PF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++		retval = -EINVAL;
++	}
++
++	if ((*flags & PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++	    && !(*flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
++#endif
++
++	   )
++	{
++		*flags &= ~PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++		retval = -EINVAL;
++	}
++
++	if ((*flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++	    && !(*flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)
++#endif
++
++	   )
++	{
++		*flags &= ~PF_PAX_RANDEXEC;
++		retval = -EINVAL;
++	}
++
++	return retval;
++}
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(pax_check_flags);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++void pax_report_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
++	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
++	char* buffer_exec = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
++	char* buffer_fault = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
++	char* path_exec=NULL;
++	char* path_fault=NULL;
++	unsigned long start=0UL, end=0UL, offset=0UL;
++
++	if (buffer_exec && buffer_fault) {
++		struct vm_area_struct* vma, * vma_exec=NULL, * vma_fault=NULL;
++
++		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++		vma = mm->mmap;
++		while (vma && (!vma_exec || !vma_fault)) {
++			if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file)
++				vma_exec = vma;
++			if (vma->vm_start <= (unsigned long)pc && (unsigned long)pc < vma->vm_end)
++				vma_fault = vma;
++			vma = vma->vm_next;
++		}
++		if (vma_exec) {
++			path_exec = d_path(vma_exec->vm_file->f_dentry, vma_exec->vm_file->f_vfsmnt, buffer_exec, PAGE_SIZE);
++			if (IS_ERR(path_exec))
++				path_exec = "<path too long>";
++		}
++		if (vma_fault) {
++			start = vma_fault->vm_start;
++			end = vma_fault->vm_end;
++			offset = vma_fault->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
++			if (vma_fault->vm_file) {
++				path_fault = d_path(vma_fault->vm_file->f_dentry, vma_fault->vm_file->f_vfsmnt, buffer_fault, PAGE_SIZE);
++				if (IS_ERR(path_fault))
++					path_fault = "<path too long>";
++			} else
++				path_fault = "<anonymous mapping>";
++		}
++		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++	}
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", path_fault, start, end, offset);
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: terminating task: %s(%s):%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, "
++			"PC: %p, SP: %p\n", path_exec, tsk->comm, tsk->pid,
++			tsk->uid, tsk->euid, pc, sp);
++	if (buffer_exec) free_page((unsigned long)buffer_exec);
++	if (buffer_fault) free_page((unsigned long)buffer_fault);
++	pax_report_insns(pc, sp);
++	do_coredump(SIGKILL, SIGKILL, regs);
++}
++#endif
++
+ static void zap_threads (struct mm_struct *mm)
+ {
+ 	struct task_struct *g, *p;
+@@ -1365,6 +1656,7 @@
+ 	current->signal->group_exit_code = exit_code;
+ 	coredump_wait(mm);
+ 
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, binfmt->min_coredump, 1);
+ 	if (current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur < binfmt->min_coredump)
+ 		goto fail_unlock;
+ 
+@@ -1384,7 +1676,7 @@
+ 		goto close_fail;
+ 	if (!file->f_op->write)
+ 		goto close_fail;
+-	if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0) != 0)
++	if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0, file->f_vfsmnt) != 0)
+ 		goto close_fail;
+ 
+ 	retval = binfmt->core_dump(signr, regs, file);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/fcntl.c linux-2.6.7/fs/fcntl.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/fcntl.c	2004-06-16 01:19:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/fcntl.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/poll.h>
+ #include <asm/siginfo.h>
+@@ -86,6 +87,9 @@
+ 	int error;
+ 
+ 	error = -EINVAL;
++
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, orig_start, 0);
++
+ 	if (orig_start >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+@@ -105,6 +109,9 @@
+ 	}
+ 	
+ 	error = -EMFILE;
++
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd, 0);
++
+ 	if (newfd >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+@@ -154,6 +161,8 @@
+ 	struct file * file, *tofree;
+ 	struct files_struct * files = current->files;
+ 
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd, 0);
++
+ 	spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
+ 	if (!(file = fcheck(oldfd)))
+ 		goto out_unlock;
+@@ -493,13 +502,15 @@
+ 	if (pid > 0) {
+ 		p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
+ 		if (p) {
+-			send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band);
++			if (!gr_check_protected_task(p))
++				send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band);
+ 		}
+ 	} else {
+ 		struct list_head *l;
+ 		struct pid *pidptr;
+ 		for_each_task_pid(-pid, PIDTYPE_PGID, p, l, pidptr) {
+-			send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band);
++			if (!gr_check_protected_task(p) && !gr_pid_is_chrooted(p))
++				send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/namei.c linux-2.6.7/fs/namei.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/namei.c	2004-06-16 01:19:12.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/namei.c	2004-06-25 17:29:01.000000000 -0400
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
+ #include <linux/audit.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/namei.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ 
+@@ -413,6 +414,13 @@
+ 	err = security_inode_follow_link(dentry, nd);
+ 	if (err)
+ 		goto loop;
++
++	if (gr_handle_follow_link(dentry->d_parent->d_inode,
++				  dentry->d_inode, dentry, nd->mnt)) {
++		err = -EACCES;
++		goto loop;
++	}
++
+ 	current->link_count++;
+ 	current->total_link_count++;
+ 	touch_atime(nd->mnt, dentry);
+@@ -764,6 +772,10 @@
+ 				break;
+ 		}
+ return_base:
++		if (!gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(nd->dentry, nd->mnt)) {
++			path_release(nd);
++			return -ENOENT;
++		}
+ 		return 0;
+ out_dput:
+ 		dput(next.dentry);
+@@ -1225,7 +1237,7 @@
+ 		if (!error) {
+ 			DQUOT_INIT(inode);
+ 			
+-			error = do_truncate(dentry, 0);
++			error = do_truncate(dentry, 0, nd->mnt);
+ 		}
+ 		put_write_access(inode);
+ 		if (error)
+@@ -1276,6 +1288,17 @@
+ 		error = path_lookup(pathname, lookup_flags(flag)|LOOKUP_OPEN, nd);
+ 		if (error)
+ 			return error;
++
++		if (gr_handle_rawio(nd->dentry->d_inode)) {
++			error = -EPERM;
++			goto exit;
++		}
++
++		if (!gr_acl_handle_open(nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) {
++			error = -EACCES;
++			goto exit;
++		}
++
+ 		goto ok;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1309,9 +1332,19 @@
+ 
+ 	/* Negative dentry, just create the file */
+ 	if (!dentry->d_inode) {
++		if (!gr_acl_handle_creat(dentry, nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag, mode)) {
++			error = -EACCES;
++			up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
++			goto exit_dput;
++		}
++
+ 		if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode))
+ 			mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
+ 		error = vfs_create(dir->d_inode, dentry, mode, nd);
++
++		if (!error)
++			gr_handle_create(dentry, nd->mnt);
++
+ 		up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
+ 		dput(nd->dentry);
+ 		nd->dentry = dentry;
+@@ -1326,6 +1359,25 @@
+ 	/*
+ 	 * It already exists.
+ 	 */
++
++	if (gr_handle_rawio(dentry->d_inode)) {
++		error = -EPERM;
++		up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
++		goto exit_dput;
++	}
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_open(dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) {
++		up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto exit_dput;
++	}
++
++	if (gr_handle_fifo(dentry, nd->mnt, dir, flag, acc_mode)) {
++		up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto exit_dput;
++	}
++
+ 	up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
+ 
+ 	error = -EEXIST;
+@@ -1379,6 +1431,13 @@
+ 	error = security_inode_follow_link(dentry, nd);
+ 	if (error)
+ 		goto exit_dput;
++
++	if (gr_handle_follow_link(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry->d_inode,
++				  dentry, nd->mnt)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto exit_dput;
++	}
++
+ 	touch_atime(nd->mnt, dentry);
+ 	error = dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, nd);
+ 	dput(dentry);
+@@ -1486,6 +1545,22 @@
+ 	if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.dentry->d_inode))
+ 		mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
++		if (gr_handle_chroot_mknod(dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
++			error = -EPERM;
++			dput(dentry);
++			up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
++			path_release(&nd);
++			goto out;
++		}
++
++		if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
++			error = -EACCES;
++			dput(dentry);
++			up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
++			path_release(&nd);
++			goto out;
++		}
++
+ 		switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+ 		case 0: case S_IFREG:
+ 			error = vfs_create(nd.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,&nd);
+@@ -1503,6 +1578,10 @@
+ 		default:
+ 			error = -EINVAL;
+ 		}
++
++		if (!error)
++			gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
++
+ 		dput(dentry);
+ 	}
+ 	up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+@@ -1554,9 +1633,19 @@
+ 		dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 1);
+ 		error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ 		if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
++			error = 0;
+ 			if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.dentry->d_inode))
+ 				mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
+-			error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
++
++			if (!gr_acl_handle_mkdir(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt))
++				error = -EACCES;
++
++			if (!error)
++				error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
++
++			if (!error)
++				gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
++
+ 			dput(dentry);
+ 		}
+ 		up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+@@ -1640,6 +1729,8 @@
+ 	char * name;
+ 	struct dentry *dentry;
+ 	struct nameidata nd;
++	ino_t saved_ino = 0;
++	dev_t saved_dev = 0;
+ 
+ 	name = getname(pathname);
+ 	if(IS_ERR(name))
+@@ -1664,7 +1755,21 @@
+ 	dentry = lookup_hash(&nd.last, nd.dentry);
+ 	error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+-		error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
++		error = 0;
++		if (dentry->d_inode) {
++			if (dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1) {
++				saved_ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
++				saved_dev = dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
++			}
++
++			if (!gr_acl_handle_rmdir(dentry, nd.mnt))
++				error = -EACCES;
++		}
++
++		if (!error)
++			error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
++		if (!error && (saved_dev || saved_ino))
++			gr_handle_delete(saved_ino, saved_dev);
+ 		dput(dentry);
+ 	}
+ 	up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+@@ -1718,6 +1823,8 @@
+ 	struct dentry *dentry;
+ 	struct nameidata nd;
+ 	struct inode *inode = NULL;
++	ino_t saved_ino = 0;
++	dev_t saved_dev = 0;
+ 
+ 	name = getname(pathname);
+ 	if(IS_ERR(name))
+@@ -1733,13 +1840,26 @@
+ 	dentry = lookup_hash(&nd.last, nd.dentry);
+ 	error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
++		error = 0;
+ 		/* Why not before? Because we want correct error value */
+ 		if (nd.last.name[nd.last.len])
+ 			goto slashes;
+ 		inode = dentry->d_inode;
+-		if (inode)
++		if (inode) {
++			if (inode->i_nlink <= 1) {
++				saved_ino = inode->i_ino;
++				saved_dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
++			}
++
++			if (!gr_acl_handle_unlink(dentry, nd.mnt))
++				error = -EACCES;
++
+ 			atomic_inc(&inode->i_count);
+-		error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
++		}
++		if (!error)
++			error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
++		if (!error && (saved_ino || saved_dev))
++			gr_handle_delete(saved_ino, saved_dev);
+ 	exit2:
+ 		dput(dentry);
+ 	}
+@@ -1803,7 +1923,15 @@
+ 		dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0);
+ 		error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ 		if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+-			error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from, S_IALLUGO);
++			error = 0;
++			if (!gr_acl_handle_symlink(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, from))
++				error = -EACCES;
++
++			if (!error)
++				error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from, S_IALLUGO);
++
++			if (!error)
++				gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
+ 			dput(dentry);
+ 		}
+ 		up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+@@ -1887,7 +2015,20 @@
+ 	new_dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0);
+ 	error = PTR_ERR(new_dentry);
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(new_dentry)) {
+-		error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
++		error = 0;
++		if (gr_handle_hardlink(old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt,
++				       old_nd.dentry->d_inode,
++				       old_nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode, to))
++			error = -EPERM;
++		if (!gr_acl_handle_link(new_dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt,
++					old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt, to))
++			error = -EACCES;
++		if (!error)
++			error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
++
++		if (!error)
++			gr_handle_create(new_dentry, nd.mnt);
++
+ 		dput(new_dentry);
+ 	}
+ 	up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+@@ -2109,8 +2250,16 @@
+ 	if (new_dentry == trap)
+ 		goto exit5;
+ 
+-	error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
++	error = gr_acl_handle_rename(new_dentry, newnd.dentry, newnd.mnt,
++				     old_dentry, old_dir->d_inode, oldnd.mnt,
++				     newname);
++
++	if (!error)
++		error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
+ 				   new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry);
++	if (!error)
++		gr_handle_rename(old_dir->d_inode, newnd.dentry->d_inode, old_dentry, 
++				 new_dentry, oldnd.mnt, new_dentry->d_inode ? 1 : 0);
+ exit5:
+ 	dput(new_dentry);
+ exit4:
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/namespace.c linux-2.6.7/fs/namespace.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/namespace.c	2004-06-16 01:19:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/namespace.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
+ #include <linux/namei.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/unistd.h>
+ 
+@@ -402,6 +404,8 @@
+ 			lock_kernel();
+ 			retval = do_remount_sb(sb, MS_RDONLY, 0, 0);
+ 			unlock_kernel();
++
++			gr_log_remount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval);
+ 		}
+ 		up_write(&sb->s_umount);
+ 		return retval;
+@@ -430,6 +434,9 @@
+ 	if (retval)
+ 		security_sb_umount_busy(mnt);
+ 	up_write(&current->namespace->sem);
++
++	gr_log_unmount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval);
++
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -852,6 +859,11 @@
+ 	if (retval)
+ 		goto dput_out;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_chroot_mount(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, dev_name)) {
++		retval = -EPERM;
++		goto dput_out;
++	}
++
+ 	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+ 		retval = do_remount(&nd, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags,
+ 				    data_page);
+@@ -864,6 +876,9 @@
+ 				      dev_name, data_page);
+ dput_out:
+ 	path_release(&nd);
++
++	gr_log_mount(dev_name, dir_name, retval);
++
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1086,6 +1101,9 @@
+ 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ 		return -EPERM;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_chroot_pivot())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	lock_kernel();
+ 
+ 	error = __user_walk(new_root, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &new_nd);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/open.c linux-2.6.7/fs/open.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/open.c	2004-06-16 01:18:56.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/open.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <linux/fs.h>
+ #include <linux/pagemap.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/unistd.h>
+ 
+@@ -191,7 +192,7 @@
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
+-int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length)
++int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, struct vfsmount *mnt)
+ {
+ 	int err;
+ 	struct iattr newattrs;
+@@ -200,6 +201,9 @@
+ 	if (length < 0)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_truncate(dentry, mnt))
++		return -EACCES;
++
+ 	newattrs.ia_size = length;
+ 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE | ATTR_CTIME;
+ 	down(&dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+@@ -260,7 +264,7 @@
+ 	error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, NULL, length);
+ 	if (!error) {
+ 		DQUOT_INIT(inode);
+-		error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length);
++		error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length, nd.mnt);
+ 	}
+ 	put_write_access(inode);
+ 
+@@ -312,7 +316,7 @@
+ 
+ 	error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, file, length);
+ 	if (!error)
+-		error = do_truncate(dentry, length);
++		error = do_truncate(dentry, length, file->f_vfsmnt);
+ out_putf:
+ 	fput(file);
+ out:
+@@ -391,6 +395,11 @@
+ 		    (error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE,&nd)) != 0)
+ 			goto dput_and_out;
+ 	}
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto dput_and_out;
++	}
++
+ 	down(&inode->i_sem);
+ 	error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
+ 	up(&inode->i_sem);
+@@ -444,6 +453,12 @@
+ 		    (error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE,&nd)) != 0)
+ 			goto dput_and_out;
+ 	}
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto dput_and_out;
++	}
++
+ 	down(&inode->i_sem);
+ 	error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
+ 	up(&inode->i_sem);
+@@ -505,6 +520,10 @@
+ 		if(!res && (mode & S_IWOTH) && IS_RDONLY(nd.dentry->d_inode)
+ 		   && !special_file(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
+ 			res = -EROFS;
++
++		if (!res && !gr_acl_handle_access(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode))
++			res = -EACCES;
++
+ 		path_release(&nd);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -528,6 +547,8 @@
+ 	if (error)
+ 		goto dput_and_out;
+ 
++	gr_log_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt);
++
+ 	set_fs_pwd(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
+ 
+ dput_and_out:
+@@ -558,6 +579,13 @@
+ 		goto out_putf;
+ 
+ 	error = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, NULL);
++
++	if (!error && !gr_chroot_fchdir(dentry, mnt))
++		error = -EPERM;
++
++	if (!error)
++		gr_log_chdir(dentry, mnt);
++
+ 	if (!error)
+ 		set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry);
+ out_putf:
+@@ -583,8 +611,16 @@
+ 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
+ 		goto dput_and_out;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_chroot_chroot(nd.dentry, nd.mnt))
++		goto dput_and_out;
++
+ 	set_fs_root(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
+ 	set_fs_altroot();
++
++	gr_handle_chroot_caps(current);
++
++	gr_handle_chroot_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt);
++
+ 	error = 0;
+ dput_and_out:
+ 	path_release(&nd);
+@@ -613,9 +649,22 @@
+ 	err = -EPERM;
+ 	if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
+ 		goto out_putf;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_fchmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) {
++		err = -EACCES;
++		goto out_putf;
++	}
++
+ 	down(&inode->i_sem);
+ 	if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
+ 		mode = inode->i_mode;
++
++	if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) {
++		err = -EPERM;
++		up(&inode->i_sem);
++		goto out_putf;
++	}
++
+ 	newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
+ 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
+ 	err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
+@@ -647,9 +696,21 @@
+ 	if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
+ 		goto dput_and_out;
+ 
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto dput_and_out;
++	}
++
+ 	down(&inode->i_sem);
+ 	if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
+ 		mode = inode->i_mode;
++
++	if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		up(&inode->i_sem);
++		goto dput_and_out;
++	}
++
+ 	newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
+ 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
+ 	error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
+@@ -661,7 +722,7 @@
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
+-static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group)
++static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group, struct vfsmount *mnt)
+ {
+ 	struct inode * inode;
+ 	int error;
+@@ -678,6 +739,12 @@
+ 	error = -EPERM;
+ 	if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
+ 		goto out;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_chown(dentry, mnt)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	newattrs.ia_valid =  ATTR_CTIME;
+ 	if (user != (uid_t) -1) {
+ 		newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_UID;
+@@ -703,7 +770,7 @@
+ 
+ 	error = user_path_walk(filename, &nd);
+ 	if (!error) {
+-		error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group);
++		error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt);
+ 		path_release(&nd);
+ 	}
+ 	return error;
+@@ -716,7 +783,7 @@
+ 
+ 	error = user_path_walk_link(filename, &nd);
+ 	if (!error) {
+-		error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group);
++		error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt);
+ 		path_release(&nd);
+ 	}
+ 	return error;
+@@ -730,7 +797,8 @@
+ 
+ 	file = fget(fd);
+ 	if (file) {
+-		error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, group);
++		error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user,
++				     group, file->f_vfsmnt);
+ 		fput(file);
+ 	}
+ 	return error;
+@@ -852,6 +920,7 @@
+ 	 * N.B. For clone tasks sharing a files structure, this test
+ 	 * will limit the total number of files that can be opened.
+ 	 */
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, fd, 0);
+ 	if (fd >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/array.c linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/array.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/array.c	2004-06-16 01:19:36.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/array.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -274,6 +274,19 @@
+ 			    cap_t(p->cap_effective));
+ }
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
++static inline char *task_pax(struct task_struct *p, char *buffer)
++{
++	return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "PaX:\t%c%c%c%c%c%c\n",
++				p->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC ? 'P' : 'p',
++				p->flags & PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP ? 'E' : 'e',
++				p->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT ? 'M' : 'm',
++				p->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP ? 'R' : 'r',
++				p->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC ? 'X' : 'x',
++				p->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 'S' : 's');
++}
++#endif
++
+ extern char *task_mem(struct mm_struct *, char *);
+ int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)
+ {
+@@ -292,9 +305,20 @@
+ #if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_S390)
+ 	buffer = task_show_regs(task, buffer);
+ #endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
++	buffer = task_pax(task, buffer);
++#endif
++
+ 	return buffer - orig;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++#define PAX_RAND_FLAGS (task->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP || \
++			task->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC || \
++			task->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++#endif
++
+ extern unsigned long task_vsize(struct mm_struct *);
+ int proc_pid_stat(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)
+ {
+@@ -326,6 +350,19 @@
+ 
+ 	wchan = get_wchan(task);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++	if (PAX_RAND_FLAGS) {
++		eip = 0;
++		esp = 0;
++		wchan = 0;
++	}
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++	wchan = 0;
++	eip =0;
++	esp =0;
++#endif
++
+ 	sigemptyset(&sigign);
+ 	sigemptyset(&sigcatch);
+ 	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+@@ -385,9 +422,15 @@
+ 		vsize,
+ 		mm ? mm->rss : 0, /* you might want to shift this left 3 */
+ 		task->rlim[RLIMIT_RSS].rlim_cur,
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++		PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0 : (mm ? mm->start_code : 0),
++		PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0 : (mm ? mm->end_code : 0),
++		PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0 : (mm ? mm->start_stack : 0),
++#else
+ 		mm ? mm->start_code : 0,
+ 		mm ? mm->end_code : 0,
+ 		mm ? mm->start_stack : 0,
++#endif
+ 		esp,
+ 		eip,
+ 		/* The signal information here is obsolete.
+@@ -427,3 +470,14 @@
+ 	return sprintf(buffer,"%d %d %d %d %d %d %d\n",
+ 		       size, resident, shared, text, lib, data, 0);
+ }
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)
++{
++	int len;
++
++	len = sprintf(buffer, "%u.%u.%u.%u\n", NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip));
++	return len;
++}
++#endif
++
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/base.c linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/base.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/base.c	2004-06-16 01:19:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/base.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ /*
+  * For hysterical raisins we keep the same inumbers as in the old procfs.
+@@ -67,6 +68,9 @@
+ 	PROC_TGID_ATTR_EXEC,
+ 	PROC_TGID_ATTR_FSCREATE,
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++	PROC_TGID_IPADDR,
++#endif
+ 	PROC_TGID_FD_DIR,
+ 	PROC_TID_INO,
+ 	PROC_TID_STATUS,
+@@ -117,6 +121,9 @@
+ 	E(PROC_TGID_ROOT,      "root",    S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
+ 	E(PROC_TGID_EXE,       "exe",     S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
+ 	E(PROC_TGID_MOUNTS,    "mounts",  S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++	E(PROC_TGID_IPADDR,     "ipaddr",  S_IFREG|S_IRUSR),
++#endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ 	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR,      "attr",    S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO),
+ #endif
+@@ -181,6 +188,9 @@
+ int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct*,char*);
+ int proc_pid_statm(struct task_struct*,char*);
+ int proc_pid_cpu(struct task_struct*,char*);
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct*,char*);
++#endif
+ 
+ static int proc_fd_link(struct inode *inode, struct dentry **dentry, struct vfsmount **mnt)
+ {
+@@ -277,7 +287,7 @@
+ 	(task == current || \
+ 	(task->parent == current && \
+ 	(task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) &&  task->state == TASK_STOPPED && \
+-	 security_ptrace(current,task) == 0))
++	 security_ptrace(current,task) == 0 && !gr_handle_proc_ptrace(task)))
+ 
+ static int may_ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
+ {
+@@ -292,13 +302,15 @@
+ 	     (current->uid != task->uid) ||
+ 	     (current->gid != task->egid) ||
+ 	     (current->gid != task->sgid) ||
+-	     (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
++	     (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ 		goto out;
+ 	rmb();
+-	if (!task->mm->dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
++	if (!task->mm->dumpable && !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ 		goto out;
+ 	if (security_ptrace(current, task))
+ 		goto out;
++	if (gr_handle_proc_ptrace(task))
++		goto out;
+ 
+ 	retval = 1;
+ out:
+@@ -445,9 +457,22 @@
+ 
+ static int proc_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
+ {
++	int ret;
++	struct task_struct *task;
++
+ 	if (vfs_permission(inode, mask) != 0)
+ 		return -EACCES;
+-	return proc_check_root(inode);
++	ret = proc_check_root(inode);
++
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	task = proc_task(inode);
++
++	if (!task)
++		return 0;
++
++	return gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(task);
+ }
+ 
+ extern struct seq_operations proc_pid_maps_op;
+@@ -954,6 +979,9 @@
+ 		inode->i_uid = task->euid;
+ 		inode->i_gid = task->egid;
+ 	}
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
++#endif
+ 	security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
+ 
+ out:
+@@ -982,7 +1010,9 @@
+ 	if (pid_alive(task)) {
+ 		if (proc_type(inode) == PROC_TGID_INO || proc_type(inode) == PROC_TID_INO || task_dumpable(task)) {
+ 			inode->i_uid = task->euid;
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+ 			inode->i_gid = task->egid;
++#endif
+ 		} else {
+ 			inode->i_uid = 0;
+ 			inode->i_gid = 0;
+@@ -1318,6 +1348,12 @@
+ 			inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations;
+ 			ei->op.proc_read = proc_pid_status;
+ 			break;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++		case PROC_TGID_IPADDR:
++			inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations;
++			ei->op.proc_read = proc_pid_ipaddr;
++			break;
++#endif
+ 		case PROC_TID_STAT:
+ 		case PROC_TGID_STAT:
+ 			inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations;
+@@ -1567,6 +1603,22 @@
+ 	if (!task)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++	if (gr_check_hidden_task(task)) {
++		put_task_struct(task);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++	if (current->uid && (task->uid != current->uid)
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	    && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID)
++#endif
++	) {
++		put_task_struct(task);
++		goto out;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, PROC_TGID_INO);
+ 
+ 
+@@ -1574,7 +1626,15 @@
+ 		put_task_struct(task);
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR;
++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXGRP;
++	inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
++#else
+ 	inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
++#endif
+ 	inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations;
+ 	inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations;
+ 	inode->i_nlink = 3;
+@@ -1658,6 +1718,9 @@
+ static int get_tgid_list(int index, unsigned long version, unsigned int *tgids)
+ {
+ 	struct task_struct *p;
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++	struct task_struct *tmp = current;
++#endif
+ 	int nr_tgids = 0;
+ 
+ 	index--;
+@@ -1678,6 +1741,18 @@
+ 		int tgid = p->pid;
+ 		if (!pid_alive(p))
+ 			continue;
++		if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(p))
++			continue;
++		if (gr_check_hidden_task(p))
++			continue;
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++		if (tmp->uid && (p->uid != tmp->uid)
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++		    && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID)
++#endif
++		)
++			continue;
++#endif
+ 		if (--index >= 0)
+ 			continue;
+ 		tgids[nr_tgids] = tgid;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/inode.c linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/inode.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/inode.c	2004-06-16 01:20:03.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/inode.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -209,7 +209,11 @@
+ 		if (de->mode) {
+ 			inode->i_mode = de->mode;
+ 			inode->i_uid = de->uid;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++			inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
++#else
+ 			inode->i_gid = de->gid;
++#endif
+ 		}
+ 		if (de->size)
+ 			inode->i_size = de->size;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/proc_misc.c linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/proc_misc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/proc_misc.c	2004-06-16 01:18:58.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/proc_misc.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -654,6 +654,8 @@
+ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
+ {
+ 	struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
++	int gr_mode = 0;
++
+ 	static struct {
+ 		char *name;
+ 		int (*read_proc)(char*,char**,off_t,int,int*,void*);
+@@ -668,9 +670,13 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_STRAM_PROC
+ 		{"stram",	stram_read_proc},
+ #endif
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+ 		{"devices",	devices_read_proc},
++#endif
+ 		{"filesystems",	filesystems_read_proc},
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+ 		{"cmdline",	cmdline_read_proc},
++#endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SGI_DS1286
+ 		{"rtc",		ds1286_read_proc},
+ #endif
+@@ -681,24 +687,39 @@
+ 	for (p = simple_ones; p->name; p++)
+ 		create_proc_read_entry(p->name, 0, NULL, p->read_proc, NULL);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	gr_mode = S_IRUSR;
++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	gr_mode = S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++	create_proc_read_entry("devices", gr_mode, NULL, &devices_read_proc, NULL);
++	create_proc_read_entry("cmdline", gr_mode, NULL, &cmdline_read_proc, NULL);
++#endif	
++
+ 	proc_symlink("mounts", NULL, "self/mounts");
+ 
+ 	/* And now for trickier ones */
+ 	entry = create_proc_entry("kmsg", S_IRUSR, &proc_root);
+ 	if (entry)
+ 		entry->proc_fops = &proc_kmsg_operations;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++	create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", gr_mode, &proc_cpuinfo_operations);
++	create_seq_entry("slabinfo",gr_mode,&proc_slabinfo_operations);
++#else
+ 	create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", 0, &proc_cpuinfo_operations);
++	create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO,&proc_slabinfo_operations);
++#endif
+ 	create_seq_entry("partitions", 0, &proc_partitions_operations);
+ 	create_seq_entry("stat", 0, &proc_stat_operations);
+ 	create_seq_entry("interrupts", 0, &proc_interrupts_operations);
+-	create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO,&proc_slabinfo_operations);
+ 	create_seq_entry("buddyinfo",S_IRUGO, &fragmentation_file_operations);
+ 	create_seq_entry("vmstat",S_IRUGO, &proc_vmstat_file_operations);
+ 	create_seq_entry("diskstats", 0, &proc_diskstats_operations);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
+-	create_seq_entry("modules", 0, &proc_modules_operations);
++	create_seq_entry("modules", gr_mode, &proc_modules_operations);
+ #endif
+-#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_KCORE
++#if defined(CONFIG_PROC_KCORE)
+ 	proc_root_kcore = create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL);
+ 	if (proc_root_kcore) {
+ 		proc_root_kcore->proc_fops = &proc_kcore_operations;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/root.c linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/root.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/root.c	2004-06-16 01:19:44.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/root.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -52,13 +52,26 @@
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 	proc_misc_init();
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	proc_net = proc_mkdir_mode("net", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, 0);
++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	proc_net = proc_mkdir_mode("net", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, 0);
++#else
+ 	proc_net = proc_mkdir("net", 0);
++#endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
+ 	proc_mkdir("sysvipc", 0);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	proc_sys_root = proc_mkdir_mode("sys", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, 0);
++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	proc_sys_root = proc_mkdir_mode("sys", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, 0);
++#else
+ 	proc_sys_root = proc_mkdir("sys", 0);
+ #endif
++#endif
+ #if defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC) || defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC_MODULE)
+ 	proc_mkdir("sys/fs", 0);
+ 	proc_mkdir("sys/fs/binfmt_misc", 0);
+@@ -74,7 +87,15 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_DEVICETREE
+ 	proc_device_tree_init();
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	proc_bus = proc_mkdir_mode("bus", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, 0);
++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	proc_bus = proc_mkdir_mode("bus", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, 0);
++#endif
++#else
+ 	proc_bus = proc_mkdir("bus", 0);
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ static struct dentry *proc_root_lookup(struct inode * dir, struct dentry * dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/task_mmu.c linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/task_mmu.c	2004-06-16 01:18:59.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/proc/task_mmu.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -34,12 +34,23 @@
+ 		"VmData:\t%8lu kB\n"
+ 		"VmStk:\t%8lu kB\n"
+ 		"VmExe:\t%8lu kB\n"
+-		"VmLib:\t%8lu kB\n",
+-		mm->total_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
++		"VmLib:\t%8lu kB\n"
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
++		"CsBase:\t%8lx\nCsLim:\t%8lx\n"
++#endif
++
++		,mm->total_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
+ 		mm->locked_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
+ 		mm->rss << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
+ 		data - stack, stack,
+-		exec - lib, lib);
++		exec - lib, lib
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
++		, mm->context.user_cs_base, mm->context.user_cs_limit
++#endif
++
++);
+ 	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	return buffer;
+ }
+@@ -76,8 +87,17 @@
+ 	return size;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++#define PAX_RAND_FLAGS (task->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP || \
++			task->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC || \
++			task->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++#endif
++
+ static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+ {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++	struct task_struct *task = m->private;
++#endif
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *map = v;
+ 	struct file *file = map->vm_file;
+ 	int flags = map->vm_flags;
+@@ -92,8 +112,14 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	seq_printf(m, "%08lx-%08lx %c%c%c%c %08lx %02x:%02x %lu %n",
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++			PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0UL : map->vm_start,
++			PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0UL : map->vm_end,
++#else
+ 			map->vm_start,
+ 			map->vm_end,
++#endif
++
+ 			flags & VM_READ ? 'r' : '-',
+ 			flags & VM_WRITE ? 'w' : '-',
+ 			flags & VM_EXEC ? 'x' : '-',
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/fs/readdir.c linux-2.6.7/fs/readdir.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/fs/readdir.c	2004-06-16 01:19:22.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/fs/readdir.c	2004-06-25 17:29:52.000000000 -0400
+@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
+ #include <linux/dirent.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/unistd.h>
++#include <linux/namei.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ 
+@@ -65,6 +67,7 @@
+ struct readdir_callback {
+ 	struct old_linux_dirent __user * dirent;
+ 	int result;
++	struct nameidata nd;
+ };
+ 
+ static int fillonedir(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, loff_t offset,
+@@ -75,6 +78,10 @@
+ 
+ 	if (buf->result)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->nd.dentry, buf->nd.mnt, ino))
++		return 0;
++
+ 	buf->result++;
+ 	dirent = buf->dirent;
+ 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, dirent,
+@@ -107,6 +114,9 @@
+ 	buf.result = 0;
+ 	buf.dirent = dirent;
+ 
++	buf.nd.dentry = file->f_dentry;
++	buf.nd.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
++
+ 	error = vfs_readdir(file, fillonedir, &buf);
+ 	if (error >= 0)
+ 		error = buf.result;
+@@ -134,6 +144,7 @@
+ 	struct linux_dirent __user * previous;
+ 	int count;
+ 	int error;
++	struct nameidata nd;
+ };
+ 
+ static int filldir(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, loff_t offset,
+@@ -146,6 +157,10 @@
+ 	buf->error = -EINVAL;	/* only used if we fail.. */
+ 	if (reclen > buf->count)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->nd.dentry, buf->nd.mnt, ino))
++		return 0;
++
+ 	dirent = buf->previous;
+ 	if (dirent) {
+ 		if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off))
+@@ -193,6 +208,9 @@
+ 	buf.count = count;
+ 	buf.error = 0;
+ 
++	buf.nd.dentry = file->f_dentry;
++	buf.nd.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
++
+ 	error = vfs_readdir(file, filldir, &buf);
+ 	if (error < 0)
+ 		goto out_putf;
+@@ -218,6 +236,7 @@
+ 	struct linux_dirent64 __user * previous;
+ 	int count;
+ 	int error;
++	struct nameidata nd;
+ };
+ 
+ static int filldir64(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, loff_t offset,
+@@ -230,6 +249,10 @@
+ 	buf->error = -EINVAL;	/* only used if we fail.. */
+ 	if (reclen > buf->count)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->nd.dentry, buf->nd.mnt, ino))
++		return 0;
++
+ 	dirent = buf->previous;
+ 	if (dirent) {
+ 		if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off))
+@@ -279,6 +302,9 @@
+ 	buf.count = count;
+ 	buf.error = 0;
+ 
++	buf.nd.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
++	buf.nd.dentry = file->f_dentry;
++
+ 	error = vfs_readdir(file, filldir64, &buf);
+ 	if (error < 0)
+ 		goto out_putf;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/Kconfig linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/Kconfig
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/Kconfig	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/Kconfig	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,864 @@
++#
++# grecurity configuration
++#
++
++menu "Grsecurity"
++
++config GRKERNSEC
++	bool "Grsecurity"
++	select CRYPTO
++	select CRYPTO_SHA256
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to configure many features
++	  that will enhance the security of your system.  It is highly
++	  recommended that you say Y here and read through the help
++	  for each option so that you fully understand the features and
++	  can evaluate their usefulness for your machine.
++
++choice
++	prompt "Security Level"
++	depends GRKERNSEC
++	default GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
++
++config GRKERNSEC_LOW
++	bool "Low"
++	select GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
++	select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++	select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	help
++	  If you choose this option, several of the grsecurity options will
++	  be enabled that will give you greater protection against a number
++	  of attacks, while assuring that none of your software will have any
++	  conflicts with the additional security measures.  If you run a lot
++	  of unusual software, or you are having problems with the higher
++	  security levels, you should say Y here.  With this option, the
++	  following features are enabled:
++
++	  - Linking Restrictions
++	  - FIFO Restrictions
++	  - Randomized PIDs
++	  - Enforcing RLIMIT_NPROC on execve
++	  - Restricted dmesg
++	  - Randomized IP IDs
++	  - Enforced chdir("/") on chroot
++
++config GRKERNSEC_MEDIUM
++	bool "Medium"
++	select PAX_EI_PAX
++	select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
++	select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++	select GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
++	select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
++	select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++	select GRKERNSEC_TIME
++	select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	select PAX_RANDUSTACK
++	select PAX_ASLR
++	select PAX_RANDMMAP
++
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, several features in addition to those included
++	  in the low additional security level will be enabled.  These
++	  features provide even more security to your system, though in rare
++	  cases they may be incompatible with very old or poorly written
++	  software.  If you enable this option, make sure that your auth
++	  service (identd) is running as gid 1001.  With this option, 
++	  the following features (in addition to those provided in the 
++	  low additional security level) will be enabled:
++
++	  - Randomized TCP Source Ports
++	  - Failed Fork Logging
++	  - Time Change Logging
++	  - Signal Logging
++	  - Deny Mounts in chroot
++	  - Deny Double chrooting
++	  - Deny Sysctl Writes in chroot
++	  - Deny Mknod in chroot
++	  - Deny Access to Abstract AF_UNIX Sockets out of chroot
++	  - Deny pivot_root in chroot
++	  - Denied Writes of /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port
++	  - /proc restrictions with special GID set to 10 (usually wheel)
++	  - Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
++
++config GRKERNSEC_HIGH
++	bool "High"
++	select GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
++	select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
++	select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++	select GRKERNSEC_TIME
++	select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++	select GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	select GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++	select GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	select PAX_RANDUSTACK
++	select PAX_ASLR
++	select PAX_RANDMMAP
++	select PAX_NOEXEC
++	select PAX_MPROTECT
++	select PAX_EI_PAX
++	select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
++	select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++	select PAX_KERNEXEC
++	select PAX_RANDKSTACK
++	select PAX_RANDEXEC
++	select PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	select PAX_EMUTRAMP
++	select PAX_NOVSYSCALL
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, many of the features of grsecurity will be
++	  enabled, which will protect you against many kinds of attacks
++	  against your system.  The heightened security comes at a cost
++	  of an increased chance of incompatibilities with rare software
++	  on your machine.  Since this security level enables PaX, you should
++	  view <http://pax.grsecurity.net> and read about the PaX
++	  project.  While you are there, download chpax and run it on
++	  binaries that cause problems with PaX.  Also remember that
++	  since the /proc restrictions are enabled, you must run your
++	  identd as gid 1001.  This security level enables the following 
++	  features in addition to those listed in the low and medium 
++	  security levels:
++
++	  - Additional /proc Restrictions
++	  - Chmod Restrictions in chroot
++	  - No Signals, Ptrace, or Viewing of Processes Outside of chroot
++	  - Capability Restrictions in chroot
++	  - Deny fchdir out of chroot
++	  - Priority Restrictions in chroot
++	  - Segmentation-based Implementation of PaX
++	  - Mprotect Restrictions
++	  - Removal of Addresses from /proc/<pid>/[maps|stat]
++	  - Kernel Stack Randomization
++	  - Mount/Unmount/Remount Logging
++	  - Kernel Symbol Hiding
++	
++config GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
++	bool "Custom"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to configure every grsecurity
++	  option, which allows you to enable many more features that aren't
++	  covered in the basic security levels.  These additional features
++	  include TPE, socket restrictions, and the sysctl system for
++	  grsecurity.  It is advised that you read through the help for
++	  each option to determine its usefulness in your situation.
++
++endchoice
++
++menu "Address Space Protection"
++depends on GRKERNSEC
++
++config GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++	bool "Deny writing to /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, /dev/kmem and /dev/mem won't be allowed to
++	  be written to via mmap or otherwise to modify the running kernel.
++	  /dev/port will also not be allowed to be opened. If you have module
++	  support disabled, enabling this will close up four ways that are
++	  currently used  to insert malicious code into the running kernel.
++	  Even with all these features enabled, we still highly recommend that
++	  you use the ACL system, as it is still possible for an attacker to
++	  modify the running kernel through privileged I/O granted by ioperm/iopl.
++	  If you are not using XFree86, you may be able to stop this additional
++	  case by enabling the 'Disable privileged I/O' option. Though nothing
++	  legitimately writes to /dev/kmem, XFree86 does need to write to /dev/mem,
++	  but only to video memory, which is the only writing we allow in this
++	  case.  If /dev/kmem or /dev/mem are mmaped without PROT_WRITE, they will
++	  not be allowed to mprotect it with PROT_WRITE later.
++	  Enabling this feature could make certain apps like VMWare stop working,
++	  as they need to write to other locations in /dev/mem.
++	  It is highly recommended that you say Y here if you meet all the
++	  conditions above.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_IO
++	bool "Disable privileged I/O"
++	depends on X86
++	select RTC
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error.
++	  Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel.
++	  Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly,
++	  the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock.  hwclock can be
++	  remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so CONFIG_RTC is
++	  enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure that hwclock operates
++	  correctly.  XFree86 still will not operate correctly with this option
++	  enabled, so DO NOT CHOOSE Y IF YOU USE XFree86.  If you use XFree86
++	  and you still want to protect your kernel against modification,
++	  use the ACL system.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++	bool "Remove addresses from /proc/<pid>/[maps|stat]"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the /proc/<pid>/maps and /proc/<pid>/stat files will
++	  give no information about the addresses of its mappings if
++	  PaX features that rely on random addresses are enabled on the task.
++	  If you use PaX it is greatly recommended that you say Y here as it
++	  closes up a hole that makes the full ASLR useless for suid
++	  binaries.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++	bool "Hide kernel symbols"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, getting information on loaded modules, and
++	  displaying all kernel symbols through a syscall will be restricted
++	  to users with CAP_SYS_MODULE.  This option is only effective
++	  provided the following conditions are met:
++	  1) The kernel using grsecurity is not precompiled by some distribution
++	  2) You are using the ACL system and hiding other files such as your
++	     kernel image and System.map
++	  3) You have the additional /proc restrictions enabled, which removes
++	     /proc/kcore
++	  If the above conditions are met, this option will aid to provide a
++	  useful protection against local and remote kernel exploitation of
++	  overflows and arbitrary read/write vulnerabilities.
++
++endmenu
++menu "Role Based Access Control Options"
++depends on GRKERNSEC
++
++config GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN
++	bool "Hide kernel processes"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, when the RBAC system is enabled via gradm -E,
++	  an additional ACL will be passed to the kernel that hides all kernel
++	  processes.  These processes will only be viewable by the authenticated
++	  admin, or processes that have viewing access set.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES
++	int "Maximum tries before password lockout"
++	default 3
++	help
++	  This option enforces the maximum number of times a user can attempt
++	  to authorize themselves with the grsecurity ACL system before being
++	  denied the ability to attempt authorization again for a specified time.
++	  The lower the number, the harder it will be to brute-force a password.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT
++	int "Time to wait after max password tries, in seconds"
++	default 30
++	help
++	  This option specifies the time the user must wait after attempting to
++	  authorize to the ACL system with the maximum number of invalid
++	  passwords.  The higher the number, the harder it will be to brute-force
++	  a password.
++
++endmenu
++menu "Filesystem Protections"
++depends on GRKERNSEC
++
++config GRKERNSEC_PROC
++	bool "Proc restrictions"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the permissions of the /proc filesystem
++	  will be altered to enhance system security and privacy.  Depending
++	  upon the options you choose, you can either restrict users to see
++	  only the processes they themselves run, or choose a group that can
++	  view all processes and files normally restricted to root if you choose
++	  the "restrict to user only" option.  NOTE: If you're running identd as
++	  a non-root user, you will have to run it as the group you specify here.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	bool "Restrict /proc to user only"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, non-root users will only be able to view their own
++	  processes, and restricts them from viewing network-related information,
++	  and viewing kernel symbol and module information.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	bool "Allow special group"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to select a group that will be
++	  able to view all processes, network-related information, and
++	  kernel and symbol information.  This option is useful if you want
++	  to run identd as a non-root user.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID
++	int "GID for special group"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	default 1001
++
++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++	bool "Additional restrictions"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER || GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, additional restrictions will be placed on
++	  /proc that keep normal users from viewing cpu and device information.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	bool "Linking restrictions"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
++	  will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in
++	  world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of the
++	  symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
++	  able to hardlink to files they do not own.  If the sysctl option is
++	  enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	bool "FIFO restrictions"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
++	  own in world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of
++	  the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in.  If the sysctl
++	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
++	  created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	bool "Chroot jail restrictions"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose several options that will
++	  make breaking out of a chrooted jail much more difficult.  If you
++	  encounter no software incompatibilities with the following options, it
++	  is recommended that you enable each one.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++	bool "Deny mounts"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
++	  mount or remount filesystems.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
++	  sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++	bool "Deny double-chroots"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot
++	  again outside the chroot.  This is a widely used method of breaking
++	  out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed.  If the sysctl 
++	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name 
++	  "chroot_deny_chroot" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++	bool "Deny pivot_root in chroot"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use
++	  a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41.  It
++	  works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem.  This
++	  function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out
++	  of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed.  If the sysctl
++	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is
++	  created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	bool "Enforce chdir(\"/\") on all chroots"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted
++	  applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot.
++	  The man page on chroot(2) states:
++	  Note that this call does not change  the  current  working
++	  directory,  so  that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at
++	  `/'.  In particular, the  super-user  can  escape  from  a
++	  `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'.
++
++	  It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break
++	  any software.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
++	  name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++	bool "Deny (f)chmod +s"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod
++	  or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits.  This protects
++	  against another published method of breaking a chroot.  If the sysctl
++	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is
++	  created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++	bool "Deny fchdir out of chroot"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
++	  to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
++	  outside the filesystem will be stopped.  If the sysctl option
++	  is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++	bool "Deny mknod"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to
++	  mknod.  The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it
++	  would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same
++	  as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from
++	  anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which
++	  they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data).  It is recommended
++	  that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities.
++	  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++	  "chroot_deny_mknod" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++	bool "Deny shmat() out of chroot"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach
++	  to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail.
++	  It is recommended that you say Y here.  If the sysctl option is enabled,
++	  a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++	bool "Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
++	  connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix
++	  domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot.  It is recommended
++	  that you say Y here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
++	  with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++	bool "Protect outside processes"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
++	  kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, setpgid, getpgid,
++	  getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot.  If the sysctl
++	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is
++	  created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++	bool "Restrict priority changes"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise
++	  the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of
++	  processes outside the chroot.  This provides more security than simply
++	  removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set.  If the
++	  sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice"
++	  is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++	bool "Deny sysctl writes"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to
++	  write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc
++	  interface.  It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the
++	  sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++	  "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	bool "Capability restrictions"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the capabilities on all root processes within a
++	  chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o,
++	  system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable
++	  files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time.
++	  This is left an option because it can break some apps.  Disable this
++	  if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of
++	  tasks.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
++	  name "chroot_caps" is created.
++
++endmenu
++menu "Kernel Auditing"
++depends on GRKERNSEC
++
++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
++	bool "Single group for auditing"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the exec, chdir, (un)mount, and ipc logging features
++	  will only operate on a group you specify.  This option is recommended
++	  if you only want to watch certain users instead of having a large
++	  amount of logs from the entire system.  If the sysctl option is enabled,
++	  a sysctl option with name "audit_group" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID
++	int "GID for auditing"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
++	default 1007
++
++config GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
++	bool "Exec logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the
++	  other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution
++	  will be logged).  Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track
++	  of their users.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
++	  name "exec_logging" is created.
++	  WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially
++	  on an active system.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++	bool "Resource logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will
++	  be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current
++	  limit.  It is highly recommended that you say Y here.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
++	bool "Log execs within chroot"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged
++	  to syslog.  This can cause a large amount of logs if certain
++	  applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and
++	  is therefore left as an option.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
++	  sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
++	bool "Chdir logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all chdir() calls will be logged.  If the sysctl
++ 	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_chdir" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	bool "(Un)Mount logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged.  If the
++	  sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is
++	  created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	bool "IPC logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, creation and removal of message queues, semaphores,
++	  and shared memory will be logged.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
++	  sysctl option with name "audit_ipc" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++	bool "Signal logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as
++	  SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program
++	  occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt.
++	  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++	  "signal_logging" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++	bool "Fork failure logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged.
++	  This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep
++	  their process limit.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
++	  with name "forkfail_logging" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_TIME
++	bool "Time change logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged.
++	  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++	  "timechange_logging" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++	bool "/proc/<pid>/ipaddr support"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, a new entry will be added to each /proc/<pid>
++	  directory that contains the IP address of the person using the task.
++	  The IP is carried across local TCP and AF_UNIX stream sockets.
++	  This information can be useful for IDS/IPSes to perform remote response
++	  to a local attack.  The entry is readable by only the owner of the
++	  process (and root if he has CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, which can be removed via
++	  the RBAC system), and thus does not create privacy concerns.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
++	bool 'ELF text relocations logging (READ HELP)'
++	depends on PAX_MPROTECT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, text relocations will be logged with the filename
++	  of the offending library or binary.  The purpose of the feature is
++	  to help Linux distribution developers get rid of libraries and
++	  binaries that need text relocations which hinder the future progress
++	  of PaX.  Only Linux distribution developers should say Y here, and
++	  never on a production machine, as this option creates an information
++	  leak that could aid an attacker in defeating the randomization of
++	  a single memory region.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
++	  option with name "audit_textrel" is created.
++
++endmenu
++
++menu "Executable Protections"
++depends on GRKERNSEC
++
++config GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	bool "Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC on execs"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, users with a resource limit on processes will
++	  have the value checked during execve() calls.  The current system
++	  only checks the system limit during fork() calls.  If the sysctl option
++	  is enabled, a sysctl option with name "execve_limiting" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	bool "Dmesg(8) restriction"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8)
++	  to view up to the last 4kb of messages in the kernel's log buffer.
++	  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is
++	  created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
++	bool "Randomized PIDs"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all PIDs created on the system will be
++	  pseudo-randomly generated.  This is extremely effective along
++	  with the /proc restrictions to disallow an attacker from guessing
++	  pids of daemons, etc.  PIDs are also used in some cases as part
++	  of a naming system for temporary files, so this option would keep
++	  those filenames from being predicted as well.  We also use code
++	  to make sure that PID numbers aren't reused too soon.  If the sysctl
++	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rand_pids" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_TPE
++	bool "Trusted Path Execution (TPE)"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
++	  supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
++	  These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
++	  root-owned directories writable only by root.  If the sysctl option
++	  is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
++	bool "Partially restrict non-root users"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, All non-root users other than the ones in the
++	  group specified in the main TPE option will only be allowed to
++	  execute files in directories they own that are not group or
++	  world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by
++	  root.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++	  "tpe_restrict_all" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID
++	int "GID for untrusted users"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE
++	default 1005
++	help
++	  Here you can choose the GID to enable trusted path protection for.
++	  Remember to add the users you want protection enabled for to the GID
++	  specified here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose
++	  here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
++	  script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry.  View the help
++	  on the sysctl option for more information.  If the sysctl option is
++	  enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe_gid" is created.
++
++endmenu
++menu "Network Protections"
++depends on GRKERNSEC
++
++config GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++	bool "Larger entropy pools"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the entropy pools used for many features of Linux
++	  and grsecurity will be doubled in size.  Since several grsecurity
++	  features use additional randomness, it is recommended that you say Y
++	  here.  Saying Y here has a similar effect as modifying
++	  /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++	bool "Truly random TCP ISN selection"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, Linux's default selection of TCP Initial Sequence
++	  Numbers (ISNs) will be replaced with that of OpenBSD.  Linux uses
++	  an MD4 hash based on the connection plus a time value to create the
++	  ISN, while OpenBSD's selection is random.  If the sysctl option is
++	  enabled, a sysctl option with name "rand_isns" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++	bool "Randomized IP IDs"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all the id field on all outgoing packets
++	  will be randomized.  This hinders os fingerprinters and
++	  keeps your machine from being used as a bounce for an untraceable
++	  portscan.  Ids are used for fragmented packets, fragments belonging
++	  to the same packet have the same id.  By default linux only
++	  increments the id value on each packet sent to an individual host.
++	  We use a port of the OpenBSD random ip id code to achieve the
++	  randomness, while keeping the possibility of id duplicates to
++	  near none.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++	  "rand_ip_ids" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
++	bool "Randomized TCP source ports"
++	default n if GRKERNSEC_LOW || GRKERNSEC_MID
++	default y if GRKERNSEC_HIGH
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, situations where a source port is generated on the
++	  fly for the TCP protocol (ie. with connect() ) will be altered so that
++	  the source port is generated at random, instead of a simple incrementing
++	  algorithm.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++	  "rand_tcp_src_ports" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
++	bool "Randomized RPC XIDs"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the method of determining XIDs for RPC requests will
++	  be randomized, instead of using linux's default behavior of simply
++	  incrementing the XID.  If you want your RPC connections to be more
++	  secure, say Y here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
++	  with name "rand_rpc" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
++	bool "Socket restrictions"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose from several options.
++	  If you assign a GID on your system and add it to the supplementary
++	  groups of users you want to restrict socket access to, this patch
++	  will perform up to three things, based on the option(s) you choose.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
++	bool "Deny any sockets to group"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
++	  be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server
++	  applications from your machine.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
++	  sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID
++	int "GID to deny all sockets for"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
++	default 1004
++	help
++	  Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
++	  add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
++	  specified here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose
++	  here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
++	  script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry.  View the help
++	  on the sysctl option for more information.  If the sysctl option is
++	  enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_all_gid" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
++	bool "Deny client sockets to group"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
++	  be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
++	  able to run servers.  If this option is enabled, all users in the group
++	  you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
++	  from the shell on your machine.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
++	  sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID
++	int "GID to deny client sockets for"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
++	default 1003
++	help
++	  Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
++	  Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
++	  the GID specified here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you
++	  choose here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
++	  script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry.  View the help
++	  on the sysctl option for more information.  If the sysctl option is
++	  enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_client_gid" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++	bool "Deny server sockets to group"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
++	  be unable to run server applications from your machine.  If the sysctl
++	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID
++	int "GID to deny server sockets for"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++	default 1002
++	help
++	  Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
++	  Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to
++	  the GID specified here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you
++	  choose here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
++	  script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry.  View the help
++	  on the sysctl option for more information.  If the sysctl option is
++	  enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server_gid" is created.
++
++endmenu
++menu "Sysctl support"
++depends on GRKERNSEC && SYSCTL
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++	bool "Sysctl support"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to change the options that
++	  grsecurity runs with at bootup, without having to recompile your
++	  kernel.  You can echo values to files in /proc/sys/kernel/grsecurity
++	  to enable (1) or disable (0) various features.  All the sysctl entries
++	  are mutable until the "grsec_lock" entry is set to a non-zero value.
++	  All features are disabled by default. Please note that this option could
++	  reduce the effectiveness of the added security of this patch if an ACL
++	  system is not put in place.  Your init scripts should be read-only, and
++	  root should not have access to adding modules or performing raw i/o
++	  operations.  All options should be set at startup, and the grsec_lock
++	  entry should be set to a non-zero value after all the options are set.
++	  *THIS IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT*
++
++endmenu
++menu "Logging Options"
++depends on GRKERNSEC
++
++config GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME
++	int "Seconds in between log messages (minimum)"
++	default 10
++	help
++	  This option allows you to enforce the number of seconds between
++	  grsecurity log messages.  The default should be suitable for most
++	  people, however, if you choose to change it, choose a value small enough
++	  to allow informative logs to be produced, but large enough to
++	  prevent flooding.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST
++	int "Number of messages in a burst (maximum)"
++	default 4
++	help
++	  This option allows you to choose the maximum number of messages allowed
++	  within the flood time interval you chose in a separate option.  The
++	  default should be suitable for most people, however if you find that
++	  many of your logs are being interpreted as flooding, you may want to
++	  raise this value.
++
++endmenu
++
++endmenu
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/Makefile linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/Makefile
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/Makefile	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/Makefile	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
++# grsecurity's ACL system was originally written in 2001 by Michael Dalton
++# during 2001, 2002, and 2003 it has been completely redesigned by
++# Brad Spengler
++#
++# All code in this directory and various hooks inserted throughout the kernel
++# are copyright Brad Spengler, and released under the GPL, unless otherwise
++# noted (as in obsd_rand.c)
++
++obj-y = grsec_chdir.o grsec_chroot.o grsec_exec.o grsec_fifo.o grsec_fork.o \
++	grsec_mount.o grsec_rand.o grsec_sig.o grsec_sock.o grsec_sysctl.o \
++	grsec_time.o grsec_tpe.o grsec_ipc.o grsec_link.o grsec_textrel.o
++
++obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC) += grsec_init.o grsum.o gracl.o gracl_ip.o gracl_segv.o obsd_rand.o \
++	gracl_cap.o gracl_alloc.o gracl_shm.o grsec_mem.o gracl_fs.o \
++	gracl_learn.o
++obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG) += gracl_res.o
++
++ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++obj-y += grsec_disabled.o
++endif
++
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl.c	2004-06-25 22:51:33.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,3347 @@
++/* 
++ * grsecurity/gracl.c
++ * Copyright Brad Spengler 2001, 2002, 2003
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/namei.h>
++#include <linux/mount.h>
++#include <linux/tty.h>
++#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/capability.h>
++#include <linux/sysctl.h>
++#include <linux/ptrace.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/gralloc.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++#include <linux/percpu.h>
++
++#include <asm/uaccess.h>
++#include <asm/errno.h>
++#include <asm/mman.h>
++
++static struct acl_role_db acl_role_set;
++static struct acl_role_label *role_list_head;
++static struct name_db name_set;
++static struct name_db inodev_set;
++
++/* for keeping track of userspace pointers used for subjects, so we
++   can share references in the kernel as well
++*/
++static struct acl_subj_map_db subj_map_set;
++
++static struct acl_role_label *default_role;
++
++static u16 acl_sp_role_value;
++
++extern char *gr_shared_page[4];
++static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_dev_sem);
++rwlock_t gr_inode_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++
++struct gr_arg *gr_usermode;
++
++static unsigned long gr_status = GR_STATUS_INIT;
++
++extern int chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum);
++extern void gr_clear_learn_entries(void);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++extern void gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
++			    const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt);
++#endif
++
++extern char * __d_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
++                        struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt,
++                        char *buffer, int buflen);
++
++unsigned char *gr_system_salt;
++unsigned char *gr_system_sum;
++
++static struct sprole_pw **acl_special_roles = NULL;
++static __u16 num_sprole_pws = 0;
++
++static struct acl_role_label *kernel_role = NULL;
++
++/* The following are used to keep a place held in the hash table when we move
++   entries around.  They can be replaced during insert. */
++
++static struct acl_subject_label *deleted_subject;
++static struct acl_object_label *deleted_object;
++static struct name_entry *deleted_inodev;
++
++/* for keeping track of the last and final allocated subjects, since
++   nested subject parsing is tricky
++*/
++static struct acl_subject_label *s_last = NULL;
++static struct acl_subject_label *s_final = NULL;
++
++static unsigned int gr_auth_attempts = 0;
++static unsigned long gr_auth_expires = 0UL;
++
++extern int gr_init_uidset(void);
++extern void gr_free_uidset(void);
++extern void gr_remove_uid(uid_t uid);
++extern int gr_find_uid(uid_t uid);
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_acl_is_enabled(void)
++{
++	return (gr_status & GR_READY);
++}
++
++char gr_roletype_to_char(void)
++{
++	switch (current->role->roletype &
++		(GR_ROLE_DEFAULT | GR_ROLE_USER | GR_ROLE_GROUP |
++		 GR_ROLE_SPECIAL)) {
++	case GR_ROLE_DEFAULT:
++		return 'D';
++	case GR_ROLE_USER:
++		return 'U';
++	case GR_ROLE_GROUP:
++		return 'G';
++	case GR_ROLE_SPECIAL:
++		return 'S';
++	}
++
++	return 'X';
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_acl_tpe_check(void)
++{
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 0;
++	if (current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_TPE)
++		return 1;
++	else
++		return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode)
++{
++	if (inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) &&
++	    ((gr_status & GR_READY)
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	     || (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current))
++#endif
++	    ))
++		return 1;
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
++static __inline__ int
++gr_streq(const char *a, const char *b, const __u16 lena, const __u16 lenb)
++{
++	int i;
++	unsigned long *l1;
++	unsigned long *l2;
++	unsigned char *c1;
++	unsigned char *c2;
++	int num_longs;
++
++	if (likely(lena != lenb))
++		return 0;
++
++	l1 = (unsigned long *)a;
++	l2 = (unsigned long *)b;
++
++	num_longs = lena / sizeof(unsigned long);
++
++	for (i = num_longs; i--; l1++, l2++) {
++		if (unlikely(*l1 != *l2))
++			return 0;
++	}
++
++	c1 = (unsigned char *) l1;
++	c2 = (unsigned char *) l2;
++
++	i = lena - (num_longs * sizeof(unsigned long));	
++
++	for (; i--; c1++, c2++) {
++		if (unlikely(*c1 != *c2))
++			return 0;
++	}
++
++	return 1;
++}
++		
++static __inline__ char *
++__d_real_path(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
++		char *buf, int buflen)
++{
++	char *res;
++	struct dentry *our_dentry;
++	struct vfsmount *our_mount;
++	struct vfsmount *rootmnt;
++	struct dentry *root;
++
++	our_dentry = (struct dentry *) dentry;
++	our_mount = (struct vfsmount *) vfsmnt;
++
++	read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++	rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
++	root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
++	read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++
++	res = __d_path(our_dentry, our_mount, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen);
++	if (unlikely(IS_ERR(res)))
++		res = strcpy(buf, "<path too long>");
++	dput(root);
++	mntput(rootmnt);
++	return res;
++}
++
++char *
++gr_to_filename_nolock(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return __d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id()),
++				PAGE_SIZE);
++}
++
++static __inline__ char *
++d_real_path(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
++	    char *buf, int buflen)
++{
++	char *res;
++	struct dentry *our_dentry;
++	struct vfsmount *our_mount;
++	struct vfsmount *rootmnt;
++	struct dentry *root;
++
++	our_dentry = (struct dentry *) dentry;
++	our_mount = (struct vfsmount *) vfsmnt;
++
++	read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++	rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
++	root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
++	read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++
++	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
++	res = __d_path(our_dentry, our_mount, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen);
++	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
++	if (unlikely(IS_ERR(res)))
++		res = strcpy(buf, "<path too long>");
++	dput(root);
++	mntput(rootmnt);
++	return res;
++}
++
++char *
++gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id()),
++			   PAGE_SIZE);
++}
++
++char *
++gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[1], smp_processor_id()),
++			   PAGE_SIZE);
++}
++
++char *
++gr_to_filename2(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[2], smp_processor_id()),
++			   PAGE_SIZE);
++}
++
++char *
++gr_to_filename3(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[3], smp_processor_id()),
++			   PAGE_SIZE);
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode)
++{
++	__u32 retmode = 0;
++
++	retmode |= (reqmode & GR_READ) ? GR_AUDIT_READ : 0;
++	retmode |= (reqmode & GR_WRITE) ? GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_APPEND : 0;
++	retmode |= (reqmode & GR_APPEND) ? GR_AUDIT_APPEND : 0;
++	retmode |= (reqmode & GR_EXEC) ? GR_AUDIT_EXEC : 0;
++	retmode |= (reqmode & GR_INHERIT) ? GR_AUDIT_INHERIT : 0;
++	retmode |= (reqmode & GR_FIND) ? GR_AUDIT_FIND : 0;
++	retmode |= (reqmode & GR_SETID) ? GR_AUDIT_SETID : 0;
++	retmode |= (reqmode & GR_CREATE) ? GR_AUDIT_CREATE : 0;
++	retmode |= (reqmode & GR_DELETE) ? GR_AUDIT_DELETE : 0;
++
++	return retmode;
++}
++
++__inline__ struct acl_subject_label *
++lookup_subject_map(const struct acl_subject_label *userp)
++{
++	unsigned long index = shash(userp, subj_map_set.s_size);
++	struct subject_map *match;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++
++	match = subj_map_set.s_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && match->user != userp) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_map_set.s_size;
++		match = subj_map_set.s_hash[index];
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++	}
++
++	if (match)
++		return match->kernel;
++	else
++		return NULL;
++}
++
++static void
++insert_subj_map_entry(struct subject_map *subjmap)
++{
++	unsigned long index = shash(subjmap->user, subj_map_set.s_size);
++	struct subject_map **curr;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++
++	curr = &subj_map_set.s_hash[index];
++
++	while (*curr) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_map_set.s_size;
++		curr = &subj_map_set.s_hash[index];
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++	}
++
++	*curr = subjmap;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++__inline__ struct acl_role_label *
++lookup_acl_role_label(const struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid,
++		      const gid_t gid)
++{
++	unsigned long index = rhash(uid, GR_ROLE_USER, acl_role_set.r_size);
++	struct acl_role_label *match;
++	struct role_allowed_ip *ipp;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++
++	match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
++
++	while (match
++	       && (match->uidgid != uid || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_USER))) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size;
++		match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++	}
++
++	if (match == NULL) {
++	      try_group:
++		index = rhash(gid, GR_ROLE_GROUP, acl_role_set.r_size);
++		match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
++		i = 0;
++
++		while (match && (match->uidgid != gid
++			   || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_GROUP))) {
++			index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size;
++			match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
++			i = (i + 1) % 32;
++		}
++
++		if (match == NULL)
++			match = default_role;
++		if (match->allowed_ips == NULL)
++			return match;
++		else {
++			for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) {
++				if (likely
++				    ((task->curr_ip & ipp->netmask) ==
++				     (ipp->addr & ipp->netmask)))
++					return match;
++			}
++			match = default_role;
++		}
++	} else if (match->allowed_ips == NULL) {
++		return match;
++	} else {
++		for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) {
++			if (likely
++			    ((task->curr_ip & ipp->netmask) ==
++			     (ipp->addr & ipp->netmask)))
++				return match;
++		}
++		goto try_group;
++	}
++
++	return match;
++}
++
++__inline__ struct acl_subject_label *
++lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev,
++		      const struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size;
++	struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash;
++	unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, subj_size);
++	struct acl_subject_label *match;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++
++	match = s_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
++	       (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size;
++		match = s_hash[index];
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++	}
++
++	if (match && (match != deleted_subject) && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))
++		return match;
++	else
++		return NULL;
++}
++
++static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
++lookup_acl_obj_label(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev,
++		     const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
++{
++	unsigned long obj_size = subj->obj_hash_size;
++	struct acl_object_label **o_hash = subj->obj_hash;
++	unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size);
++	struct acl_object_label *match;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++
++	match = o_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
++	       (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size;
++		match = o_hash[index];
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++	}
++
++	if (match && (match != deleted_object) && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))
++		return match;
++	else
++		return NULL;
++}
++
++static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
++lookup_acl_obj_label_create(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev,
++		     const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
++{
++	unsigned long obj_size = subj->obj_hash_size;
++	struct acl_object_label **o_hash = subj->obj_hash;
++	unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size);
++	struct acl_object_label *match;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++
++	match = o_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
++	       !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size;
++		match = o_hash[index];
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++	}
++
++	if (match && (match != deleted_object) && (match->mode & GR_DELETED))
++		return match;
++
++	i = 0;
++	index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size);
++	match = o_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
++	       (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size;
++		match = o_hash[index];
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++	}
++
++	if (match && (match != deleted_object) && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))
++		return match;
++	else
++		return NULL;
++}
++
++static __inline__ struct name_entry *
++lookup_name_entry(const char *name)
++{
++	__u16 len = strlen(name);
++	unsigned long index = nhash(name, len, name_set.n_size);
++	struct name_entry *match;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++
++	match = name_set.n_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && !gr_streq(match->name, name, match->len, len)) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % name_set.n_size;
++		match = name_set.n_hash[index];
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++	}
++
++	return match;
++}
++
++static __inline__ struct name_entry *
++lookup_inodev_entry(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
++{
++	unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, inodev_set.n_size);
++	struct name_entry *match;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++
++	match = inodev_set.n_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev)) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size;
++		match = inodev_set.n_hash[index];
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++	}
++
++	if (match && (match != deleted_inodev))
++		return match;
++	else
++		return NULL;
++}
++
++static void
++insert_inodev_entry(struct name_entry *nentry)
++{
++	unsigned long index = fhash(nentry->inode, nentry->device,
++				    inodev_set.n_size);
++	struct name_entry **curr;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++
++	curr = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
++
++	while (*curr && *curr != deleted_inodev) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size;
++		curr = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++	}
++
++	*curr = nentry;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void
++insert_acl_role_label(struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	unsigned long index =
++	    rhash(role->uidgid, role->roletype & (GR_ROLE_USER | GR_ROLE_GROUP), acl_role_set.r_size);
++	struct acl_role_label **curr;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++
++	curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
++
++	while (*curr) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size;
++		curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++	}
++
++	*curr = role;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static int
++insert_name_entry(char *name, const ino_t inode, const dev_t device)
++{
++	struct name_entry **curr;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++	__u16 len = strlen(name);
++	unsigned long index = nhash(name, len, name_set.n_size);
++
++	curr = &name_set.n_hash[index];
++
++	while (*curr && !gr_streq((*curr)->name, name, (*curr)->len, len)) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % name_set.n_size;
++		curr = &name_set.n_hash[index];
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++	}
++
++	if (!(*curr)) {
++		struct name_entry *nentry =
++		    acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry));
++		if (!nentry)
++			return 0;
++		nentry->name = name;
++		nentry->inode = inode;
++		nentry->device = device;
++		nentry->len = len;
++		*curr = nentry;
++		/* insert us into the table searchable by inode/dev */
++		insert_inodev_entry(nentry);
++	}
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static void
++insert_acl_obj_label(struct acl_object_label *obj,
++		     struct acl_subject_label *subj)
++{
++	unsigned long index =
++	    fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj->obj_hash_size);
++	struct acl_object_label **curr;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++
++	curr = &subj->obj_hash[index];
++
++	while (*curr && *curr != deleted_object) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj->obj_hash_size;
++		curr = &subj->obj_hash[index];
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++	}
++
++	*curr = obj;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void
++insert_acl_subj_label(struct acl_subject_label *obj,
++		      struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size;
++	struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash;
++	unsigned long index = fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj_size);
++	struct acl_subject_label **curr;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++
++	curr = &s_hash[index];
++
++	while (*curr && *curr != deleted_subject) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size;
++		curr = &s_hash[index];
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++	}
++
++	*curr = obj;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void **
++create_table(__u32 * len)
++{
++	unsigned long table_sizes[] = {
++		7, 13, 31, 61, 127, 251, 509, 1021, 2039, 4093, 8191, 16381,
++		32749, 65521, 131071, 262139, 524287, 1048573, 2097143,
++		4194301, 8388593, 16777213, 33554393, 67108859, 134217689,
++		268435399, 536870909, 1073741789, 2147483647
++	};
++	void *newtable = NULL;
++	unsigned int pwr = 0;
++
++	while ((pwr < ((sizeof (table_sizes) / sizeof (table_sizes[0])) - 1)) &&
++	       table_sizes[pwr] <= (2 * (*len)))
++		pwr++;
++
++	if (table_sizes[pwr] <= (2 * (*len)))
++		return newtable;
++
++	if ((table_sizes[pwr] * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
++		newtable =
++		    kmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * sizeof (void *), GFP_KERNEL);
++	else
++		newtable = vmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * sizeof (void *));
++
++	*len = table_sizes[pwr];
++
++	return newtable;
++}
++
++static int
++init_variables(const unsigned long acl_obj_size,
++	       const unsigned long acl_glob_size,
++	       const unsigned long acl_subj_size,
++	       const unsigned long acl_ip_size,
++	       const unsigned long acl_role_size,
++	       const unsigned long allowed_ip_size,
++	       const unsigned long acl_trans_size,
++	       const __u16 num_sprole_pws)
++{
++	unsigned long stacksize;
++
++	subj_map_set.s_size = acl_subj_size;
++	acl_role_set.r_size = acl_role_size;
++	name_set.n_size = (acl_obj_size + acl_subj_size);
++	inodev_set.n_size = (acl_obj_size + acl_subj_size);
++
++	if (!gr_init_uidset())
++		return 1;
++
++	/* set up the stack that holds allocation info */
++
++	stacksize = (3 * acl_obj_size) + (3 * acl_role_size) +
++	    (6 * acl_subj_size) + acl_ip_size + (2 * acl_trans_size) +
++	    allowed_ip_size + (2 * num_sprole_pws) + (2 * acl_glob_size) + 5;
++
++	if (!acl_alloc_stack_init(stacksize))
++		return 1;
++
++	/* create our empty, fake deleted acls */
++	deleted_subject =
++	    (struct acl_subject_label *)
++	    acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label));
++	deleted_object =
++	    (struct acl_object_label *)
++	    acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label));
++	deleted_inodev =
++	    (struct name_entry *) acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry));
++
++	if (!deleted_subject || !deleted_object || !deleted_inodev)
++		return 1;
++
++	memset(deleted_subject, 0, sizeof (struct acl_subject_label));
++	memset(deleted_object, 0, sizeof (struct acl_object_label));
++	memset(deleted_inodev, 0, sizeof (struct name_entry));
++
++	/* We only want 50% full tables for now */
++
++	subj_map_set.s_hash =
++	    (struct subject_map **) create_table(&subj_map_set.s_size);
++	acl_role_set.r_hash =
++	    (struct acl_role_label **) create_table(&acl_role_set.r_size);
++	name_set.n_hash = (struct name_entry **) create_table(&name_set.n_size);
++	inodev_set.n_hash =
++	    (struct name_entry **) create_table(&inodev_set.n_size);
++
++	if (!subj_map_set.s_hash || !acl_role_set.r_hash ||
++	    !name_set.n_hash || !inodev_set.n_hash)
++		return 1;
++
++	memset(subj_map_set.s_hash, 0,
++	       sizeof(struct subject_map *) * subj_map_set.s_size);
++	memset(acl_role_set.r_hash, 0,
++	       sizeof (struct acl_role_label *) * acl_role_set.r_size);
++	memset(name_set.n_hash, 0,
++	       sizeof (struct name_entry *) * name_set.n_size);
++	memset(inodev_set.n_hash, 0,
++	       sizeof (struct name_entry *) * inodev_set.n_size);
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/* free information not needed after startup
++   currently contains user->kernel pointer mappings for subjects
++*/
++
++static void
++free_init_variables(void)
++{
++	__u32 i;
++
++	if (subj_map_set.s_hash) {
++		for (i = 0; i < subj_map_set.s_size; i++) {
++			if (subj_map_set.s_hash[i]) {
++				kfree(subj_map_set.s_hash[i]);
++				subj_map_set.s_hash[i] = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++		if ((subj_map_set.s_size * sizeof (struct subject_map *)) <=
++		    PAGE_SIZE)
++			kfree(subj_map_set.s_hash);
++		else
++			vfree(subj_map_set.s_hash);
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void
++free_variables(void)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *s;
++	struct acl_role_label *r;
++	struct task_struct *task, *task2;
++
++	gr_clear_learn_entries();
++
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++	for_each_process(task) {
++		task2 = task;
++		do {
++			task2->acl_sp_role = 0;
++			task2->acl_role_id = 0;
++			task2->acl = NULL;
++			task2->role = NULL;
++		} while ((task2 = next_thread(task2)) != task);
++	}
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++	/* free all object hash tables */
++
++	if (role_list_head) {
++		for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) {
++			if (!r->subj_hash)
++				break;
++			for (s = r->hash->first; s; s = s->next) {
++				if (!s->obj_hash)
++					break;
++				if ((s->obj_hash_size *
++				     sizeof (struct acl_object_label *)) <=
++				    PAGE_SIZE)
++					kfree(s->obj_hash);
++				else
++					vfree(s->obj_hash);
++			}
++			if ((r->subj_hash_size *
++			     sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
++				kfree(r->subj_hash);
++			else
++				vfree(r->subj_hash);
++		}
++	}
++
++	acl_free_all();
++
++	if (acl_role_set.r_hash) {
++		if ((acl_role_set.r_size * sizeof (struct acl_role_label *)) <=
++		    PAGE_SIZE)
++			kfree(acl_role_set.r_hash);
++		else
++			vfree(acl_role_set.r_hash);
++	}
++	if (name_set.n_hash) {
++		if ((name_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <=
++		    PAGE_SIZE)
++			kfree(name_set.n_hash);
++		else
++			vfree(name_set.n_hash);
++	}
++
++	if (inodev_set.n_hash) {
++		if ((inodev_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <=
++		    PAGE_SIZE)
++			kfree(inodev_set.n_hash);
++		else
++			vfree(inodev_set.n_hash);
++	}
++
++	gr_free_uidset();
++
++	memset(&name_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db));
++	memset(&inodev_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db));
++	memset(&acl_role_set, 0, sizeof (struct acl_role_db));
++	memset(&subj_map_set, 0, sizeof (struct acl_subj_map_db));
++
++	role_list_head = NULL;
++	default_role = NULL;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static __u32
++count_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label o_tmp;
++	__u32 num = 0;
++
++	while (userp) {
++		if (copy_from_user(&o_tmp, userp,
++				   sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
++			break;
++
++		userp = o_tmp.prev;
++		num++;
++	}
++
++	return num;
++}
++
++static struct acl_subject_label *
++do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role);
++
++static int
++copy_user_glob(struct acl_object_label *obj)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *g_tmp, **guser, *glast = NULL;
++	unsigned int len;
++	char *tmp;
++
++	if (obj->globbed == NULL)
++		return 0;
++
++	guser = &obj->globbed;
++	while (*guser) {
++		g_tmp = (struct acl_object_label *)
++			acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label));
++		if (g_tmp == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		if (copy_from_user(g_tmp, *guser,
++				   sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
++			return -EFAULT;
++
++		len = strnlen_user(g_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
++
++		if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
++			return -EINVAL;
++
++		if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		if (copy_from_user(tmp, g_tmp->filename, len))
++			return -EFAULT;
++
++		g_tmp->filename = tmp;
++
++		if (glast)
++			glast->next = g_tmp;
++		g_tmp->prev = glast;
++		*guser = g_tmp;
++		glast = g_tmp;
++		guser = &((*guser)->next);
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++copy_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp, struct acl_subject_label *subj,
++	       struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *o_tmp;
++	unsigned int len;
++	int ret;
++	char *tmp;
++
++	while (userp) {
++		if ((o_tmp = (struct acl_object_label *)
++		     acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		if (copy_from_user(o_tmp, userp,
++				   sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
++			return -EFAULT;
++
++		userp = o_tmp->prev;
++
++		len = strnlen_user(o_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
++
++		if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
++			return -EINVAL;
++
++		if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		if (copy_from_user(tmp, o_tmp->filename, len))
++			return -EFAULT;
++
++		o_tmp->filename = tmp;
++
++		insert_acl_obj_label(o_tmp, subj);
++		if (!insert_name_entry(o_tmp->filename, o_tmp->inode,
++				       o_tmp->device))
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		ret = copy_user_glob(o_tmp);
++		if (ret)
++			return ret;
++
++		if (o_tmp->nested) {
++			o_tmp->nested = do_copy_user_subj(o_tmp->nested, role);
++			if (IS_ERR(o_tmp->nested))
++				return PTR_ERR(o_tmp->nested);
++
++			s_final = o_tmp->nested;
++		}
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static __u32
++count_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label s_tmp;
++	__u32 num = 0;
++
++	while (userp) {
++		if (copy_from_user(&s_tmp, userp,
++				   sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
++			break;
++
++		userp = s_tmp.prev;
++		/* do not count nested subjects against this count, since
++		   they are not included in the hash table, but are
++		   attached to objects.  We have already counted
++		   the subjects in userspace for the allocation 
++		   stack
++		*/
++		if (!(s_tmp.mode & GR_NESTED))
++			num++;
++	}
++
++	return num;
++}
++
++static int
++copy_user_allowedips(struct acl_role_label *rolep)
++{
++	struct role_allowed_ip *ruserip, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast;
++
++	ruserip = rolep->allowed_ips;
++
++	while (ruserip) {
++		rlast = rtmp;
++
++		if ((rtmp = (struct role_allowed_ip *)
++		     acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip))) == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		if (copy_from_user(rtmp, ruserip,
++				   sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip)))
++			return -EFAULT;
++
++		ruserip = rtmp->prev;
++
++		if (!rlast) {
++			rtmp->prev = NULL;
++			rolep->allowed_ips = rtmp;
++		} else {
++			rlast->next = rtmp;
++			rtmp->prev = rlast;
++		}
++
++		if (!ruserip)
++			rtmp->next = NULL;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++copy_user_transitions(struct acl_role_label *rolep)
++{
++	struct role_transition *rusertp, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast;
++	unsigned int len;
++	char *tmp;
++
++	rusertp = rolep->transitions;
++
++	while (rusertp) {
++		rlast = rtmp;
++
++		if ((rtmp = (struct role_transition *)
++		     acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_transition))) == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		if (copy_from_user(rtmp, rusertp,
++				   sizeof (struct role_transition)))
++			return -EFAULT;
++
++		rusertp = rtmp->prev;
++
++		len = strnlen_user(rtmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN);
++
++		if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN)
++			return -EINVAL;
++
++		if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		if (copy_from_user(tmp, rtmp->rolename, len))
++			return -EFAULT;
++
++		rtmp->rolename = tmp;
++
++		if (!rlast) {
++			rtmp->prev = NULL;
++			rolep->transitions = rtmp;
++		} else {
++			rlast->next = rtmp;
++			rtmp->prev = rlast;
++		}
++
++		if (!rusertp)
++			rtmp->next = NULL;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static struct acl_subject_label *
++do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *s_tmp = NULL, *s_tmp2;
++	unsigned int len;
++	char *tmp;
++	__u32 num_objs;
++	struct acl_ip_label **i_tmp, *i_utmp2;
++	struct gr_hash_struct ghash;
++	struct subject_map *subjmap;
++	unsigned long i_num;
++	int err;
++
++	s_tmp = lookup_subject_map(userp);
++
++	/* we've already copied this subject into the kernel, just return
++	   the reference to it, and don't copy it over again
++	*/
++	if (s_tmp)
++		return(s_tmp);
++
++
++	if ((s_tmp = (struct acl_subject_label *)
++	    acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) == NULL)
++		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++	subjmap = (struct subject_map *)kmalloc(sizeof (struct subject_map), GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (subjmap == NULL)
++		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++	subjmap->user = userp;
++	subjmap->kernel = s_tmp;
++	insert_subj_map_entry(subjmap);
++
++	if (copy_from_user(s_tmp, userp,
++			   sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
++		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++	if (!s_last) {
++		s_tmp->prev = NULL;
++		role->hash->first = s_tmp;
++	} else {
++		s_last->next = s_tmp;
++		s_tmp->prev = s_last;
++	}
++
++	s_last = s_tmp;
++
++	len = strnlen_user(s_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
++
++	if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
++		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
++
++	if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
++		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++	if (copy_from_user(tmp, s_tmp->filename, len))
++		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++	s_tmp->filename = tmp;
++
++	if (!strcmp(s_tmp->filename, "/"))
++		role->root_label = s_tmp;
++
++	if (copy_from_user(&ghash, s_tmp->hash, sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct)))
++		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++	/* copy user and group transition tables */
++
++	if (s_tmp->user_trans_num) {
++		uid_t *uidlist;
++
++		uidlist = (uid_t *)acl_alloc(s_tmp->user_trans_num * sizeof(uid_t));
++		if (uidlist == NULL)
++			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++		if (copy_from_user(uidlist, s_tmp->user_transitions, s_tmp->user_trans_num * sizeof(uid_t)))
++			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++		s_tmp->user_transitions = uidlist;
++	}
++
++	if (s_tmp->group_trans_num) {
++		gid_t *gidlist;
++
++		gidlist = (gid_t *)acl_alloc(s_tmp->group_trans_num * sizeof(gid_t));
++		if (gidlist == NULL)
++			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++		if (copy_from_user(gidlist, s_tmp->group_transitions, s_tmp->group_trans_num * sizeof(gid_t)))
++			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++		s_tmp->group_transitions = gidlist;
++	}
++
++	/* set up object hash table */
++	num_objs = count_user_objs(ghash.first);
++
++	s_tmp->obj_hash_size = num_objs;
++	s_tmp->obj_hash =
++	    (struct acl_object_label **)
++	    create_table(&(s_tmp->obj_hash_size));
++
++	if (!s_tmp->obj_hash)
++		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++	memset(s_tmp->obj_hash, 0,
++	       s_tmp->obj_hash_size *
++	       sizeof (struct acl_object_label *));
++
++	/* copy before adding in objects, since a nested
++	   acl could be found and be the final subject
++	   copied
++	*/
++
++	s_final = s_tmp;
++
++	/* add in objects */
++	err = copy_user_objs(ghash.first, s_tmp, role);
++
++	if (err)
++		return ERR_PTR(err);
++
++	/* set pointer for parent subject */
++	if (s_tmp->parent_subject) {
++		s_tmp2 = do_copy_user_subj(s_tmp->parent_subject, role);
++
++		if (IS_ERR(s_tmp2))
++			return s_tmp2;
++
++		s_tmp->parent_subject = s_tmp2;
++	}
++
++	/* add in ip acls */
++
++	if (!s_tmp->ip_num) {
++		s_tmp->ips = NULL;
++		goto insert;
++	}
++
++	i_tmp =
++	    (struct acl_ip_label **) acl_alloc(s_tmp->ip_num *
++					       sizeof (struct
++						       acl_ip_label *));
++
++	if (!i_tmp)
++		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++	for (i_num = 0; i_num < s_tmp->ip_num; i_num++) {
++		*(i_tmp + i_num) =
++		    (struct acl_ip_label *)
++		    acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_ip_label));
++		if (!*(i_tmp + i_num))
++			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++		if (copy_from_user
++		    (&i_utmp2, s_tmp->ips + i_num,
++		     sizeof (struct acl_ip_label *)))
++			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++		if (copy_from_user
++		    (*(i_tmp + i_num), i_utmp2,
++		     sizeof (struct acl_ip_label)))
++			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++	}
++
++	s_tmp->ips = i_tmp;
++
++insert:
++	if (!insert_name_entry(s_tmp->filename, s_tmp->inode,
++			       s_tmp->device))
++		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++	return s_tmp;
++}
++
++static int
++copy_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label s_pre;
++	struct acl_subject_label * ret;
++	int err;
++
++	while (userp) {
++		if (copy_from_user(&s_pre, userp,
++				   sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
++			return -EFAULT;
++		
++		/* do not add nested subjects here, add
++		   while parsing objects
++		*/
++
++		if (s_pre.mode & GR_NESTED) {
++			userp = s_pre.prev;
++			continue;
++		}
++
++		ret = do_copy_user_subj(userp, role);
++
++		err = PTR_ERR(ret);
++		if (IS_ERR(ret))
++			return err;
++
++		insert_acl_subj_label(ret, role);
++
++		userp = s_pre.prev;
++	}
++
++	s_final->next = NULL;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++copy_user_acl(struct gr_arg *arg)
++{
++	struct acl_role_label *r_tmp = NULL, **r_utmp, *r_utmp2, *r_last;
++	struct sprole_pw *sptmp;
++	struct gr_hash_struct *ghash;
++	unsigned long r_num;
++	unsigned int len;
++	char *tmp;
++	int err = 0;
++	__u16 i;
++	__u32 num_subjs;
++
++	/* we need a default and kernel role */
++	if (arg->role_db.r_entries < 2)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	/* copy special role authentication info from userspace */
++
++	num_sprole_pws = arg->num_sprole_pws;
++	acl_special_roles = (struct sprole_pw **) acl_alloc(num_sprole_pws * sizeof(struct sprole_pw *));
++
++	if (!acl_special_roles) {
++		err = -ENOMEM;
++		goto cleanup;
++	}
++
++	for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) {
++		sptmp = (struct sprole_pw *) acl_alloc(sizeof(struct sprole_pw));
++		if (!sptmp) {
++			err = -ENOMEM;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++		if (copy_from_user(sptmp, arg->sprole_pws + i,
++				   sizeof (struct sprole_pw))) {
++			err = -EFAULT;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		len =
++		    strnlen_user(sptmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN);
++
++		if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN) {
++			err = -EINVAL;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) {
++			err = -ENOMEM;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		if (copy_from_user(tmp, sptmp->rolename, len)) {
++			err = -EFAULT;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
++		printk(KERN_ALERT "Copying special role %s\n", tmp);
++#endif
++		sptmp->rolename = tmp;
++		acl_special_roles[i] = sptmp;
++	}
++
++	r_utmp = (struct acl_role_label **) arg->role_db.r_table;
++
++	for (r_num = 0; r_num < arg->role_db.r_entries; r_num++) {
++		r_last = r_tmp;
++
++		r_tmp = acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_role_label));
++
++		if (!r_tmp) {
++			err = -ENOMEM;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		if (copy_from_user(&r_utmp2, r_utmp + r_num,
++				   sizeof (struct acl_role_label *))) {
++			err = -EFAULT;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		if (copy_from_user(r_tmp, r_utmp2,
++				   sizeof (struct acl_role_label))) {
++			err = -EFAULT;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		if (!r_last) {
++			r_tmp->prev = NULL;
++			role_list_head = r_tmp;
++		} else {
++			r_last->next = r_tmp;
++			r_tmp->prev = r_last;
++		}
++
++		if (r_num == (arg->role_db.r_entries - 1))
++			r_tmp->next = NULL;
++
++		len = strnlen_user(r_tmp->rolename, PATH_MAX);
++
++		if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) {
++			err = -EINVAL;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) {
++			err = -ENOMEM;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++		if (copy_from_user(tmp, r_tmp->rolename, len)) {
++			err = -EFAULT;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++		r_tmp->rolename = tmp;
++
++		if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, "default")
++		    && (r_tmp->roletype & GR_ROLE_DEFAULT)) {
++			default_role = r_tmp;
++		} else if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, ":::kernel:::")) {
++			kernel_role = r_tmp;
++		}
++
++		if ((ghash = (struct gr_hash_struct *) acl_alloc(sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct))) == NULL) {
++			err = -ENOMEM;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++		if (copy_from_user(ghash, r_tmp->hash, sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct))) {
++			err = -EFAULT;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		r_tmp->hash = ghash;
++
++		num_subjs = count_user_subjs(r_tmp->hash->first);
++
++		r_tmp->subj_hash_size = num_subjs;
++		r_tmp->subj_hash =
++		    (struct acl_subject_label **)
++		    create_table(&(r_tmp->subj_hash_size));
++
++		if (!r_tmp->subj_hash) {
++			err = -ENOMEM;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		err = copy_user_allowedips(r_tmp);
++		if (err)
++			goto cleanup;
++
++		err = copy_user_transitions(r_tmp);
++		if (err)
++			goto cleanup;
++
++		memset(r_tmp->subj_hash, 0,
++		       r_tmp->subj_hash_size *
++		       sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *));
++
++		s_last = NULL;
++
++		err = copy_user_subjs(r_tmp->hash->first, r_tmp);
++
++		if (err)
++			goto cleanup;
++
++		insert_acl_role_label(r_tmp);
++	}
++
++	goto return_err;
++      cleanup:
++	free_variables();
++      return_err:
++	return err;
++
++}
++
++static int
++gracl_init(struct gr_arg *args)
++{
++	int error = 0;
++
++	memcpy(gr_system_salt, args->salt, GR_SALT_LEN);
++	memcpy(gr_system_sum, args->sum, GR_SHA_LEN);
++
++	if (init_variables(args->role_db.o_entries, args->role_db.g_entries,
++			   args->role_db.s_entries, args->role_db.i_entries,
++			   args->role_db.r_entries, args->role_db.a_entries,
++			   args->role_db.t_entries, args->num_sprole_pws)) {
++		security_alert_good(GR_INITF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
++		error = -ENOMEM;
++		free_variables();
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	error = copy_user_acl(args);
++	free_init_variables();
++	if (error) {
++		free_variables();
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((error = gr_set_acls(0))) {
++		free_variables();
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	gr_status |= GR_READY;
++      out:
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int
++glob_match(char *pattern, char *string)
++{
++	char *p1, *p2;
++
++	p1 = pattern;
++	p2 = string;
++
++	while (*p1 != '\0' && *p2 != '\0' && *p1 != '*') {
++		if (*p1 == *p2 || *p1 == '?') {
++			p1++;
++			p2++;
++		} else
++			break;
++	}
++	if (*p1 == '*') {
++		p1++;
++		while (*p2 != '\0') {
++			if (!glob_match(p1, p2))
++				return 0;
++			else
++				p2++;
++		}
++	} 
++
++	if (*p2 == '\0' && *p1 == '*')
++		while (*p1 == '*')
++			p1++;
++
++	if (*p1 == '\0' && *p2 == '\0')
++		return 0;
++	else
++		return 1;
++}
++
++static struct acl_object_label *
++chk_glob_label(struct acl_object_label *globbed,
++	struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char **path)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *tmp;
++
++	if (*path == NULL)
++		*path = gr_to_filename_nolock(dentry, mnt);
++
++	tmp = globbed;
++
++	while (tmp) {
++		if (!glob_match(tmp->filename, *path))
++			return tmp;
++		tmp = tmp->next;
++	}
++
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
++full_lookup(const struct dentry *orig_dentry, const struct vfsmount *orig_mnt,
++	    struct dentry *curr_dentry,
++	    const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char **path)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *tmpsubj;
++	struct acl_object_label *retval;
++	struct acl_object_label *retval2;
++
++	tmpsubj = (struct acl_subject_label *) subj;
++	read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	do {
++		retval = lookup_acl_obj_label(curr_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++					curr_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, tmpsubj);
++		if (retval) {
++			if (retval->globbed) {
++				retval2 = chk_glob_label(retval->globbed, (struct dentry *)orig_dentry,
++						(struct vfsmount *)orig_mnt, path);
++				if (retval2)
++					retval = retval2;
++			}
++			break;
++		}
++	} while ((tmpsubj = tmpsubj->parent_subject));
++	read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++	return retval;
++}
++
++static struct acl_object_label *
++chk_obj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
++	      const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
++{
++	struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry;
++	struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt;
++	struct dentry *root;
++	struct vfsmount *rootmnt;
++	struct acl_object_label *retval;
++	char *path = NULL;
++
++	read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++	rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
++	root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
++	read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
++
++	for (;;) {
++		if (dentry == root && mnt == rootmnt)
++			break;
++		if (dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
++			if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
++				break;
++
++			retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path);
++			if (retval != NULL)
++				goto out;
++
++			dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
++			mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
++			continue;
++		}
++
++		retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path);
++		if (retval != NULL)
++			goto out;
++
++		dentry = dentry->d_parent;
++	}
++
++	retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path);
++
++	if (retval == NULL)
++		retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, root, subj, &path);
++out:
++	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
++	dput(root);
++	mntput(rootmnt);
++
++	return retval;
++}
++
++static struct acl_object_label *
++chk_obj_create_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
++	      const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char *path)
++{
++	struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry;
++	struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt;
++	struct dentry *root;
++	struct vfsmount *rootmnt;
++	struct acl_object_label *retval;
++
++	read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++	rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
++	root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
++	read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
++
++	for (;;) {
++		if (dentry == root && mnt == rootmnt)
++			break;
++		if (dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
++			if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
++				break;
++
++			retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path);
++			if (retval != NULL)
++				goto out;
++
++			dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
++			mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
++			continue;
++		}
++
++		retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path);
++		if (retval != NULL)
++			goto out;
++
++		dentry = dentry->d_parent;
++	}
++
++	retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path);
++
++	if (retval == NULL)
++		retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, root, subj, &path);
++out:
++	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
++	dput(root);
++	mntput(rootmnt);
++
++	return retval;
++}
++
++static struct acl_subject_label *
++chk_subj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
++	       const struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry;
++	struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt;
++	struct dentry *root;
++	struct vfsmount *rootmnt;
++	struct acl_subject_label *retval;
++
++	read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++	rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
++	root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
++	read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
++
++	for (;;) {
++		if (unlikely(dentry == root && mnt == rootmnt))
++			break;
++		if (unlikely(dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) {
++			if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
++				break;
++
++			read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++			retval =
++			    lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++						  dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
++			read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++			if (unlikely(retval != NULL))
++				goto out;
++
++			dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
++			mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
++			continue;
++		}
++
++		read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++		retval =
++		    lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++					  dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
++		read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++		if (unlikely(retval != NULL))
++			goto out;
++
++		dentry = dentry->d_parent;
++	}
++
++	read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	retval =
++	    lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++				  dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
++	read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++	if (unlikely(retval == NULL)) {
++		read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++		retval =
++		    lookup_acl_subj_label(root->d_inode->i_ino,
++					  root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
++		read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	}
++      out:
++	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
++	dput(root);
++	mntput(rootmnt);
++
++	return retval;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++gr_log_learn(const struct acl_role_label *role, const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid,
++	     const struct task_struct *task, const char *pathname,
++	     const __u32 mode)
++{
++	security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, role->rolename, role->roletype,
++		       uid, gid, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename1(task->exec_file->f_dentry,
++		       task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : task->acl->filename, task->acl->filename,
++		       1, 1, pathname, (unsigned long) mode, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip));
++
++	return;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_check_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++	      const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++	      const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
++	      const struct dentry * old_dentry, const struct vfsmount * old_mnt)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *obj;
++	__u32 oldmode, newmode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
++
++	obj = chk_obj_label(old_dentry, old_mnt, current->acl);
++	oldmode = obj->mode;
++
++	if (current->acl->mode & GR_LEARN)
++		oldmode |= (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
++	newmode =
++	    gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
++			    oldmode | GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE |
++			    GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++	if ((newmode & oldmode) == oldmode)
++		return newmode;
++	else if (current->acl->mode & GR_LEARN) {
++		gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid,
++			current, gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), oldmode);
++		return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
++	} else if (newmode & GR_SUPPRESS)
++		return GR_SUPPRESS;
++	else
++		return 0;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_search_file(const struct dentry * dentry, const __u32 mode,
++	       const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	__u32 retval = mode;
++	struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
++	struct acl_object_label *currobj;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS);
++
++	curracl = current->acl;
++
++	currobj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, curracl);
++	retval = currobj->mode & mode;
++
++	if (unlikely
++	    ((curracl->mode & GR_LEARN) && !(mode & GR_NOPTRACE)
++	     && (retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))))) {
++		__u32 new_mode = mode;
++
++		new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++		retval = new_mode;
++
++		if (!(mode & GR_NOLEARN))
++			gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid,
++				     current, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), new_mode);
++	}
++
++	return retval;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_check_create(const struct dentry * new_dentry, const struct dentry * parent,
++		const struct vfsmount * mnt, const __u32 mode)
++{
++	struct name_entry *match;
++	struct acl_object_label *matchpo;
++	struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
++	char *path;
++	__u32 retval;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS);
++
++	preempt_disable();
++	path = gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt);
++	match = lookup_name_entry(path);
++
++	if (!match)
++		goto check_parent;
++
++	curracl = current->acl;
++
++	read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	matchpo = lookup_acl_obj_label_create(match->inode, match->device, curracl);
++	read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++	if (matchpo) {
++		if ((matchpo->mode & mode) !=
++		    (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))
++		    && curracl->mode & GR_LEARN) {
++			__u32 new_mode = mode;
++
++			new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++			gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid,
++				     current, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt), new_mode);
++
++			preempt_enable();
++			return new_mode;
++		}
++		preempt_enable();
++		return (matchpo->mode & mode);
++	}
++
++      check_parent:
++	curracl = current->acl;
++
++	matchpo = chk_obj_create_label(parent, mnt, curracl, path);
++	retval = matchpo->mode & mode;
++
++	if ((retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS)))
++	    && (curracl->mode & GR_LEARN)) {
++		__u32 new_mode = mode;
++
++		new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++		gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid, 
++			     current, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt), new_mode);
++		preempt_enable();
++		return new_mode;
++	}
++
++	preempt_enable();
++	return retval;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (!(task->acl->mode & GR_FIND) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_VIEW))
++		return 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task))
++		return 0;
++
++	if ((task->acl->mode & GR_PROTECTED) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_KILL))
++		return 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk)
++{
++	tsk->used_accept = 0;
++	tsk->acl_sp_role = 0;
++	tsk->acl_role_id = current->acl_role_id;
++	tsk->acl = current->acl;
++	tsk->role = current->role;
++	tsk->curr_ip = current->curr_ip;
++	if (current->exec_file)
++		get_file(current->exec_file);
++	tsk->exec_file = current->exec_file;
++	tsk->is_writable = current->is_writable;
++	if (unlikely(current->used_accept))
++		current->curr_ip = 0;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++gr_set_proc_res(void)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *proc;
++	unsigned short i;
++
++	proc = current->acl;
++
++	if (proc->mode & GR_LEARN)
++		return;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
++		if (!(proc->resmask & (1 << i)))
++			continue;
++
++		current->rlim[i].rlim_cur = proc->res[i].rlim_cur;
++		current->rlim[i].rlim_max = proc->res[i].rlim_max;
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++do_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid)
++{
++	task->role = lookup_acl_role_label(task, uid, gid);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
++{
++	unsigned int i;
++	__u16 num;
++	uid_t *uidlist;
++	int curuid;
++	int realok = 0;
++	int effectiveok = 0;
++	int fsok = 0;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 0;
++
++	num = current->acl->user_trans_num;
++	uidlist = current->acl->user_transitions;
++
++	if (uidlist == NULL)
++		return 0;
++
++	if (real == -1)
++		realok = 1;
++	if (effective == -1)
++		effectiveok = 1;
++	if (fs == -1)
++		fsok = 1;
++
++	if (current->acl->user_trans_type & GR_ID_ALLOW) {
++		for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
++			curuid = (int)uidlist[i];
++			if (real == curuid)
++				realok = 1;
++			if (effective == curuid)
++				effectiveok = 1;
++			if (fs == curuid)
++				fsok = 1;
++		}
++	} else if (current->acl->user_trans_type & GR_ID_DENY) {
++		for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
++			curuid = (int)uidlist[i];
++			if (real == curuid)
++				break;
++			if (effective == curuid)
++				break;
++			if (fs == curuid)
++				break;
++		}
++		/* not in deny list */
++		if (i == num) {
++			realok = 1;
++			effectiveok = 1;
++			fsok = 1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (realok && effectiveok && fsok)
++		return 0;
++	else {
++		security_alert(GR_USRCHANGE_ACL_MSG,
++			realok ? (effectiveok ? (fsok ? 0 : fs) : effective) : real, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 1;
++	}
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
++{
++	unsigned int i;
++	__u16 num;
++	gid_t *gidlist;
++	int curgid;
++	int realok = 0;
++	int effectiveok = 0;
++	int fsok = 0;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 0;
++
++	num = current->acl->group_trans_num;
++	gidlist = current->acl->group_transitions;
++
++	if (gidlist == NULL)
++		return 0;
++
++	if (real == -1)
++		realok = 1;
++	if (effective == -1)
++		effectiveok = 1;
++	if (fs == -1)
++		fsok = 1;
++
++	if (current->acl->group_trans_type & GR_ID_ALLOW) {
++		for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
++			curgid = (int)gidlist[i];
++			if (real == curgid)
++				realok = 1;
++			if (effective == curgid)
++				effectiveok = 1;
++			if (fs == curgid)
++				fsok = 1;
++		}
++	} else if (current->acl->group_trans_type & GR_ID_DENY) {
++		for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
++			curgid = (int)gidlist[i];
++			if (real == curgid)
++				break;
++			if (effective == curgid)
++				break;
++			if (fs == curgid)
++				break;
++		}
++		/* not in deny list */
++		if (i == num) {
++			realok = 1;
++			effectiveok = 1;
++			fsok = 1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (realok && effectiveok && fsok)
++		return 0;
++	else {
++		security_alert(GR_GRPCHANGE_ACL_MSG,
++			realok ? (effectiveok ? (fsok ? 0 : fs) : effective) : real, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 1;
++	}
++}
++
++void
++gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, const uid_t gid)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *obj;
++	struct file *filp;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return;
++
++	filp = task->exec_file;
++
++	/* kernel process, we'll give them the kernel role */
++	if (unlikely(!filp)) {
++		task->role = kernel_role;
++		task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
++		return;
++	} else if (!task->role || !(task->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL))
++		do_set_role_label(task, uid, gid);
++
++	task->acl =
++	    chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role);
++
++	task->is_writable = 0;
++
++	/* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable 
++	   by the default ACL */
++	obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
++	if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++		task->is_writable = 1;
++	obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label);
++	if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++		task->is_writable = 1;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
++	printk(KERN_ALERT "Set role label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
++#endif
++
++	gr_set_proc_res();
++
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	struct task_struct *task = current;
++	struct acl_subject_label *newacl;
++	struct acl_object_label *obj;
++	__u32 retmode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 0;
++
++	newacl = chk_subj_label(dentry, mnt, task->role);
++
++	task_lock(task);
++	if (((task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !(task->acl->mode &
++	     GR_OVERRIDE) && (task->acl != newacl) &&
++	     !(task->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) &&
++	     !gr_search_file(dentry, GR_PTRACERD, mnt)) ||
++	    (atomic_read(&task->fs->count) > 1 ||
++	     atomic_read(&task->files->count) > 1 ||
++	     atomic_read(&task->sighand->count) > 1)) {
++                task_unlock(task);
++		security_alert(GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG,
++			       gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++	obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, task->acl);
++	retmode = obj->mode & (GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT);
++
++	if ((newacl->mode & GR_LEARN) || !(retmode & GR_INHERIT)) {
++		if (obj->nested)
++			task->acl = obj->nested;
++		else
++			task->acl = newacl;
++		task_unlock(task);
++	} else if (retmode & GR_INHERIT && retmode & GR_AUDIT_INHERIT) {
++		task_unlock(task);
++		security_audit(GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG, task->acl->filename,
++			       gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++	} else
++		task_unlock(task);
++
++	task->is_writable = 0;
++
++	/* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable 
++	   by the default ACL */
++	obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, default_role->root_label);
++	if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++		task->is_writable = 1;
++	obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, task->role->root_label);
++	if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++		task->is_writable = 1;
++
++	gr_set_proc_res();
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
++	printk(KERN_ALERT "Set subject label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++do_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *matchpo;
++	struct acl_subject_label *matchps;
++	struct acl_subject_label *i;
++	struct acl_role_label *role;
++
++	for (role = role_list_head; role; role = role->next) {
++		for (i = role->hash->first; i; i = i->next) {
++			if (unlikely((i->mode & GR_NESTED) &&
++				     (i->inode == ino) &&
++				     (i->device == dev)))
++				i->mode |= GR_DELETED;
++			if (unlikely((matchpo =
++			     lookup_acl_obj_label(ino, dev, i)) != NULL))
++				matchpo->mode |= GR_DELETED;
++		}
++
++		if (unlikely((matchps = lookup_acl_subj_label(ino, dev, role)) != NULL))
++			matchps->mode |= GR_DELETED;
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
++{
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return;
++
++	write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	if (unlikely((unsigned long)lookup_inodev_entry(ino, dev)))
++		do_handle_delete(ino, dev);
++	write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++update_acl_obj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice,
++		     const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice,
++		     struct acl_subject_label *subj)
++{
++	unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj->obj_hash_size);
++	struct acl_object_label **match;
++	struct acl_object_label *tmp;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++
++	match = &subj->obj_hash[index];
++
++	while (*match && ((*match)->inode != oldinode ||
++	       (*match)->device != olddevice ||
++	       !((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj->obj_hash_size;
++		match = &subj->obj_hash[index];
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++	}
++
++	if (*match && ((*match) != deleted_object)
++	    && ((*match)->inode == oldinode)
++	    && ((*match)->device == olddevice)
++	    && ((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED)) {
++		tmp = *match;
++		tmp->inode = newinode;
++		tmp->device = newdevice;
++		tmp->mode &= ~GR_DELETED;
++
++		*match = deleted_object;
++
++		insert_acl_obj_label(tmp, subj);
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++update_acl_subj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice,
++		      const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice,
++		      struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash;
++	unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size;
++	unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj_size);
++	struct acl_subject_label **match;
++	struct acl_subject_label *tmp;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++
++	match = &s_hash[index];
++
++	while (*match && ((*match)->inode != oldinode ||
++	       (*match)->device != olddevice ||
++	       !((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size;
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++		match = &s_hash[index];
++	}
++
++	if (*match && (*match != deleted_subject)
++	    && ((*match)->inode == oldinode)
++	    && ((*match)->device == olddevice)
++	    && ((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED)) {
++		tmp = *match;
++
++		tmp->inode = newinode;
++		tmp->device = newdevice;
++		tmp->mode &= ~GR_DELETED;
++
++		*match = deleted_subject;
++
++		insert_acl_subj_label(tmp, role);
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++update_inodev_entry(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice,
++		    const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice)
++{
++	unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, inodev_set.n_size);
++	struct name_entry **match;
++	struct name_entry *tmp;
++	__u8 i = 0;
++
++	match = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
++
++	while (*match
++	       && ((*match)->inode != oldinode
++		   || (*match)->device != olddevice)) {
++		index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size;
++		i = (i + 1) % 32;
++		match = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
++	}
++
++	if (*match && (*match != deleted_inodev)
++	    && ((*match)->inode == oldinode)
++	    && ((*match)->device == olddevice)) {
++		tmp = *match;
++
++		tmp->inode = newinode;
++		tmp->device = newdevice;
++
++		*match = deleted_inodev;
++
++		insert_inodev_entry(tmp);
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++do_handle_create(const struct name_entry *matchn, const struct dentry *dentry,
++		 const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *i;
++	struct acl_role_label *role;
++
++	for (role = role_list_head; role; role = role->next) {
++		update_acl_subj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
++				      dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++				      dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
++
++		for (i = role->hash->first; i; i = i->next) {
++			if (unlikely((i->mode & GR_NESTED) &&
++				     (i->inode == dentry->d_inode->i_ino) &&
++				     (i->device == dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev))) {
++				i->inode = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
++				i->device = dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
++			}
++			update_acl_obj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
++					     dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++					     dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, i);
++		}
++	}
++
++	update_inodev_entry(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
++			    dentry->d_inode->i_ino, dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	struct name_entry *matchn;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return;
++
++	preempt_disable();
++	matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
++	preempt_enable();
++
++	if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn)) {
++		write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++		do_handle_create(matchn, dentry, mnt);
++		write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
++		 struct dentry *old_dentry,
++		 struct dentry *new_dentry,
++		 struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace)
++{
++	struct name_entry *matchn;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return;
++
++	preempt_disable();
++	matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt));
++	preempt_enable();
++
++	/* we wouldn't have to check d_inode if it weren't for
++	   NFS silly-renaming
++	 */
++
++	write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	if (unlikely(replace && new_dentry->d_inode)) {
++		if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++					new_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) &&
++		    (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1)))
++			do_handle_delete(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++					 new_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev);
++	}
++
++	if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++				old_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) &&
++	    (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1)))
++		do_handle_delete(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++				 old_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev);
++
++	if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn))
++		do_handle_create(matchn, old_dentry, mnt);
++	write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static int
++lookup_special_role_auth(const char *rolename, unsigned char **salt,
++			 unsigned char **sum)
++{
++	struct acl_role_label *r;
++	struct role_transition *trans;
++	__u16 i;
++	int found = 0;
++
++	/* check transition table */
++
++	for (trans = current->role->transitions; trans; trans = trans->next) {
++		if (!strcmp(rolename, trans->rolename)) {
++			found = 1;
++			break;
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (!found)
++		return 0;
++
++	/* handle special roles that do not require authentication */
++
++	for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) {
++		if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename)
++		    && (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_NOPW)) {
++			*salt = NULL;
++			*sum = NULL;
++			return 1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) {
++		if (!strcmp(rolename, acl_special_roles[i]->rolename)) {
++			*salt = acl_special_roles[i]->salt;
++			*sum = acl_special_roles[i]->sum;
++			return 1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static void
++assign_special_role(char *rolename)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *obj;
++	struct acl_role_label *r;
++	struct acl_role_label *assigned = NULL;
++	struct task_struct *tsk;
++	struct file *filp;
++
++	for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next)
++		if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename) &&
++		    (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL))
++			assigned = r;
++
++	if (!assigned)
++		return;
++
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++	read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++
++	tsk = current->parent;
++	if (tsk == NULL) {
++		read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	filp = tsk->exec_file;
++	if (filp == NULL) {
++		read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	tsk->is_writable = 0;
++
++	acl_sp_role_value = (acl_sp_role_value % 65535) + 1;
++	tsk->acl_sp_role = 1;
++	tsk->acl_role_id = acl_sp_role_value;
++	tsk->role = assigned;
++	tsk->acl = chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role);
++
++	/* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable 
++	   by the default ACL */
++	obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
++	if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++		tsk->is_writable = 1;
++	obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role->root_label);
++	if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++		tsk->is_writable = 1;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
++	printk(KERN_ALERT "Assigning special role:%s subject:%s to process (%s:%d)\n", tsk->role->rolename, tsk->acl->filename, tsk->comm, tsk->pid);
++#endif
++
++	read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++	return;
++}
++
++ssize_t
++write_grsec_handler(struct file *file, const char * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
++{
++	struct gr_arg *uarg;
++	unsigned char *sprole_salt;
++	unsigned char *sprole_sum;
++	int error = sizeof (struct gr_arg *);
++	int error2 = 0;
++
++	down(&gr_dev_sem);
++
++	if (count != sizeof (struct gr_arg *)) {
++		security_alert_good(GR_DEV_ACL_MSG, count,
++				    (int) sizeof (struct gr_arg *));
++		error = -EINVAL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((gr_auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES)
++	    && time_before_eq(gr_auth_expires, get_seconds())) {
++		gr_auth_expires = 0;
++		gr_auth_attempts = 0;
++	}
++
++	if (copy_from_user(&uarg, buf, sizeof (struct gr_arg *))) {
++		error = -EFAULT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (copy_from_user(gr_usermode, uarg, sizeof (struct gr_arg))) {
++		error = -EFAULT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (gr_usermode->mode != SPROLE && time_after(gr_auth_expires, get_seconds())) {
++		error = -EBUSY;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* if non-root trying to do anything other than use a special role,
++	   do not attempt authentication, do not count towards authentication
++	   locking
++	 */
++
++	if (gr_usermode->mode != SPROLE && current->uid) {
++		error = -EPERM;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* ensure pw and special role name are null terminated */
++
++	gr_usermode->pw[GR_PW_LEN - 1] = '\0';
++	gr_usermode->sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN - 1] = '\0';
++
++	/* Okay. 
++	 * We have our enough of the argument structure..(we have yet
++	 * to copy_from_user the tables themselves) . Copy the tables
++	 * only if we need them, i.e. for loading operations. */
++
++	switch (gr_usermode->mode) {
++	case STATUS:
++			if (gr_status & GR_READY)
++				error = 1;
++			else
++				error = 2;
++			goto out;
++	case SHUTDOWN:
++		if ((gr_status & GR_READY)
++		    && !(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) {
++			gr_status &= ~GR_READY;
++			security_alert_good(GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			free_variables();
++			memset(gr_usermode, 0, sizeof (struct gr_arg));
++			memset(gr_system_salt, 0, GR_SALT_LEN);
++			memset(gr_system_sum, 0, GR_SHA_LEN);
++		} else if (gr_status & GR_READY) {
++			security_alert(GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			error = -EPERM;
++		} else {
++			security_alert_good(GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			error = -EAGAIN;
++		}
++		break;
++	case ENABLE:
++		if (!(gr_status & GR_READY) && !(error2 = gracl_init(gr_usermode)))
++			security_alert_good(GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
++		else {
++			if (gr_status & GR_READY)
++				error = -EAGAIN;
++			else
++				error = error2;
++			security_alert(GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION,
++				       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		}
++		break;
++	case RELOAD:
++		if (!(gr_status & GR_READY)) {
++			security_alert_good(GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG);
++			error = -EAGAIN;
++		} else if (!(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) {
++			lock_kernel();
++			gr_status &= ~GR_READY;
++			free_variables();
++			if (!(error2 = gracl_init(gr_usermode))) {
++				unlock_kernel();
++				security_alert_good(GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG,
++						    GR_VERSION);
++			} else {
++				unlock_kernel();
++				error = error2;
++				security_alert(GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION,
++					       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			}
++		} else {
++			security_alert(GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION,
++				       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			error = -EPERM;
++		}
++		break;
++	case SEGVMOD:
++		if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
++			security_alert_good(GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG,
++					    DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			error = -EAGAIN;
++			break;
++		}
++
++		if (!(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) {
++			security_alert_good(GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG,
++					    DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			if (gr_usermode->segv_device && gr_usermode->segv_inode) {
++				struct acl_subject_label *segvacl;
++				segvacl =
++				    lookup_acl_subj_label(gr_usermode->segv_inode,
++							  gr_usermode->segv_device,
++							  current->role);
++				if (segvacl) {
++					segvacl->crashes = 0;
++					segvacl->expires = 0;
++				}
++			} else if (gr_find_uid(gr_usermode->segv_uid) >= 0) {
++				gr_remove_uid(gr_usermode->segv_uid);
++			}
++		} else {
++			security_alert(GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			error = -EPERM;
++		}
++		break;
++	case SPROLE:
++		if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
++			security_alert_good(GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			error = -EAGAIN;
++			break;
++		}
++
++		if ((current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES)
++		    && time_before_eq(current->role->expires, get_seconds())) {
++			current->role->expires = 0;
++			current->role->auth_attempts = 0;
++		}
++
++		if (time_after(current->role->expires, get_seconds())) {
++			error = -EBUSY;
++			goto out;
++		}
++
++		if (lookup_special_role_auth
++		    (gr_usermode->sp_role, &sprole_salt, &sprole_sum)
++		    && ((!sprole_salt && !sprole_sum)
++			|| !(chkpw(gr_usermode, sprole_salt, sprole_sum)))) {
++			assign_special_role(gr_usermode->sp_role);
++			security_alert_good(GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG,
++					    (current->parent) ? current->
++					    parent->role->rolename : "",
++					    acl_sp_role_value, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		} else {
++			security_alert(GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG, gr_usermode->sp_role,
++				       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			error = -EPERM;
++			current->role->auth_attempts++;
++			if (current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) {
++				current->role->expires =
++				    get_seconds() + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT;
++				security_alert(GR_MAXROLEPW_ACL_MSG,
++				       CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES,
++				       gr_usermode->sp_role, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			}
++
++			goto out;
++		}
++		break;
++	case UNSPROLE:
++		if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
++			security_alert_good(GR_UNSPROLEI_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			error = -EAGAIN;
++			break;
++		}
++
++		if (current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL) {
++			security_alert_good(GR_UNSPROLES_ACL_MSG,
++					    (current->parent) ? current->
++					    parent->role->rolename : "",
++					    (current->parent) ? current->
++					    parent->acl_role_id : 0, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			gr_set_acls(1);
++		} else {
++			security_alert(GR_UNSPROLEF_ACL_MSG, current->role->rolename,
++				       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			error = -EPERM;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		break;
++	default:
++		security_alert(GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG, gr_usermode->mode,
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		error = -EINVAL;
++		break;
++	}
++
++	if (error != -EPERM)
++		goto out;
++
++	gr_auth_attempts++;
++
++	if (gr_auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) {
++		security_alert(GR_MAXPW_ACL_MSG, CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES);
++		gr_auth_expires = get_seconds() + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT;
++	}
++
++      out:
++	up(&gr_dev_sem);
++	return error;
++}
++
++int
++gr_set_acls(const int type)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *obj;
++	struct task_struct *task, *task2;
++	struct file *filp;
++	unsigned short i;
++
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++	read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	for_each_process(task2) {
++		task = task2;
++		do {
++		/* check to see if we're called from the exit handler,
++		   if so, only replace ACLs that have inherited the admin
++		   ACL */
++
++		if (type && (task->role != current->role ||
++			     task->acl_role_id != current->acl_role_id))
++			continue;
++
++		task->acl_role_id = 0;
++		task->acl_sp_role = 0;
++
++		if ((filp = task->exec_file)) {
++			do_set_role_label(task, task->uid, task->gid);
++
++			task->acl =
++			    chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt,
++					   task->role);
++			if (task->acl) {
++				struct acl_subject_label *curr;
++				curr = task->acl;
++
++				task->is_writable = 0;
++				/* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable 
++				   by the default ACL */
++				obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
++				if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++					task->is_writable = 1;
++				obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label);
++				if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++					task->is_writable = 1;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
++				printk(KERN_ALERT "gr_set_acls for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
++#endif
++				if (!(curr->mode & GR_LEARN))
++					for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
++						if (!(curr->resmask & (1 << i)))
++							continue;
++
++						task->rlim[i].rlim_cur =
++						    curr->res[i].rlim_cur;
++						task->rlim[i].rlim_max =
++						    curr->res[i].rlim_max;
++					}
++			} else {
++				read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++				read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++				security_alert_good(GR_DEFACL_MSG, task->comm,
++						    task->pid);
++				return 1;
++			}
++		} else {
++			// it's a kernel process
++			task->role = kernel_role;
++			task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN
++			task->acl->mode &= ~GR_FIND;
++#endif
++		}
++	} while ((task = next_thread(task)) != task2);
++	}
++	read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_learn_resource);
++
++void
++gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
++		  const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *acl;
++
++	if (unlikely((gr_status & GR_READY) &&
++		     task->acl && (task->acl->mode & GR_LEARN)))
++		goto skip_reslog;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++	gr_log_resource(task, res, wanted, gt);
++#endif
++      skip_reslog:
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !wanted))
++		return;
++
++	acl = task->acl;
++
++	if (likely(!acl || !(acl->mode & GR_LEARN) ||
++		   !(acl->resmask & (1 << (unsigned short) res))))
++		return;
++
++	if (wanted >= acl->res[res].rlim_cur) {
++		unsigned long res_add;
++
++		res_add = wanted;
++		switch (res) {
++		case RLIMIT_CPU:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_FSIZE:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_DATA:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_STACK:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_CORE:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_RSS:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_NPROC:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_NOFILE:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_MEMLOCK:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_AS:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_LOCKS:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP;
++			break;
++		}
++
++		acl->res[res].rlim_cur = res_add;
++
++		if (wanted > acl->res[res].rlim_max)
++			acl->res[res].rlim_max = res_add;
++
++		security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, current->role->rolename,
++			       current->role->roletype, acl->filename,
++			       acl->res[res].rlim_cur, acl->res[res].rlim_max,
++			       "", (unsigned long) res);
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++void
++pax_set_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
++{
++	struct task_struct *task = current;
++        struct acl_subject_label *proc;
++
++        if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++                return;
++
++        proc = task->acl;
++
++        if (proc->mode & GR_PAXPAGE)
++                task->flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++        if (proc->mode & GR_PAXSEGM)
++                task->flags &= ~PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++        if (proc->mode & GR_PAXGCC)
++                task->flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++        if (proc->mode & GR_PAXMPROTECT)
++                task->flags &= ~PF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++        if (proc->mode & GR_PAXRANDMMAP)
++                task->flags &= ~PF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
++        if (proc->mode & GR_PAXRANDEXEC)
++                task->flags |= PF_PAX_RANDEXEC;
++
++        return;
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
++extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_sys_root;
++
++
++/* the following function is called under the BKL */
++
++__u32
++gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table *table, const void *oldval,
++		 const void *newval)
++{
++	struct proc_dir_entry *tmp;
++	struct nameidata nd;
++	const char *proc_sys = "/proc/sys";
++	char *path;
++	struct acl_object_label *obj;
++	unsigned short len = 0, pos = 0, depth = 0, i;
++	__u32 err = 0;
++	__u32 mode = 0;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 1;
++
++	path = per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id());
++
++	if (oldval)
++		mode |= GR_READ;
++	if (newval)
++		mode |= GR_WRITE;
++
++	/* convert the requested sysctl entry into a pathname */
++
++	for (tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root; tmp = tmp->parent) {
++		len += strlen(tmp->name);
++		len++;
++		depth++;
++	}
++
++	if ((len + depth + strlen(proc_sys) + 1) > PAGE_SIZE)
++		return 0;	/* deny */
++
++	memset(path, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
++
++	memcpy(path, proc_sys, strlen(proc_sys));
++
++	pos += strlen(proc_sys);
++
++	for (; depth > 0; depth--) {
++		path[pos] = '/';
++		pos++;
++		for (i = 1, tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root;
++		     tmp = tmp->parent) {
++			if (depth == i) {
++				memcpy(path + pos, tmp->name,
++				       strlen(tmp->name));
++				pos += strlen(tmp->name);
++			}
++			i++;
++		}
++	}
++
++	err = path_lookup(path, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd);
++
++	if (err)
++		goto out;
++
++	obj = chk_obj_label(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, current->acl);
++	err = obj->mode & (mode | to_gr_audit(mode) | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++	if (unlikely((current->acl->mode & GR_LEARN) && ((err & mode) != mode))) {
++		__u32 new_mode = mode;
++
++		new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++		err = new_mode;
++		gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid,
++			     current, path, new_mode);
++	} else if ((err & mode) != mode && !(err & GR_SUPPRESS)) {
++		security_alert(GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "denied", path,
++			       (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "",
++			       (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "",
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		err = 0;
++	} else if ((err & mode) != mode) {
++		err = 0;
++	} else if (((err & mode) == mode) && (err & GR_AUDITS)) {
++		security_audit(GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++			       path, (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "",
++			       (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "",
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++	}
++
++	path_release(&nd);
++
++      out:
++	return err;
++}
++#endif
++
++int
++gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	struct file *filp;
++	struct task_struct *tmp = task;
++	struct task_struct *curtemp = current;
++	__u32 retmode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 0;
++
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++	read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	filp = task->exec_file;
++
++	while (tmp->pid > 0) {
++		if (tmp == curtemp)
++			break;
++		tmp = tmp->parent;
++	}
++
++	if (!filp || (tmp->pid == 0 && !(current->acl->mode & GR_RELAXPTRACE))) {
++		read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	retmode = gr_search_file(filp->f_dentry, GR_NOPTRACE, filp->f_vfsmnt);
++	read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++	if (retmode & GR_NOPTRACE)
++		return 1;
++
++	if (!(current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) && !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD)
++	    && (current->acl != task->acl || (current->acl != current->role->root_label
++	    && current->pid != task->pid)))
++		return 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request)
++{
++	struct task_struct *tmp = task;
++	struct task_struct *curtemp = current;
++	__u32 retmode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (task->acl->mode & GR_NOPTRACE) {
++		security_alert(GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, task->exec_file ?
++			       gr_to_filename(task->exec_file->f_dentry, task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt)
++			       : "(none)", task->comm, task->pid,
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++	while (tmp->pid > 0) {
++		if (tmp == curtemp)
++			break;
++		tmp = tmp->parent;
++	}
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++	if (tmp->pid == 0 && !(current->acl->mode & GR_RELAXPTRACE)) {
++		security_alert(GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, task->exec_file ?
++			       gr_to_filename(task->exec_file->f_dentry, task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt)
++			       : "(none)", task->comm, task->pid,
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	if (unlikely(!task->exec_file)) {
++		read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	retmode = gr_search_file(task->exec_file->f_dentry, GR_PTRACERD | GR_NOPTRACE, task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt);
++	read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++
++	if (retmode & GR_NOPTRACE) {
++		security_alert(GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, gr_to_filename(task->exec_file->f_dentry, task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt),
++			       task->comm, task->pid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 1;
++	}
++		
++	if (retmode & GR_PTRACERD) {
++		switch (request) {
++		case PTRACE_POKETEXT:
++		case PTRACE_POKEDATA:
++		case PTRACE_POKEUSR:
++#if !defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && !defined(CONFIG_PARISC) && !defined(CONFIG_ALPHA)
++		case PTRACE_SETREGS:
++		case PTRACE_SETFPREGS:
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86
++		case PTRACE_SETFPXREGS:
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
++		case PTRACE_SETVRREGS:
++#endif
++			return 1;
++		default:
++			return 0;
++		}
++	} else if (!(current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) &&
++		   !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD)
++		   && (current->acl != task->acl
++		       || (current->acl != current->role->root_label
++			   && current->pid != task->pid))) {
++		security_alert(GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG,
++			       gr_to_filename(task->exec_file->f_dentry, task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt),
++			       task->comm, task->pid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_mmap(const struct file *filp, const unsigned long prot)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *obj, *obj2;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) ||
++		     (current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) || !filp ||
++		     !(prot & PROT_EXEC)))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (unlikely(current->is_writable))
++		return 0;
++
++	obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
++	obj2 = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt,
++			     current->role->root_label);
++	if (unlikely((obj->mode & GR_WRITE) || (obj2->mode & GR_WRITE))) {
++		security_alert(GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG,
++			       gr_to_filename(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
++{
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC)))
++		return 1;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_search_file(file->f_dentry,
++			   GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS,
++			   file->f_vfsmnt);
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || (!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))) {
++		security_alert(GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++			       gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || !(mode & GR_EXEC))) {
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) {
++		security_audit(GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++			       gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
++{
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC)))
++		return 1;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_search_file(file->f_dentry,
++			   GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS,
++			   file->f_vfsmnt);
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || (!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))) {
++		security_alert(GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++			       gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || !(mode & GR_EXEC))) {
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) {
++		security_audit(GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++			       gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void
++gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code)
++{
++	u64 runtime64;
++	unsigned long runtime;
++	unsigned long cputime;
++	unsigned int wday, cday;
++	__u8 whr, chr;
++	__u8 wmin, cmin;
++	__u8 wsec, csec;
++	char cur_tty[64] = { 0 };
++	char parent_tty[64] = { 0 };
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task->acl ||
++		     !(task->acl->mode & GR_PROCACCT)))
++		return;
++
++	runtime64 = get_jiffies_64() - task->start_time;
++	do_div(runtime64, HZ);
++	runtime = (unsigned long)runtime64;
++	wday = runtime / (3600 * 24);
++	runtime -= wday * (3600 * 24);
++	whr = runtime / 3600;
++	runtime -= whr * 3600;
++	wmin = runtime / 60;
++	runtime -= wmin * 60;
++	wsec = runtime;
++
++	cputime = (task->utime + task->stime) / HZ;
++	cday = cputime / (3600 * 24);
++	cputime -= cday * (3600 * 24);
++	chr = cputime / 3600;
++	cputime -= chr * 3600;
++	cmin = cputime / 60;
++	cputime -= cmin * 60;
++	csec = cputime;
++
++	security_audit(GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm,
++		       task->pid, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip), tty_name(task->signal->tty,
++								   cur_tty),
++		       task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, wday, whr,
++		       wmin, wsec, cday, chr, cmin, csec,
++		       (task->flags & PF_SIGNALED) ? "killed by signal" : "exited",
++		       code, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), 
++		       task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid,
++		       NIPQUAD(task->parent->curr_ip),
++		       tty_name(task->parent->signal->tty, parent_tty),
++		       task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid,
++		       task->parent->egid);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_set_kernel_label);
++
++void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	if (gr_status & GR_READY) {
++		task->role = kernel_role;
++		task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
++	}
++	return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
++/* stack-based acl allocation tracking (c) Brad Spengler 2002,2003 */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
++static unsigned long alloc_stack_next = 1;
++static unsigned long alloc_stack_size = 1;
++static void **alloc_stack;
++
++static __inline__ int
++alloc_pop(void)
++{
++	if (alloc_stack_next == 1)
++		return 0;
++
++	kfree(alloc_stack[alloc_stack_next - 2]);
++
++	alloc_stack_next--;
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++alloc_push(void *buf)
++{
++	if (alloc_stack_next >= alloc_stack_size)
++		BUG();
++
++	alloc_stack[alloc_stack_next - 1] = buf;
++
++	alloc_stack_next++;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++void *
++acl_alloc(unsigned long len)
++{
++	void *ret;
++
++	if (len > PAGE_SIZE)
++		BUG();
++
++	ret = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
++
++	if (ret)
++		alloc_push(ret);
++
++	return ret;
++}
++
++void
++acl_free_all(void)
++{
++	if (gr_acl_is_enabled() || !alloc_stack)
++		return;
++
++	while (alloc_pop()) ;
++
++	if (alloc_stack) {
++		if ((alloc_stack_size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
++			kfree(alloc_stack);
++		else
++			vfree(alloc_stack);
++	}
++
++	alloc_stack = NULL;
++	alloc_stack_size = 1;
++	alloc_stack_next = 1;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size)
++{
++	if ((size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
++		alloc_stack =
++		    (void **) kmalloc(size * sizeof (void *), GFP_KERNEL);
++	else
++		alloc_stack = (void **) vmalloc(size * sizeof (void *));
++
++	alloc_stack_size = size;
++
++	if (!alloc_stack)
++		return 0;
++	else
++		return 1;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
++/* capability handling routines, (c) Brad Spengler 2002,2003 */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/capability.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++static const char *captab_log[29] = {
++	"CAP_CHOWN",
++	"CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE",
++	"CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH",
++	"CAP_FOWNER",
++	"CAP_FSETID",
++	"CAP_KILL",
++	"CAP_SETGID",
++	"CAP_SETUID",
++	"CAP_SETPCAP",
++	"CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE",
++	"CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE",
++	"CAP_NET_BROADCAST",
++	"CAP_NET_ADMIN",
++	"CAP_NET_RAW",
++	"CAP_IPC_LOCK",
++	"CAP_IPC_OWNER",
++	"CAP_SYS_MODULE",
++	"CAP_SYS_RAWIO",
++	"CAP_SYS_CHROOT",
++	"CAP_SYS_PTRACE",
++	"CAP_SYS_PACCT",
++	"CAP_SYS_ADMIN",
++	"CAP_SYS_BOOT",
++	"CAP_SYS_NICE",
++	"CAP_SYS_RESOURCE",
++	"CAP_SYS_TIME",
++	"CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG",
++	"CAP_MKNOD",
++	"CAP_LEASE"
++};
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_task_is_capable);
++
++int
++gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
++	__u32 cap_drop = 0, cap_mask = 0;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
++		return 1;
++
++	curracl = task->acl;
++
++	cap_drop = curracl->cap_lower;
++	cap_mask = curracl->cap_mask;
++
++	while ((curracl = curracl->parent_subject)) {
++		cap_drop |= curracl->cap_lower & (cap_mask & ~curracl->cap_mask);
++		cap_mask |= curracl->cap_mask;
++	}
++
++	if (!cap_raised(cap_drop, cap))
++		return 1;
++
++	curracl = task->acl;
++
++	if ((curracl->mode & GR_LEARN)
++	    && cap_raised(task->cap_effective, cap)) {
++		security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, task->role->rolename,
++			       task->role->roletype, task->uid,
++			       task->gid, task->exec_file ?
++			       gr_to_filename(task->exec_file->f_dentry,
++			       task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : curracl->filename,
++			       curracl->filename, 0UL,
++			       0UL, "", (unsigned long) cap, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip));
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	if ((cap >= 0) && (cap < 29) && cap_raised(task->cap_effective, cap))
++		security_alert(GR_CAP_ACL_MSG, captab_log[cap],
++				gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid,
++				task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task),
++				task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid,
++				task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid);
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
++	__u32 cap_drop = 0, cap_mask = 0;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
++		return 1;
++
++	curracl = current->acl;
++
++	cap_drop = curracl->cap_lower;
++	cap_mask = curracl->cap_mask;
++
++	while ((curracl = curracl->parent_subject)) {
++		cap_drop |= curracl->cap_lower & (cap_mask & ~curracl->cap_mask);
++		cap_mask |= curracl->cap_mask;
++	}
++
++	if (!cap_raised(cap_drop, cap))
++		return 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,462 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry,
++			  const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode))
++		return GR_FIND;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_search_file(dentry, GR_FIND | GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt);
++
++	if (unlikely(mode & GR_FIND && mode & GR_AUDIT_FIND)) {
++		security_audit(GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++			       gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return mode;
++	} else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
++		security_alert(GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++			       gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND)))
++		return 0;
++
++	return GR_FIND;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
++		   const int fmode)
++{
++	__u32 reqmode = GR_FIND;
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode))
++		return reqmode;
++
++	if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND))
++		reqmode |= GR_APPEND;
++	else if (unlikely(fmode & FMODE_WRITE))
++		reqmode |= GR_WRITE;
++	if (likely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY)))
++		reqmode |= GR_READ;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS,
++			   mnt);
++
++	if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++		security_audit(GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++			       gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++			       reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" :
++			       reqmode & GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "",
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return reqmode;
++	} else
++	    if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
++	{
++		security_alert(GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++			       gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++			       reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
++			       GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "", DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
++		return 0;
++
++	return reqmode;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry,
++		    const struct dentry * p_dentry,
++		    const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode,
++		    const int imode)
++{
++	__u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND))
++		reqmode |= GR_APPEND;
++	if (unlikely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY)))
++		reqmode |= GR_READ;
++	if (unlikely((fmode & O_CREAT) && (imode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))))
++		reqmode |= GR_SETID;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_check_create(dentry, p_dentry, p_mnt,
++			    reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++	if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++		security_audit(GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++			       gr_to_filename(dentry, p_mnt),
++			       reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" :
++			       reqmode & GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "",
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return reqmode;
++	} else
++	    if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
++	{
++		security_alert(GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++			       gr_to_filename(dentry, p_mnt),
++			       reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
++			       GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "", DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
++		return 0;
++
++	return reqmode;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
++		     const int fmode)
++{
++	__u32 mode, reqmode = GR_FIND;
++
++	if ((fmode & S_IXOTH) && !S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
++		reqmode |= GR_EXEC;
++	if (fmode & S_IWOTH)
++		reqmode |= GR_WRITE;
++	if (fmode & S_IROTH)
++		reqmode |= GR_READ;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS,
++			   mnt);
++
++	if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++		security_audit(GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++			       gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++			       reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "",
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return reqmode;
++	} else
++	    if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
++	{
++		security_alert(GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++			       gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++			       reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "",
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
++		return 0;
++
++	return reqmode;
++}
++
++#define generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, reqmode, fmt) \
++{ \
++	__u32 mode; \
++	\
++	mode = gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt); \
++	\
++	if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { \
++		security_audit(fmt, "successful", \
++				gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); \
++		return mode; \
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { \
++		security_alert(fmt, "denied", gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), \
++				DEFAULTSECARGS); \
++		return 0; \
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode))) \
++		return 0; \
++	\
++	return (reqmode); \
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++		     mode_t mode)
++{
++	if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) {
++		generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID,
++				   GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG);
++	} else {
++		generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG);
++	}
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++		    mode_t mode)
++{
++	if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) {
++		generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID,
++				   GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG);
++	} else {
++		generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG);
++	}
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_EXEC, GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_READ | GR_WRITE,
++			   GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++		      const ino_t ino)
++{
++	if (likely((unsigned long)(dentry->d_inode))) {
++		struct dentry d = *dentry;
++		struct inode inode = *(dentry->d_inode);
++
++		inode.i_ino = ino;
++		d.d_inode = &inode;
++
++		if (unlikely(!gr_search_file(&d, GR_FIND | GR_NOLEARN, mnt)))
++			return 0;
++	}
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++		   const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++		   const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
++		   const struct dentry * old_dentry,
++		   const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to)
++{
++	__u32 needmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_check_link(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, old_dentry,
++			  old_mnt);
++
++	if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) == needmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++		security_audit(GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++			       gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), to,
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return mode;
++	} else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
++		security_alert(GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++			       gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), to,
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode))
++		return 0;
++
++	return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++		      const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++		      const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from)
++{
++	__u32 needmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
++			    GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE |
++			    GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++	if (unlikely(mode & GR_WRITE && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++		security_audit(GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++			       from, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return mode;
++	} else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
++		security_alert(GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++			       from, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode))
++		return 0;
++
++	return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
++}
++
++#define generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, reqmode, fmt) \
++{ \
++	__u32 mode; \
++	\
++	mode = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS); \
++	\
++	if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { \
++		security_audit(fmt, "successful", \
++				gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt), \
++				DEFAULTSECARGS); \
++		return mode; \
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { \
++		security_alert(fmt, "denied", \
++				gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt), \
++				DEFAULTSECARGS); \
++		return 0; \
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode))) \
++		return 0; \
++	\
++	return (reqmode); \
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++		    const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++		    const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
++		    const int mode)
++{
++	__u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
++	if (unlikely(mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))
++		reqmode |= GR_SETID;
++
++	generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
++				  reqmode, GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++		    const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++		    const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt)
++{
++	generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
++				  GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE, GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++#define RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(old, new) \
++	(((old & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) && \
++	 ((new & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)))
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry,
++		     struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++		     const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++		     struct dentry *old_dentry,
++		     struct inode *old_parent_inode,
++		     struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname)
++{
++	__u32 comp1, comp2;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (!new_dentry->d_inode) {
++		comp1 = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
++					GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_READ |
++					GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_SUPPRESS);
++		comp2 = gr_search_file(old_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE |
++				       GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
++				       GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE |
++				       GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt);
++	} else {
++		comp1 = gr_search_file(new_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE |
++				       GR_CREATE | GR_DELETE |
++				       GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
++				       GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE |
++				       GR_SUPPRESS, parent_mnt);
++		comp2 =
++		    gr_search_file(old_dentry,
++				   GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_READ |
++				   GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
++				   GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt);
++	}
++
++	if (RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) &&
++	    ((comp1 & GR_AUDITS) || (comp2 & GR_AUDITS)))
++		security_audit(GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++			       gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt),
++			       newname, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++	else if (!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) && !(comp1 & GR_SUPPRESS)
++		 && !(comp2 & GR_SUPPRESS)) {
++		security_alert(GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++			       gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), newname,
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		error = -EACCES;
++	} else if (unlikely(!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2)))
++		error = -EACCES;
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++void
++gr_acl_handle_exit(void)
++{
++	u16 id;
++	char *rolename;
++
++	if (unlikely(current->acl_sp_role && gr_acl_is_enabled())) {
++		id = current->acl_role_id;
++		rolename = current->role->rolename;
++		gr_set_acls(1);
++		security_alert_good(GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG,
++				    rolename, id, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++	}
++
++	write_lock_irq(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	if (current->exec_file) {
++		fput(current->exec_file);
++		current->exec_file = NULL;
++	}
++	write_unlock_irq(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTPROCFD)
++		return -EACCES;
++
++	return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
++/* 
++ * grsecurity/gracl_ip.c
++ * Copyright Brad Spengler 2002, 2003
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <asm/uaccess.h>
++#include <asm/errno.h>
++#include <net/sock.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/net.h>
++#include <linux/in.h>
++#include <linux/skbuff.h>
++#include <linux/ip.h>
++#include <linux/udp.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++#define GR_BIND 	0x01
++#define GR_CONNECT 	0x02
++
++static const char * gr_protocols[256] = {
++	"ip", "icmp", "igmp", "ggp", "ipencap", "st", "tcp", "cbt",
++	"egp", "igp", "bbn-rcc", "nvp", "pup", "argus", "emcon", "xnet",
++	"chaos", "udp", "mux", "dcn", "hmp", "prm", "xns-idp", "trunk-1",
++	"trunk-2", "leaf-1", "leaf-2", "rdp", "irtp", "iso-tp4", "netblt", "mfe-nsp",
++	"merit-inp", "sep", "3pc", "idpr", "xtp", "ddp", "idpr-cmtp", "tp++",
++	"il", "ipv6", "sdrp", "ipv6-route", "ipv6-frag", "idrp", "rsvp", "gre",
++	"mhrp", "bna", "ipv6-crypt", "ipv6-auth", "i-nlsp", "swipe", "narp", "mobile",
++	"tlsp", "skip", "ipv6-icmp", "ipv6-nonxt", "ipv6-opts", "unknown:61", "cftp", "unknown:63",
++	"sat-expak", "kryptolan", "rvd", "ippc", "unknown:68", "sat-mon", "visa", "ipcv",
++	"cpnx", "cphb", "wsn", "pvp", "br-sat-mon", "sun-nd", "wb-mon", "wb-expak", 
++	"iso-ip", "vmtp", "secure-vmtp", "vines", "ttp", "nfsnet-igp", "dgp", "tcf", 
++	"eigrp", "ospf", "sprite-rpc", "larp", "mtp", "ax.25", "ipip", "micp",
++	"scc-sp", "etherip", "encap", "unknown:99", "gmtp", "ifmp", "pnni", "pim",
++	"aris", "scps", "qnx", "a/n", "ipcomp", "snp", "compaq-peer", "ipx-in-ip",
++	"vrrp", "pgm", "unknown:114", "l2tp", "ddx", "iatp", "stp", "srp",
++	"uti", "smp", "sm", "ptp", "isis", "fire", "crtp", "crdup",
++	"sscopmce", "iplt", "sps", "pipe", "sctp", "fc", "unkown:134", "unknown:135",
++	"unknown:136", "unknown:137", "unknown:138", "unknown:139", "unknown:140", "unknown:141", "unknown:142", "unknown:143",
++	"unknown:144", "unknown:145", "unknown:146", "unknown:147", "unknown:148", "unknown:149", "unknown:150", "unknown:151",
++	"unknown:152", "unknown:153", "unknown:154", "unknown:155", "unknown:156", "unknown:157", "unknown:158", "unknown:159",
++	"unknown:160", "unknown:161", "unknown:162", "unknown:163", "unknown:164", "unknown:165", "unknown:166", "unknown:167",
++	"unknown:168", "unknown:169", "unknown:170", "unknown:171", "unknown:172", "unknown:173", "unknown:174", "unknown:175",
++	"unknown:176", "unknown:177", "unknown:178", "unknown:179", "unknown:180", "unknown:181", "unknown:182", "unknown:183",
++	"unknown:184", "unknown:185", "unknown:186", "unknown:187", "unknown:188", "unknown:189", "unknown:190", "unknown:191",
++	"unknown:192", "unknown:193", "unknown:194", "unknown:195", "unknown:196", "unknown:197", "unknown:198", "unknown:199",
++	"unknown:200", "unknown:201", "unknown:202", "unknown:203", "unknown:204", "unknown:205", "unknown:206", "unknown:207",
++	"unknown:208", "unknown:209", "unknown:210", "unknown:211", "unknown:212", "unknown:213", "unknown:214", "unknown:215",
++	"unknown:216", "unknown:217", "unknown:218", "unknown:219", "unknown:220", "unknown:221", "unknown:222", "unknown:223",
++	"unknown:224", "unknown:225", "unknown:226", "unknown:227", "unknown:228", "unknown:229", "unknown:230", "unknown:231",
++	"unknown:232", "unknown:233", "unknown:234", "unknown:235", "unknown:236", "unknown:237", "unknown:238", "unknown:239",
++	"unknown:240", "unknown:241", "unknown:242", "unknown:243", "unknown:244", "unknown:245", "unknown:246", "unknown:247",
++	"unknown:248", "unknown:249", "unknown:250", "unknown:251", "unknown:252", "unknown:253", "unknown:254", "unknown:255",
++	};
++
++static const char * gr_socktypes[11] = {
++	"unknown:0", "stream", "dgram", "raw", "rdm", "seqpacket", "unknown:6", 
++	"unknown:7", "unknown:8", "unknown:9", "packet"
++	};
++
++__inline__ const char *
++gr_proto_to_name(unsigned char proto)
++{
++	return gr_protocols[proto];
++}
++
++__inline__ const char *
++gr_socktype_to_name(unsigned char type)
++{
++	return gr_socktypes[type];
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type, const int protocol)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *curr;
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++		goto exit;
++
++	if ((domain < 0) || (type < 0) || (protocol < 0) || (domain != PF_INET)
++	    || (domain >= NPROTO) || (type >= SOCK_MAX) || (protocol > 255))
++		goto exit;	// let the kernel handle it
++
++	curr = current->acl;
++
++	if (!curr->ips)
++		goto exit;
++
++	if ((curr->ip_type & (1 << type)) &&
++	    (curr->ip_proto[protocol / 32] & (1 << (protocol % 32))))
++		goto exit;
++
++	if (curr->mode & GR_LEARN) {
++		/* we don't place acls on raw sockets , and sometimes
++		   dgram/ip sockets are opened for ioctl and not
++		   bind/connect, so we'll fake a bind learn log */
++		if (type == SOCK_RAW || type == SOCK_PACKET) {
++			__u32 fakeip = 0;
++			security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
++				       current->role->roletype, current->uid,
++				       current->gid, current->exec_file ?
++				       gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
++				       current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) :
++				       curr->filename, curr->filename,
++				       NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type,
++				       protocol, GR_CONNECT, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
++		} else if ((type == SOCK_DGRAM) && (protocol == IPPROTO_IP)) {
++			__u32 fakeip = 0;
++			security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
++				       current->role->roletype, current->uid,
++				       current->gid, current->exec_file ?
++				       gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
++				       current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) :
++				       curr->filename, curr->filename,
++				       NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type,
++				       protocol, GR_BIND, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
++		}
++		/* we'll log when they use connect or bind */
++		goto exit;
++	}
++
++	security_alert(GR_SOCK_MSG, "inet", gr_socktype_to_name(type),
++		       gr_proto_to_name(protocol), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++
++	return 0;
++      exit:
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static __inline__ int
++gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct sock *sk,
++		      const struct sockaddr_in *addr, const int type)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *curr;
++	struct acl_ip_label *ip;
++	unsigned long i;
++	__u32 ip_addr = 0;
++	__u16 ip_port = 0;
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled() || sk->sk_family != PF_INET))
++		return 1;
++
++	curr = current->acl;
++
++	if (!curr->ips)
++		return 1;
++
++	ip_addr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
++	ip_port = ntohs(addr->sin_port);
++
++	for (i = 0; i < curr->ip_num; i++) {
++		ip = *(curr->ips + i);
++		if ((ip->mode & mode) &&
++		    (ip_port >= ip->low) &&
++		    (ip_port <= ip->high) &&
++		    ((ntohl(ip_addr) & ip->netmask) ==
++		     (ntohl(ip->addr) & ip->netmask))
++		    && (ip->
++			proto[sk->sk_protocol / 32] & (1 << (sk->sk_protocol % 32)))
++		    && (ip->type & (1 << type)))
++			return 1;
++	}
++
++	if (curr->mode & GR_LEARN) {
++		security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
++			       current->role->roletype, current->uid,
++			       current->gid, current->exec_file ?
++			       gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
++			       current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) :
++			       curr->filename, curr->filename,
++			       NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, type,
++			       sk->sk_protocol, mode, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	if (mode == GR_BIND)
++		security_alert(GR_BIND_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port,
++			       gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->sk_protocol),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++	else if (mode == GR_CONNECT)
++		security_alert(GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port,
++			       gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->sk_protocol),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++	return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sock->sk, addr, sock->type);
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++	return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, addr, sock->type);
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++	if (addr)
++		return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, addr, SOCK_DGRAM);
++	else {
++		struct sockaddr_in sin;
++		const struct inet_opt *inet = inet_sk(sk);
++
++		sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet->daddr;
++		sin.sin_port = inet->dport;
++
++		return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM);
++	}
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
++{
++	struct sockaddr_in sin;
++
++	if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof (struct udphdr)))
++		return 1;	// skip this packet
++
++	sin.sin_addr.s_addr = skb->nh.iph->saddr;
++	sin.sin_port = skb->h.uh->source;
++
++	return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM);
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/poll.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/string.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++extern ssize_t write_grsec_handler(struct file * file, const char * buf,
++				   size_t count, loff_t *ppos);
++extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void);
++
++static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(learn_wait);
++static int gr_learn_attached;
++
++/* use a 512k buffer */
++#define LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE (512 * 1024)
++
++static spinlock_t gr_learn_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_learn_user_sem);
++
++/* we need to maintain two buffers, so that the kernel context of grlearn
++   uses a semaphore around the userspace copying, and the other kernel contexts
++   use a spinlock when copying into the buffer, since they cannot sleep
++*/
++static char *learn_buffer;
++static char *learn_buffer_user;
++static int learn_buffer_len;
++static int learn_buffer_user_len;
++
++static ssize_t
++read_learn(struct file *file, char * buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos)
++{
++	DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
++	ssize_t retval = 0;
++
++	add_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait);
++	set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
++	do {
++		down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++		spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
++		if (learn_buffer_len)
++			break;
++		spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
++		up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++		if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
++			retval = -EAGAIN;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		if (signal_pending(current)) {
++			retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
++			goto out;
++		}
++
++		schedule();
++	} while (1);
++
++	memcpy(learn_buffer_user, learn_buffer, learn_buffer_len);
++	learn_buffer_user_len = learn_buffer_len;
++	retval = learn_buffer_len;
++	learn_buffer_len = 0;
++
++	spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
++
++	if (copy_to_user(buf, learn_buffer_user, learn_buffer_user_len))
++		retval = -EFAULT;
++
++	up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++out:
++	set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
++	remove_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait);
++	return retval;
++}
++
++static unsigned int
++poll_learn(struct file * file, poll_table * wait)
++{
++	poll_wait(file, &learn_wait, wait);
++
++	if (learn_buffer_len)
++		return (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM);
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_clear_learn_entries(void)
++{
++	char *tmp;
++
++	down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++	if (learn_buffer != NULL) {
++		spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
++		tmp = learn_buffer;
++		learn_buffer = NULL;
++		spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
++		vfree(learn_buffer);
++	}
++	if (learn_buffer_user != NULL) {
++		vfree(learn_buffer_user);
++		learn_buffer_user = NULL;
++	}
++	learn_buffer_len = 0;
++	up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...)
++{
++	va_list args;
++	unsigned int len;
++
++	if (!gr_learn_attached)
++		return;
++
++	spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
++
++	/* leave a gap at the end so we know when it's "full" but don't have to
++	   compute the exact length of the string we're trying to append
++	*/
++	if (learn_buffer_len > LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE - 16384) {
++		spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
++		wake_up_interruptible(&learn_wait);
++		return;
++	}
++	if (learn_buffer == NULL) {
++		spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	va_start(args, fmt);
++	len = vsnprintf(learn_buffer + learn_buffer_len, LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE - learn_buffer_len, fmt, args);
++	va_end(args);
++
++	learn_buffer_len += len + 1;
++
++	spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
++	wake_up_interruptible(&learn_wait);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static int
++open_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
++{
++	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ && gr_learn_attached)
++		return -EBUSY;
++	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
++		down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++		if (learn_buffer == NULL)
++			learn_buffer = vmalloc(LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE);
++		if (learn_buffer_user == NULL)
++			learn_buffer_user = vmalloc(LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE);
++		if (learn_buffer == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++		if (learn_buffer_user == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++		learn_buffer_len = 0;
++		learn_buffer_user_len = 0;
++		gr_learn_attached = 1;
++		up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++close_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
++{
++	char *tmp;
++
++	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
++		down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++		if (learn_buffer != NULL) {
++			spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
++			tmp = learn_buffer;
++			learn_buffer = NULL;
++			spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
++			vfree(tmp);
++		}
++		if (learn_buffer_user != NULL) {
++			vfree(learn_buffer_user);
++			learn_buffer_user = NULL;
++		}
++		learn_buffer_len = 0;
++		learn_buffer_user_len = 0;
++		gr_learn_attached = 0;
++		up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++		
++struct file_operations grsec_fops = {
++	read:		read_learn,
++	write:		write_grsec_handler,
++	open:		open_learn,
++	release:	close_learn,
++	poll:		poll_learn,
++};
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_res.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_res.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_res.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_res.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
++/* resource handling routines (c) Brad Spengler 2002, 2003 */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++static const char *restab_log[11] = {
++	"RLIMIT_CPU",
++	"RLIMIT_FSIZE",
++	"RLIMIT_DATA",
++	"RLIMIT_STACK",
++	"RLIMIT_CORE",
++	"RLIMIT_RSS",
++	"RLIMIT_NPROC",
++	"RLIMIT_NOFILE",
++	"RLIMIT_MEMLOCK",
++	"RLIMIT_AS",
++	"RLIMIT_LOCKS"
++};
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
++		const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt)
++{
++	if (unlikely(res == RLIMIT_NPROC && 
++	    (cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || 
++	     cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))))
++		return;
++
++	preempt_disable();
++
++	if (unlikely(((gt && wanted > task->rlim[res].rlim_cur) ||
++		      (!gt && wanted >= task->rlim[res].rlim_cur)) &&
++		     task->rlim[res].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY))
++		security_alert(GR_RESOURCE_MSG, wanted, restab_log[res],
++			       task->rlim[res].rlim_cur,
++			       gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm,
++			       task->pid, task->uid, task->euid,
++			       task->gid, task->egid,
++			       gr_parent_task_fullpath(task),
++			       task->parent->comm,
++			       task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, 
++			       task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid,
++			       task->parent->egid);
++
++	preempt_enable_no_resched();
++
++	return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
++/* 
++ * grsecurity/gracl_segv.c
++ * Copyright Brad Spengler 2002, 2003
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <asm/uaccess.h>
++#include <asm/errno.h>
++#include <asm/mman.h>
++#include <net/sock.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/net.h>
++#include <linux/in.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/timer.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++static struct crash_uid *uid_set;
++static unsigned short uid_used;
++static rwlock_t gr_uid_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++extern rwlock_t gr_inode_lock;
++extern struct acl_subject_label *
++	lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t inode, const dev_t dev,
++			      struct acl_role_label *role);
++extern int specific_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t);
++
++int
++gr_init_uidset(void)
++{
++	uid_set =
++	    kmalloc(GR_UIDTABLE_MAX * sizeof (struct crash_uid), GFP_KERNEL);
++	uid_used = 0;
++
++	return uid_set ? 1 : 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_free_uidset(void)
++{
++	if (uid_set)
++		kfree(uid_set);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_find_uid(const uid_t uid)
++{
++	struct crash_uid *tmp = uid_set;
++	uid_t buid;
++	int low = 0, high = uid_used - 1, mid;
++
++	while (high >= low) {
++		mid = (low + high) >> 1;
++		buid = tmp[mid].uid;
++		if (buid == uid)
++			return mid;
++		if (buid > uid)
++			high = mid - 1;
++		if (buid < uid)
++			low = mid + 1;
++	}
++
++	return -1;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++gr_insertsort(void)
++{
++	unsigned short i, j;
++	struct crash_uid index;
++
++	for (i = 1; i < uid_used; i++) {
++		index = uid_set[i];
++		j = i;
++		while ((j > 0) && uid_set[j - 1].uid > index.uid) {
++			uid_set[j] = uid_set[j - 1];
++			j--;
++		}
++		uid_set[j] = index;
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++gr_insert_uid(const uid_t uid, const unsigned long expires)
++{
++	int loc;
++
++	if (uid_used == GR_UIDTABLE_MAX)
++		return;
++
++	loc = gr_find_uid(uid);
++
++	if (loc >= 0) {
++		uid_set[loc].expires = expires;
++		return;
++	}
++
++	uid_set[uid_used].uid = uid;
++	uid_set[uid_used].expires = expires;
++	uid_used++;
++
++	gr_insertsort();
++
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_remove_uid(const unsigned short loc)
++{
++	unsigned short i;
++
++	for (i = loc + 1; i < uid_used; i++)
++		uid_set[i - i] = uid_set[i];
++
++	uid_used--;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid)
++{
++	int loc;
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++		return 0;
++
++	read_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
++	loc = gr_find_uid(uid);
++	read_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
++
++	if (loc < 0)
++		return 0;
++
++	write_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
++	if (time_before_eq(uid_set[loc].expires, get_seconds()))
++		gr_remove_uid(loc);
++	else {
++		write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static __inline__ int
++proc_is_setxid(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	if (task->uid != task->euid || task->uid != task->suid ||
++	    task->uid != task->fsuid)
++		return 1;
++	if (task->gid != task->egid || task->gid != task->sgid ||
++	    task->gid != task->fsgid)
++		return 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++static __inline__ int
++gr_fake_force_sig(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
++{
++	unsigned long int flags;
++	int ret;
++
++	spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
++	if (sigismember(&t->blocked, sig) || t->sighand->action[sig-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN) {
++		t->sighand->action[sig-1].sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
++		sigdelset(&t->blocked, sig);
++		recalc_sigpending_tsk(t);
++	}
++	ret = specific_send_sig_info(sig, (void*)1L, t);
++	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
++
++	return ret;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *curr;
++	struct acl_subject_label *curr2;
++	struct task_struct *tsk, *tsk2;
++
++	if (sig != SIGSEGV && sig != SIGKILL && sig != SIGBUS && sig != SIGILL)
++		return;
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++		return;
++
++	curr = task->acl;
++
++	if (!(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES)))
++		return;
++
++	if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, get_seconds())) {
++		curr->expires = 0;
++		curr->crashes = 0;
++	}
++
++	curr->crashes++;
++
++	if (!curr->expires)
++		curr->expires = get_seconds() + curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max;
++
++	if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) &&
++	    time_after(curr->expires, get_seconds())) {
++		if (task->uid && proc_is_setxid(task)) {
++			security_alert(GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG,
++				       gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm,
++				       task->pid, task->uid, task->euid,
++				       task->gid, task->egid,
++				       gr_parent_task_fullpath(task),
++				       task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid,
++				       task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid,
++				       task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid,
++				       task->uid,
++				       curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max);
++			write_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
++			gr_insert_uid(task->uid, curr->expires);
++			write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
++			curr->expires = 0;
++			curr->crashes = 0;
++			read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++			for_each_process(tsk) {
++				tsk2 = tsk;
++				do {
++					if (tsk2 != task && tsk2->uid == task->uid)
++					gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk2);
++				} while ((tsk2 = next_thread(tsk2)) != tsk);
++			}
++			read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++		} else {
++			security_alert(GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG,
++				       gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm,
++				       task->pid, task->uid, task->euid,
++				       task->gid, task->egid,
++				       gr_parent_task_fullpath(task),
++				       task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid,
++				       task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid,
++				       task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid,
++				       curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max);
++			read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++			for_each_process(tsk) {
++				tsk2 = tsk;
++				do {
++					if (likely(tsk2 != task)) {
++						curr2 = tsk2->acl;
++
++						if (curr2->device == curr->device &&
++						    curr2->inode == curr->inode)
++							gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk2);
++					}
++				} while ((tsk2 = next_thread(tsk2)) != tsk);
++			}
++			read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++		}
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *curr;
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++		return 0;
++
++	read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	curr = lookup_acl_subj_label(filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++				     filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev,
++				     current->role);
++	read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++	if (!curr || !(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES)) ||
++	    (!curr->crashes && !curr->expires))
++		return 0;
++
++	if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) &&
++	    time_after(curr->expires, get_seconds()))
++		return 1;
++	else if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, get_seconds())) {
++		curr->crashes = 0;
++		curr->expires = 0;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_alertkill(void)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
++	__u32 curr_ip;
++	struct task_struct *task, *task2;
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++		return;
++
++	curracl = current->acl;
++	curr_ip = current->curr_ip;
++
++	if ((curracl->mode & GR_KILLIPPROC) && curr_ip &&
++	    (curr_ip != 0xffffffff)) {
++		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++		for_each_process(task) {
++			task2 = task;
++			do {
++				if (task2->curr_ip == curr_ip)
++					gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, task2);
++			} while ((task2 = next_thread(task2)) != task);
++		}
++		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++	} else if (curracl->mode & GR_KILLPROC)
++		gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
++
++	return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
++/* shared memory handling routines, (c) Brad Spengler 2002, 2003 */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/ipc.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
++		const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid)
++{
++	struct task_struct *task;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
++		return 1;
++
++	task = find_task_by_pid(shm_cprid);
++
++	if (unlikely(!task))
++		task = find_task_by_pid(shm_lapid);
++
++	if (unlikely(task && ((task->start_time < shm_createtime) ||
++			      (task->pid == shm_lapid)) &&
++		     (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTSHM) &&
++		     (task->acl != current->acl))) {
++		security_alert(GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG, cuid, shm_cprid, shmid,
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	return 1;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
++	if ((grsec_enable_chdir && grsec_enable_group &&
++	     in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid)) || (grsec_enable_chdir &&
++					      !grsec_enable_group)) {
++		security_audit(GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++	}
++#endif
++	return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/mount.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++	struct pid *spid = NULL;
++
++	if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_unix))
++		return 1;
++
++	if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current)))
++		return 1;
++
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++	spid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, pid);
++	if (spid) {
++		struct task_struct *p;
++		p = pid_task(spid->task_list.next, PIDTYPE_PID);
++		task_lock(p);
++		if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p))) {
++			task_unlock(p);
++			read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++			security_alert(GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			return 0;
++		}
++		task_unlock(p);
++	}
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++#endif
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_nice(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++		security_alert(GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(struct task_struct *p, const int niceval)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && (niceval < task_nice(p))
++			&& proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++		security_alert(GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG, p->comm, p->pid,
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_capset(struct task_struct *target)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	if (!grsec_enable_chroot_caps || !proc_is_chrooted(current))
++		return 0;
++
++	task_lock(target);
++	if (!have_same_root(current, target)) {
++		task_unlock(target);
++		security_alert(GR_CAPSET_CHROOT_MSG, target->comm, target->pid,
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 1;
++	}
++	task_unlock(target);
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_rawio(const struct inode *inode)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current) && 
++	    inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
++		return 1;
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_pid_is_chrooted(struct task_struct *p)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++	if (!grsec_enable_chroot_findtask || !current->fs || 
++	    !proc_is_chrooted(current) || !p)
++		return 0;
++
++	task_lock(p);
++	if (p->fs && !have_same_root(current, p)) {
++		task_unlock(p);
++		return 1;
++	}
++	task_unlock(p);
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_pid_is_chrooted);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR)
++int gr_is_outside_chroot(const struct dentry *u_dentry, const struct vfsmount *u_mnt)
++{
++	struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *)u_dentry;
++	struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *)u_mnt;
++	struct dentry *realroot;
++	struct vfsmount *realrootmnt;
++	struct dentry *currentroot;
++	struct vfsmount *currentmnt;
++
++	read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++	realrootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
++	realroot = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
++	read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++
++	read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
++	currentmnt = mntget(current->fs->rootmnt);
++	currentroot = dget(current->fs->root);
++	read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
++
++	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
++	for (;;) {
++		if (unlikely((dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt)
++		     || (dentry == currentroot && mnt == currentmnt)))
++			break;
++		if (unlikely(dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) {
++			if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
++				break;
++			dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
++			mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
++			continue;
++		}
++		dentry = dentry->d_parent;
++	}
++	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
++
++	dput(currentroot);
++	mntput(currentmnt);
++
++	if (dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt) {
++		/* access is outside of chroot */
++		dput(realroot);
++		mntput(realrootmnt);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	dput(realroot);
++	mntput(realrootmnt);
++	return 1;
++}
++#endif
++
++int
++gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++	if (!grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir)
++		return 1;
++
++	if (!proc_is_chrooted(current))
++		return 1;
++	else if (!gr_is_outside_chroot(u_dentry, u_mnt)) {
++		security_alert(GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG,
++			       gr_to_filename(u_dentry, u_mnt),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 0;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
++		const time_t shm_createtime)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++	struct pid *pid = NULL;
++	u64 starttime64;
++	time_t starttime;
++
++	if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_shmat))
++		return 1;
++
++	if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current)))
++		return 1;
++
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++	pid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, shm_cprid);
++	if (pid) {
++		struct task_struct *p;
++		p = pid_task(pid->task_list.next, PIDTYPE_PID);
++		task_lock(p);
++		starttime64 = p->start_time;
++		do_div(starttime64, HZ);
++		starttime = (time_t) starttime64;
++		if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p) &&
++			     time_before((unsigned long)starttime, (unsigned long)shm_createtime))) {
++			task_unlock(p);
++			read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++			security_alert(GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++			return 0;
++		}
++		task_unlock(p);
++	} else {
++		pid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, shm_lapid);
++		if (pid) {
++			struct task_struct *p;
++			p = pid_task(pid->task_list.next, PIDTYPE_PID);
++			task_lock(p);
++			if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p))) {
++				task_unlock(p);
++				read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++				security_alert(GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++				return 0;
++			}
++			task_unlock(p);
++		}
++	}
++
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++#endif
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_execlog && proc_is_chrooted(current))
++		security_audit(GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++		       const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_mknod && !S_ISFIFO(mode) && !S_ISREG(mode) && 
++	    proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++		security_alert(GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG,
++			       gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry,
++		       const struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *dev_name)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_mount && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++		security_alert(GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG, dev_name,
++			       gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_pivot && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++		security_alert(GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_double && proc_is_chrooted(current) &&
++	    !gr_is_outside_chroot(dentry, mnt)) {
++		security_alert(GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG,
++			       gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(task)) {
++		task->cap_permitted =
++		    cap_drop(task->cap_permitted, GR_CHROOT_CAPS);
++		task->cap_inheritable =
++		    cap_drop(task->cap_inheritable, GR_CHROOT_CAPS);
++		task->cap_effective =
++		    cap_drop(task->cap_effective, GR_CHROOT_CAPS);
++	}
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl && proc_is_chrooted(current)
++	    && (op & 002))
++		return -EACCES;
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_chdir)
++		set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++		       const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_chmod &&
++	    ((mode & S_ISUID) || ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP))) &&
++	    proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++		security_alert(GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG,
++			       gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c	2004-06-25 17:25:57.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,413 @@
++/* 
++ * when grsecurity is disabled, compile all external functions into nothing
++ */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/config.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
++#include <linux/net.h>
++#include <linux/in.h>
++#include <linux/ip.h>
++#include <linux/skbuff.h>
++#include <linux/sysctl.h>
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++__inline__ void
++pax_set_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
++{
++	return;
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table * table, __u32 mode)
++{
++	return mode;
++}
++#endif
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_acl_is_enabled(void)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_handle_mmap(const struct file *filp, const unsigned long prot)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
++		  const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_set_acls(const int type)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_set_pax_flags(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
++		 struct dentry *old_dentry,
++		 struct dentry *new_dentry,
++		 struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_search_socket(const int family, const int type, const int protocol)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct socket *sock,
++		      const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_handle_alertkill(void)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry,
++			  const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
++		   const int fmode)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot,
++		   unsigned int *vm_flags)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry * dentry,
++		       const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry,
++		     const struct vfsmount * mnt, const int fmode)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
++		     mode_t mode)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
++		    mode_t mode)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++grsecurity_init(void)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++		    const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++		    const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
++		    const int mode)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++		    const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++		    const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++		      const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++		      const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++		   const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++		   const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
++		   const struct dentry * old_dentry,
++		   const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_acl_handle_rename(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++		     const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++		     const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++		     const struct dentry *old_dentry,
++		     const struct inode *old_parent_inode,
++		     const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct dentry * dentry,
++		      const struct vfsmount * mnt, const ino_t ino)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
++		const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry,
++		    const struct dentry * p_dentry,
++		    const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode,
++		    const int imode)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_acl_handle_exit(void)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_set_role_label(const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_task_is_capable);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_learn_resource);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_set_kernel_label);
++
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/grdefs.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++#include <linux/capability.h>
++
++#include <asm/uaccess.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_nproc(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	if (grsec_enable_execve && current->user &&
++	    (atomic_read(&current->user->processes) >
++	     current->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) &&
++	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) {
++		security_alert(GR_NPROC_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EAGAIN;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, char **argv)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
++	char grarg[64] = { 0 };
++	__u8 execlen = 0;
++	unsigned int i;
++
++	if (!((grsec_enable_execlog && grsec_enable_group &&
++	       in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid))
++	      || (grsec_enable_execlog && !grsec_enable_group)))
++		return;
++
++	if (unlikely(!argv))
++		goto log;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < bprm->argc && execlen < 62; i++) {
++		char *p;
++		__u8 len;
++
++		if (get_user(p, argv + i))
++			goto log;
++		if (!p)
++			goto log;
++		len = strnlen_user(p, 62 - execlen);
++		if (len > 62 - execlen)
++			len = 62 - execlen;
++		else if (len > 0)
++			len--;
++		if (copy_from_user(grarg + execlen, p, len))
++			goto log;
++		execlen += len;
++		*(grarg + execlen) = ' ';
++		*(grarg + execlen + 1) = '\0';
++		execlen++;
++	}
++
++      log:
++	security_audit(GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG, gr_to_filename(bprm->file->f_dentry,
++							 bprm->file->f_vfsmnt),
++		       grarg, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++	       const struct dentry *dir, const int flag, const int acc_mode)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	if (grsec_enable_fifo && S_ISFIFO(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
++	    !(flag & O_EXCL) && (dir->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
++	    (dentry->d_inode->i_uid != dir->d_inode->i_uid) &&
++	    (current->fsuid != dentry->d_inode->i_uid)) {
++		if (!vfs_permission(dentry->d_inode, acc_mode))
++			security_alert(GR_FIFO_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++				       dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
++				       dentry->d_inode->i_gid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_forkfail(const int retval)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++	if (grsec_enable_forkfail)
++		security_alert(GR_FAILFORK_MSG, retval, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_init.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_init.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_init.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_init.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
++#include <linux/percpu.h>
++
++int grsec_enable_link;
++int grsec_enable_dmesg;
++int grsec_enable_fifo;
++int grsec_enable_execve;
++int grsec_enable_execlog;
++int grsec_enable_signal;
++int grsec_enable_forkfail;
++int grsec_enable_time;
++int grsec_enable_audit_textrel;
++int grsec_enable_group;
++int grsec_audit_gid;
++int grsec_enable_chdir;
++int grsec_enable_audit_ipc;
++int grsec_enable_mount;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_mount;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_double;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_nice;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_caps;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_unix;
++int grsec_enable_tpe;
++int grsec_tpe_gid;
++int grsec_enable_tpe_all;
++int grsec_enable_randpid;
++int grsec_enable_randid;
++int grsec_enable_randisn;
++int grsec_enable_randsrc;
++int grsec_enable_randrpc;
++int grsec_enable_socket_all;
++int grsec_socket_all_gid;
++int grsec_enable_socket_client;
++int grsec_socket_client_gid;
++int grsec_enable_socket_server;
++int grsec_socket_server_gid;
++int grsec_lock;
++
++spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime = 0;
++unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet = 0;
++
++spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++
++rwlock_t grsec_exec_file_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++
++char *gr_shared_page[4];
++extern struct gr_arg *gr_usermode;
++extern unsigned char *gr_system_salt;
++extern unsigned char *gr_system_sum;
++extern struct task_struct **gr_conn_table;
++extern const unsigned int gr_conn_table_size;
++
++void
++grsecurity_init(void)
++{
++	int j;
++	/* create the per-cpu shared pages */
++
++	preempt_disable();
++	for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
++		gr_shared_page[j] = (char *)__alloc_percpu(PAGE_SIZE, __alignof__(char *));
++		if (gr_shared_page[j] == NULL) {
++			panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity shared page");
++			return;
++		}
++	}
++	preempt_enable();
++
++	/* create hash tables for ip tagging */
++
++	gr_conn_table = (struct task_struct **) vmalloc(gr_conn_table_size * sizeof(struct task_struct *));
++	if (gr_conn_table == NULL) {
++		panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity IP tagging table");
++		return;
++	}
++	memset(gr_conn_table, 0, gr_conn_table_size * sizeof(struct task_struct *));
++
++	/* allocate memory for authentication structure */
++	gr_usermode = kmalloc(sizeof(struct gr_arg), GFP_KERNEL);
++	gr_system_salt = kmalloc(GR_SALT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
++	gr_system_sum = kmalloc(GR_SHA_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
++
++	if (!gr_usermode || !gr_system_salt || !gr_system_sum) {
++		panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity authentication structure");
++		return;
++	}
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++	grsec_lock = 1;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
++	grsec_enable_audit_textrel = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
++	grsec_enable_group = 1;
++	grsec_audit_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
++	grsec_enable_chdir = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	grsec_enable_audit_ipc = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	grsec_enable_mount = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	grsec_enable_link = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	grsec_enable_dmesg = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	grsec_enable_fifo = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	grsec_enable_execve = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
++	grsec_enable_execlog = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++	grsec_enable_signal = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++	grsec_enable_forkfail = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
++	grsec_enable_time = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++	grsec_enable_chroot_findtask = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++	grsec_enable_chroot_unix = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++	grsec_enable_chroot_mount = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++	grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++	grsec_enable_chroot_shmat = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++	grsec_enable_chroot_double = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++	grsec_enable_chroot_pivot = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	grsec_enable_chroot_chdir = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++	grsec_enable_chroot_chmod = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++	grsec_enable_chroot_mknod = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++	grsec_enable_chroot_nice = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
++	grsec_enable_chroot_execlog = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	grsec_enable_chroot_caps = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++	grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
++	grsec_enable_tpe = 1;
++	grsec_tpe_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
++	grsec_enable_tpe_all = 1;
++#endif
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
++	grsec_enable_randpid = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++	grsec_enable_randid = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++	grsec_enable_randisn = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
++	grsec_enable_randsrc = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
++	grsec_enable_randrpc = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
++	grsec_enable_socket_all = 1;
++	grsec_socket_all_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
++	grsec_enable_socket_client = 1;
++	grsec_socket_client_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++	grsec_enable_socket_server = 1;
++	grsec_socket_server_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID;
++#endif
++#endif
++
++	return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/ipc.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++	      grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
++					  !grsec_enable_group)) && (ret >= 0)
++	    && (msgflg & IPC_CREAT))
++		security_audit(GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++	     grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
++	    (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
++		security_audit(GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++	      grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
++					  !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0)
++	    && (semflg & IPC_CREAT))
++		security_audit(GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++	     grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
++	    (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
++		security_audit(GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++	      grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
++					  !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0)
++	    && (shmflg & IPC_CREAT))
++		security_audit(GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG, size, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++	     grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
++	    (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
++		security_audit(GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_link.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_link.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_link.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_link.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent,
++		      const struct inode *inode,
++		      const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	if (grsec_enable_link && S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) &&
++	    (parent->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && (parent->i_uid != inode->i_uid) &&
++	    (parent->i_mode & S_IWOTH) && (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid)) {
++		security_alert(GR_SYMLINK_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++			       inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
++		   const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++		   struct inode *inode, const int mode, const char *to)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	if (grsec_enable_link && current->fsuid != inode->i_uid &&
++	    (!S_ISREG(mode) || (mode & S_ISUID) ||
++	     ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) ||
++	     (vfs_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))) &&
++	    !capable(CAP_FOWNER) && current->uid) {
++		security_alert(GR_HARDLINK_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++			       inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, to, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/mman.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_handle_ioperm(void)
++{
++	security_alert(GR_IOPERM_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_iopl(void)
++{
++	security_alert(GR_IOPL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_mem_write(void)
++{
++	security_alert(GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_kmem_write(void)
++{
++	security_alert(GR_KMEM_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_open_port(void)
++{
++	security_alert(GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
++{
++	if (offset < __pa(high_memory) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) &&
++	    !(offset == 0xf0000 && ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) <= 0x10000)) &&
++	    !(offset == 0xa0000 && ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) <= 0x20000))) {
++		security_alert(GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EPERM;
++	} else if (offset < __pa(high_memory))
++		vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
++
++	return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
++		security_audit(GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname ? devname : "none", DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
++		security_audit(GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname ? devname : "none", DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
++		security_audit(GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, from, to, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++extern int pid_max;
++
++int
++gr_random_pid(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
++	int pid;
++
++	if (grsec_enable_randpid && current->fs->root) {
++
++		pid = 1 + (get_random_long() % pid_max);
++		return pid;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++	if (grsec_enable_signal && ((sig == SIGSEGV) || (sig == SIGILL) ||
++				    (sig == SIGABRT) || (sig == SIGBUS))) {
++		if (t->pid == current->pid) {
++			security_alert_good(GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG, sig,
++					    DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		} else {
++			security_alert_good(GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG, sig,
++					    gr_task_fullpath0(t), t->comm,
++					    t->pid, t->uid, t->euid, t->gid,
++					    t->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath0(t),
++					    t->parent->comm,
++					    t->parent->pid, t->parent->uid,
++					    t->parent->euid, t->parent->gid,
++					    t->parent->egid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	if (current->pid > 1 && gr_check_protected_task(p)) {
++		security_alert(GR_SIG_ACL_MSG, sig, gr_task_fullpath0(p),
++			       p->comm, p->pid, p->uid,
++			       p->euid, p->gid, p->egid,
++			       gr_parent_task_fullpath0(p), p->parent->comm,
++			       p->parent->pid, p->parent->uid,
++			       p->parent->euid, p->parent->gid,
++			       p->parent->egid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EPERM;
++	} else if (gr_pid_is_chrooted((struct task_struct *)p)) {
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/net.h>
++#include <linux/in.h>
++#include <linux/ip.h>
++#include <net/sock.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH_MODULE)
++extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_v4_lookup);
++#endif
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID)
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_randomid);
++#endif
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC)
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_long);
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_randomisn);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randisn);
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randid);
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randsrc);
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randrpc);
++#endif
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_cap_rtnetlink);
++
++extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb);
++extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr);
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_recvmsg);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_sendmsg);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX_MODULE
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_unix);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_mknod);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_chroot_unix);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_create);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++struct task_struct **gr_conn_table;
++const unsigned int gr_conn_table_size = 65521;
++struct task_struct *deleted_conn = (struct task_struct *)~0;
++spinlock_t gr_conn_table_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++
++extern __inline__ const char * gr_socktype_to_name(unsigned char type);
++extern __inline__ const char * gr_proto_to_name(unsigned char proto);
++
++static __inline__ int 
++conn_hash(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport, __u16 dport, unsigned int size)
++{
++	return ((daddr + saddr + (sport << 8) + (dport << 16)) % size);
++}
++
++static __inline__ int
++conn_match(const struct task_struct *task, __u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, 
++	   __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
++{
++	if (unlikely(task != deleted_conn && task->gr_saddr == saddr && 
++		     task->gr_daddr == daddr && task->gr_sport == sport &&
++		     task->gr_dport == dport))
++		return 1;
++	else
++		return 0;
++}
++
++void gr_add_to_task_ip_table(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	unsigned int index;
++
++	if (unlikely(gr_conn_table == NULL))
++		return;
++
++	if (!thread_group_leader(task))
++		task = task->group_leader;
++
++	index = conn_hash(task->gr_saddr, task->gr_daddr, 
++			  task->gr_sport, task->gr_dport, 
++			  gr_conn_table_size);
++
++	spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
++
++	while (gr_conn_table[index] && gr_conn_table[index] != deleted_conn) {
++		index = (index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size;
++	}
++
++	gr_conn_table[index] = task;
++
++	spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++void gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	unsigned int index;
++
++	if (unlikely(gr_conn_table == NULL))
++		return;
++
++	if (!thread_group_leader(task))
++		task = task->group_leader;
++
++	index = conn_hash(task->gr_saddr, task->gr_daddr, 
++			  task->gr_sport, task->gr_dport, 
++			  gr_conn_table_size);
++
++	while (gr_conn_table[index] && !conn_match(gr_conn_table[index], 
++		task->gr_saddr, task->gr_daddr, task->gr_sport, 
++		task->gr_dport)) {
++		index = (index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size;
++	}
++
++	if (gr_conn_table[index]) {
++		if (gr_conn_table[(index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size])
++			gr_conn_table[index] = deleted_conn;
++		else
++			gr_conn_table[index] = NULL;
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++struct task_struct * gr_lookup_task_ip_table(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
++					     __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
++{
++	unsigned int index;
++
++	if (unlikely(gr_conn_table == NULL))
++		return NULL;
++
++	index = conn_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, gr_conn_table_size);
++
++	while (gr_conn_table[index] && !conn_match(gr_conn_table[index], 
++		saddr, daddr, sport, dport)) {
++		index = (index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size;
++	}
++
++	return gr_conn_table[index];
++}
++
++#endif
++
++void gr_del_task_from_ip_table(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
++	if (!thread_group_leader(task))
++		gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(task->group_leader);
++	else
++		gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(task);
++	spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	struct task_struct *p;
++	struct task_struct *set;
++	const struct inet_opt *inet = inet_sk(sk);	
++
++	if (unlikely(sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP))
++		return;
++
++	set = current;
++	if (!thread_group_leader(set))
++		set = set->group_leader;
++
++	spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
++	p = gr_lookup_task_ip_table(inet->daddr, inet->rcv_saddr,
++				    inet->dport, inet->sport);
++	if (unlikely(p != NULL)) {
++		set->curr_ip = p->curr_ip;
++		set->used_accept = 1;
++		gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(p);
++		spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
++		return;
++	}
++	spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
++
++	set->curr_ip = inet->daddr;
++	set->used_accept = 1;
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type, const int protocol)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
++	if (grsec_enable_socket_all && in_group_p(grsec_socket_all_gid) &&
++	    (family != AF_UNIX) && (family != AF_LOCAL)) {
++		security_alert(GR_SOCK2_MSG, family, gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(protocol),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++	if (grsec_enable_socket_server &&
++	    in_group_p(grsec_socket_server_gid) &&
++	    sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) &&
++	    (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) {
++		security_alert(GR_BIND_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
++	if (grsec_enable_socket_client && in_group_p(grsec_socket_client_gid) &&
++	    sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) &&
++	    (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) {
++		security_alert(GR_CONNECT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_cap_rtnetlink(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
++		return current->cap_effective;
++	else
++		return (current->cap_effective & ~(current->acl->cap_lower));
++#else
++	return current->cap_effective;
++#endif
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/sysctl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name, const int op)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++	if (!strcmp(dirname, "grsecurity") && grsec_lock && (op & 002)) {
++		security_alert(GR_SYSCTL_MSG, name, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++enum {GS_LINK=1, GS_FIFO, GS_EXECVE, GS_EXECLOG, GS_SIGNAL,
++GS_FORKFAIL, GS_TIME, GS_CHROOT_SHMAT, GS_CHROOT_UNIX, GS_CHROOT_MNT,
++GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR, GS_CHROOT_DBL, GS_CHROOT_PVT, GS_CHROOT_CD, GS_CHROOT_CM,
++GS_CHROOT_MK, GS_CHROOT_NI, GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG, GS_CHROOT_CAPS,
++GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL, GS_TPE, GS_TPE_GID, GS_TPE_ALL, GS_SIDCAPS,
++GS_RANDPID, GS_RANDID, GS_RANDSRC, GS_RANDISN,
++GS_SOCKET_ALL, GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, GS_SOCKET_CLIENT,
++GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID, GS_SOCKET_SERVER, GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID, GS_TTY, GS_TTYS,
++GS_PTY, GS_GROUP, GS_GID, GS_ACHDIR, GS_AMOUNT, GS_AIPC, GS_DMSG, GS_RANDRPC,
++GS_TEXTREL, GS_FINDTASK, GS_LOCK};
++
++
++ctl_table grsecurity_table[] = {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_LINK,
++		.procname	= "linking_restrictions",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_link,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_FIFO,
++		.procname	= "fifo_restrictions",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_fifo,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_EXECVE,
++		.procname	= "execve_limiting",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_execve,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_EXECLOG,
++		.procname	= "exec_logging",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_execlog,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_SIGNAL,
++		.procname	= "signal_logging",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_signal,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_FORKFAIL,
++		.procname	= "forkfail_logging",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_forkfail,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_TIME,
++		.procname	= "timechange_logging",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_time,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_CHROOT_SHMAT,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_shmat",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_shmat,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_CHROOT_UNIX,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_unix",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_unix,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_CHROOT_MNT,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_mount",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_mount,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_fchdir",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_CHROOT_DBL,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_chroot",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_double,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_CHROOT_PVT,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_pivot",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_pivot,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_CHROOT_CD,
++		.procname	= "chroot_enforce_chdir",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_chdir,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_CHROOT_CM,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_chmod",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_chmod,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_CHROOT_MK,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_mknod",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_mknod,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_CHROOT_NI,
++		.procname	= "chroot_restrict_nice",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_nice,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG,
++		.procname	= "chroot_execlog",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_execlog,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_CHROOT_CAPS,
++		.procname	= "chroot_caps",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_caps,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_sysctl",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_TPE,
++		.procname	= "tpe",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_tpe,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_TPE_GID,
++		.procname	= "tpe_gid",
++		.data		= &grsec_tpe_gid,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_TPE_ALL,
++		.procname	= "tpe_restrict_all",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_tpe_all,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_RANDPID,
++		.procname	= "rand_pids",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_randpid,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_RANDID,
++		.procname	= "rand_ip_ids",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_randid,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_RANDSRC,
++		.procname	= "rand_tcp_src_ports",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_randsrc,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_RANDISN,
++		.procname	= "rand_isns",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_randisn,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_SOCKET_ALL,
++		.procname	= "socket_all",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_socket_all,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID,
++		.procname	= "socket_all_gid",
++		.data		= &grsec_socket_all_gid,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_SOCKET_CLIENT,
++		.procname	= "socket_client",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_socket_client,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID,
++		.procname	= "socket_client_gid",
++		.data		= &grsec_socket_client_gid,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_SOCKET_SERVER,
++		.procname	= "socket_server",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_socket_server,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID,
++		.procname	= "socket_server_gid",
++		.data		= &grsec_socket_server_gid,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_GROUP,
++		.procname	= "audit_group",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_group,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_GID,
++		.procname	= "audit_gid",
++		.data		= &grsec_audit_gid,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_ACHDIR,
++		.procname	= "audit_chdir",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chdir,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_AMOUNT,
++		.procname	= "audit_mount",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_mount,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_AIPC,
++		.procname	= "audit_ipc",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_audit_ipc,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_TEXTREL,
++		.procname	= "audit_textrel",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_audit_textrel,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_DMSG,
++		.procname	= "dmesg",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_dmesg,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_RANDRPC,
++		.procname	= "rand_rpc",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_randrpc,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_FINDTASK,
++		.procname	= "chroot_findtask",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_findtask,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= GS_LOCK,
++		.procname	= "grsec_lock",
++		.data		= &grsec_lock,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++	{ .ctl_name = 0 }
++};
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_textrel(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
++	if (grsec_enable_audit_textrel)
++		security_audit(GR_TEXTREL_AUDIT_MSG, vma->vm_file ? 
++				gr_to_filename(vma->vm_file->f_dentry, vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt)
++				: "<anonymous mapping>", vma->vm_start, 
++				vma->vm_pgoff, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_time.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_time.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_time.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_time.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_timechange(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
++	if (grsec_enable_time)
++		security_alert_good(GR_TIME_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++extern int gr_acl_tpe_check(void);
++
++int
++gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
++
++	if (current->uid && ((grsec_enable_tpe && in_group_p(grsec_tpe_gid)) || gr_acl_tpe_check()) &&
++	    (inode->i_uid || (!inode->i_uid && ((inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) ||
++						(inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))))) {
++		security_alert(GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG,
++			       gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 0;
++	}
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
++	if (current->uid && grsec_enable_tpe && grsec_enable_tpe_all &&
++	    ((inode->i_uid && (inode->i_uid != current->uid)) ||
++	     (inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) || (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))) {
++		security_alert(GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG,
++			       gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
++			       DEFAULTSECARGS);
++		return 0;
++	}
++#endif
++#endif
++	return 1;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsum.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsum.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsum.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/grsum.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
++#include <linux/crypto.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++
++
++#if !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MODULE) || !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_MODULE)
++#error "crypto and sha256 must be built into the kernel"
++#endif
++
++int
++chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum)
++{
++	char *p;
++	struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
++	unsigned char temp_sum[GR_SHA_LEN];
++	struct scatterlist sg[2];
++	volatile int retval = 0;
++	volatile int dummy = 0;
++	unsigned int i;
++
++	tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("sha256", 0);
++	if (tfm == NULL) {
++		/* should never happen, since sha256 should be built in */
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	crypto_digest_init(tfm);
++
++	p = salt;
++	sg[0].page = virt_to_page(p);
++	sg[0].offset = ((long) p & ~PAGE_MASK);
++	sg[0].length = GR_SALT_LEN;
++	
++	crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
++
++	p = entry->pw;
++	sg[0].page = virt_to_page(p);
++	sg[0].offset = ((long) p & ~PAGE_MASK);
++	sg[0].length = strlen(entry->pw);
++
++	crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
++
++	crypto_digest_final(tfm, temp_sum);
++
++	memset(entry->pw, 0, GR_PW_LEN);
++
++	for (i = 0; i < GR_SHA_LEN; i++)
++		if (sum[i] != temp_sum[i])
++			retval = 1;
++		else
++			dummy = 1;	// waste a cycle
++
++	crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
++
++	return retval;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
++
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 1996, 1997, 2000-2002 Michael Shalayeff.
++ * 
++ * Version 1.89, last modified 19-Sep-99
++ *    
++ * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999.
++ * All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Copyright 1998 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
++ * All rights reserved.
++ * Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org> came up with the idea of using
++ * such a mathematical system to generate more random (yet non-repeating)
++ * ids to solve the resolver/named problem.  But Niels designed the
++ * actual system based on the constraints.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer,
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/time.h>
++#include <linux/timer.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
++#define RU_OUT 180
++#define RU_MAX 30000
++#define RU_GEN 2
++#define RU_N 32749
++#define RU_AGEN 7
++#define RU_M 31104
++#define PFAC_N 3
++const static __u16 pfacts[PFAC_N] = { 2, 3, 2729 };
++
++static __u16 ru_x;
++static __u16 ru_seed, ru_seed2;
++static __u16 ru_a, ru_b;
++static __u16 ru_g;
++static __u16 ru_counter = 0;
++static __u16 ru_msb = 0;
++static unsigned long ru_reseed = 0;
++static __u32 tmp;
++
++#define TCP_RNDISS_ROUNDS	15
++#define TCP_RNDISS_OUT		7200
++#define TCP_RNDISS_MAX		30000
++
++static __u8 tcp_rndiss_sbox[128];
++static __u16 tcp_rndiss_msb;
++static __u16 tcp_rndiss_cnt;
++static unsigned long tcp_rndiss_reseed;
++
++static __u16 pmod(__u16, __u16, __u16);
++static void ip_initid(void);
++__u16 ip_randomid(void);
++
++static __u16
++pmod(__u16 gen, __u16 exp, __u16 mod)
++{
++	__u16 s, t, u;
++
++	s = 1;
++	t = gen;
++	u = exp;
++
++	while (u) {
++		if (u & 1)
++			s = (s * t) % mod;
++		u >>= 1;
++		t = (t * t) % mod;
++	}
++	return (s);
++}
++
++static void
++ip_initid(void)
++{
++	__u16 j, i;
++	int noprime = 1;
++
++	ru_x = ((tmp = get_random_long()) & 0xFFFF) % RU_M;
++
++	ru_seed = (tmp >> 16) & 0x7FFF;
++	ru_seed2 = get_random_long() & 0x7FFF;
++
++	ru_b = ((tmp = get_random_long()) & 0xfffe) | 1;
++	ru_a = pmod(RU_AGEN, (tmp >> 16) & 0xfffe, RU_M);
++	while (ru_b % 3 == 0)
++		ru_b += 2;
++
++	j = (tmp = get_random_long()) % RU_N;
++	tmp = tmp >> 16;
++
++	while (noprime) {
++		for (i = 0; i < PFAC_N; i++)
++			if (j % pfacts[i] == 0)
++				break;
++
++		if (i >= PFAC_N)
++			noprime = 0;
++		else
++			j = (j + 1) % RU_N;
++	}
++
++	ru_g = pmod(RU_GEN, j, RU_N);
++	ru_counter = 0;
++
++	ru_reseed = xtime.tv_sec + RU_OUT;
++	ru_msb = ru_msb == 0x8000 ? 0 : 0x8000;
++}
++
++__u16
++ip_randomid(void)
++{
++	int i, n;
++
++	if (ru_counter >= RU_MAX || time_after(get_seconds(), ru_reseed))
++		ip_initid();
++
++	if (!tmp)
++		tmp = get_random_long();
++
++	n = tmp & 0x3;
++	tmp = tmp >> 2;
++	if (ru_counter + n >= RU_MAX)
++		ip_initid();
++	for (i = 0; i <= n; i++)
++		ru_x = (ru_a * ru_x + ru_b) % RU_M;
++	ru_counter += i;
++
++	return ((ru_seed ^ pmod(ru_g, ru_seed2 ^ ru_x, RU_N)) | ru_msb);
++}
++
++__u16
++tcp_rndiss_encrypt(__u16 val)
++{
++	__u16 sum = 0, i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < TCP_RNDISS_ROUNDS; i++) {
++		sum += 0x79b9;
++		val ^= ((__u16) tcp_rndiss_sbox[(val ^ sum) & 0x7f]) << 7;
++		val = ((val & 0xff) << 7) | (val >> 8);
++	}
++
++	return val;
++}
++
++static void
++tcp_rndiss_init(void)
++{
++	get_random_bytes(tcp_rndiss_sbox, sizeof (tcp_rndiss_sbox));
++	tcp_rndiss_reseed = get_seconds() + TCP_RNDISS_OUT;
++	tcp_rndiss_msb = tcp_rndiss_msb == 0x8000 ? 0 : 0x8000;
++	tcp_rndiss_cnt = 0;
++}
++
++__u32
++ip_randomisn(void)
++{
++	if (tcp_rndiss_cnt >= TCP_RNDISS_MAX ||
++	    time_after(get_seconds(), tcp_rndiss_reseed))
++		tcp_rndiss_init();
++
++	return (((tcp_rndiss_encrypt(tcp_rndiss_cnt++) |
++		  tcp_rndiss_msb) << 16) | (get_random_long() & 0x7fff));
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h	2004-06-16 01:19:43.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
+ 	set_personality (((BFPM->sh_bang || EX.ah.entry < 0x100000000 \
+ 			   ? ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT : 0) | PER_OSF4))
+ 
+-#define STACK_TOP \
++#define __STACK_TOP \
+   (current->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 0x80000000 : 0x00120000000UL)
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/elf.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/elf.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/elf.h	2004-06-16 01:19:23.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/elf.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -89,6 +89,17 @@
+ 
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + 0x1000000)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk)	((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 0x10000 : 0x120000000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk)		((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 28)
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk)		((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 28)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk)	PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk)	((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 19)
++#endif
++
+ /* $0 is set by ld.so to a pointer to a function which might be 
+    registered using atexit.  This provides a mean for the dynamic
+    linker to call DT_FINI functions for shared libraries that have
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/mman.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/mman.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/mman.h	2004-06-16 01:18:52.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/mman.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
+ #define MAP_POPULATE	0x20000		/* populate (prefault) pagetables */
+ #define MAP_NONBLOCK	0x40000		/* do not block on IO */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++#define MAP_MIRROR	0x20000
++#endif
++
+ #define MS_ASYNC	1		/* sync memory asynchronously */
+ #define MS_SYNC		2		/* synchronous memory sync */
+ #define MS_INVALIDATE	4		/* invalidate the caches */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/page.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/page.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/page.h	2004-06-16 01:19:44.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/page.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -106,6 +106,15 @@
+ #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS		(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
+ 					 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
++			  ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#else
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ 
+ #endif /* _ALPHA_PAGE_H */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h	2004-06-16 01:19:03.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -96,6 +96,17 @@
+ #define PAGE_SHARED	__pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS)
+ #define PAGE_COPY	__pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW)
+ #define PAGE_READONLY	__pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOE)
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW | _PAGE_FOE)
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW | _PAGE_FOE)
++#else
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	PAGE_SHARED
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	PAGE_COPY
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
++
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL	__pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_ASM | _PAGE_KRE | _PAGE_KWE)
+ 
+ #define _PAGE_NORMAL(x) __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | (x))
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/a.out.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/a.out.h	2004-06-16 01:19:13.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/a.out.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -19,7 +19,11 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+ 
+-#define STACK_TOP	TASK_SIZE
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++#define __STACK_TOP ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)?TASK_SIZE/2:TASK_SIZE)
++#else
++#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
++#endif
+ 
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/desc.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/desc.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/desc.h	2004-06-16 01:18:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/desc.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -8,11 +8,71 @@
+ 
+ #include <linux/preempt.h>
+ #include <linux/smp.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/mmu.h>
++#include <asm/pgtable.h>
++#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+ 
+ extern struct desc_struct cpu_gdt_table[NR_CPUS][GDT_ENTRIES];
+ 
++#define pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3)		\
++do {						\
++	typecheck(unsigned long,flags);		\
++	typecheck(unsigned long,cr3);		\
++	local_irq_save(flags);			\
++	asm("movl %%cr3,%0":"=r" (cr3));	\
++	load_cr3(kernexec_pg_dir);		\
++} while(0)
++
++#define pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3)		\
++do {						\
++	typecheck(unsigned long,flags);		\
++	typecheck(unsigned long,cr3);		\
++	asm("movl %0,%%cr3": :"r" (cr3));	\
++	local_irq_restore(flags);		\
++} while(0)
++
++#define pax_open_kernel_noirq(cr3)			\
++do {						\
++	typecheck(unsigned long,cr3);		\
++	asm("movl %%cr3,%0":"=r" (cr3));	\
++	load_cr3(kernexec_pg_dir);		\
++} while(0)
++
++#define pax_close_kernel_noirq(cr3)			\
++do {						\
++	typecheck(unsigned long,cr3);		\
++	asm("movl %0,%%cr3": :"r" (cr3));	\
++} while(0)
++
++static inline void set_user_cs(struct mm_struct *mm, int cpu)
++{
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	unsigned long base = mm->context.user_cs_base;
++	unsigned long limit = mm->context.user_cs_limit;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long flags, cr3;
++
++	pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3);
++#endif
++
++	if (limit) {
++		limit -= 1UL;
++		limit >>= 12;
++	}
++
++	cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS].a = (limit & 0xFFFFUL) | (base << 16);
++	cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS].b = (limit & 0xF0000UL) | 0xC0FB00UL | (base & 0xFF000000UL) | ((base >> 16) & 0xFFUL);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3);
++#endif
++
++#endif
++}
++
+ struct Xgt_desc_struct {
+ 	unsigned short size;
+ 	unsigned long address __attribute__((packed));
+@@ -28,7 +88,7 @@
+  * This is the ldt that every process will get unless we need
+  * something other than this.
+  */
+-extern struct desc_struct default_ldt[];
++extern const struct desc_struct default_ldt[];
+ extern void set_intr_gate(unsigned int irq, void * addr);
+ 
+ #define _set_tssldt_desc(n,addr,limit,type) \
+@@ -42,18 +102,35 @@
+ 	"rorl $16,%%eax" \
+ 	: "=m"(*(n)) : "a" (addr), "r"(n), "ir"(limit), "i"(type))
+ 
+-static inline void __set_tss_desc(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int entry, void *addr)
++static inline void __set_tss_desc(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int entry, const void *addr)
+ {
+ 	_set_tssldt_desc(&cpu_gdt_table[cpu][entry], (int)addr, 235, 0x89);
+ }
+ 
+ #define set_tss_desc(cpu,addr) __set_tss_desc(cpu, GDT_ENTRY_TSS, addr)
+ 
+-static inline void set_ldt_desc(unsigned int cpu, void *addr, unsigned int size)
++static inline void __set_ldt_desc(unsigned int cpu, const void *addr, unsigned int size)
+ {
+ 	_set_tssldt_desc(&cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_LDT], (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82);
+ }
+ 
++static inline void set_ldt_desc(unsigned int cpu, const void *addr, unsigned int size)
++{
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long flags, cr3;
++
++	pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3);
++#endif
++
++	_set_tssldt_desc(&cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_LDT], (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3);
++#endif
++
++}
++
+ #define LDT_entry_a(info) \
+ 	((((info)->base_addr & 0x0000ffff) << 16) | ((info)->limit & 0x0ffff))
+ 
+@@ -67,7 +144,7 @@
+ 	((info)->seg_32bit << 22) | \
+ 	((info)->limit_in_pages << 23) | \
+ 	((info)->useable << 20) | \
+-	0x7000)
++	0x7100)
+ 
+ #define LDT_empty(info) (\
+ 	(info)->base_addr	== 0	&& \
+@@ -104,7 +181,7 @@
+  */
+ static inline void load_LDT_nolock(mm_context_t *pc, int cpu)
+ {
+-	void *segments = pc->ldt;
++	const void *segments = pc->ldt;
+ 	int count = pc->size;
+ 
+ 	if (likely(!count)) {
+@@ -123,6 +200,22 @@
+ 	put_cpu();
+ }
+ 
++static inline void _load_LDT(mm_context_t *pc)
++{
++	int cpu = get_cpu();
++	const void *segments = pc->ldt;
++	int count = pc->size;
++
++	if (likely(!count)) {
++		segments = &default_ldt[0];
++		count = 5;
++	}
++		
++	__set_ldt_desc(cpu, segments, count);
++	load_LDT_desc();
++	put_cpu();
++}
++
+ #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/elf.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/elf.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/elf.h	2004-06-16 01:19:42.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/elf.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -72,6 +72,19 @@
+ 
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk)	0x10000000UL
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk)		15
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk)		15
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk)	PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk)	((tsk)->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 15 : 16)
++#endif
++
+ /* regs is struct pt_regs, pr_reg is elf_gregset_t (which is
+    now struct_user_regs, they are different) */
+ 
+@@ -113,8 +126,11 @@
+  * Architecture-neutral AT_ values in 0-17, leave some room
+  * for more of them, start the x86-specific ones at 32.
+  */
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL
+ #define AT_SYSINFO		32
+ #define AT_SYSINFO_EHDR		33
++#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+ #define SET_PERSONALITY(ex, ibcs2) set_personality((ibcs2)?PER_SVR4:PER_LINUX)
+@@ -129,7 +145,14 @@
+ 
+ #define VSYSCALL_BASE	(__fix_to_virt(FIX_VSYSCALL))
+ #define VSYSCALL_EHDR	((const struct elfhdr *) VSYSCALL_BASE)
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++#define VSYSCALL_ENTRY	((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ? (unsigned long) &__kernel_vsyscall - SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE : (unsigned long) &__kernel_vsyscall)
++#else
+ #define VSYSCALL_ENTRY	((unsigned long) &__kernel_vsyscall)
++#endif
++
+ extern void __kernel_vsyscall;
+ 
+ #define ARCH_DLINFO						\
+@@ -185,3 +208,5 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif
++
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h	2004-06-16 01:19:01.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS
+ 		"pushl %%edi\n\t"
+ 		"pushl %%ebp\n\t"
+-		"lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
++		"lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
+ 		"setc %%al\n\t"
+ 		"popl %%ebp\n\t"
+ 		"popl %%edi\n\t"
+@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS
+ 		"pushl %%edi\n\t"
+ 		"pushl %%ebp\n\t"
+-		"lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
++		"lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
+ 		"setc %%bl\n\t"
+ 		"popl %%ebp\n\t"
+ 		"popl %%edi\n\t"
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mach-pc9800/apm.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mach-pc9800/apm.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mach-pc9800/apm.h	2004-06-16 01:19:17.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mach-pc9800/apm.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
+ 		"pushl %%edi\n\t"
+ 		"pushl %%ebp\n\t"
+ 		"pushfl\n\t"
+-		"lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
++		"lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
+ 		"setc %%al\n\t"
+ 		"popl %%ebp\n\t"
+ 		"popl %%edi\n\t"
+@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
+ 		"pushl %%edi\n\t"
+ 		"pushl %%ebp\n\t"
+ 		"pushfl\n\t"
+-		"lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
++		"lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
+ 		"setc %%bl\n\t"
+ 		"popl %%ebp\n\t"
+ 		"popl %%edi\n\t"
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mman.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mman.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mman.h	2004-06-16 01:18:58.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mman.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
+ #define MAP_POPULATE	0x8000		/* populate (prefault) pagetables */
+ #define MAP_NONBLOCK	0x10000		/* do not block on IO */
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++#define MAP_MIRROR	0x20000
++#endif
++
+ #define MS_ASYNC	1		/* sync memory asynchronously */
+ #define MS_INVALIDATE	2		/* invalidate the caches */
+ #define MS_SYNC		4		/* synchronous memory sync */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mmu.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mmu.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mmu.h	2004-06-16 01:19:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mmu.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -12,6 +12,17 @@
+ 	int size;
+ 	struct semaphore sem;
+ 	void *ldt;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	unsigned long user_cs_base;
++	unsigned long user_cs_limit;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
++	cpumask_t cpu_user_cs_mask;
++#endif
++
++#endif
++
+ } mm_context_t;
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h	2004-06-16 01:18:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -46,6 +46,13 @@
+ 		 */
+ 		if (unlikely(prev->context.ldt != next->context.ldt))
+ 			load_LDT_nolock(&next->context, cpu);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
++		cpu_clear(cpu, prev->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
++		cpu_set(cpu, next->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
++#endif
++
++		set_user_cs(next, cpu);
+ 	}
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ 	else {
+@@ -58,6 +65,12 @@
+ 			 */
+ 			load_cr3(next->pgd);
+ 			load_LDT_nolock(&next->context, cpu);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++			cpu_set(cpu, next->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
++#endif
++
++			set_user_cs(next, cpu);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/module.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/module.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/module.h	2004-06-16 01:18:58.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/module.h	2004-06-25 14:23:23.000000000 -0400
+@@ -66,6 +66,12 @@
+ #define MODULE_STACKSIZE ""
+ #endif
+ 
+-#define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC MODULE_PROC_FAMILY MODULE_REGPARM MODULE_STACKSIZE
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++#define MODULE_GRSEC "GRSECURITY "
++#else
++#define MODULE_GRSEC ""
++#endif
++
++#define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC MODULE_PROC_FAMILY MODULE_REGPARM MODULE_STACKSIZE MODULE_GRSEC
+ 
+ #endif /* _ASM_I386_MODULE_H */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/page.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/page.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/page.h	2004-06-16 01:18:59.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/page.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -120,6 +120,19 @@
+ #define __PAGE_OFFSET		(0xC0000000UL)
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
++#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET	(0xC0400000)
++#else
++#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET	(0xC0400000UL)
++#endif
++#else
++#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
++#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET	(0)
++#else
++#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET	(0x0UL)
++#endif
++#endif
+ 
+ #define PAGE_OFFSET		((unsigned long)__PAGE_OFFSET)
+ #define VMALLOC_RESERVE		((unsigned long)__VMALLOC_RESERVE)
+@@ -139,6 +152,19 @@
+ #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS	(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
+ 				 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
++			  ((current->flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC|PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))?0:VM_EXEC))
++#else
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC|PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))?0:VM_EXEC))
++#endif
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#define CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT 1
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ 
+ #endif /* _I386_PAGE_H */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h	2004-06-16 01:18:57.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mm.h>		/* for struct page */
+ 
+ #define pmd_populate_kernel(mm, pmd, pte) \
+-		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_PAGE_TABLE + __pa(pte)))
++		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE + __pa(pte)))
+ 
+ static inline void pmd_populate(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd, struct page *pte)
+ {
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h	2004-06-16 01:19:43.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -25,13 +25,6 @@
+ #include <linux/list.h>
+ #include <linux/spinlock.h>
+ 
+-/*
+- * ZERO_PAGE is a global shared page that is always zero: used
+- * for zero-mapped memory areas etc..
+- */
+-#define ZERO_PAGE(vaddr) (virt_to_page(empty_zero_page))
+-extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[1024];
+-extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[1024];
+ extern kmem_cache_t *pgd_cache;
+ extern kmem_cache_t *pmd_cache;
+ extern spinlock_t pgd_lock;
+@@ -43,21 +36,31 @@
+ void pgtable_cache_init(void);
+ void paging_init(void);
+ 
+-#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
+-
+ /*
+  * The Linux x86 paging architecture is 'compile-time dual-mode', it
+  * implements both the traditional 2-level x86 page tables and the
+  * newer 3-level PAE-mode page tables.
+  */
+-#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
+ # include <asm/pgtable-3level.h>
+ #else
+ # include <asm/pgtable-2level.h>
+ #endif
++
++/*
++ * ZERO_PAGE is a global shared page that is always zero: used
++ * for zero-mapped memory areas etc..
++ */
++#define ZERO_PAGE(vaddr) (virt_to_page(empty_zero_page))
++extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[1024];
++extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PTE];
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++extern pgd_t kernexec_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PTE];
+ #endif
+ 
++#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
++
+ #define PMD_SIZE	(1UL << PMD_SHIFT)
+ #define PMD_MASK	(~(PMD_SIZE-1))
+ #define PGDIR_SIZE	(1UL << PGDIR_SHIFT)
+@@ -136,6 +139,16 @@
+ #define PAGE_COPY	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+ #define PAGE_READONLY	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++#else
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	PAGE_SHARED
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	PAGE_COPY
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
++
+ #define _PAGE_KERNEL \
+ 	(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+ 
+@@ -155,18 +168,18 @@
+  * This is the closest we can get..
+  */
+ #define __P000	PAGE_NONE
+-#define __P001	PAGE_READONLY
+-#define __P010	PAGE_COPY
+-#define __P011	PAGE_COPY
++#define __P001	PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __P010	PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
++#define __P011	PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
+ #define __P100	PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __P101	PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __P110	PAGE_COPY
+ #define __P111	PAGE_COPY
+ 
+ #define __S000	PAGE_NONE
+-#define __S001	PAGE_READONLY
+-#define __S010	PAGE_SHARED
+-#define __S011	PAGE_SHARED
++#define __S001	PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __S010	PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
++#define __S011	PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
+ #define __S100	PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __S101	PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __S110	PAGE_SHARED
+@@ -343,6 +356,8 @@
+ 
+ #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
+ 
++#define HAVE_ARCH_UNMAPPED_AREA
++
+ #ifndef CONFIG_DISCONTIGMEM
+ #define kern_addr_valid(addr)	(1)
+ #endif /* !CONFIG_DISCONTIGMEM */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/processor.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/processor.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/processor.h	2004-06-16 01:18:56.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/processor.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
+ };
+ 
+ #define desc_empty(desc) \
+-		(!((desc)->a + (desc)->b))
++		(!((desc)->a | (desc)->b))
+ 
+ #define desc_equal(desc1, desc2) \
+ 		(((desc1)->a == (desc2)->a) && ((desc1)->b == (desc2)->b))
+@@ -297,10 +297,23 @@
+  */
+ #define TASK_SIZE	(PAGE_OFFSET)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++#define SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE	((PAGE_OFFSET) / 2)
++#endif
++
+ /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
+  * space during mmap's.
+  */
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE	(PAGE_ALIGN((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)? 0x00110000UL : (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ? SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE/3 : TASK_SIZE/3))
++#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
++#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE	(PAGE_ALIGN((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)? 0x00110000UL : TASK_SIZE/3))
++#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE	(PAGE_ALIGN((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ? SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE/3 : TASK_SIZE/3))
++#else
+ #define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE	(PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE / 3))
++#endif
+ 
+ /*
+  * Size of io_bitmap, covering ports 0 to 0x3ff.
+@@ -494,16 +507,12 @@
+ unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p);
+ 
+ #define THREAD_SIZE_LONGS      (THREAD_SIZE/sizeof(unsigned long))
+-#define KSTK_TOP(info)                                                 \
+-({                                                                     \
+-       unsigned long *__ptr = (unsigned long *)(info);                 \
+-       (unsigned long)(&__ptr[THREAD_SIZE_LONGS]);                     \
+-})
++#define KSTK_TOP(info)         ((info)->task.thread.esp0)
+ 
+ #define task_pt_regs(task)                                             \
+ ({                                                                     \
+        struct pt_regs *__regs__;                                       \
+-       __regs__ = (struct pt_regs *)KSTK_TOP((task)->thread_info);     \
++       __regs__ = (struct pt_regs *)((task)->thread.esp0);             \
+        __regs__ - 1;                                                   \
+ })
+ 
+@@ -627,7 +636,7 @@
+ extern inline void prefetch(const void *x)
+ {
+ 	alternative_input(ASM_NOP4,
+-			  "prefetchnta (%1)",
++			  "prefetchnta (%2)",
+ 			  X86_FEATURE_XMM,
+ 			  "r" (x));
+ }
+@@ -641,7 +650,7 @@
+ extern inline void prefetchw(const void *x)
+ {
+ 	alternative_input(ASM_NOP4,
+-			  "prefetchw (%1)",
++			  "prefetchw (%2)",
+ 			  X86_FEATURE_3DNOW,
+ 			  "r" (x));
+ }
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/system.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/system.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/system.h	2004-06-16 01:18:38.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/system.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
+ #include <asm/segment.h>
+ #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
++#include <asm/page.h>
+ #include <linux/bitops.h> /* for LOCK_PREFIX */
+ 
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+@@ -301,7 +302,7 @@
+ 	asm volatile ("661:\n\t" oldinstr "\n662:\n" 		     \
+ 		      ".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n"     	     \
+ 		      "  .align 4\n"				       \
+-		      "  .long 661b\n"            /* label */          \
++		      "  .long 661b + %c1\n"       /* label */          \
+ 		      "  .long 663f\n"		  /* new instruction */ 	\
+ 		      "  .byte %c0\n"             /* feature bit */    \
+ 		      "  .byte 662b-661b\n"       /* sourcelen */      \
+@@ -309,7 +310,7 @@
+ 		      ".previous\n"						\
+ 		      ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"ax\"\n"			\
+ 		      "663:\n\t" newinstr "\n664:\n"   /* replacement */    \
+-		      ".previous" :: "i" (feature) : "memory")  
++		      ".previous" :: "i" (feature), "i" (__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) : "memory")  
+ 
+ /*
+  * Alternative inline assembly with input.
+@@ -325,7 +326,7 @@
+ 	asm volatile ("661:\n\t" oldinstr "\n662:\n"				\
+ 		      ".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n"			\
+ 		      "  .align 4\n"						\
+-		      "  .long 661b\n"            /* label */			\
++		      "  .long 661b + %c1\n"      /* label */			\
+ 		      "  .long 663f\n"		  /* new instruction */ 	\
+ 		      "  .byte %c0\n"             /* feature bit */		\
+ 		      "  .byte 662b-661b\n"       /* sourcelen */		\
+@@ -333,7 +334,7 @@
+ 		      ".previous\n"						\
+ 		      ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"ax\"\n"			\
+ 		      "663:\n\t" newinstr "\n664:\n"   /* replacement */ 	\
+-		      ".previous" :: "i" (feature), input)  
++		      ".previous" :: "i" (feature), "i" (__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET), input)  
+ 
+ /*
+  * Force strict CPU ordering.
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/elf.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/elf.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/elf.h	2004-06-16 01:19:42.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/elf.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -162,6 +162,16 @@
+ typedef struct ia64_fpreg elf_fpreg_t;
+ typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_NFPREG];
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk)	((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 0x08048000UL : 0x4000000000000000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk)		((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - PAGE_SHIFT)
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk)		((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - PAGE_SHIFT)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk)	PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk)	((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - PAGE_SHIFT)
++#endif
+ 
+ 
+ struct pt_regs;	/* forward declaration... */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/mman.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/mman.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/mman.h	2004-06-16 01:19:23.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/mman.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@
+ #define MAP_POPULATE	0x08000		/* populate (prefault) pagetables */
+ #define MAP_NONBLOCK	0x10000		/* do not block on IO */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++#define MAP_MIRROR	0x40000
++#endif
++
+ #define MS_ASYNC	1		/* sync memory asynchronously */
+ #define MS_INVALIDATE	2		/* invalidate the caches */
+ #define MS_SYNC		4		/* synchronous memory sync */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/page.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/page.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/page.h	2004-06-16 01:18:58.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/page.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -187,4 +187,13 @@
+ 					 (((current->thread.flags & IA64_THREAD_XSTACK) != 0)	\
+ 					  ? VM_EXEC : 0))
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
++			  ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#else
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* _ASM_IA64_PAGE_H */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h	2004-06-16 01:19:09.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -121,6 +121,17 @@
+ #define PAGE_READONLY	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
+ #define PAGE_COPY	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
+ #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_RX)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_RW)
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
++#else
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	PAGE_SHARED
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	PAGE_READONLY
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	PAGE_COPY
++#endif
++
+ #define PAGE_GATE	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_X_RX)
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL	__pgprot(__DIRTY_BITS  | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_RWX)
+ #define PAGE_KERNELRX	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_RX)
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h	2004-06-16 01:20:04.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -11,6 +11,6 @@
+ #define MAX_USER_STACK_SIZE	(RGN_MAP_LIMIT/2)
+ /* Make a default stack size of 2GB */
+ #define DEFAULT_USER_STACK_SIZE	(1UL << 31)
+-#define STACK_TOP		(0x6000000000000000UL + RGN_MAP_LIMIT)
++#define __STACK_TOP		(0x6000000000000000UL + RGN_MAP_LIMIT)
+ 
+ #endif /* _ASM_IA64_USTACK_H */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-mips/a.out.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-mips/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-mips/a.out.h	2004-06-16 01:19:13.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-mips/a.out.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -36,10 +36,10 @@
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_MIPS32
+-#define STACK_TOP	TASK_SIZE
++#define __STACK_TOP	TASK_SIZE
+ #endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_MIPS64
+-#define STACK_TOP	(current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR ? TASK_SIZE32 : TASK_SIZE)
++#define __STACK_TOP	(current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR ? TASK_SIZE32 : TASK_SIZE)
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-mips/elf.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-mips/elf.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-mips/elf.h	2004-06-16 01:19:22.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-mips/elf.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -273,4 +273,15 @@
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk)	(((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk)		(((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk)		(((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk)	PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk)	(((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* _ASM_ELF_H */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-mips/page.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-mips/page.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-mips/page.h	2004-06-16 01:19:13.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-mips/page.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -124,6 +124,15 @@
+ #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS	(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
+ 				 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
++			  ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#else
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ #define UNCAC_ADDR(addr)	((addr) - PAGE_OFFSET + UNCAC_BASE)
+ #define CAC_ADDR(addr)		((addr) - UNCAC_BASE + PAGE_OFFSET)
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h	2004-06-16 01:20:04.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
+ /* XXX: STACK_TOP actually should be STACK_BOTTOM for parisc.
+  * prumpf */
+ 
+-#define STACK_TOP	TASK_SIZE
++#define __STACK_TOP	TASK_SIZE
+ 
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/elf.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/elf.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/elf.h	2004-06-16 01:19:43.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/elf.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -337,6 +337,17 @@
+ 
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + 0x01000000)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk)	0x10000UL
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk)		16
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT 
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk)		16
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk)	PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk)	16
++#endif
++
+ /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
+    instruction set this CPU supports.  This could be done in user space,
+    but it's not easy, and we've already done it here.  */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/mman.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/mman.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/mman.h	2004-06-16 01:19:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/mman.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
+ #define MAP_POPULATE	0x10000		/* populate (prefault) pagetables */
+ #define MAP_NONBLOCK	0x20000		/* do not block on IO */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++#define MAP_MIRROR	0x0400
++#endif
++
+ #define MS_SYNC		1		/* synchronous memory sync */
+ #define MS_ASYNC	2		/* sync memory asynchronously */
+ #define MS_INVALIDATE	4		/* invalidate the caches */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/page.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/page.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/page.h	2004-06-16 01:19:01.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/page.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -157,6 +157,15 @@
+ #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS	(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
+ 				 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
++			  ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#else
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ 
+ #endif /* _PARISC_PAGE_H */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h	2004-06-16 01:19:52.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -189,6 +189,17 @@
+ #define PAGE_EXECREAD   __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC |_PAGE_ACCESSED)
+ #define PAGE_COPY       PAGE_EXECREAD
+ #define PAGE_RWX        __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_EXEC |_PAGE_ACCESSED)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++#else
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	PAGE_SHARED
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	PAGE_COPY
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
++
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL	__pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL)
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL_RO	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL_UNC	__pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_NO_CACHE)
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h	2004-06-16 01:19:23.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
+ #define __PPC_A_OUT_H__
+ 
+ /* grabbed from the intel stuff  */
+-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
++#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
+ 
+ 
+ struct exec
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/elf.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/elf.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/elf.h	2004-06-16 01:18:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/elf.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -89,6 +89,17 @@
+ 
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (0x08000000)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk)	0x10000000UL
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk)		15
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk)		15
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk)	PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk)	15
++#endif
++
+ #define USE_ELF_CORE_DUMP
+ #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE	4096
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/mman.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/mman.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/mman.h	2004-06-16 01:20:26.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/mman.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@
+ #define MAP_POPULATE	0x8000		/* populate (prefault) pagetables */
+ #define MAP_NONBLOCK	0x10000		/* do not block on IO */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++#define MAP_MIRROR	0x0200
++#endif
++
+ #define MS_ASYNC	1		/* sync memory asynchronously */
+ #define MS_INVALIDATE	2		/* invalidate the caches */
+ #define MS_SYNC		4		/* synchronous memory sync */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/page.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/page.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/page.h	2004-06-16 01:19:02.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/page.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -163,5 +163,14 @@
+ #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS	(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
+ 				 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
++			  ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#else
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ #endif /* _PPC_PAGE_H */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h	2004-06-16 01:19:01.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -349,11 +349,21 @@
+ 
+ #define PAGE_NONE	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE)
+ #define PAGE_READONLY	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER)
+-#define PAGE_READONLY_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC)
++#define PAGE_READONLY_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC)
+ #define PAGE_SHARED	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW)
+-#define PAGE_SHARED_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC)
++#define PAGE_SHARED_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC)
+ #define PAGE_COPY	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER)
+-#define PAGE_COPY_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC)
++#define PAGE_COPY_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC)
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_40x) && !defined(CONFIG_44x)
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_GUARDED)
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
++#else
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	PAGE_SHARED
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	PAGE_COPY
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
+ 
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL		__pgprot(_PAGE_RAM)
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE	__pgprot(_PAGE_IO)
+@@ -365,21 +375,21 @@
+  * This is the closest we can get..
+  */
+ #define __P000	PAGE_NONE
+-#define __P001	PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __P010	PAGE_COPY
+-#define __P011	PAGE_COPY_X
+-#define __P100	PAGE_READONLY
++#define __P001	PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __P010	PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
++#define __P011	PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
++#define __P100	PAGE_READONLY_X
+ #define __P101	PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __P110	PAGE_COPY
++#define __P110	PAGE_COPY_X
+ #define __P111	PAGE_COPY_X
+ 
+ #define __S000	PAGE_NONE
+-#define __S001	PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __S010	PAGE_SHARED
+-#define __S011	PAGE_SHARED_X
+-#define __S100	PAGE_READONLY
++#define __S001	PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __S010	PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
++#define __S011	PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
++#define __S100	PAGE_READONLY_X
+ #define __S101	PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __S110	PAGE_SHARED
++#define __S110	PAGE_SHARED_X
+ #define __S111	PAGE_SHARED_X
+ 
+ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/a.out.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/a.out.h	2004-06-16 01:18:52.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/a.out.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
+ /* Give 32-bit user space a full 4G address space to live in. */
+ #define STACK_TOP_USER32 (TASK_SIZE_USER32)
+ 
+-#define STACK_TOP ((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) || \
++#define __STACK_TOP ((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) || \
+ 		(ppcdebugset(PPCDBG_BINFMT_32ADDR))) ? \
+ 		STACK_TOP_USER32 : STACK_TOP_USER64)
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/elf.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/elf.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/elf.h	2004-06-16 01:19:43.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/elf.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -154,6 +154,17 @@
+ 
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (0x08000000)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk)	(0x10000000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk)		((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) || (ppcdebugset(PPCDBG_BINFMT_32ADDR))) ? 16 : 24)
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk)		((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) || (ppcdebugset(PPCDBG_BINFMT_32ADDR))) ? 16 : 24)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk)	PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk)	((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) || (ppcdebugset(PPCDBG_BINFMT_32ADDR))) ? 16 : 24)
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+ 
+ /* Common routine for both 32-bit and 64-bit processes */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/mman.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/mman.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/mman.h	2004-06-16 01:19:22.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/mman.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
+ #define MAP_DENYWRITE	0x0800		/* ETXTBSY */
+ #define MAP_EXECUTABLE	0x1000		/* mark it as an executable */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++#define MAP_MIRROR	0x0200
++#endif
++
+ #define MS_ASYNC	1		/* sync memory asynchronously */
+ #define MS_INVALIDATE	2		/* invalidate the caches */
+ #define MS_SYNC		4		/* synchronous memory sync */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/page.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/page.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/page.h	2004-06-16 01:18:47.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/page.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -245,5 +245,14 @@
+ #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS	(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
+ 				 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
++			 ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#else
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ #endif /* _PPC64_PAGE_H */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/pgtable.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/pgtable.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/pgtable.h	2004-06-16 01:20:04.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/pgtable.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -112,6 +112,17 @@
+ #define PAGE_COPY_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC)
+ #define PAGE_READONLY	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER)
+ #define PAGE_READONLY_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
++#else
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	PAGE_SHARED
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	PAGE_COPY
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
++
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_WRENABLE)
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL_CI	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED | \
+ 			       _PAGE_WRENABLE | _PAGE_NO_CACHE | _PAGE_GUARDED)
+@@ -123,21 +134,21 @@
+  * This is the closest we can get..
+  */
+ #define __P000	PAGE_NONE
+-#define __P001	PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __P010	PAGE_COPY
+-#define __P011	PAGE_COPY_X
+-#define __P100	PAGE_READONLY
++#define __P001	PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __P010	PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
++#define __P011	PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
++#define __P100	PAGE_READONLY_X
+ #define __P101	PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __P110	PAGE_COPY
++#define __P110	PAGE_COPY_X
+ #define __P111	PAGE_COPY_X
+ 
+ #define __S000	PAGE_NONE
+-#define __S001	PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __S010	PAGE_SHARED
+-#define __S011	PAGE_SHARED_X
+-#define __S100	PAGE_READONLY
++#define __S001	PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __S010	PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
++#define __S011	PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
++#define __S100	PAGE_READONLY_X
+ #define __S101	PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __S110	PAGE_SHARED
++#define __S110	PAGE_SHARED_X
+ #define __S111	PAGE_SHARED_X
+ 
+ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h	2004-06-16 01:18:57.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ 
+-#define STACK_TOP	(PAGE_OFFSET - PAGE_SIZE)
++#define __STACK_TOP	(PAGE_OFFSET - PAGE_SIZE)
+ 
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/elf.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/elf.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/elf.h	2004-06-16 01:19:51.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/elf.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -145,6 +145,17 @@
+ 
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (0x08000000)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk)	0x10000UL
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk)		16
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk)		16
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk)	PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk)	16
++#endif
++
+ /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
+    instruction set this cpu supports.  This can NOT be done in userspace
+    on Sparc.  */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/mman.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/mman.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/mman.h	2004-06-16 01:20:04.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/mman.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@
+ #define MAP_DENYWRITE	0x0800		/* ETXTBSY */
+ #define MAP_EXECUTABLE	0x1000		/* mark it as an executable */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++#define MAP_MIRROR	0x0400
++#endif
++
+ #define MS_ASYNC	1		/* sync memory asynchronously */
+ #define MS_INVALIDATE	2		/* invalidate the caches */
+ #define MS_SYNC		4		/* synchronous memory sync */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/page.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/page.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/page.h	2004-06-16 01:19:02.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/page.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -176,6 +176,15 @@
+ #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS	(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
+ 				 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
++			 ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#else
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ 
+ #endif /* _SPARC_PAGE_H */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h	2004-06-16 01:19:36.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -91,6 +91,13 @@
+ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_shared)
+ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_copy)
+ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_readonly)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_shared_noexec)
++BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_copy_noexec)
++BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_readonly_noexec)
++#endif
++
+ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_kernel)
+ 
+ #define PMD_SHIFT		SUN4C_PMD_SHIFT
+@@ -112,6 +119,16 @@
+ #define PAGE_COPY      __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_copy))
+ #define PAGE_READONLY  __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_readonly))
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	__pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_shared_noexec))
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_copy_noexec))
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_readonly_noexec))
++#else
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	PAGE_SHARED
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	PAGE_COPY
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
++
+ extern unsigned long page_kernel;
+ 
+ #ifdef MODULE
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h	2004-06-16 01:19:10.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -114,6 +114,16 @@
+ 				    SRMMU_EXEC | SRMMU_REF)
+ #define SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY  __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
+ 				    SRMMU_EXEC | SRMMU_REF)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#define SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC  __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
++					   SRMMU_WRITE | SRMMU_REF)
++#define SRMMU_PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC    __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
++					   SRMMU_REF)
++#define SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY_NOEXEC  __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
++					   SRMMU_REF)
++#endif
++
+ #define SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL  __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | SRMMU_PRIV | \
+ 				    SRMMU_DIRTY | SRMMU_REF)
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h	2004-06-16 01:19:53.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
+  * No one can read/write anything from userland in the kernel space by setting
+  * large size and address near to PAGE_OFFSET - a fault will break his intentions.
+  */
+-#define __user_ok(addr,size) ((addr) < STACK_TOP)
++#define __user_ok(addr,size) ((addr) < __STACK_TOP)
+ #define __kernel_ok (segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS))
+ #define __access_ok(addr,size) (__user_ok((addr) & get_fs().seg,(size)))
+ #define access_ok(type,addr,size) __access_ok((unsigned long)(addr),(size))
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h	2004-06-16 01:19:43.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+ 
+-#define STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0xf0000000 : 0x80000000000L)
++#define __STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0xf0000000 : 0x80000000000L)
+ 
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h	2004-06-16 01:19:10.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -140,6 +140,16 @@
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         0x0000010000000000UL
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk)	(test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0x10000UL : 0x100000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk)		(PAGE_SHIFT + 1)
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk)		(test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 14 : 28 )
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk)		(PAGE_SHIFT + 1)
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk)		(test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 14 : 28 )
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk)	PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk)	(test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 15 : 29 )
++#endif
+ 
+ /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
+    instruction set this cpu supports.  */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h	2004-06-16 01:19:23.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@
+ #define MAP_DENYWRITE	0x0800		/* ETXTBSY */
+ #define MAP_EXECUTABLE	0x1000		/* mark it as an executable */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++#define MAP_MIRROR	0x0400
++#endif
++
+ #define MS_ASYNC	1		/* sync memory asynchronously */
+ #define MS_INVALIDATE	2		/* invalidate the caches */
+ #define MS_SYNC		4		/* synchronous memory sync */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/page.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/page.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/page.h	2004-06-16 01:19:22.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/page.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -168,6 +168,15 @@
+ #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS	(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
+ 				 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
++			  ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#else
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* !(__KERNEL__) */
+ 
+ #endif /* !(_SPARC64_PAGE_H) */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/pgtable.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/pgtable.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/pgtable.h	2004-06-16 01:18:52.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/pgtable.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -128,7 +128,8 @@
+ 
+ /* Here are the SpitFire software bits we use in the TTE's. */
+ #define _PAGE_FILE	_AC(0x0000000000001000,UL)	/* Pagecache page     */
+-#define _PAGE_MODIFIED	_AC(0x0000000000000800,UL)	/* Modified (dirty)   */
++#define _PAGE_MODIFIED	_AC(0x0000000000001000,UL)	/* Modified (dirty)   */
++#define _PAGE_EXEC	_AC(0x0000000000000800,UL)	/* Executable SW Bit  */
+ #define _PAGE_ACCESSED	_AC(0x0000000000000400,UL)	/* Accessed (ref'd)   */
+ #define _PAGE_READ	_AC(0x0000000000000200,UL)	/* Readable SW Bit    */
+ #define _PAGE_WRITE	_AC(0x0000000000000100,UL)	/* Writable SW Bit    */
+@@ -164,16 +165,30 @@
+ 
+ /* Don't set the TTE _PAGE_W bit here, else the dirty bit never gets set. */
+ #define PAGE_SHARED	__pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \
+-				  __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_WRITE)
++				  __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_EXEC)
+ 
+ #define PAGE_COPY	__pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \
+-				  __ACCESS_BITS)
++				  __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_EXEC)
+ 
+ #define PAGE_READONLY	__pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \
+-				  __ACCESS_BITS)
++				  __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_EXEC)
+ 
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL	__pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \
+-				  __PRIV_BITS | __ACCESS_BITS | __DIRTY_BITS)
++				  __PRIV_BITS | __ACCESS_BITS | __DIRTY_BITS | \
++				  _PAGE_EXEC)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	__pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \
++					  __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_WRITE)
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	__pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \
++					  __ACCESS_BITS)
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	__pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \
++					  __ACCESS_BITS)
++#else
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	PAGE_SHARED
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	PAGE_COPY
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
+ 
+ #define _PFN_MASK	_PAGE_PADDR
+ 
+@@ -181,18 +196,18 @@
+ 		   __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_E)
+ 
+ #define __P000	PAGE_NONE
+-#define __P001	PAGE_READONLY
+-#define __P010	PAGE_COPY
+-#define __P011	PAGE_COPY
++#define __P001	PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __P010	PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
++#define __P011	PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
+ #define __P100	PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __P101	PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __P110	PAGE_COPY
+ #define __P111	PAGE_COPY
+ 
+ #define __S000	PAGE_NONE
+-#define __S001	PAGE_READONLY
+-#define __S010	PAGE_SHARED
+-#define __S011	PAGE_SHARED
++#define __S001	PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __S010	PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
++#define __S011	PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
+ #define __S100	PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __S101	PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __S110	PAGE_SHARED
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h	2004-06-16 01:19:22.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+ #include <linux/thread_info.h>
+-#define STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? IA32_PAGE_OFFSET : TASK_SIZE)
++#define __STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? IA32_PAGE_OFFSET : TASK_SIZE)
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* __A_OUT_GNU_H__ */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h	2004-06-16 01:19:52.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -89,6 +89,17 @@
+ 
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (2 * TASK_SIZE / 3)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk)	(test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 0x08048000UL : 0x400000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk)		(test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24)
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk)		PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk)		(test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk)	PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk)	(test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24)
++#endif
++
+ /* regs is struct pt_regs, pr_reg is elf_gregset_t (which is
+    now struct_user_regs, they are different). Assumes current is the process
+    getting dumped. */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h	2004-06-16 01:19:42.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@
+ #define MAP_POPULATE	0x8000		/* populate (prefault) pagetables */
+ #define MAP_NONBLOCK	0x10000		/* do not block on IO */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++#define MAP_MIRROR	0x8000
++#endif
++
+ #define MS_ASYNC	1		/* sync memory asynchronously */
+ #define MS_INVALIDATE	2		/* invalidate the caches */
+ #define MS_SYNC		4		/* synchronous memory sync */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/page.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/page.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/page.h	2004-06-16 01:18:56.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/page.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -132,6 +132,16 @@
+ 
+ #define __VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS	(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
+ 				 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS __VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
++			  ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#else
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
++#endif
++#else
+ #define __VM_STACK_FLAGS 	(VM_GROWSDOWN | VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
+                                 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
+ 
+@@ -142,6 +152,8 @@
+ #define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS \
+ 	(test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? vm_stack_flags32 : vm_stack_flags) 
+ 	
++#endif
++
+ #define CONFIG_ARCH_GATE_AREA 1	
+ 
+ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h	2004-06-16 01:19:29.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mm.h>
+ 
+ #define pmd_populate_kernel(mm, pmd, pte) \
+-		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_PAGE_TABLE | __pa(pte)))
++		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(pte)))
+ #define pgd_populate(mm, pgd, pmd) \
+ 		set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_PAGE_TABLE | __pa(pmd)))
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h	2004-06-16 01:19:43.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -170,6 +170,10 @@
+ #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+ #define PAGE_READONLY	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX)
+ #define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++
++#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
++#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
++
+ #define __PAGE_KERNEL \
+ 	(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX)
+ #define __PAGE_KERNEL_EXECUTABLE \
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/a.out.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/a.out.h	2004-06-16 01:19:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/a.out.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -7,6 +7,16 @@
+ 
+ #include <asm/a.out.h>
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK
++#define __DELTA_STACK (current->mm->delta_stack)
++#else
++#define __DELTA_STACK 0UL
++#endif
++
++#ifndef STACK_TOP
++#define STACK_TOP	(__STACK_TOP - __DELTA_STACK)
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* __STRUCT_EXEC_OVERRIDE__ */
+ 
+ /* these go in the N_MACHTYPE field */
+@@ -37,6 +47,14 @@
+   M_MIPS2 = 152		/* MIPS R6000/R4000 binary */
+ };
+ 
++/* Constants for the N_FLAGS field */
++#define F_PAX_PAGEEXEC	1	/* Paging based non-executable pages */
++#define F_PAX_EMUTRAMP	2	/* Emulate trampolines */
++#define F_PAX_MPROTECT	4	/* Restrict mprotect() */
++#define F_PAX_RANDMMAP	8	/* Randomize mmap() base */
++#define F_PAX_RANDEXEC	16	/* Randomize ET_EXEC base */
++#define F_PAX_SEGMEXEC	32	/* Segmentation based non-executable pages */
++
+ #if !defined (N_MAGIC)
+ #define N_MAGIC(exec) ((exec).a_info & 0xffff)
+ #endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/binfmts.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/binfmts.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/binfmts.h	2004-06-16 01:19:26.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/binfmts.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ 				   of the time same as filename, but could be
+ 				   different for binfmt_{misc,script} */
+ 	unsigned long loader, exec;
++	int misc;
+ };
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -71,5 +72,8 @@
+ extern int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs);
+ extern int set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new);
+ 
++void pax_report_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void *pc, void *sp);
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp);
++
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ #endif /* _LINUX_BINFMTS_H */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/elf.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/elf.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/elf.h	2004-06-16 01:18:59.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/elf.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@
+ 
+ #define PT_GNU_STACK	(PT_LOOS + 0x474e551)
+ 
++#define PT_PAX_FLAGS	(PT_LOOS + 0x5041580)
++
++/* Constants for the e_flags field */
++#define EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC		1	/* Paging based non-executable pages */
++#define EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP		2	/* Emulate trampolines */
++#define EF_PAX_MPROTECT		4	/* Restrict mprotect() */
++#define EF_PAX_RANDMMAP		8	/* Randomize mmap() base */
++#define EF_PAX_RANDEXEC		16	/* Randomize ET_EXEC base */
++#define EF_PAX_SEGMEXEC		32	/* Segmentation based non-executable pages */
++
+ /* These constants define the different elf file types */
+ #define ET_NONE   0
+ #define ET_REL    1
+@@ -122,6 +132,8 @@
+ #define DT_DEBUG	21
+ #define DT_TEXTREL	22
+ #define DT_JMPREL	23
++#define DT_FLAGS	30
++  #define DF_TEXTREL	0x00000004
+ #define DT_LOPROC	0x70000000
+ #define DT_HIPROC	0x7fffffff
+ 
+@@ -272,6 +284,19 @@
+ #define PF_W		0x2
+ #define PF_X		0x1
+ 
++#define PF_PAGEEXEC	(1 << 4)	/* Enable  PAGEEXEC */
++#define PF_NOPAGEEXEC	(1 << 5)	/* Disable PAGEEXEC */
++#define PF_SEGMEXEC	(1 << 6)	/* Enable  SEGMEXEC */
++#define PF_NOSEGMEXEC	(1 << 7)	/* Disable SEGMEXEC */
++#define PF_MPROTECT	(1 << 8)	/* Enable  MPROTECT */
++#define PF_NOMPROTECT	(1 << 9)	/* Disable MPROTECT */
++#define PF_RANDEXEC	(1 << 10)	/* Enable  RANDEXEC */
++#define PF_NORANDEXEC	(1 << 11)	/* Disable RANDEXEC */
++#define PF_EMUTRAMP	(1 << 12)	/* Enable  EMUTRAMP */
++#define PF_NOEMUTRAMP	(1 << 13)	/* Disable EMUTRAMP */
++#define PF_RANDMMAP	(1 << 14)	/* Enable  RANDMMAP */
++#define PF_NORANDMMAP	(1 << 15)	/* Disable RANDMMAP */
++
+ typedef struct elf32_phdr{
+   Elf32_Word	p_type;
+   Elf32_Off	p_offset;
+@@ -364,6 +389,8 @@
+ #define	EI_OSABI	7
+ #define	EI_PAD		8
+ 
++#define	EI_PAX		14
++
+ #define	ELFMAG0		0x7f		/* EI_MAG */
+ #define	ELFMAG1		'E'
+ #define	ELFMAG2		'L'
+@@ -420,6 +447,7 @@
+ #define elfhdr		elf32_hdr
+ #define elf_phdr	elf32_phdr
+ #define elf_note	elf32_note
++#define elf_dyn		Elf32_Dyn
+ 
+ #else
+ 
+@@ -427,6 +455,7 @@
+ #define elfhdr		elf64_hdr
+ #define elf_phdr	elf64_phdr
+ #define elf_note	elf64_note
++#define elf_dyn		Elf64_Dyn
+ 
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/fs.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/fs.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/fs.h	2004-06-16 01:19:02.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/fs.h	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -1192,7 +1192,7 @@
+ 
+ /* fs/open.c */
+ 
+-extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start);
++extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start, struct vfsmount *);
+ extern struct file *filp_open(const char *, int, int);
+ extern struct file * dentry_open(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, int);
+ extern int filp_close(struct file *, fl_owner_t id);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/gracl.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/gracl.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/gracl.h	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/gracl.h	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
++#ifndef GR_ACL_H
++#define GR_ACL_H
++
++#include <linux/grdefs.h>
++#include <linux/resource.h>
++#include <linux/dcache.h>
++#include <asm/resource.h>
++
++/* Major status information */
++
++#define GR_VERSION  "grsecurity 2.0.1"
++
++enum {
++
++	SHUTDOWN = 0,
++	ENABLE = 1,
++	SPROLE = 2,
++	RELOAD = 3,
++	SEGVMOD = 4,
++	STATUS = 5,
++	UNSPROLE = 6
++};
++
++/* Password setup definitions
++ * kernel/grhash.c */
++enum {
++	GR_PW_LEN = 128,
++	GR_SALT_LEN = 16,
++	GR_SHA_LEN = 32,
++};
++
++enum {
++	GR_SPROLE_LEN = 64,
++};
++
++/* Begin Data Structures */
++
++struct sprole_pw {
++	unsigned char *rolename;
++	unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN];
++	unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN];	/* 256-bit SHA hash of the password */
++};
++
++struct name_entry {
++	ino_t inode;
++	dev_t device;
++	char *name;
++	__u16 len;
++};
++
++struct acl_role_db {
++	struct acl_role_label **r_hash;
++	__u32 r_size;
++};
++
++struct name_db {
++	struct name_entry **n_hash;
++	__u32 n_size;
++};
++
++struct crash_uid {
++	uid_t uid;
++	unsigned long expires;
++};
++
++struct gr_hash_struct {
++	void **table;
++	void **nametable;
++	void *first;
++	__u32 table_size;
++	__u32 used_size;
++	int type;
++};
++
++/* Userspace Grsecurity ACL data structures */
++struct acl_subject_label {
++	char *filename;
++	ino_t inode;
++	dev_t device;
++	__u32 mode;
++	__u32 cap_mask;
++	__u32 cap_lower;
++
++	struct rlimit res[RLIM_NLIMITS + 1];
++	__u16 resmask;
++
++	__u8 user_trans_type;
++	__u8 group_trans_type;
++	uid_t *user_transitions;
++	gid_t *group_transitions;
++	__u16 user_trans_num;
++	__u16 group_trans_num;
++
++	__u32 ip_proto[8];
++	__u32 ip_type;
++	struct acl_ip_label **ips;
++	__u32 ip_num;
++
++	__u32 crashes;
++	unsigned long expires;
++
++	struct acl_subject_label *parent_subject;
++	struct gr_hash_struct *hash;
++	struct acl_ip_label *ip_object;
++	struct acl_subject_label *prev;
++	struct acl_subject_label *next;
++
++	struct acl_object_label **obj_hash;
++	__u32 obj_hash_size;
++};
++
++struct role_allowed_ip {
++	__u32 addr;
++	__u32 netmask;
++
++	struct role_allowed_ip *prev;
++	struct role_allowed_ip *next;
++};
++
++struct role_transition {
++	char *rolename;
++
++	struct role_transition *prev;
++	struct role_transition *next;
++};
++
++struct acl_role_label {
++	char *rolename;
++	uid_t uidgid;
++	__u16 roletype;
++
++	__u16 auth_attempts;
++	unsigned long expires;
++
++	struct acl_subject_label *root_label;
++	struct gr_hash_struct *hash;
++
++	struct acl_role_label *prev;
++	struct acl_role_label *next;
++
++	struct role_transition *transitions;
++	struct role_allowed_ip *allowed_ips;
++	struct acl_subject_label **subj_hash;
++	__u32 subj_hash_size;
++};
++
++struct user_acl_role_db {
++	struct acl_role_label **r_table;
++	__u32 r_entries;	/* number of entries in table */
++	__u32 s_entries;	/* total number of subject acls */
++	__u32 i_entries;	/* total number of ip acls */
++	__u32 o_entries;	/* Total number of object acls */
++	__u32 g_entries;	/* total number of globbed objects */
++	__u32 a_entries;	/* total number of allowed ips */
++	__u32 t_entries;	/* total number of transitions */
++};
++
++struct acl_object_label {
++	char *filename;
++	ino_t inode;
++	dev_t device;
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	struct acl_subject_label *nested;
++	struct acl_object_label *globbed;
++
++	/* next two structures not used */
++
++	struct acl_object_label *prev;
++	struct acl_object_label *next;
++};
++
++struct acl_ip_label {
++	__u32 addr;
++	__u32 netmask;
++	__u16 low, high;
++	__u8 mode;
++	__u32 type;
++	__u32 proto[8];
++
++	/* next two structures not used */
++
++	struct acl_ip_label *prev;
++	struct acl_ip_label *next;
++};
++
++struct gr_arg {
++	struct user_acl_role_db role_db;
++	unsigned char pw[GR_PW_LEN];
++	unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN];
++	unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN];
++	unsigned char sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN];
++	struct sprole_pw *sprole_pws;
++	dev_t segv_device;
++	ino_t segv_inode;
++	uid_t segv_uid;
++	__u16 num_sprole_pws;
++	__u16 mode;
++};
++
++struct subject_map {
++	struct acl_subject_label *user;
++	struct acl_subject_label *kernel;
++};
++
++struct acl_subj_map_db {
++	struct subject_map **s_hash;
++	__u32 s_size;
++};
++
++/* End Data Structures Section */
++
++/* Hash functions generated by empirical testing by Brad Spengler
++   Makes good use of the low bits of the inode.  Generally 0-1 times
++   in loop for successful match.  0-3 for unsuccessful match.
++   Shift/add algorithm with modulus of table size and an XOR*/
++
++static __inline__ unsigned long
++rhash(const uid_t uid, const __u16 type, const unsigned long sz)
++{
++	return (((uid << type) + (uid ^ type)) % sz);
++}
++
++ static __inline__ unsigned long
++shash(const struct acl_subject_label *userp, const unsigned long sz)
++{
++	return ((const unsigned long)userp % sz);
++}
++
++static __inline__ unsigned long
++fhash(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev, const unsigned long sz)
++{
++	return (((ino + dev) ^ ((ino << 13) + (ino << 23) + (dev << 9))) % sz);
++}
++
++static __inline__ unsigned long
++nhash(const char *name, const __u16 len, const unsigned long sz)
++{
++	return full_name_hash(name, len) % sz;
++}
++
++#endif
++
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/gralloc.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/gralloc.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/gralloc.h	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/gralloc.h	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
++#ifndef __GRALLOC_H
++#define __GRALLOC_H
++
++void acl_free_all(void);
++int acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size);
++void *acl_alloc(unsigned long len);
++
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grdefs.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grdefs.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grdefs.h	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grdefs.h	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
++#ifndef GRDEFS_H
++#define GRDEFS_H
++
++/* Begin grsecurity status declarations */
++
++enum {
++	GR_READY = 0x01,
++	GR_STATUS_INIT = 0x00	// disabled state
++};
++
++/* Begin  ACL declarations */
++
++/* Role flags */
++
++enum {
++	GR_ROLE_USER = 0x0001,
++	GR_ROLE_GROUP = 0x0002,
++	GR_ROLE_DEFAULT = 0x0004,
++	GR_ROLE_SPECIAL = 0x0008,
++	GR_ROLE_AUTH = 0x0010,
++	GR_ROLE_NOPW = 0x0020,
++	GR_ROLE_GOD = 0x0040,
++	GR_ROLE_LEARN = 0x0080,
++	GR_ROLE_TPE = 0x0100
++};
++
++/* ACL Subject and Object mode flags */
++enum {
++	GR_DELETED = 0x00000080
++};
++
++/* ACL Object-only mode flags */
++enum {
++	GR_READ 	= 0x00000001,
++	GR_APPEND 	= 0x00000002,
++	GR_WRITE 	= 0x00000004,
++	GR_EXEC 	= 0x00000008,
++	GR_FIND 	= 0x00000010,
++	GR_INHERIT 	= 0x00000040,
++	GR_PTRACERD 	= 0x00000100,
++	GR_SETID 	= 0x00000200,
++	GR_CREATE 	= 0x00000400,
++	GR_DELETE 	= 0x00000800,
++	GR_NOPTRACE	= 0x00001000,
++	GR_AUDIT_READ 	= 0x00002000,
++	GR_AUDIT_APPEND = 0x00004000,
++	GR_AUDIT_WRITE 	= 0x00008000,
++	GR_AUDIT_EXEC 	= 0x00010000,
++	GR_AUDIT_FIND 	= 0x00020000,
++	GR_AUDIT_INHERIT= 0x00040000,
++	GR_AUDIT_SETID 	= 0x00080000,
++	GR_AUDIT_CREATE = 0x00100000,
++	GR_AUDIT_DELETE = 0x00200000,
++	GR_SUPPRESS 	= 0x00400000,
++	GR_NOLEARN 	= 0x00800000
++};
++
++#define GR_AUDITS (GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_APPEND | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | \
++		   GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_SETID | \
++		   GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE)
++
++/* ACL subject-only mode flags */
++enum {
++	GR_KILL 	= 0x00000001,
++	GR_VIEW 	= 0x00000002,
++	GR_PROTECTED 	= 0x00000100,
++	GR_LEARN 	= 0x00000200,
++	GR_OVERRIDE 	= 0x00000400,
++	/* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */
++	GR_DUMMY 	= 0x00000800,
++	GR_PAXPAGE 	= 0x00001000,
++	GR_PAXSEGM 	= 0x00002000,
++	GR_PAXGCC 	= 0x00004000,
++	GR_PAXRANDMMAP 	= 0x00008000,
++	GR_PAXRANDEXEC 	= 0x00010000,
++	GR_PAXMPROTECT 	= 0x00020000,
++	GR_PROTSHM 	= 0x00040000,
++	GR_KILLPROC 	= 0x00080000,
++	GR_KILLIPPROC	= 0x00100000,
++	/* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */
++	GR_NOTROJAN 	= 0x00200000,
++	GR_PROTPROCFD 	= 0x00400000,
++	GR_PROCACCT 	= 0x00800000,
++	GR_RELAXPTRACE	= 0x01000000,
++	GR_NESTED	= 0x02000000
++};
++
++enum {
++	GR_ID_USER	= 0x01,
++	GR_ID_GROUP	= 0x02,
++};
++
++enum {
++	GR_ID_ALLOW	= 0x01,
++	GR_ID_DENY	= 0x02,
++};
++
++#define GR_CRASH_RES	11
++#define GR_UIDTABLE_MAX 500
++
++/* begin resource learning section */
++enum {
++	GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP = 60,
++	GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP = 50000,
++	GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP = 10000,
++	GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP = 1000,
++	GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP = 10000,
++	GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP = 500000,
++	GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP = 1,
++	GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP = 5,
++	GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP = 50000,
++	GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP = 500000,
++	GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP = 2
++};
++
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grinternal.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grinternal.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grinternal.h	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grinternal.h	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
++#ifndef __GRINTERNAL_H
++#define __GRINTERNAL_H
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grdefs.h>
++#include <linux/grmsg.h>
++
++extern void gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...);
++extern __u32 gr_search_file(const struct dentry *dentry, const __u32 mode,
++			    const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_check_create(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++			     const struct dentry *parent,
++			     const struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u32 mode);
++extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task);
++extern __u32 to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode);
++extern int gr_set_acls(const int type);
++
++extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void);
++extern char gr_roletype_to_char(void);
++
++extern void gr_handle_alertkill(void);
++extern char *gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			    const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern char *gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			    const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern char *gr_to_filename2(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			    const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern char *gr_to_filename3(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			    const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++
++extern int grsec_enable_link;
++extern int grsec_enable_fifo;
++extern int grsec_enable_execve;
++extern int grsec_enable_forkbomb;
++extern int grsec_forkbomb_gid;
++extern int grsec_forkbomb_sec;
++extern int grsec_forkbomb_max;
++extern int grsec_enable_execlog;
++extern int grsec_enable_signal;
++extern int grsec_enable_forkfail;
++extern int grsec_enable_time;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mount;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_double;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_nice;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_caps;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_unix;
++extern int grsec_enable_tpe;
++extern int grsec_tpe_gid;
++extern int grsec_enable_tpe_all;
++extern int grsec_enable_sidcaps;
++extern int grsec_enable_randpid;
++extern int grsec_enable_socket_all;
++extern int grsec_socket_all_gid;
++extern int grsec_enable_socket_client;
++extern int grsec_socket_client_gid;
++extern int grsec_enable_socket_server;
++extern int grsec_socket_server_gid;
++extern int grsec_audit_gid;
++extern int grsec_enable_group;
++extern int grsec_enable_audit_ipc;
++extern int grsec_enable_audit_textrel;
++extern int grsec_enable_mount;
++extern int grsec_enable_chdir;
++extern int grsec_lock;
++
++extern struct task_struct *child_reaper;
++
++extern spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock;
++extern unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime;
++extern unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet;
++
++extern spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock;
++
++extern rwlock_t grsec_exec_file_lock;
++
++#define gr_task_fullpath(tsk) (tsk->exec_file ? \
++			gr_to_filename2(tsk->exec_file->f_dentry, \
++			tsk->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
++
++#define gr_parent_task_fullpath(tsk) (tsk->parent->exec_file ? \
++			gr_to_filename3(tsk->parent->exec_file->f_dentry, \
++			tsk->parent->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
++
++#define gr_task_fullpath0(tsk) (tsk->exec_file ? \
++			gr_to_filename(tsk->exec_file->f_dentry, \
++			tsk->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
++
++#define gr_parent_task_fullpath0(tsk) (tsk->parent->exec_file ? \
++			gr_to_filename1(tsk->parent->exec_file->f_dentry, \
++			tsk->parent->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
++
++#define proc_is_chrooted(tsk_a)  ((tsk_a->pid > 1) && \
++			  ((tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev != \
++			  child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) || \
++			  (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino != \
++			  child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino)))
++
++#define have_same_root(tsk_a,tsk_b) ((tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev == \
++			  tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) && \
++			  (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino == \
++			  tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino))
++
++#define DEFAULTSECARGS gr_task_fullpath(current), current->comm, \
++		       current->pid, current->uid, \
++		       current->euid, current->gid, current->egid, \
++		       gr_parent_task_fullpath(current), \
++		       current->parent->comm, current->parent->pid, \
++		       current->parent->uid, current->parent->euid, \
++		       current->parent->gid, current->parent->egid
++
++#define GR_CHROOT_CAPS ( \
++	CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) | \
++	CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_ADMIN) | \
++	CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_MODULE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) | \
++	CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_PACCT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) | \
++	CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_BOOT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TIME) | \
++	CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_RAW) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG) | \
++	CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_IPC_OWNER))
++
++#define security_alert_good(normal_msg,args...) \
++({ \
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock); \
++	read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
++	spin_lock(&grsec_alert_lock); \
++	\
++	if (!grsec_alert_wtime || get_seconds() - grsec_alert_wtime > CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME) { \
++	    grsec_alert_wtime = get_seconds(); grsec_alert_fyet = 0; \
++	    if (current->curr_ip && gr_acl_is_enabled()) \
++		printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: (%.64s:%c:%.950s) " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip), current->role->rolename, gr_roletype_to_char(), current->acl->filename , ## args); \
++	    else if (current->curr_ip) \
++		printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \
++	    else if (gr_acl_is_enabled()) \
++		printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: (%.64s:%c:%.950s) " normal_msg "\n", current->role->rolename, gr_roletype_to_char(), current->acl->filename , ## args); \
++	    else \
++	    	printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \
++	} else if((get_seconds() - grsec_alert_wtime < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME) && (grsec_alert_fyet < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST)) { \
++	    grsec_alert_fyet++; \
++	    if (current->curr_ip && gr_acl_is_enabled()) \
++		printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: (%.64s:%c:%.950s) " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip), current->role->rolename, gr_roletype_to_char(), current->acl->filename , ## args); \
++	    else if (current->curr_ip) \
++		printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \
++	    else if (gr_acl_is_enabled()) \
++		printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: (%.64s:%c:%.950s) " normal_msg "\n", current->role->rolename, gr_roletype_to_char(), current->acl->filename , ## args); \
++	    else \
++	    	printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \
++	} else if (grsec_alert_fyet == CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST) { \
++	    grsec_alert_wtime = get_seconds(); grsec_alert_fyet++; \
++	    printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: more alerts, logging disabled for " \
++		    "%d seconds\n", CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME); \
++	} \
++	\
++	spin_unlock(&grsec_alert_lock); \
++	read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); \
++})
++
++#define security_alert(normal_msg,args...) \
++({ \
++	security_alert_good(normal_msg,args); \
++	gr_handle_alertkill(); \
++})
++
++#define security_audit(normal_msg,args...) \
++({ \
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock); \
++	read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
++	spin_lock(&grsec_audit_lock); \
++	if (current->curr_ip && gr_acl_is_enabled()) \
++	    printk(KERN_INFO "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: (%.64s:%c:%.950s) " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip), current->role->rolename, gr_roletype_to_char(), current->acl->filename , ## args); \
++	else if (current->curr_ip) \
++	    printk(KERN_INFO "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \
++	else if (gr_acl_is_enabled()) \
++	    printk(KERN_INFO "grsec: (%.64s:%c:%.950s) " normal_msg "\n", current->role->rolename, gr_roletype_to_char(), current->acl->filename , ## args); \
++	else \
++	    printk(KERN_INFO "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \
++	spin_unlock(&grsec_audit_lock); \
++	read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); \
++})
++
++#define security_learn(normal_msg,args...) \
++({ \
++	preempt_disable(); \
++	gr_add_learn_entry(normal_msg "\n", ## args); \
++	preempt_enable(); \
++})
++
++#endif
++
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grmsg.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grmsg.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grmsg.h	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grmsg.h	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
++#define DEFAULTSECMSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d"
++#define GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d run time:[%ud %uh %um %us] cpu time:[%ud %uh %um %us] %s with exit code %ld, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d"
++#define GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s(%.16s:%d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_IOPERM_MSG "denied use of ioperm() by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_IOPL_MSG "denied use of iopl() by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG "denied attach of shared memory of UID %u, PID %d, ID %u by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG "denied connect to abstract AF_UNIX socket outside of chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attach of shared memory outside of chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_KMEM_MSG "attempted write to /dev/kmem by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG "attempted open of /dev/port by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG "attempted write of /dev/mem by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG "attempted mmap write of /dev/[k]mem by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SYMLINK_MSG "not following symlink %.950s owned by %d.%d by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%lu\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%u.%u.%u.%u"
++#define GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG "%s access to hidden file %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG "%s open of %.950s for%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG "%s create of %.950s for%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_FIFO_MSG "denied writing FIFO %.950s of %d.%d by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG "refused attempt to mknod %.950s from chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG "%s mknod of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG "%s connect to the unix domain socket %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG "%s mkdir of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG "%s rmdir of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG "%s unlink of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG "%s symlink from %.480s to %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_HARDLINK_MSG "denied hardlink of %.930s (owned by %d.%d) to %.30s for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_LINK_ACL_MSG "%s link of %.480s to %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG "successful inherit of %.480s's ACL for %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG "%s rename of %.480s to %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_NPROC_MSG "attempt to overstep process limit by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG "%s execution of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG "denied untrusted exec of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " Banning uid %u from login for %lu seconds"
++#define GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " Banning execution for %lu seconds"
++#define GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to mount %.30s as %.930s from chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to pivot_root from chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG "%s truncate of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG "%s access time change of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG "%s access of %.950s for%s%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to double chroot to %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s fchmod of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to chmod +s %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s chmod of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG "attempted fchdir outside of chroot to %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG "%s chown of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG "denied load of writable library %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_INITF_ACL_MSG "init_variables() failed %s"
++#define GR_DISABLED_ACL_MSG "Error loading %s, trying to run kernel with acls disabled. To disable acls at startup use <kernel image name> gracl=off from your boot loader"
++#define GR_DEV_ACL_MSG "/dev/grsec: being fed garbage %d bytes sent %d required"
++#define GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth success for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG "ignoring shutdown for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth success for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG "ignoring segvmod for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG "Loaded %s"
++#define GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG "Unable to load %s for " DEFAULTSECMSG " RBAC system may already be enabled."
++#define GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG "Ignoring reload request for disabled RBAC system"
++#define GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG "Reloaded %s"
++#define GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG "Failed reload of %s for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG "Ignoring change to special role for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful change to special role %s (id %d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG "special role %s (id %d) exited by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role %s failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNSPROLEI_ACL_MSG "Ignoring unauth of special role for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNSPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful unauth of special role %s (id %d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNSPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role unauth of %s failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG "Invalid mode %d by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MAXPW_ACL_MSG "Maximum pw attempts reached (%d), locking password authentication"
++#define GR_MAXROLEPW_ACL_MSG "Maximum pw attempts reached (%d) trying to auth to special role %s, locking auth for role of " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG "attempted priority change of process (%.16s:%d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CAPSET_CHROOT_MSG "denied capset of (%.16s:%d) within chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_FAILFORK_MSG "failed fork with errno %d by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG "attempted priority change by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to " DEFAULTSECMSG " by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SIG_ACL_MSG "Attempted send of signal %d to protected task " DEFAULTSECMSG " by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SYSCTL_MSG "attempt to modify grsecurity sysctl value : %.32s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG "%s sysctl of %.950s for%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_TIME_MSG "time set by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_DEFACL_MSG "Fatal: Unable to find ACL for (%.16s:%d)"
++#define GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG "%s executable mmap of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG "%s executable mprotect of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SOCK_MSG "attempted socket(%.16s,%.16s,%.16s) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SOCK2_MSG "attempted socket(%d,%.16s,%.16s) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_BIND_MSG "attempted bind() by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CONNECT_MSG "attempted connect by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_BIND_ACL_MSG "attempted bind to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG "attempted connect to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_IP_LEARN_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%u.%u.%u.%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u.%u.%u.%u"
++#define GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG "exec of %.980s within chroot by process " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CAP_ACL_MSG "use of %s denied for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_USRCHANGE_ACL_MSG "change to uid %d denied for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_GRPCHANGE_ACL_MSG "change to gid %d denied for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "remount of %.30s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "unmount of %.30s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "mount %.30s to %.64s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG "chdir to %.980s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG "exec of %.930s (%.63s) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG "message queue created by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG "message queue of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore created by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of size %d created by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_RESOURCE_MSG "attempted resource overstep by requesting %lu for %.16s against limit %lu by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_TEXTREL_AUDIT_MSG "text relocation in %s, VMA:0x%08lx 0x%08lx by " DEFAULTSECMSG
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grsecurity.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grsecurity.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grsecurity.h	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/grsecurity.h	2004-06-25 17:26:18.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
++#ifndef GR_SECURITY_H
++#define GR_SECURITY_H
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
++
++extern int gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs);
++extern int gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs);
++
++extern void gr_add_to_task_ip_table(struct task_struct *p);
++extern void gr_del_task_from_ip_table(struct task_struct *p);
++
++extern int gr_pid_is_chrooted(struct task_struct *p);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_nice(void);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_capset(struct task_struct *target);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(struct task_struct *p,
++					const int niceval);
++extern int gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				   const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern void gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task);
++extern void gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				  const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				  const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				  const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++				  const char *dev_name);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid);
++
++extern int gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode);
++extern int gr_handle_nproc(void);
++
++extern void gr_handle_ioperm(void);
++extern void gr_handle_iopl(void);
++
++extern int gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file);
++
++extern int gr_random_pid(void);
++
++extern void gr_log_forkfail(const int retval);
++extern void gr_log_timechange(void);
++extern void gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t);
++extern void gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			 const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern void gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			       const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern void gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, char **argv);
++extern void gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval);
++extern void gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval);
++extern void gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval);
++extern void gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg);
++extern void gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
++extern void gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg);
++extern void gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
++extern void gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size);
++extern void gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
++extern void gr_log_textrel(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
++
++extern int gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent,
++				 const struct inode *inode,
++				 const struct dentry *dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern int gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			  const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++			  const struct dentry *dir, const int flag,
++			  const int acc_mode);
++extern int gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			      const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++			      struct inode *inode,
++			      const int mode, const char *to);
++
++extern int gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap);
++extern int gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap);
++extern void gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task, const int limit,
++			      const unsigned long wanted, const int gt);
++extern void gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk);
++extern void gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig);
++extern int gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig);
++extern int gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid);
++extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task);
++extern int gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file,
++			      const unsigned long prot);
++extern int gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file,
++				  const unsigned long prot);
++extern int gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				    const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				  const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				  const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern int gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request);
++extern int gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task);
++extern int gr_handle_mmap(const struct file *filp, const unsigned long prot);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				  const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern int gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp);
++extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void);
++extern void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task);
++extern void gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid,
++			      const gid_t gid);
++extern int gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			      const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				       const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				 const struct dentry *p_dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *p_mnt, const int fmode,
++				 const int imode);
++extern void gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			     const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++				 const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++				 const int mode);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++				 const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern void gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				  const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++				   const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++				   const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++				   const char *from);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++				const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++				const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++				const struct dentry *old_dentry,
++				const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *to);
++extern int gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry,
++				struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++				const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++				struct dentry *old_dentry,
++				struct inode *old_parent_inode,
++				struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname);
++extern void gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
++				struct dentry *old_dentry,
++				struct dentry *new_dentry,
++				struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace);
++extern __u32 gr_check_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++			   const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++			   const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++			   const struct dentry *old_dentry,
++			   const struct vfsmount *old_mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				   const struct vfsmount *mnt, const ino_t ino);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern void gr_acl_handle_exit(void);
++extern void gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code);
++extern int gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task);
++extern __u32 gr_cap_rtnetlink(void);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++extern void gr_handle_mem_write(void);
++extern void gr_handle_kmem_write(void);
++extern void gr_handle_open_port(void);
++extern int gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset,
++			      struct vm_area_struct *vma);
++
++extern __u16 ip_randomid(void);
++extern __u32 ip_randomisn(void);
++extern unsigned long get_random_long(void);
++
++extern int grsec_enable_dmesg;
++extern int grsec_enable_randid;
++extern int grsec_enable_randisn;
++extern int grsec_enable_randsrc;
++extern int grsec_enable_randrpc;
++#endif
++
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/mm.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/mm.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/mm.h	2004-06-16 01:18:56.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/mm.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+ #include <asm/atomic.h>
++#include <asm/mman.h>
+ 
+ #ifndef MM_VM_SIZE
+ #define MM_VM_SIZE(mm)	TASK_SIZE
+@@ -100,6 +101,11 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+ 	struct mempolicy *vm_policy;	/* NUMA policy for the VMA */
+ #endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	unsigned long vm_mirror;	/* PaX: mirror distance */
++#endif
++
+ };
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -135,6 +141,18 @@
+ #define VM_HUGETLB	0x00400000	/* Huge TLB Page VM */
+ #define VM_NONLINEAR	0x00800000	/* Is non-linear (remap_file_pages) */
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++#define VM_MIRROR	0x01000000	/* vma is mirroring another */
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++#define VM_MAYNOTWRITE	0x02000000	/* vma cannot be granted VM_WRITE any more */
++#endif
++
++#ifdef __VM_STACK_FLAGS
++#define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS (0x00000033 | __VM_STACK_FLAGS)
++#endif
++
+ #ifndef VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS		/* arch can override this */
+ #define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
+ #endif
+@@ -636,6 +654,10 @@
+ 	unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
+ 	unsigned long flag, unsigned long pgoff);
+ 
++extern unsigned long __do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
++	unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
++	unsigned long flag, unsigned long pgoff);
++
+ static inline unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
+ 	unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
+ 	unsigned long flag, unsigned long offset)
+@@ -725,5 +747,11 @@
+ int in_gate_area(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long addr);
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
++extern void track_exec_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot);
++#else
++static inline void track_exec_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot) {}
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ #endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/mman.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/mman.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/mman.h	2004-06-16 01:18:58.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/mman.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@
+ calc_vm_flag_bits(unsigned long flags)
+ {
+ 	return _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_GROWSDOWN,  VM_GROWSDOWN ) |
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	       _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_MIRROR, VM_MIRROR) |
++#endif
++
+ 	       _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_DENYWRITE,  VM_DENYWRITE ) |
+ 	       _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_EXECUTABLE, VM_EXECUTABLE) |
+ 	       _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_LOCKED,     VM_LOCKED    );
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/proc_fs.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/proc_fs.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/proc_fs.h	2004-06-16 01:20:26.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/proc_fs.h	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@
+ 
+ #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+ 
+-#if !defined(CONFIG_PROC_FS)
++#if !defined(CONFIG_PROC_FS) || !defined(CONFIG_PROC_KCORE)
+ static inline void kclist_add(struct kcore_list *new, void *addr, size_t size)
+ {
+ }
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/random.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/random.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/random.h	2004-06-16 01:20:26.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/random.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@
+ 
+ extern __u32 secure_ipv6_id(__u32 *daddr);
+ 
++extern unsigned long pax_get_random_long(void);
++
+ #ifndef MODULE
+ extern struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
+ #endif
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/sched.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/sched.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/sched.h	2004-06-16 01:18:57.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/sched.h	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include <linux/percpu.h>
+ 
+ struct exec_domain;
++struct linux_binprm;
+ 
+ /*
+  * cloning flags:
+@@ -234,6 +235,21 @@
+ 	struct kioctx		*ioctx_list;
+ 
+ 	struct kioctx		default_kioctx;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DLRESOLVE
++	unsigned long call_dl_resolve;
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
++	unsigned long call_syscall;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++	unsigned long delta_mmap;		/* randomized offset */
++	unsigned long delta_exec;		/* randomized offset */
++	unsigned long delta_stack;		/* randomized offset */
++#endif
++
+ };
+ 
+ extern int mmlist_nr;
+@@ -513,6 +529,22 @@
+   	struct mempolicy *mempolicy;
+   	short il_next;		/* could be shared with used_math */
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	/* grsecurity */
++	struct acl_subject_label *acl;
++	struct acl_role_label *role;
++	struct file *exec_file;
++	u32 curr_ip;
++	u32 gr_saddr;
++	u32 gr_daddr;
++	u16 gr_sport;
++	u16 gr_dport;
++	u16 acl_role_id;
++	u8 acl_sp_role:1;
++	u8 used_accept:1;
++	u8 is_writable:1;
++#endif
+ };
+ 
+ static inline pid_t process_group(struct task_struct *tsk)
+@@ -550,6 +582,29 @@
+ #define PF_LESS_THROTTLE 0x00100000	/* Throttle me less: I clean memory */
+ #define PF_SYNCWRITE	0x00200000	/* I am doing a sync write */
+ 
++#define PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC		0x01000000	/* Paging based non-executable pages */
++#define PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP		0x02000000	/* Emulate trampolines */
++#define PF_PAX_MPROTECT		0x04000000	/* Restrict mprotect() */
++#define PF_PAX_RANDMMAP		0x08000000	/* Randomize mmap() base */
++#define PF_PAX_RANDEXEC		0x10000000	/* Randomize ET_EXEC base */
++#define PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC		0x20000000	/* Segmentation based non-executable pages */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK)
++extern unsigned int pax_aslr;
++#endif
++
++extern unsigned int pax_softmode;
++#endif
++
++extern int pax_check_flags(unsigned long *);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++extern void pax_set_flags(struct linux_binprm * bprm);
++#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS)
++extern void (*pax_set_flags_func)(struct linux_binprm * bprm);
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ #define SCHED_LOAD_SCALE	128UL	/* increase resolution of load */
+ 
+@@ -809,14 +864,29 @@
+ 		: on_sig_stack(sp) ? SS_ONSTACK : 0);
+ }
+ 
++extern int gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap);
++extern int gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap);
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ /* code is in security.c */
+ extern int capable(int cap);
++static inline int capable_nolog(int cap)
++{
++	return capable(cap);
++}
+ #else
+ static inline int capable(int cap)
+ {
+-	if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap)) {
++	if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap) && gr_task_is_capable(current, cap)) {
++		current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
++		return 1;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static inline int capable_nolog(int cap)
++{
++	if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap) && gr_is_capable_nolog(cap)) {
+ 		current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/shm.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/shm.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/shm.h	2004-06-16 01:19:43.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/shm.h	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -84,6 +84,10 @@
+ 	time_t			shm_ctim;
+ 	pid_t			shm_cprid;
+ 	pid_t			shm_lprid;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	time_t			shm_createtime;
++	pid_t			shm_lapid;
++#endif
+ };
+ 
+ /* shm_mode upper byte flags */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/linux/sysctl.h linux-2.6.7/include/linux/sysctl.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/sysctl.h	2004-06-16 01:19:35.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/linux/sysctl.h	2004-06-25 17:47:51.000000000 -0400
+@@ -133,7 +133,20 @@
+ 	KERN_NGROUPS_MAX=63,	/* int: NGROUPS_MAX */
+ 	KERN_SPARC_SCONS_PWROFF=64, /* int: serial console power-off halt */
+ 	KERN_HZ_TIMER=65,	/* int: hz timer on or off */
++	KERN_GRSECURITY=68,	/* grsecurity */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++	KERN_PAX=69,		/* PaX control */
++#endif
++
++};
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++enum {
++	PAX_ASLR=1,		/* PaX: disable/enable all randomization features */
++	PAX_SOFTMODE=2		/* PaX: disable/enable soft mode */
+ };
++#endif
+ 
+ 
+ /* CTL_VM names: */
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/include/net/ip.h linux-2.6.7/include/net/ip.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/net/ip.h	2004-06-16 01:19:42.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/include/net/ip.h	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@
+ #include <net/route.h>
+ #include <net/arp.h>
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++extern int grsec_enable_randid;
++extern __u16 ip_randomid(void);
++#endif
++
+ #ifndef _SNMP_H
+ #include <net/snmp.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -188,6 +193,13 @@
+ 
+ static inline void ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph, struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++	if (grsec_enable_randid)
++		iph->id = htons(ip_randomid());
++	else
++#endif
++
+ 	if (iph->frag_off & htons(IP_DF)) {
+ 		/* This is only to work around buggy Windows95/2000
+ 		 * VJ compression implementations.  If the ID field
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/init/Kconfig linux-2.6.7/init/Kconfig
+--- linux-2.6.7/init/Kconfig	2004-06-16 01:19:52.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/init/Kconfig	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -230,6 +230,7 @@
+ config KALLSYMS
+ 	 bool "Load all symbols for debugging/kksymoops" if EMBEDDED
+ 	 default y
++	 depends on !GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
+ 	 help
+ 	   Say Y here to let the kernel print out symbolic crash information and
+ 	   symbolic stack backtraces. This increases the size of the kernel
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/init/do_mounts.c linux-2.6.7/init/do_mounts.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/init/do_mounts.c	2004-06-16 01:19:13.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/init/do_mounts.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@
+ 			case -EINVAL:
+ 				continue;
+ 		}
++
+ 	        /*
+ 		 * Allow the user to distinguish between failed sys_open
+ 		 * and bad superblock on root device.
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/init/main.c linux-2.6.7/init/main.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/init/main.c	2004-06-16 01:19:01.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/init/main.c	2004-06-25 17:33:13.000000000 -0400
+@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
+ extern void populate_rootfs(void);
+ extern void driver_init(void);
+ extern void prepare_namespace(void);
++extern void grsecurity_init(void);
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TC
+ extern void tc_init(void);
+@@ -636,6 +637,7 @@
+ 		execute_command = "/init";
+ 	else
+ 		prepare_namespace();
++	grsecurity_init();
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Ok, we have completed the initial bootup, and
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/ipc/msg.c linux-2.6.7/ipc/msg.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/ipc/msg.c	2004-06-16 01:18:38.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/ipc/msg.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ #include <linux/list.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/current.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include "util.h"
+@@ -226,6 +227,9 @@
+ 		msg_unlock(msq);
+ 	}
+ 	up(&msg_ids.sem);
++
++	gr_log_msgget(ret, msgflg);
++
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -475,6 +479,8 @@
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 	case IPC_RMID:
++		gr_log_msgrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid);
++
+ 		freeque (msq, msqid); 
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/ipc/sem.c linux-2.6.7/ipc/sem.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/ipc/sem.c	2004-06-16 01:19:13.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/ipc/sem.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
+ #include <linux/time.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include "util.h"
+ 
+@@ -238,6 +239,9 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	up(&sem_ids.sem);
++
++	gr_log_semget(err, semflg);
++
+ 	return err;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -804,6 +808,8 @@
+ 
+ 	switch(cmd){
+ 	case IPC_RMID:
++		gr_log_semrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid);
++
+ 		freeary(sma, semid);
+ 		err = 0;
+ 		break;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/ipc/shm.c linux-2.6.7/ipc/shm.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/ipc/shm.c	2004-06-16 01:19:23.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/ipc/shm.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+ #include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ 
+ #include "util.h"
+@@ -50,6 +51,14 @@
+ static int sysvipc_shm_read_proc(char *buffer, char **start, off_t offset, int length, int *eof, void *data);
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++extern int gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
++			   const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid,
++			   const int shmid);
++extern int gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
++			   const time_t shm_createtime);
++#endif
++
+ size_t	shm_ctlmax = SHMMAX;
+ size_t 	shm_ctlall = SHMALL;
+ int 	shm_ctlmni = SHMMNI;
+@@ -217,6 +226,9 @@
+ 	shp->shm_lprid = 0;
+ 	shp->shm_atim = shp->shm_dtim = 0;
+ 	shp->shm_ctim = get_seconds();
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	shp->shm_createtime = get_seconds();
++#endif
+ 	shp->shm_segsz = size;
+ 	shp->shm_nattch = 0;
+ 	shp->id = shm_buildid(id,shp->shm_perm.seq);
+@@ -271,6 +283,8 @@
+ 	}
+ 	up(&shm_ids.sem);
+ 
++	gr_log_shmget(err, shmflg, size);
++
+ 	return err;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -569,6 +583,8 @@
+ 		if (err)
+ 			goto out_unlock_up;
+ 
++		gr_log_shmrm(shp->shm_perm.uid, shp->shm_perm.cuid);
++
+ 		if (shp->shm_nattch){
+ 			shp->shm_flags |= SHM_DEST;
+ 			/* Do not find it any more */
+@@ -707,9 +723,27 @@
+ 		return err;
+ 	}
+ 		
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	if (!gr_handle_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime,
++			     shp->shm_perm.cuid, shmid)) {
++		shm_unlock(shp);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++
++	if (!gr_chroot_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime)) {
++		shm_unlock(shp);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	file = shp->shm_file;
+ 	size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
+ 	shp->shm_nattch++;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	shp->shm_lapid = current->pid;
++#endif
++
+ 	shm_unlock(shp);
+ 
+ 	down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/kernel/capability.c linux-2.6.7/kernel/capability.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/kernel/capability.c	2004-06-16 01:19:42.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/kernel/capability.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mm.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ 
+ unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
+@@ -168,6 +169,11 @@
+      } else
+                target = current;
+ 
++     if (gr_handle_chroot_capset(target)) {
++		ret = -ESRCH;
++		goto out;
++     }
++
+      ret = -EPERM;
+ 
+      if (security_capset_check(target, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted))
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/kernel/configs.c linux-2.6.7/kernel/configs.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/kernel/configs.c	2004-06-16 01:19:12.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/kernel/configs.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -78,8 +78,16 @@
+ 	struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
+ 
+ 	/* create the current config file */
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR, &proc_root);
++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, &proc_root);
++#endif
++#else
+ 	entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUGO,
+ 				  &proc_root);
++#endif
+ 	if (!entry)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/kernel/exit.c linux-2.6.7/kernel/exit.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/kernel/exit.c	2004-06-16 01:19:52.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/kernel/exit.c	2004-06-25 17:30:50.000000000 -0400
+@@ -23,6 +23,11 @@
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
+ #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+ #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++extern rwlock_t grsec_exec_file_lock;
++#endif
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/unistd.h>
+@@ -233,6 +238,15 @@
+ {
+ 	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	write_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	if (current->exec_file) {
++		fput(current->exec_file);
++		current->exec_file = NULL;
++	}
++	write_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++#endif
++
+ 	ptrace_unlink(current);
+ 	/* Reparent to init */
+ 	REMOVE_LINKS(current);
+@@ -240,6 +254,8 @@
+ 	current->real_parent = child_reaper;
+ 	SET_LINKS(current);
+ 
++	gr_set_kernel_label(current);
++
+ 	/* Set the exit signal to SIGCHLD so we signal init on exit */
+ 	current->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
+ 
+@@ -334,6 +350,17 @@
+ 	vsnprintf(current->comm, sizeof(current->comm), name, args);
+ 	va_end(args);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	write_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	if (current->exec_file) {
++		fput(current->exec_file);
++		current->exec_file = NULL;
++	}
++	write_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++#endif
++
++	gr_set_kernel_label(current);
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If we were started as result of loading a module, close all of the
+ 	 * user space pages.  We don't need them, and if we didn't close them
+@@ -793,6 +820,11 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	acct_process(code);
++
++	gr_acl_handle_psacct(tsk, code);
++	gr_acl_handle_exit();
++	gr_del_task_from_ip_table(tsk);
++
+ 	__exit_mm(tsk);
+ 
+ 	exit_sem(tsk);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/kernel/fork.c linux-2.6.7/kernel/fork.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/kernel/fork.c	2004-06-16 01:18:57.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/kernel/fork.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
+ #include <linux/audit.h>
+ #include <linux/rmap.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+@@ -279,7 +280,7 @@
+ 	mm->locked_vm = 0;
+ 	mm->mmap = NULL;
+ 	mm->mmap_cache = NULL;
+-	mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++	mm->free_area_cache = oldmm->free_area_cache;
+ 	mm->map_count = 0;
+ 	mm->rss = 0;
+ 	cpus_clear(mm->cpu_vm_mask);
+@@ -902,6 +903,9 @@
+ 		goto fork_out;
+ 
+ 	retval = -EAGAIN;
++
++	gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&p->user->processes), 0);
++
+ 	if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >=
+ 			p->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) {
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
+@@ -998,6 +1002,8 @@
+ 	if (retval)
+ 		goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespace;
+ 
++	gr_copy_label(p);
++
+ 	p->set_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL;
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Clear TID on mm_release()?
+@@ -1139,6 +1145,9 @@
+ 	free_uid(p->user);
+ bad_fork_free:
+ 	free_task(p);
++
++	gr_log_forkfail(retval);
++
+ 	goto fork_out;
+ }
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/kernel/kallsyms.c linux-2.6.7/kernel/kallsyms.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/kernel/kallsyms.c	2004-06-16 01:20:19.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/kernel/kallsyms.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -313,7 +313,15 @@
+ {
+ 	struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR, NULL);
++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
++#endif
++#else
+ 	entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", 0444, NULL);
++#endif
+ 	if (entry)
+ 		entry->proc_fops = &kallsyms_operations;
+ 	return 0;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/kernel/pid.c linux-2.6.7/kernel/pid.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/kernel/pid.c	2004-06-16 01:19:36.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/kernel/pid.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/bootmem.h>
+ #include <linux/hash.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #define pid_hashfn(nr) hash_long((unsigned long)nr, pidhash_shift)
+ static struct list_head *pid_hash[PIDTYPE_MAX];
+@@ -99,10 +100,12 @@
+ 
+ int alloc_pidmap(void)
+ {
+-	int pid, offset, max_steps = PIDMAP_ENTRIES + 1;
++	int pid = 0, offset, max_steps = PIDMAP_ENTRIES + 1;
+ 	pidmap_t *map;
+ 
+-	pid = last_pid + 1;
++	pid = gr_random_pid();
++	if (!pid)
++		pid = last_pid + 1;
+ 	if (pid >= pid_max)
+ 		pid = RESERVED_PIDS;
+ 
+@@ -225,10 +228,16 @@
+ task_t *find_task_by_pid(int nr)
+ {
+ 	struct pid *pid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, nr);
++	struct task_struct *task = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (!pid)
+ 		return NULL;
+-	return pid_task(pid->task_list.next, PIDTYPE_PID);
++	task = pid_task(pid->task_list.next, PIDTYPE_PID);
++
++	if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(task))
++		return NULL;
++
++	return task;
+ }
+ 
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(find_task_by_pid);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/kernel/printk.c linux-2.6.7/kernel/printk.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/kernel/printk.c	2004-06-16 01:20:26.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/kernel/printk.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
+ #include <linux/smp.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/bootmem.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ 
+@@ -249,6 +250,11 @@
+ 	char c;
+ 	int error = 0;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && grsec_enable_dmesg)
++		return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
+ 	error = security_syslog(type);
+ 	if (error)
+ 		return error;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/kernel/resource.c linux-2.6.7/kernel/resource.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/kernel/resource.c	2004-06-16 01:19:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/kernel/resource.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -134,10 +134,27 @@
+ {
+ 	struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", S_IRUSR, NULL);
++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
++#endif
++#else
+ 	entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", 0, NULL);
++#endif
+ 	if (entry)
+ 		entry->proc_fops = &proc_ioports_operations;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", S_IRUSR, NULL);
++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
++#endif
++#else
+ 	entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", 0, NULL);
++#endif
+ 	if (entry)
+ 		entry->proc_fops = &proc_iomem_operations;
+ 	return 0;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/kernel/sched.c linux-2.6.7/kernel/sched.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/kernel/sched.c	2004-06-16 01:19:51.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/kernel/sched.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ #include <linux/cpu.h>
+ #include <linux/percpu.h>
+ #include <linux/kthread.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/unistd.h>
+ 
+@@ -2630,6 +2631,8 @@
+ 			return -EPERM;
+ 		if (increment < -40)
+ 			increment = -40;
++		if (gr_handle_chroot_nice())
++			return -EPERM;
+ 	}
+ 	if (increment > 40)
+ 		increment = 40;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/kernel/signal.c linux-2.6.7/kernel/signal.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/kernel/signal.c	2004-06-16 01:19:13.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/kernel/signal.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+ #include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/param.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/unistd.h>
+@@ -770,11 +771,13 @@
+ 	(((sig) < SIGRTMIN) && sigismember(&(sigptr)->signal, (sig)))
+ 
+ 
+-static int
++int
+ specific_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 
++	gr_log_signal(sig, t);
++
+ 	if (!irqs_disabled())
+ 		BUG();
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+@@ -825,6 +828,8 @@
+ 	ret = specific_send_sig_info(sig, info, t);
+ 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
+ 
++	gr_handle_crash(t, sig);
++
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1083,9 +1088,14 @@
+ 		int err;
+ 
+ 		found = 1;
+-		err = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
+-		if (!retval)
+-			retval = err;
++
++		if (gr_handle_signal(p, sig))
++			retval = -EPERM;
++		else {
++			err = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
++			if (!retval)
++				retval = err;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	return found ? retval : -ESRCH;
+ }
+@@ -1143,8 +1153,12 @@
+ 	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ 	p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
+ 	error = -ESRCH;
+-	if (p)
+-		error = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
++	if (p) {
++		if (gr_handle_signal(p, sig))
++			error = -EPERM;
++		else
++			error = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
++	}
+ 	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ 	return error;
+ }
+@@ -1168,10 +1182,14 @@
+ 		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ 		for_each_process(p) {
+ 			if (p->pid > 1 && p->tgid != current->tgid) {
+-				int err = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
+-				++count;
+-				if (err != -EPERM)
+-					retval = err;
++				if (gr_handle_signal(p, sig))
++					retval = -EPERM;
++				else { 
++					int err = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
++					++count;
++					if (err != -EPERM)
++						retval = err;
++				}
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/kernel/sys.c linux-2.6.7/kernel/sys.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/kernel/sys.c	2004-06-16 01:18:58.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/kernel/sys.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/dcookies.h>
+ #include <linux/suspend.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/io.h>
+@@ -294,6 +295,12 @@
+ 		error = -EACCES;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++
++	if (gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(p, niceval)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
+ 	if (no_nice) {
+ 		error = no_nice;
+@@ -598,6 +605,9 @@
+ 	if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
+ 	    (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid))
+ 		current->sgid = new_egid;
++
++	gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, new_rgid);
++
+ 	current->fsgid = new_egid;
+ 	current->egid = new_egid;
+ 	current->gid = new_rgid;
+@@ -625,6 +635,9 @@
+ 			current->mm->dumpable=0;
+ 			wmb();
+ 		}
++
++		gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, gid);
++
+ 		current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid;
+ 	}
+ 	else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid))
+@@ -663,6 +676,9 @@
+ 		current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ 		wmb();
+ 	}
++
++	gr_set_role_label(current, new_ruid, current->gid);
++
+ 	current->uid = new_ruid;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+@@ -763,6 +779,9 @@
+ 	} else if ((uid != current->uid) && (uid != new_suid))
+ 		return -EPERM;
+ 
++	if (gr_check_crash_uid(uid))
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	if (old_euid != uid)
+ 	{
+ 		current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+@@ -862,8 +881,10 @@
+ 		current->egid = egid;
+ 	}
+ 	current->fsgid = current->egid;
+-	if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
++	if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
++		gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, rgid);
+ 		current->gid = rgid;
++	}
+ 	if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
+ 		current->sgid = sgid;
+ 	return 0;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/kernel/sysctl.c linux-2.6.7/kernel/sysctl.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/kernel/sysctl.c	2004-06-16 01:18:58.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/kernel/sysctl.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -46,6 +46,14 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++extern __u32 gr_handle_sysctl(const ctl_table *table, const void *oldval,
++			      const void *newval);
++extern int gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name,
++				const int op);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op);
+ 
+ /* External variables not in a header file. */
+ extern int panic_timeout;
+@@ -142,6 +150,32 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_UNIX98_PTYS
+ extern ctl_table pty_table[];
+ #endif
++extern ctl_table grsecurity_table[];
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++static ctl_table pax_table[] = {
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK)
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= PAX_ASLR,
++		.procname	= "aslr",
++		.data		= &pax_aslr,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(unsigned int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= PAX_SOFTMODE,
++		.procname	= "softmode",
++		.data		= &pax_softmode,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(unsigned int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	}
++};
++#endif
+ 
+ /* /proc declarations: */
+ 
+@@ -636,6 +670,14 @@
+ 		.mode		= 0444,
+ 		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
+ 	},
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= KERN_GRSECURITY,
++		.procname	= "grsecurity",
++		.mode		= 0500,
++		.child		= grsecurity_table,
++	},
++#endif
+ 	{ .ctl_name = 0 }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -905,6 +947,16 @@
+ 		.mode		= 0644,
+ 		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
+ 	},
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= KERN_PAX,
++		.procname	= "pax",
++		.mode		= 0500,
++		.child		= pax_table,
++	},
++#endif
++
+ 	{ .ctl_name = 0 }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -989,6 +1041,10 @@
+ static inline int ctl_perm(ctl_table *table, int op)
+ {
+ 	int error;
++	if (table->de && gr_handle_sysctl_mod(table->de->parent->name, table->de->name, op))
++		return -EACCES;
++	if (gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(op))
++		return -EACCES;
+ 	error = security_sysctl(table, op);
+ 	if (error)
+ 		return error;
+@@ -1025,6 +1081,10 @@
+ 				table = table->child;
+ 				goto repeat;
+ 			}
++
++			if (!gr_handle_sysctl(table, oldval, newval))
++				return -EACCES;
++
+ 			error = do_sysctl_strategy(table, name, nlen,
+ 						   oldval, oldlenp,
+ 						   newval, newlen, context);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/kernel/time.c linux-2.6.7/kernel/time.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/kernel/time.c	2004-06-16 01:19:01.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/kernel/time.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ #include <linux/timex.h>
+ #include <linux/errno.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/unistd.h>
+ 
+@@ -82,6 +83,9 @@
+ 
+ 	tv.tv_nsec = 0;
+ 	do_settimeofday(&tv);
++
++	gr_log_timechange();
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -183,6 +187,8 @@
+ 			return -EFAULT;
+ 	}
+ 
++	gr_log_timechange();
++
+ 	return do_sys_settimeofday(tv ? &new_ts : NULL, tz ? &new_tz : NULL);
+ }
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/kernel/timer.c linux-2.6.7/kernel/timer.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/kernel/timer.c	2004-06-16 01:19:52.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/kernel/timer.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include <linux/time.h>
+ #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+ #include <linux/cpu.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/unistd.h>
+@@ -792,6 +793,9 @@
+ 
+ 	psecs = (p->utime += user);
+ 	psecs += (p->stime += system);
++
++	gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_CPU, psecs / HZ, 1);
++
+ 	if (psecs / HZ > p->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur) {
+ 		/* Send SIGXCPU every second.. */
+ 		if (!(psecs % HZ))
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/mm/filemap.c linux-2.6.7/mm/filemap.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/mm/filemap.c	2004-06-16 01:19:12.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/mm/filemap.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
+ #include <linux/pagevec.h>
+ #include <linux/blkdev.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
+ /*
+  * This is needed for the following functions:
+  *  - try_to_release_page
+@@ -1423,6 +1425,12 @@
+ 
+ 	if (!mapping->a_ops->readpage)
+ 		return -ENOEXEC;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
++		vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
++#endif
++
+ 	file_accessed(file);
+ 	vma->vm_ops = &generic_file_vm_ops;
+ 	return 0;
+@@ -1721,6 +1729,7 @@
+                         *pos = i_size_read(inode);
+ 
+ 		if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY) {
++			gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE,*pos, 0);
+ 			if (*pos >= limit) {
+ 				send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
+ 				return -EFBIG;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/mm/madvise.c linux-2.6.7/mm/madvise.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/mm/madvise.c	2004-06-16 01:19:02.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/mm/madvise.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -13,8 +13,42 @@
+  * We can potentially split a vm area into separate
+  * areas, each area with its own behavior.
+  */
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++static long __madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start,
++			     unsigned long end, int behavior);
++
++static long madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start,
++			     unsigned long end, int behavior)
++{
++	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++		struct vm_area_struct * vma_m, * prev_m;
++		unsigned long start_m, end_m;
++		int error;
++
++		start_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
++		vma_m = find_vma_prev(vma->vm_mm, start_m, &prev_m);
++		if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == start_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
++			start_m = start + vma->vm_mirror;
++			end_m = end + vma->vm_mirror;
++			error = __madvise_behavior(vma_m, start_m, end_m, behavior);
++			if (error)
++				return error;
++		} else {
++			printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: madvise bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start);
++			return -ENOMEM;
++		}
++	}
++
++	return __madvise_behavior(vma, start, end, behavior);
++}
++
++static long __madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start,
++			     unsigned long end, int behavior)
++#else
+ static long madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start,
+ 			     unsigned long end, int behavior)
++#endif
+ {
+ 	struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm;
+ 	int error;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/mm/memory.c linux-2.6.7/mm/memory.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/mm/memory.c	2004-06-16 01:19:22.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/mm/memory.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
+ #include <linux/rmap.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/init.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -1004,6 +1005,81 @@
+ 	update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry);
+ }
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++/* PaX: if vma is mirrored, synchronize the mirror's PTE
++ *
++ * mm->page_table_lock is held on entry and is not released on exit or inside
++ * to ensure atomic changes to the PTE states (swapout, mremap, munmap, etc)
++ */
++static void pax_mirror_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct * vma,
++	unsigned long address, pte_t *pte)
++{
++	unsigned long address_m;
++	struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL;
++	pte_t * pte_m, entry_m;
++	struct page * page_m;
++
++	address_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
++	vma_m = find_vma(mm, address_m);
++	BUG_ON(!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != address_m);
++
++	address_m = address + vma->vm_mirror;
++
++	{
++		pgd_t *pgd_m;
++		pmd_t *pmd_m;
++
++		pgd_m = pgd_offset(mm, address_m);
++		pmd_m = pmd_offset(pgd_m, address_m);
++		pte_m = pte_offset_map_nested(pmd_m, address_m);
++	}
++
++	if (pte_present(*pte_m)) {
++		flush_cache_page(vma_m, address_m);
++		flush_icache_page(vma_m, pte_page(*pte_m));
++	}
++	entry_m = ptep_get_and_clear(pte_m);
++	if (pte_present(entry_m))
++		flush_tlb_page(vma_m, address_m);
++
++	if (pte_none(entry_m)) {
++		++mm->rss;
++	} else if (pte_present(entry_m)) {
++		page_m = pte_page(entry_m);
++		if (PageReserved(page_m))
++			++mm->rss;
++		else
++			page_remove_rmap(page_m);
++		page_cache_release(page_m);
++	} else if (!pte_file(entry_m)) {
++		free_swap_and_cache(pte_to_swp_entry(entry_m));
++		++mm->rss;
++	} else {
++		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: bug in mirror_fault: %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n",
++				address, vma->vm_start, address_m, vma_m->vm_start);
++	}
++
++	page_m = pte_page(*pte);
++	entry_m = mk_pte(page_m, vma_m->vm_page_prot);
++	if (pte_write(*pte) && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
++		entry_m = pte_mkdirty(pte_mkwrite(entry_m));
++	if (!PageReserved(page_m)) {
++		page_cache_get(page_m);
++		/*
++		 * we can test PG_anon without holding page_map_lock because
++		 * we hold the page table lock and have a reference to page_m
++		 */
++		if (PageAnon(page_m))
++			page_add_anon_rmap(page_m, vma_m, address_m);
++		else
++			page_add_file_rmap(page_m);
++	}
++	ptep_establish(vma_m, address_m, pte_m, entry_m);
++	update_mmu_cache(vma_m, address_m, entry_m);
++	pte_unmap_nested(pte_m);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * This routine handles present pages, when users try to write
+  * to a shared page. It is done by copying the page to a new address
+@@ -1090,6 +1166,12 @@
+ 
+ 		/* Free the old page.. */
+ 		new_page = old_page;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++		if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
++			pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table);
++#endif
++
+ 	}
+ 	pte_unmap(page_table);
+ 	page_cache_release(new_page);
+@@ -1216,6 +1298,7 @@
+ 
+ do_expand:
+ 	limit = current->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur;
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, offset, 1);
+ 	if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && offset > limit)
+ 		goto out_sig;
+ 	if (offset > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
+@@ -1375,6 +1458,12 @@
+ 
+ 	/* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
+ 	update_mmu_cache(vma, address, pte);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
++		pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table);
++#endif
++
+ 	pte_unmap(page_table);
+ 	spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+ out:
+@@ -1429,10 +1518,16 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	set_pte(page_table, entry);
+-	pte_unmap(page_table);
+ 
+ 	/* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
+ 	update_mmu_cache(vma, addr, entry);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
++		pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, addr, page_table);
++#endif
++
++	pte_unmap(page_table);
+ 	spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+ out:
+ 	return VM_FAULT_MINOR;
+@@ -1539,6 +1634,15 @@
+ 			page_add_anon_rmap(new_page, vma, address);
+ 		} else
+ 			page_add_file_rmap(new_page);
++
++		/* no need to invalidate: a not-present page shouldn't be cached */
++		update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++		if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
++			pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table);
++#endif
++
+ 		pte_unmap(page_table);
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* One of our sibling threads was faster, back out. */
+@@ -1548,8 +1652,6 @@
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* no need to invalidate: a not-present page shouldn't be cached */
+-	update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry);
+ 	spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+ out:
+ 	return ret;
+@@ -1658,6 +1760,11 @@
+ 	pgd_t *pgd;
+ 	pmd_t *pmd;
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	unsigned long address_m = 0UL;
++	struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL;
++#endif
++
+ 	__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
+ 	pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
+ 
+@@ -1671,6 +1778,45 @@
+ 	 * and the SMP-safe atomic PTE updates.
+ 	 */
+ 	spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++		pgd_t *pgd_m;
++		pmd_t *pmd_m;
++		pte_t *pte_m;
++
++		address_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
++		vma_m = find_vma(mm, address_m);
++
++		/* PaX: sanity checks */
++		if (!vma_m) {
++			spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++			printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: fault bug, %08lx, %p, %08lx, %p\n",
++			       address, vma, address_m, vma_m);
++			return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
++		} else if (!(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ||
++			   vma_m->vm_start != address_m ||
++			   vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start)
++		{
++			spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++			printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: fault bug2, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n",
++			       address, vma->vm_start, vma_m->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma_m->vm_end);
++			return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
++		}
++
++		address_m = address + vma->vm_mirror;
++		pgd_m = pgd_offset(mm, address_m);
++		pmd_m = pmd_alloc(mm, pgd_m, address_m);
++		if (pmd_m)
++			pte_m = pte_alloc_map(mm, pmd_m, address_m);
++		if (!pmd_m || !pte_m) {
++			spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++			return VM_FAULT_OOM;
++		}
++		pte_unmap(pte_m);
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	pmd = pmd_alloc(mm, pgd, address);
+ 
+ 	if (pmd) {
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/mm/mlock.c linux-2.6.7/mm/mlock.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/mm/mlock.c	2004-06-16 01:18:57.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/mm/mlock.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -7,11 +7,43 @@
+ 
+ #include <linux/mman.h>
+ #include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++static int __mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma, 
++	unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags);
+ 
+ static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma, 
+ 	unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
+ {
++	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++		struct vm_area_struct * vma_m;
++		unsigned long start_m, end_m;
++		int error;
++
++		start_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
++		vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, start_m);
++		if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == start_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
++			start_m = start + vma->vm_mirror;
++			end_m = end + vma->vm_mirror;
++			error = __mlock_fixup(vma_m, start_m, end_m, newflags);
++			if (error)
++				return error;
++		} else {
++			printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: mlock bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start);
++			return -ENOMEM;
++		}
++	}
++	return __mlock_fixup(vma, start, end, newflags);
++}
++
++static int __mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma, 
++	unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
++#else
++static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma, 
++	unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
++#endif
++{
+ 	struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm;
+ 	int pages;
+ 	int ret = 0;
+@@ -68,6 +100,17 @@
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	if (end == start)
+ 		return 0;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++		if (end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
++			return -EINVAL;
++	} else
++#endif
++
++	if (end > TASK_SIZE)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
+ 	if (!vma || vma->vm_start > start)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+@@ -118,6 +161,7 @@
+ 	lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 
+ 	/* check against resource limits */
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked, 1);
+ 	if (locked <= lock_limit)
+ 		error = do_mlock(start, len, 1);
+ 	up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+@@ -154,6 +198,16 @@
+ 	for (vma = current->mm->mmap; vma ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
+ 		unsigned int newflags;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++			if (vma->vm_end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
++				break;
++		} else
++#endif
++
++		if (vma->vm_end > TASK_SIZE)
++			break;
++
+ 		newflags = vma->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED;
+ 		if (!(flags & MCL_CURRENT))
+ 			newflags &= ~VM_LOCKED;
+@@ -177,6 +231,7 @@
+ 	lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 
+ 	ret = -ENOMEM;
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, current->mm->total_vm, 1);
+ 	if (current->mm->total_vm <= lock_limit)
+ 		ret = do_mlockall(flags);
+ out:
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/mm/mmap.c linux-2.6.7/mm/mmap.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/mm/mmap.c	2004-06-16 01:19:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/mm/mmap.c	2004-06-25 22:44:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
+ #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
+ #include <linux/rmap.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+@@ -137,6 +138,7 @@
+ 
+ 	/* Check against rlimit.. */
+ 	rlim = current->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur;
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, brk - mm->start_data, 1);
+ 	if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY && brk - mm->start_data > rlim)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+@@ -495,7 +497,11 @@
+  * If the vma has a ->close operation then the driver probably needs to release
+  * per-vma resources, so we don't attempt to merge those.
+  */
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++#define VM_SPECIAL (VM_IO | VM_DONTCOPY | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_RESERVED | VM_MIRROR)
++#else
+ #define VM_SPECIAL (VM_IO | VM_DONTCOPY | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_RESERVED)
++#endif
+ 
+ static inline int is_mergeable_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ 			struct file *file, unsigned long vm_flags)
+@@ -729,6 +735,42 @@
+ 			unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
+ 			unsigned long flags, unsigned long pgoff)
+ {
++	unsigned long ret = -EINVAL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) &&
++	    (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || (addr && addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len)))
++		return ret;
++#endif
++
++	ret = __do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && ret < TASK_SIZE && ((flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_PRIVATE)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++	    && (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) || ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && file && !(prot & PROT_WRITE)))
++#endif
++
++	   )
++	{
++		unsigned long ret_m;
++		prot = prot & PROT_EXEC ? prot : PROT_NONE;
++		ret_m = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ret + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, 0UL, prot, flags | MAP_MIRROR | MAP_FIXED, ret);
++		if (ret_m >= TASK_SIZE) {
++			do_munmap(current->mm, ret, len);
++			ret = ret_m;
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
++	return ret;
++}
++
++unsigned long __do_mmap_pgoff(struct file * file, unsigned long addr,
++			unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
++			unsigned long flags, unsigned long pgoff)
++{
+ 	struct mm_struct * mm = current->mm;
+ 	struct vm_area_struct * vma, * prev;
+ 	struct inode *inode;
+@@ -739,6 +781,28 @@
+ 	int accountable = 1;
+ 	unsigned long charged = 0;
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL;
++
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) {
++		/* PaX: sanity checks, to be removed when proved to be stable */
++		if (file || len || ((flags & MAP_TYPE) != MAP_PRIVATE))
++			return -EINVAL;
++
++		vma_m = find_vma(mm, pgoff);
++
++		if (!vma_m || is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma_m) ||
++		    vma_m->vm_start != pgoff ||
++		    (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ||
++		    (!(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))
++			return -EINVAL;
++
++		file = vma_m->vm_file;
++		pgoff = vma_m->vm_pgoff;
++		len = vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	if (file) {
+ 		if (is_file_hugepages(file))
+ 			accountable = 0;
+@@ -770,7 +834,7 @@
+ 	/* Obtain the address to map to. we verify (or select) it and ensure
+ 	 * that it represents a valid section of the address space.
+ 	 */
+-	addr = get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
++	addr = get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags | ((prot & PROT_EXEC) ? MAP_EXECUTABLE : 0));
+ 	if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
+ 		return addr;
+ 
+@@ -781,6 +845,30 @@
+ 	vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
+ 			mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
+ 
++	if (file && (file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC))
++		vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	if (current->flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++		if (current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) {
++			if (!file || (prot & PROT_WRITE))
++				vm_flags &= ~(VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC);
++			else
++				vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
++			if (file && (flags & MAP_MIRROR) && (vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
++				vma_m->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
++#endif
++
++		}
++#endif
++
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	if (flags & MAP_LOCKED) {
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
+ 			return -EPERM;
+@@ -790,6 +878,7 @@
+ 	if (vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
+ 		unsigned long locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 		locked += len;
++		gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked, 1);
+ 		if (locked > current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)
+ 			return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+@@ -837,6 +926,11 @@
+ 			/*
+ 			 * Set pgoff according to addr for anon_vma.
+ 			 */
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++			if (!(flags & MAP_MIRROR))
++#endif
++
+ 			pgoff = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 			break;
+ 		default:
+@@ -848,6 +942,9 @@
+ 	if (error)
+ 		return error;
+ 		
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_mmap(file, prot))
++		return -EACCES;
++
+ 	/* Clear old maps */
+ 	error = -ENOMEM;
+ munmap_back:
+@@ -859,6 +956,7 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Check against address space limit. */
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len, 1);
+ 	if ((mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len
+ 	    > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+@@ -905,6 +1003,13 @@
+ 	vma->vm_start = addr;
+ 	vma->vm_end = addr + len;
+ 	vma->vm_flags = vm_flags;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if ((file || !(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) && (vm_flags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE)))
++		vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(vm_flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x0f];
++	else
++#endif
++
+ 	vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vm_flags & 0x0f];
+ 	vma->vm_pgoff = pgoff;
+ 
+@@ -929,6 +1034,14 @@
+ 			goto free_vma;
+ 	}
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) {
++		vma_m->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR;
++		vma_m->vm_mirror = vma->vm_start - vma_m->vm_start;
++		vma->vm_mirror = vma_m->vm_start - vma->vm_start;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/* We set VM_ACCOUNT in a shared mapping's vm_flags, to inform
+ 	 * shmem_zero_setup (perhaps called through /dev/zero's ->mmap)
+ 	 * that memory reservation must be checked; but that reservation
+@@ -970,6 +1083,7 @@
+ 					pgoff, flags & MAP_NONBLOCK);
+ 		down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	}
++	track_exec_limit(mm, addr, addr + len, vm_flags);
+ 	return addr;
+ 
+ unmap_and_free_vma:
+@@ -989,6 +1103,7 @@
+ }
+ 
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(do_mmap_pgoff);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(__do_mmap_pgoff);
+ 
+ /* Get an address range which is currently unmapped.
+  * For shmat() with addr=0.
+@@ -1008,11 +1123,17 @@
+ {
+ 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+-	unsigned long start_addr;
++	unsigned long start_addr, task_unmapped_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+ 
+ 	if (len > TASK_SIZE)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++		task_unmapped_base += mm->delta_mmap;
++	if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
++#endif
++
+ 	if (addr) {
+ 		addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
+ 		vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
+@@ -1030,8 +1151,8 @@
+ 			 * Start a new search - just in case we missed
+ 			 * some holes.
+ 			 */
+-			if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
+-				start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++			if (start_addr != task_unmapped_base) {
++				start_addr = addr = task_unmapped_base;
+ 				goto full_search;
+ 			}
+ 			return -ENOMEM;
+@@ -1172,6 +1293,11 @@
+ {
+ 	unsigned long grow;
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL;
++	unsigned long address_m = 0UL;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP))
+ 		return -EFAULT;
+ 
+@@ -1198,17 +1324,76 @@
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 	}
+ 	
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++		address_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
++		vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, address_m);
++		if (!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != address_m ||
++				!(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ||
++				vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start !=
++				vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start) {
++			anon_vma_unlock(vma);
++			vm_unacct_memory(grow);
++			printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: expand bug, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n",
++			       address, vma->vm_start, vma_m->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma_m->vm_end);
++			return -ENOMEM;
++		}
++
++		gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_STACK, address_m - vma_m->vm_start, 1);
++		gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (vma_m->vm_mm->total_vm + 2*grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
++		if (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
++			gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, (vma_->vm_mm->locked_vm + 2*grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
++
++		address_m = address + vma->vm_mirror;
++		if (address_m - vma_m->vm_start > current->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur ||
++				((vma_m->vm_mm->total_vm + 2*grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) >
++				current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur ||
++				((vma_m->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) &&
++				((vma_m->vm_mm->locked_vm + 2*grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) >
++				current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)) {
++			anon_vma_unlock(vma);
++			vm_unacct_memory(grow);
++			return -ENOMEM;
++		}
++	} else {
++#endif
++
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_STACK, address - vma->vm_start, 1);
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
++	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
++		gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, (vma->vm_mm->locked_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
++
+ 	if (address - vma->vm_start > current->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur ||
+ 			((vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) >
+-			current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur) {
++			current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur ||
++			((vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) &&
++			((vma->vm_mm->locked_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) >
++			current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)) {
+ 		anon_vma_unlock(vma);
+ 		vm_unacct_memory(grow);
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 	}
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	vma->vm_end = address;
+ 	vma->vm_mm->total_vm += grow;
+ 	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
+ 		vma->vm_mm->locked_vm += grow;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++		vma_m->vm_end = address_m;
++		vma_m->vm_mm->total_vm += grow;
++		if (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
++			vma_m->vm_mm->locked_vm += grow;
++		track_exec_limit(vma_m->vm_mm, vma_m->vm_start, vma_m->vm_end, vma_m->vm_flags);
++	}
++#endif
++
++	track_exec_limit(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_flags);
+ 	anon_vma_unlock(vma);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+@@ -1237,6 +1422,11 @@
+ {
+ 	unsigned long grow;
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL;
++	unsigned long address_m = 0UL;
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated
+ 	 * so that the anon_vma locking is not a noop.
+@@ -1258,19 +1448,80 @@
+ 		anon_vma_unlock(vma);
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 	}
+-	
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++		address_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
++		vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, address_m);
++		if (!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != address_m ||
++				!(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ||
++				vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start !=
++				vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start ||
++				vma->anon_vma != vma_m->anon_vma) {
++			anon_vma_unlock(vma);
++			vm_unacct_memory(grow);
++			printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: expand bug, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n",
++			       address, vma->vm_start, vma_m->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma_m->vm_end);
++			return -ENOMEM;
++		}
++
++		gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_STACK, vma_m->vm_end - address_m, 1);
++		gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (vma_m->vm_mm->total_vm + 2*grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
++		if (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
++			gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, (vma_m->vm_mm->locked_vm + 2*grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
++
++		address_m = address + vma->vm_mirror;
++		if (vma_m->vm_end - address_m > current->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur ||
++				((vma_m->vm_mm->total_vm + 2*grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) >
++				current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur ||
++				((vma_m->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) &&
++				((vma_m->vm_mm->locked_vm + 2*grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) >
++				current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)) {
++			anon_vma_unlock(vma);
++			vm_unacct_memory(grow);
++			return -ENOMEM;
++		}
++	} else {
++#endif
++
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_STACK, vma->vm_end - address, 1);
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
++	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
++		gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, (vma->vm_mm->locked_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
++
+ 	if (vma->vm_end - address > current->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur ||
+ 			((vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) >
+-			current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur) {
++			current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur ||
++			((vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) &&
++			((vma->vm_mm->locked_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) >
++			current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)) {
+ 		anon_vma_unlock(vma);
+ 		vm_unacct_memory(grow);
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 	}
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	vma->vm_start = address;
+ 	vma->vm_pgoff -= grow;
+ 	vma->vm_mm->total_vm += grow;
+ 	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
+ 		vma->vm_mm->locked_vm += grow;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++		vma_m->vm_start = address_m;
++		vma_m->vm_pgoff -= grow;
++		vma_m->vm_mm->total_vm += grow;
++		if (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
++			vma_m->vm_mm->locked_vm += grow;
++		track_exec_limit(vma_m->vm_mm, vma_m->vm_start, vma_m->vm_end, vma_m->vm_flags);
++	}
++#endif
++
++	track_exec_limit(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_flags);
+ 	anon_vma_unlock(vma);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+@@ -1373,15 +1624,15 @@
+ {
+ 	size_t len = area->vm_end - area->vm_start;
+ 
+-	area->vm_mm->total_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++	mm->total_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 	if (area->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
+-		area->vm_mm->locked_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++		mm->locked_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Is this a new hole at the lowest possible address?
+ 	 */
+ 	if (area->vm_start >= TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE &&
+-				area->vm_start < area->vm_mm->free_area_cache)
+-	      area->vm_mm->free_area_cache = area->vm_start;
++				area->vm_start < mm->free_area_cache)
++	      mm->free_area_cache = area->vm_start;
+ 
+ 	remove_vm_struct(area);
+ }
+@@ -1435,21 +1686,73 @@
+  */
+ static void
+ detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+-	struct vm_area_struct *prev, unsigned long end)
++	struct vm_area_struct *prev, unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end)
+ {
+ 	struct vm_area_struct **insertion_point;
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *tail_vma = NULL;
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	unsigned long start_m;
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma_m, *head_vma = vma, *mirrors = NULL, *head_vma_m = NULL;
++#endif
++
+ 	insertion_point = (prev ? &prev->vm_next : &mm->mmap);
+ 	do {
+ 		rb_erase(&vma->vm_rb, &mm->mm_rb);
+ 		mm->map_count--;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++		if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) &&
++		    vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror >= *start &&
++		    vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror < *end)
++		{
++			mm->mmap_cache = NULL;		/* Kill the cache. */
++			start_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
++			vma_m = find_vma(mm, start_m);
++			if (vma_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) && vma_m->vm_start == start_m) {
++				vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MIRROR;
++				vma_m->vm_flags &= ~VM_MIRROR;
++			} else
++				printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: munmap bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start);
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		tail_vma = vma;
+ 		vma = vma->vm_next;
+-	} while (vma && vma->vm_start < end);
++	} while (vma && vma->vm_start < *end);
+ 	*insertion_point = vma;
+ 	tail_vma->vm_next = NULL;
+ 	mm->mmap_cache = NULL;		/* Kill the cache. */
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	for (; head_vma; head_vma = head_vma->vm_next) {
++		struct vm_area_struct *prev_m;
++
++		if (!(head_vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR))
++			continue;
++
++		start_m = head_vma->vm_start + head_vma->vm_mirror;
++		vma_m = find_vma_prev(mm, start_m, &prev_m);
++		rb_erase(&vma_m->vm_rb, &mm->mm_rb);
++		mm->map_count--;
++		insertion_point = prev_m ? &prev_m->vm_next : &mm->mmap;
++		*insertion_point = vma_m->vm_next;
++		if (head_vma_m) {
++			mirrors->vm_next = vma_m;
++			mirrors = vma_m;
++		} else
++			head_vma_m = mirrors = vma_m;
++		mirrors->vm_next = NULL;
++		if (vma_m->vm_start < *start)
++			*start = vma_m->vm_start;
++		if (vma_m->vm_end > *end)
++			*end = vma_m->vm_end;
++		mm->mmap_cache = NULL;		/* Kill the cache. */
++	}
++	if (head_vma_m)
++		tail_vma->vm_next = head_vma_m;
++#endif
++
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1512,6 +1815,10 @@
+ 	unsigned long end;
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *mpnt, *prev, *last;
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	struct vm_area_struct *mpnt_m = NULL, *last_m;
++#endif
++
+ 	if ((start & ~PAGE_MASK) || start > TASK_SIZE || len > TASK_SIZE-start)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+@@ -1548,6 +1855,20 @@
+ 	 * places tmp vma above, and higher split_vma places tmp vma below.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (start > mpnt->vm_start) {
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++		if (mpnt->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++			unsigned long start_m = mpnt->vm_start + mpnt->vm_mirror;
++
++			mpnt_m = find_vma(mm, start_m);
++			if (!mpnt_m || (!mpnt_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) || mpnt_m->vm_start != start_m)
++				return -EINVAL;
++			start_m = start + mpnt->vm_mirror;
++			if (split_vma(mm, mpnt_m, start_m, 0))
++				return -ENOMEM;
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		if (split_vma(mm, mpnt, start, 0))
+ 			return -ENOMEM;
+ 		prev = mpnt;
+@@ -1556,6 +1877,20 @@
+ 	/* Does it split the last one? */
+ 	last = find_vma(mm, end);
+ 	if (last && end > last->vm_start) {
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++		if (last->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++			unsigned long end_m = last->vm_start + last->vm_mirror;
++
++			last_m = find_vma(mm, end_m);
++			if (!last_m || (!last_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) || last_m->vm_start != end_m)
++				return -EINVAL;
++			end_m = end + last->vm_mirror;
++			if (split_vma(mm, last_m, end_m, 1))
++				return -ENOMEM;
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		if (split_vma(mm, last, end, 1))
+ 			return -ENOMEM;
+ 	}
+@@ -1564,7 +1899,7 @@
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Remove the vma's, and unmap the actual pages
+ 	 */
+-	detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(mm, mpnt, prev, end);
++	detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(mm, mpnt, prev, &start, &end);
+ 	spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+ 	unmap_region(mm, mpnt, prev, start, end);
+ 	spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+@@ -1572,6 +1907,8 @@
+ 	/* Fix up all other VM information */
+ 	unmap_vma_list(mm, mpnt);
+ 
++	track_exec_limit(mm, start, end, 0UL);
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1582,6 +1919,12 @@
+ 	int ret;
+ 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) &&
++	    (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len))
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	ret = do_munmap(mm, addr, len);
+ 	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+@@ -1593,7 +1936,31 @@
+  *  anonymous maps.  eventually we may be able to do some
+  *  brk-specific accounting here.
+  */
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT)
++unsigned long __do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len);
++
++unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
++{
++	unsigned long ret;
++
++	ret = __do_brk(addr, len);
++	if (ret == addr && (current->flags & (PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC | PF_PAX_MPROTECT)) == PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++		unsigned long ret_m;
++
++		ret_m = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, addr + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, 0UL, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_MIRROR, addr);
++		if (ret_m > TASK_SIZE) {
++			do_munmap(current->mm, addr, len);
++			ret = ret_m;
++		}
++	}
++
++	return ret;
++}
++
++unsigned long __do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
++#else
+ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
++#endif
+ {
+ 	struct mm_struct * mm = current->mm;
+ 	struct vm_area_struct * vma, * prev;
+@@ -1605,6 +1972,13 @@
+ 	if (!len)
+ 		return addr;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++		if ((addr + len) > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || (addr + len) < addr)
++			return -EINVAL;
++	} else
++#endif
++
+ 	if ((addr + len) > TASK_SIZE || (addr + len) < addr)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+@@ -1614,6 +1988,7 @@
+ 	if (mm->def_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
+ 		unsigned long locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 		locked += len;
++		gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked, 1);
+ 		if (locked > current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)
+ 			return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+@@ -1630,6 +2005,7 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Check against address space limits *after* clearing old maps... */
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len, 1);
+ 	if ((mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len
+ 	    > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+@@ -1642,6 +2018,18 @@
+ 
+ 	flags = VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT | mm->def_flags;
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	if (current->flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
++		flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++		if (current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)
++			flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
++#endif
++
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Can we just expand an old private anonymous mapping? */
+ 	if (vma_merge(mm, prev, addr, addr + len, flags,
+ 					NULL, NULL, pgoff, NULL))
+@@ -1662,6 +2050,13 @@
+ 	vma->vm_end = addr + len;
+ 	vma->vm_pgoff = pgoff;
+ 	vma->vm_flags = flags;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (flags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE)))
++		vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x0f];
++	else
++#endif
++
+ 	vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[flags & 0x0f];
+ 	vma_link(mm, vma, prev, rb_link, rb_parent);
+ out:
+@@ -1670,6 +2065,7 @@
+ 		mm->locked_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 		make_pages_present(addr, addr + len);
+ 	}
++	track_exec_limit(mm, addr, addr + len, flags);
+ 	return addr;
+ }
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/mm/mprotect.c linux-2.6.7/mm/mprotect.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/mm/mprotect.c	2004-06-16 01:20:27.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/mm/mprotect.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -17,12 +17,19 @@
+ #include <linux/highmem.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++#include <linux/elf.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#endif
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+ #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
++#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+ 
+ static inline void
+ change_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long address,
+@@ -108,6 +115,90 @@
+ 	return;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
++/* called while holding the mmap semaphor for writing */
++static inline void establish_user_cs_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
++{
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, start);
++
++	for (; vma && vma->vm_start < end; vma = vma->vm_next)
++		change_protection(vma, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_page_prot);
++
++}
++
++void track_exec_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot)
++{
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) {
++		unsigned long oldlimit, newlimit = 0UL;
++
++		spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++		oldlimit = mm->context.user_cs_limit;
++		if ((prot & VM_EXEC) && oldlimit < end)
++			/* USER_CS limit moved up */
++			newlimit = end;
++		else if (!(prot & VM_EXEC) && start < oldlimit && oldlimit <= end)
++			/* USER_CS limit moved down */
++			newlimit = start;
++
++		if (newlimit) {
++			mm->context.user_cs_limit = newlimit;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
++			wmb();
++			cpus_clear(mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
++			cpu_set(smp_processor_id(), mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
++#endif
++
++			set_user_cs(mm, smp_processor_id());
++		}
++		spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++		if (newlimit == end)
++			establish_user_cs_limit(mm, oldlimit, end);
++	}
++}
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++static int __mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
++	unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags);
++
++static int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
++	unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
++{
++	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++		struct vm_area_struct * vma_m, * prev_m;
++		unsigned long start_m, end_m;
++		int error;
++
++		start_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
++		vma_m = find_vma_prev(vma->vm_mm, start_m, &prev_m);
++		if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == start_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
++			start_m = start + vma->vm_mirror;
++			end_m = end + vma->vm_mirror;
++			if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && !(newflags & VM_EXEC))
++				error = __mprotect_fixup(vma_m, &prev_m, start_m, end_m, vma_m->vm_flags & ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC));
++			else
++				error = __mprotect_fixup(vma_m, &prev_m, start_m, end_m, newflags);
++			if (error)
++				return error;
++		} else {
++			printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: mprotect bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start);
++			return -ENOMEM;
++		}
++	}
++
++	return __mprotect_fixup(vma, pprev, start, end, newflags);
++}
++
++static int __mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
++	unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
++{
++	struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm;
++	unsigned long charged = 0;
++	pgprot_t newprot;
++	pgoff_t pgoff;
++	int error;
++#else
+ static int
+ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
+ 	unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
+@@ -122,6 +213,7 @@
+ 		*pprev = vma;
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If we make a private mapping writable we increase our commit;
+@@ -140,6 +232,12 @@
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (newflags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE)))
++		newprot = protection_map[(newflags | VM_EXEC) & 0xf];
++	else
++#endif
++
+ 	newprot = protection_map[newflags & 0xf];
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -185,6 +283,68 @@
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++/* PaX: non-PIC ELF libraries need relocations on their executable segments
++ * therefore we'll grant them VM_MAYWRITE once during their life.
++ *
++ * The checks favour ld-linux.so behaviour which operates on a per ELF segment
++ * basis because we want to allow the common case and not the special ones.
++ */
++static inline void pax_handle_maywrite(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start)
++{
++	struct elfhdr elf_h;
++	struct elf_phdr elf_p, p_dyn;
++	elf_dyn dyn;
++	unsigned long i, j = 65536UL / sizeof(struct elf_phdr);
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOELFRELOCS
++	if ((vma->vm_start != start) ||
++	    !vma->vm_file ||
++	    !(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC) ||
++	    (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYNOTWRITE))
++#endif
++
++		return;
++
++	if (0 > kernel_read(vma->vm_file, 0UL, (char*)&elf_h, sizeof(elf_h)) ||
++	    memcmp(elf_h.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) ||
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ETEXECRELOCS
++	    (elf_h.e_type != ET_DYN && elf_h.e_type != ET_EXEC) ||
++#else
++	    elf_h.e_type != ET_DYN ||
++#endif
++
++	    !elf_check_arch(&elf_h) ||
++	    elf_h.e_phentsize != sizeof(struct elf_phdr) ||
++	    elf_h.e_phnum > j)
++		return;
++
++	for (i = 0UL; i < elf_h.e_phnum; i++) {
++		if (0 > kernel_read(vma->vm_file, elf_h.e_phoff + i*sizeof(elf_p), (char*)&elf_p, sizeof(elf_p)))
++			return;
++		if (elf_p.p_type == PT_DYNAMIC) {
++			p_dyn = elf_p;
++			j = i;
++		}
++	}
++	if (elf_h.e_phnum <= j)
++		return;
++
++	i = 0UL;
++	do {
++		if (0 > kernel_read(vma->vm_file, p_dyn.p_offset + i*sizeof(dyn), (char*)&dyn, sizeof(dyn)))
++			return;
++		if (dyn.d_tag == DT_TEXTREL || (dyn.d_tag == DT_FLAGS && (dyn.d_un.d_val & DF_TEXTREL))) {
++			vma->vm_flags |= VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYNOTWRITE;
++			return;
++		}
++		i++;
++	} while (dyn.d_tag != DT_NULL);
++	return;
++}
++#endif
++
+ asmlinkage long
+ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t len, unsigned long prot)
+ {
+@@ -202,6 +362,17 @@
+ 	end = start + len;
+ 	if (end < start)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++		if (end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
++			return -EINVAL;
++	} else
++#endif
++
++	if (end > TASK_SIZE)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	if (prot & ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	if (end == start)
+@@ -236,6 +407,16 @@
+ 	if (start > vma->vm_start)
+ 		prev = vma;
+ 
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_mprotect(vma->vm_file, prot)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++	if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
++		pax_handle_maywrite(vma, start);
++#endif
++
+ 	for (nstart = start ; ; ) {
+ 		unsigned int newflags;
+ 
+@@ -253,6 +434,12 @@
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++		/* PaX: disallow write access after relocs are done, hopefully noone else needs it... */
++		if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) && (prot & PROT_WRITE) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYNOTWRITE))
++			newflags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
++#endif
++
+ 		error = security_file_mprotect(vma, prot);
+ 		if (error)
+ 			goto out;
+@@ -276,6 +463,9 @@
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++
++	track_exec_limit(current->mm, start, end, vm_flags);
++
+ out:
+ 	up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	return error;
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/mm/mremap.c linux-2.6.7/mm/mremap.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/mm/mremap.c	2004-06-16 01:19:35.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/mm/mremap.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -129,6 +129,12 @@
+ 			if (dst) {
+ 				pte_t pte;
+ 				pte = ptep_clear_flush(vma, old_addr, src);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++				if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
++					pte_exprotect(pte);
++#endif
++
+ 				set_pte(dst, pte);
+ 			} else
+ 				error = -ENOMEM;
+@@ -267,6 +273,18 @@
+ 	if (!new_len)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++		if (new_len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-new_len ||
++		    old_len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-old_len)
++			goto out;
++	} else
++#endif
++
++	if (new_len > TASK_SIZE || addr > TASK_SIZE-new_len ||
++	    old_len > TASK_SIZE || addr > TASK_SIZE-old_len)
++		goto out;
++
+ 	/* new_addr is only valid if MREMAP_FIXED is specified */
+ 	if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) {
+ 		if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
+@@ -274,6 +292,13 @@
+ 		if (!(flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE))
+ 			goto out;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++			if (new_len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || new_addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-new_len)
++				goto out;
++		} else
++#endif
++
+ 		if (new_len > TASK_SIZE || new_addr > TASK_SIZE - new_len)
+ 			goto out;
+ 
+@@ -317,6 +342,16 @@
+ 		ret = -EINVAL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++	if ((current->flags & (PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC | PF_PAX_RANDEXEC)) &&
++	    (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR))
++	{
++		ret = -EINVAL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/* We can't remap across vm area boundaries */
+ 	if (old_len > vma->vm_end - addr)
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -365,6 +400,7 @@
+ 						   addr + new_len);
+ 			}
+ 			ret = addr;
++			track_exec_limit(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start, addr + new_len, vma->vm_flags);
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+@@ -375,8 +411,8 @@
+ 	 */
+ 	ret = -ENOMEM;
+ 	if (flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE) {
++		unsigned long map_flags = 0;
+ 		if (!(flags & MREMAP_FIXED)) {
+-			unsigned long map_flags = 0;
+ 			if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE)
+ 				map_flags |= MAP_SHARED;
+ 
+@@ -386,7 +422,12 @@
+ 			if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
+ 				goto out;
+ 		}
++		map_flags = vma->vm_flags;
+ 		ret = move_vma(vma, addr, old_len, new_len, new_addr);
++		if (!(ret & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++			track_exec_limit(current->mm, addr, addr + old_len, 0UL);
++			track_exec_limit(current->mm, new_addr, new_addr + new_len, map_flags);
++		}
+ 	}
+ out:
+ 	if (ret & ~PAGE_MASK)
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/mm/rmap.c linux-2.6.7/mm/rmap.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/mm/rmap.c	2004-06-16 01:20:03.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/mm/rmap.c	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -83,6 +83,19 @@
+ 			list_add(&vma->anon_vma_node, &anon_vma->head);
+ 			allocated = NULL;
+ 		}
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++		if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++			struct vm_area_struct *vma_m;
++
++			vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror);
++			BUG_ON(!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror);
++			BUG_ON(vma_m->anon_vma || vma->vm_pgoff != vma_m->vm_pgoff);
++			vma_m->anon_vma = anon_vma;
++			__anon_vma_link(vma_m);
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+ 		if (unlikely(allocated))
+ 			anon_vma_free(allocated);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/af_inet.c linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/af_inet.c	2004-06-16 01:18:58.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/af_inet.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/poll.h>
+ #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+@@ -387,7 +388,12 @@
+ 	else
+ 		inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT;
+ 
+-	inet->id = 0;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++	if (grsec_enable_randid)
++		inet->id = htons(ip_randomid());
++	else
++#endif
++		inet->id = 0;
+ 
+ 	sock_init_data(sock, sk);
+ 	sk_set_owner(sk, THIS_MODULE);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/ip_output.c linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/ip_output.c	2004-06-16 01:20:22.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/ip_output.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
+ #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+ #include <linux/stat.h>
+ #include <linux/init.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <net/snmp.h>
+ #include <net/ip.h>
+@@ -1164,6 +1165,12 @@
+ 	iph->tos = inet->tos;
+ 	iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len);
+ 	iph->frag_off = df;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++	if (grsec_enable_randid)
++		iph->id = htons(ip_randomid());
++	else
++#endif
+ 	if (!df) {
+ 		__ip_select_ident(iph, &rt->u.dst, 0);
+ 	} else {
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig	2004-06-16 01:19:52.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -225,6 +225,21 @@
+ 
+ 	  To compile it as a module, choose M here.  If unsure, say N.
+ 
++config IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH
++	tristate "stealth match support"
++	depends on IP_NF_IPTABLES
++	help
++	  Enabling this option will drop all syn packets coming to unserved tcp
++	  ports as well as all packets coming to unserved udp ports.  If you
++	  are using your system to route any type of packets (ie. via NAT)
++	  you should put this module at the end of your ruleset, since it will
++	  drop packets that aren't going to ports that are listening on your
++	  machine itself, it doesn't take into account that the packet might be
++	  destined for someone on your internal network if you're using NAT for
++	  instance.
++
++	  To compile it as a module, choose M here.  If unsure, say N.
++
+ config IP_NF_MATCH_HELPER
+ 	tristate "Helper match support"
+ 	depends on IP_NF_CONNTRACK && IP_NF_IPTABLES
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile	2004-06-16 01:19:01.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@
+ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_CONNTRACK) += ipt_conntrack.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_TCPMSS) += ipt_tcpmss.o
+ 
++obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH) += ipt_stealth.o
++
+ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_PHYSDEV) += ipt_physdev.o
+ 
+ # targets
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c	1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
++/* Kernel module to add stealth support.
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 2002 Brad Spengler  <spender@grsecurity.net>
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/skbuff.h>
++#include <linux/net.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/inet.h>
++#include <linux/stddef.h>
++
++#include <net/ip.h>
++#include <net/sock.h>
++#include <net/tcp.h>
++#include <net/udp.h>
++#include <net/route.h>
++#include <net/inet_common.h>
++
++#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h>
++
++MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
++
++extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif);
++
++static int
++match(const struct sk_buff *skb,
++      const struct net_device *in,
++      const struct net_device *out,
++      const void *matchinfo,
++      int offset,
++      int *hotdrop)
++{
++	struct iphdr *ip = skb->nh.iph;
++	struct tcphdr th;
++	struct udphdr uh;
++	struct sock *sk = NULL;
++
++	if (!ip || offset) return 0;
++
++	switch(ip->protocol) {
++	case IPPROTO_TCP:
++		if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->nh.iph->ihl*4, &th, sizeof(th)) < 0) {
++			*hotdrop = 1;
++			return 0;
++		}
++		if (!(th.syn && !th.ack)) return 0;
++		sk = tcp_v4_lookup_listener(ip->daddr, ntohs(th.dest), ((struct rtable*)skb->dst)->rt_iif);	
++		break;
++	case IPPROTO_UDP:
++		if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->nh.iph->ihl*4, &uh, sizeof(uh)) < 0) {
++			*hotdrop = 1;
++			return 0;
++		}
++		sk = udp_v4_lookup(ip->saddr, uh.source, ip->daddr, uh.dest, skb->dev->ifindex);
++		break;
++	default:
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	if(!sk) // port is being listened on, match this
++		return 1;
++	else {
++		sock_put(sk);
++		return 0;
++	}
++}
++
++/* Called when user tries to insert an entry of this type. */
++static int
++checkentry(const char *tablename,
++           const struct ipt_ip *ip,
++           void *matchinfo,
++           unsigned int matchsize,
++           unsigned int hook_mask)
++{
++        if (matchsize != IPT_ALIGN(0))
++                return 0;
++
++	if(((ip->proto == IPPROTO_TCP && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO)) ||
++		((ip->proto == IPPROTO_UDP) && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO)))
++		&& (hook_mask & (1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_IN)))
++			return 1;
++
++	printk("stealth: Only works on TCP and UDP for the INPUT chain.\n");
++
++        return 0;
++}
++
++
++static struct ipt_match stealth_match = {
++	.name = "stealth",
++	.match = &match,
++	.checkentry = &checkentry,
++	.destroy = NULL,
++	.me = THIS_MODULE
++};
++
++static int __init init(void)
++{
++	return ipt_register_match(&stealth_match);
++}
++
++static void __exit fini(void)
++{
++	ipt_unregister_match(&stealth_match);
++}
++
++module_init(init);
++module_exit(fini);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c	2004-06-16 01:19:10.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
+ #include <linux/jhash.h>
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/times.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <net/icmp.h>
+ #include <net/tcp.h>
+@@ -224,9 +225,16 @@
+ 		spin_lock(&tcp_portalloc_lock);
+ 		rover = tcp_port_rover;
+ 		do {
+-			rover++;
+-			if (rover < low || rover > high)
+-				rover = low;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
++			if (grsec_enable_randsrc && (high > low)) {
++				rover = low + (get_random_long() % (high - low));
++			} else
++#endif
++			{
++				rover++;
++				if (rover < low || rover > high)
++					rover = low;
++			}
+ 			head = &tcp_bhash[tcp_bhashfn(rover)];
+ 			spin_lock(&head->lock);
+ 			tb_for_each(tb, node, &head->chain)
+@@ -537,6 +545,11 @@
+ 
+ static inline __u32 tcp_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++	if (likely(grsec_enable_randisn))
++		return ip_randomisn();
++	else
++#endif
+ 	return secure_tcp_sequence_number(skb->nh.iph->daddr,
+ 					  skb->nh.iph->saddr,
+ 					  skb->h.th->dest,
+@@ -671,10 +684,17 @@
+  		rover = tcp_port_rover;
+ 
+  		do {
+- 			rover++;
+- 			if ((rover < low) || (rover > high))
+- 				rover = low;
+- 			head = &tcp_bhash[tcp_bhashfn(rover)];
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
++			if (grsec_enable_randsrc && (high > low)) {
++				rover = low + (get_random_long() % (high - low));
++			} else
++#endif
++			{
++ 				rover++;
++ 				if ((rover < low) || (rover > high))
++ 					rover = low;
++			} 
++			head = &tcp_bhash[tcp_bhashfn(rover)];
+  			spin_lock(&head->lock);
+ 
+  			/* Does not bother with rcv_saddr checks,
+@@ -724,6 +744,15 @@
+  		}
+  		spin_unlock(&head->lock);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++		gr_del_task_from_ip_table(current);
++		current->gr_saddr = inet_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr;
++		current->gr_daddr = inet_sk(sk)->daddr;
++		current->gr_sport = inet_sk(sk)->sport;
++		current->gr_dport = inet_sk(sk)->dport;
++		gr_add_to_task_ip_table(current);
++#endif
++
+  		if (tw) {
+  			tcp_tw_deschedule(tw);
+  			tcp_tw_put(tw);
+@@ -843,13 +872,24 @@
+ 	tcp_v4_setup_caps(sk, &rt->u.dst);
+ 	tp->ext2_header_len = rt->u.dst.header_len;
+ 
+-	if (!tp->write_seq)
++	if (!tp->write_seq) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++		if (likely(grsec_enable_randisn))
++			tp->write_seq = ip_randomisn();
++		else
++#endif
+ 		tp->write_seq = secure_tcp_sequence_number(inet->saddr,
+ 							   inet->daddr,
+ 							   inet->sport,
+ 							   usin->sin_port);
++	}
+ 
+-	inet->id = tp->write_seq ^ jiffies;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++	if (grsec_enable_randid)
++		inet->id = htons(ip_randomid());
++	else
++#endif
++		inet->id = tp->write_seq ^ jiffies;
+ 
+ 	err = tcp_connect(sk);
+ 	rt = NULL;
+@@ -1593,7 +1633,13 @@
+ 	if (newinet->opt)
+ 		newtp->ext_header_len = newinet->opt->optlen;
+ 	newtp->ext2_header_len = dst->header_len;
+-	newinet->id = newtp->write_seq ^ jiffies;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++	if (grsec_enable_randid)
++		newinet->id = htons(ip_randomid());
++	else
++#endif
++		newinet->id = newtp->write_seq ^ jiffies;
+ 
+ 	tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_pmtu(dst));
+ 	newtp->advmss = dst_metric(dst, RTAX_ADVMSS);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/udp.c linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/udp.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/udp.c	2004-06-16 01:18:59.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/udp.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
+ #include <linux/skbuff.h>
+ #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+ #include <linux/seq_file.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <net/sock.h>
+ #include <net/udp.h>
+ #include <net/icmp.h>
+@@ -108,6 +109,12 @@
+ #include <net/checksum.h>
+ #include <net/xfrm.h>
+ 
++extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk,
++				 const struct sk_buff *skb);
++extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk,
++				 const struct sockaddr_in *addr);
++
++
+ /*
+  *	Snmp MIB for the UDP layer
+  */
+@@ -538,9 +545,16 @@
+ 		dport = usin->sin_port;
+ 		if (dport == 0)
+ 			return -EINVAL;
++
++		if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, usin))
++			return -EPERM;
+ 	} else {
+ 		if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
+ 			return -EDESTADDRREQ;
++
++		if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, NULL))
++			return -EPERM;
++
+ 		daddr = inet->daddr;
+ 		dport = inet->dport;
+ 		/* Open fast path for connected socket.
+@@ -792,7 +806,12 @@
+ 	if (!skb)
+ 		goto out;
+   
+-  	copied = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
++	if (!gr_search_udp_recvmsg(sk, skb)) {
++		err = -EPERM;
++		goto out_free;
++	}
++
++	copied = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
+ 	if (copied > len) {
+ 		copied = len;
+ 		msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
+@@ -901,7 +920,12 @@
+ 	inet->daddr = rt->rt_dst;
+ 	inet->dport = usin->sin_port;
+ 	sk->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
+-	inet->id = jiffies;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++	if (grsec_enable_randid)
++		inet->id = htons(ip_randomid());
++	else
++#endif
++		inet->id = jiffies;
+ 
+ 	sk_dst_set(sk, &rt->u.dst);
+ 	return(0);
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/net/socket.c linux-2.6.7/net/socket.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/socket.c	2004-06-16 01:19:13.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/net/socket.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+ #include <linux/compat.h>
+ #include <linux/kmod.h>
++#include <linux/in.h>
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RADIO
+ #include <linux/wireless.h>		/* Note : will define WIRELESS_EXT */
+@@ -94,6 +95,18 @@
+ #include <net/sock.h>
+ #include <linux/netfilter.h>
+ 
++extern void gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk);
++extern int gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type,
++			      const int protocol);
++extern int gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck);
++extern int gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck);
++extern int gr_search_connect(const struct socket * sock,
++			     const struct sockaddr_in * addr);
++extern int gr_search_bind(const struct socket * sock,
++			   const struct sockaddr_in * addr);
++extern int gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type,
++			    const int protocol);
++
+ static int sock_no_open(struct inode *irrelevant, struct file *dontcare);
+ static ssize_t sock_aio_read(struct kiocb *iocb, char __user *buf,
+ 			 size_t size, loff_t pos);
+@@ -898,6 +911,7 @@
+ 		printk(KERN_DEBUG "sock_close: NULL inode\n");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
++
+ 	sock_fasync(-1, filp, 0);
+ 	sock_release(SOCKET_I(inode));
+ 	return 0;
+@@ -1127,6 +1141,16 @@
+ 	int retval;
+ 	struct socket *sock;
+ 
++	if(!gr_search_socket(family, type, protocol)) {
++		retval = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (gr_handle_sock_all(family, type, protocol)) {
++		retval = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	retval = sock_create(family, type, protocol, &sock);
+ 	if (retval < 0)
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -1222,11 +1246,23 @@
+ {
+ 	struct socket *sock;
+ 	char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR];
++	struct sockaddr *sck;
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	if((sock = sockfd_lookup(fd,&err))!=NULL)
+ 	{
+ 		if((err=move_addr_to_kernel(umyaddr,addrlen,address))>=0) {
++			sck = (struct sockaddr *)address;
++			if (!gr_search_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *)sck)) {
++				sockfd_put(sock);
++				return -EACCES;
++			}
++
++			if (gr_handle_sock_server(sck)) {
++				sockfd_put(sock);
++				return -EACCES;
++			}
++
+ 			err = security_socket_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)address, addrlen);
+ 			if (err) {
+ 				sockfd_put(sock);
+@@ -1329,6 +1365,7 @@
+ 		goto out_release;
+ 
+ 	security_socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
++	gr_attach_curr_ip(newsock->sk);
+ 
+ out_put:
+ 	sockfd_put(sock);
+@@ -1356,6 +1393,7 @@
+ {
+ 	struct socket *sock;
+ 	char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR];
++	struct sockaddr *sck;
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	sock = sockfd_lookup(fd, &err);
+@@ -1365,6 +1403,18 @@
+ 	if (err < 0)
+ 		goto out_put;
+ 
++	sck = (struct sockaddr *)address;
++
++	if (!gr_search_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *)sck)) {
++		err = -EACCES;
++		goto out_put;
++	}
++
++	if (gr_handle_sock_client(sck)) {
++		err = -EACCES;
++		goto out_put;
++	}
++
+ 	err = security_socket_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)address, addrlen);
+ 	if (err)
+ 		goto out_put;
+@@ -1618,6 +1668,7 @@
+ 		err=sock->ops->shutdown(sock, how);
+ 		sockfd_put(sock);
+ 	}
++
+ 	return err;
+ }
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/net/sunrpc/xprt.c linux-2.6.7/net/sunrpc/xprt.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/sunrpc/xprt.c	2004-06-16 01:19:42.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/net/sunrpc/xprt.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
+ #include <linux/file.h>
+ #include <linux/workqueue.h>
+ #include <linux/random.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <net/sock.h>
+ #include <net/checksum.h>
+@@ -1337,6 +1338,12 @@
+  */
+ static inline u32 xprt_alloc_xid(struct rpc_xprt *xprt)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
++	if (grsec_enable_randrpc)
++		return (u32) get_random_long();
++#endif
++
+ 	return xprt->xid++;
+ }
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/net/unix/af_unix.c linux-2.6.7/net/unix/af_unix.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/unix/af_unix.c	2004-06-16 01:19:37.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/net/unix/af_unix.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
+ #include <net/checksum.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ int sysctl_unix_max_dgram_qlen = 10;
+ 
+@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@
+ 		if (err)
+ 			goto put_fail;
+ 
++		if (!gr_acl_handle_unix(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) {
++			err = -EACCES;
++			goto put_fail;
++		}
++
+ 		err = -ECONNREFUSED;
+ 		if (!S_ISSOCK(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
+ 			goto put_fail;
+@@ -704,6 +710,13 @@
+ 		if (u) {
+ 			struct dentry *dentry;
+ 			dentry = unix_sk(u)->dentry;
++
++			if (!gr_handle_chroot_unix(u->sk_peercred.pid)) {
++				err = -EPERM;
++				sock_put(u);
++				goto fail;
++			}
++
+ 			if (dentry)
+ 				touch_atime(unix_sk(u)->mnt, dentry);
+ 		} else
+@@ -803,9 +816,18 @@
+ 		 */
+ 		mode = S_IFSOCK |
+ 		       (SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_mode & ~current->fs->umask);
++
++		if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
++			err = -EACCES;
++			goto out_mknod_dput;
++		}
++
+ 		err = vfs_mknod(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode, 0);
+ 		if (err)
+ 			goto out_mknod_dput;
++
++		gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
++
+ 		up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+ 		dput(nd.dentry);
+ 		nd.dentry = dentry;
+@@ -823,6 +845,10 @@
+ 			goto out_unlock;
+ 		}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++		sk->sk_peercred.pid = current->pid;
++#endif
++
+ 		list = &unix_socket_table[addr->hash];
+ 	} else {
+ 		list = &unix_socket_table[dentry->d_inode->i_ino & (UNIX_HASH_SIZE-1)];
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/security/Kconfig linux-2.6.7/security/Kconfig
+--- linux-2.6.7/security/Kconfig	2004-06-16 01:19:42.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/security/Kconfig	2004-06-25 17:41:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -4,6 +4,421 @@
+ 
+ menu "Security options"
+ 
++source grsecurity/Kconfig
++
++menu "PaX"
++
++config PAX
++	bool "Enable various PaX features"
++	depends on ALPHA || IA64 || MIPS32 || MIPS64 || PARISC || PPC32 || PPC64 || SPARC32 || SPARC64 || X86 || X86_64
++	help
++	  This allows you to enable various PaX features.  PaX adds
++	  intrusion prevention mechanisms to the kernel that reduce
++	  the risks posed by exploitable memory corruption bugs.
++
++menu "PaX Control"
++	depends on PAX
++
++config PAX_SOFTMODE
++	bool 'Support soft mode'
++	help
++	  Enabling this option will allow you to run PaX in soft mode, that
++	  is, PaX features will not be enforced by default, only on executables
++	  marked explicitly.  You must also enable PT_PAX_FLAGS support as it
++	  is the only way to mark executables for soft mode use.
++
++	  Soft mode can be activated by using the "pax_softmode=1" kernel command
++	  line option on boot.  Furthermore you can control various PaX features
++	  at runtime via the entries in /proc/sys/kernel/pax.
++
++config PAX_EI_PAX
++	bool 'Use legacy ELF header marking'
++	help
++	  Enabling this option will allow you to control PaX features on
++	  a per executable basis via the 'chpax' utility available at
++	  http://pax.grsecurity.net/.  The control flags will be read from
++	  an otherwise reserved part of the ELF header.  This marking has
++	  numerous drawbacks (no support for soft-mode, toolchain does not
++	  know about the non-standard use of the ELF header) therefore it
++	  has been deprecated in favour of PT_PAX_FLAGS support.
++
++	  You should enable this option only if your toolchain does not yet
++	  support the new control flag location (PT_PAX_FLAGS) or you still
++	  have applications not marked by PT_PAX_FLAGS.
++
++	  Note that if you enable PT_PAX_FLAGS marking support as well,
++	  it will override the legacy EI_PAX marks.
++
++config PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
++	bool 'Use ELF program header marking'
++	help
++	  Enabling this option will allow you to control PaX features on
++	  a per executable basis via the 'paxctl' utility available at
++	  http://pax.grsecurity.net/.  The control flags will be read from
++	  a PaX specific ELF program header (PT_PAX_FLAGS).  This marking
++	  has the benefits of supporting both soft mode and being fully
++	  integrated into the toolchain (the binutils patch is available
++	  from http://pax.grsecurity.net).
++
++	  Note that if you enable the legacy EI_PAX marking support as well,
++	  it will be overridden by the PT_PAX_FLAGS marking.
++
++choice
++	prompt 'MAC system integration'
++	default PAX_NO_ACL_FLAGS
++	help
++	  Mandatory Access Control systems have the option of controlling
++	  PaX flags on a per executable basis, choose the method supported
++	  by your particular system.
++
++	  - "none": if your MAC system does not interact with PaX,
++	  - "direct": if your MAC system defines pax_set_flags() itself,
++	  - "hook": if your MAC system uses the pax_set_flags_func callback.
++
++	  NOTE: this option is for developers/integrators only.
++
++config PAX_NO_ACL_FLAGS
++	bool 'none'
++
++config PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++	bool 'direct'
++
++config PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS
++	bool 'hook'
++endchoice
++
++endmenu
++
++menu "Non-executable pages"
++	depends on PAX
++
++config PAX_NOEXEC
++	bool "Enforce non-executable pages"
++	depends on (PAX_EI_PAX || PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS || PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS || PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS) && (ALPHA || IA64 || MIPS32 || MIPS64 || PARISC || PPC32 || PPC64 || SPARC32 || SPARC64 || X86 || X86_64)
++	help
++	  By design some architectures do not allow for protecting memory
++	  pages against execution or even if they do, Linux does not make
++	  use of this feature.  In practice this means that if a page is
++	  readable (such as the stack or heap) it is also executable.
++
++	  There is a well known exploit technique that makes use of this
++	  fact and a common programming mistake where an attacker can
++	  introduce code of his choice somewhere in the attacked program's
++	  memory (typically the stack or the heap) and then execute it.
++
++	  If the attacked program was running with different (typically
++	  higher) privileges than that of the attacker, then he can elevate
++	  his own privilege level (e.g. get a root shell, write to files for
++	  which he does not have write access to, etc).
++
++	  Enabling this option will let you choose from various features
++	  that prevent the injection and execution of 'foreign' code in
++	  a program.
++
++	  This will also break programs that rely on the old behaviour and
++	  expect that dynamically allocated memory via the malloc() family
++	  of functions is executable (which it is not).  Notable examples
++	  are the XFree86 4.x server, the java runtime and wine.
++
++config PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	bool "Paging based non-executable pages"
++	depends on PAX_NOEXEC && !HIGHPTE && (!X86 || X86_64 || M586 || M586TSC || M586MMX || M686 || MPENTIUMII || MPENTIUMIII || MPENTIUM4 || MK7 || MK8)
++	select PAX_NOVSYSCALL if X86 && !X86_64
++	help
++	  This implementation is based on the paging feature of the CPU.
++	  On i386 and ppc there is a variable but usually low performance
++	  impact on applications.  On alpha, ia64, parisc, sparc, sparc64
++	  and x86_64 there is no performance impact.
++
++config PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	bool "Segmentation based non-executable pages"
++	depends on PAX_NOEXEC && X86 && !X86_64
++	help
++	  This implementation is based on the segmentation feature of the
++	  CPU and has little performance impact, however applications will
++	  be limited to a 1.5 GB address space instead of the normal 3 GB.
++
++choice
++	prompt "Default non-executable page method"
++	depends on PAX_PAGEEXEC && PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	default PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC
++	help
++	  Select the default non-executable page method applied to applications
++	  that do not select one themselves.
++
++config	PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC
++	bool "PAGEEXEC"
++
++config	PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC
++	bool "SEGMEXEC"
++endchoice
++
++config PAX_EMUTRAMP
++	bool "Emulate trampolines" if (PAX_PAGEEXEC || PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (PARISC || PPC32 || X86) && !X86_64
++	default y if PARISC || PPC32
++	help
++	  There are some programs and libraries that for one reason or
++	  another attempt to execute special small code snippets from
++	  non-executable memory pages.  Most notable examples are the
++	  signal handler return code generated by the kernel itself and
++	  the GCC trampolines.
++
++	  If you enabled CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC or CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC then
++	  such programs will no longer work under your kernel.
++
++	  As a remedy you can say Y here and use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl'
++	  utilities to enable trampoline emulation for the affected programs
++	  yet still have the protection provided by the non-executable pages.
++
++	  On parisc and ppc you MUST enable this option and EMUSIGRT as
++	  well, otherwise your system will not even boot.
++
++	  Alternatively you can say N here and use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl'
++	  utilities to disable CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC and CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	  for the affected files.
++
++	  NOTE: enabling this feature *may* open up a loophole in the
++	  protection provided by non-executable pages that an attacker
++	  could abuse.  Therefore the best solution is to not have any
++	  files on your system that would require this option.  This can
++	  be achieved by not using libc5 (which relies on the kernel
++	  signal handler return code) and not using or rewriting programs
++	  that make use of the nested function implementation of GCC.
++	  Skilled users can just fix GCC itself so that it implements
++	  nested function calls in a way that does not interfere with PaX.
++
++config PAX_EMUSIGRT
++	bool "Automatically emulate sigreturn trampolines"
++	depends on PAX_EMUTRAMP && (PARISC || PPC32)
++	default y
++	help
++	  Enabling this option will have the kernel automatically detect
++	  and emulate signal return trampolines executing on the stack
++	  that would otherwise lead to task termination.
++
++	  This solution is intended as a temporary one for users with
++	  legacy versions of libc (libc5, glibc 2.0, uClibc before 0.9.17,
++	  Modula-3 runtime, etc) or executables linked to such, basically
++	  everything that does not specify its own SA_RESTORER function in
++	  normal executable memory like glibc 2.1+ does.
++
++	  On parisc and ppc you MUST enable this option, otherwise your
++	  system will not even boot.
++
++	  NOTE: this feature cannot be disabled on a per executable basis
++	  and since it *does* open up a loophole in the protection provided
++	  by non-executable pages, the best solution is to not have any
++	  files on your system that would require this option.
++
++config PAX_MPROTECT
++	bool "Restrict mprotect()"
++	depends on (PAX_PAGEEXEC || PAX_SEGMEXEC) && !PPC64
++	help
++	  Enabling this option will prevent programs from
++	   - changing the executable status of memory pages that were
++	     not originally created as executable,
++	   - making read-only executable pages writable again,
++	   - creating executable pages from anonymous memory.
++
++	  You should say Y here to complete the protection provided by
++	  the enforcement of non-executable pages.
++
++	  NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control
++	  this feature on a per file basis.
++
++config PAX_NOELFRELOCS
++	bool "Disallow ELF text relocations"
++	depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (IA64 || X86 || X86_64)
++	help
++	  Non-executable pages and mprotect() restrictions are effective
++	  in preventing the introduction of new executable code into an
++	  attacked task's address space.  There remain only two venues
++	  for this kind of attack: if the attacker can execute already
++	  existing code in the attacked task then he can either have it
++	  create and mmap() a file containing his code or have it mmap()
++	  an already existing ELF library that does not have position
++	  independent code in it and use mprotect() on it to make it
++	  writable and copy his code there.  While protecting against
++	  the former approach is beyond PaX, the latter can be prevented
++	  by having only PIC ELF libraries on one's system (which do not
++	  need to relocate their code).  If you are sure this is your case,
++	  then enable this option otherwise be careful as you may not even
++	  be able to boot or log on your system (for example, some PAM
++	  modules are erroneously compiled as non-PIC by default).
++
++	  NOTE: if you are using dynamic ELF executables (as suggested
++	  when using ASLR) then you must have made sure that you linked
++	  your files using the PIC version of crt1 (the et_dyn.tar.gz package
++	  referenced there has already been updated to support this).
++
++config PAX_ETEXECRELOCS
++	bool "Allow ELF ET_EXEC text relocations"
++	depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (ALPHA || IA64 || PARISC)
++	default y
++	help
++	  On some architectures there are incorrectly created applications
++	  that require text relocations and would not work without enabling
++	  this option.  If you are an alpha, ia64 or parisc user, you should
++	  enable this option and disable it once you have made sure that
++	  none of your applications need it.
++
++config PAX_EMUPLT
++	bool "Automatically emulate ELF PLT"
++	depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (ALPHA || PARISC || PPC32 || SPARC32 || SPARC64)
++	default y
++	help
++	  Enabling this option will have the kernel automatically detect
++	  and emulate the Procedure Linkage Table entries in ELF files.
++	  On some architectures such entries are in writable memory, and
++	  become non-executable leading to task termination.  Therefore
++	  it is mandatory that you enable this option on alpha, parisc, ppc,
++	  sparc and sparc64, otherwise your system would not even boot.
++
++	  NOTE: this feature *does* open up a loophole in the protection
++	  provided by the non-executable pages, therefore the proper
++	  solution is to modify the toolchain to produce a PLT that does
++	  not need to be writable.
++
++config PAX_DLRESOLVE
++	bool
++	depends on PAX_EMUPLT && (SPARC32 || SPARC64)
++	default y
++
++config PAX_SYSCALL
++	bool
++	depends on PAX_PAGEEXEC && PPC32
++	default y
++
++config PAX_KERNEXEC
++	bool "Enforce non-executable kernel pages"
++	depends on PAX_NOEXEC && X86 && !X86_64 && !MODULES && !HOTPLUG_PCI_COMPAQ_NVRAM
++	help
++	  This is the kernel land equivalent of PAGEEXEC and MPROTECT,
++	  that is, enabling this option will make it harder to inject
++	  and execute 'foreign' code in kernel memory itself.
++
++endmenu
++
++menu "Address Space Layout Randomization"
++	depends on PAX
++
++config PAX_ASLR
++	bool "Address Space Layout Randomization"
++	depends on PAX_EI_PAX || PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS || PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS || PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS
++	help
++	  Many if not most exploit techniques rely on the knowledge of
++	  certain addresses in the attacked program.  The following options
++	  will allow the kernel to apply a certain amount of randomization
++	  to specific parts of the program thereby forcing an attacker to
++	  guess them in most cases.  Any failed guess will most likely crash
++	  the attacked program which allows the kernel to detect such attempts
++	  and react on them.  PaX itself provides no reaction mechanisms,
++	  instead it is strongly encouraged that you make use of Nergal's
++	  segvguard (ftp://ftp.pl.openwall.com/misc/segvguard/) or grsecurity's
++	  (http://www.grsecurity.net/) built-in crash detection features or
++	  develop one yourself.
++
++	  By saying Y here you can choose to randomize the following areas:
++	   - top of the task's kernel stack
++	   - top of the task's userland stack
++	   - base address for mmap() requests that do not specify one
++	     (this includes all libraries)
++	   - base address of the main executable
++
++	  It is strongly recommended to say Y here as address space layout
++	  randomization has negligible impact on performance yet it provides
++	  a very effective protection.
++
++	  NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control
++	  this feature on a per file basis.
++
++config PAX_RANDKSTACK
++	bool "Randomize kernel stack base"
++	depends on PAX_ASLR && X86_TSC && !X86_64
++	help
++	  By saying Y here the kernel will randomize every task's kernel
++	  stack on every system call.  This will not only force an attacker
++	  to guess it but also prevent him from making use of possible
++	  leaked information about it.
++
++	  Since the kernel stack is a rather scarce resource, randomization
++	  may cause unexpected stack overflows, therefore you should very
++	  carefully test your system.  Note that once enabled in the kernel
++	  configuration, this feature cannot be disabled on a per file basis.
++
++config PAX_RANDUSTACK
++	bool "Randomize user stack base"
++	depends on PAX_ASLR
++	help
++	  By saying Y here the kernel will randomize every task's userland
++	  stack.  The randomization is done in two steps where the second
++	  one may apply a big amount of shift to the top of the stack and
++	  cause problems for programs that want to use lots of memory (more
++	  than 2.5 GB if SEGMEXEC is not active, or 1.25 GB when it is).
++	  For this reason the second step can be controlled by 'chpax' or
++	  'paxctl' on a per file basis.
++
++config PAX_RANDMMAP
++	bool "Randomize mmap() base"
++	depends on PAX_ASLR
++	help
++	  By saying Y here the kernel will use a randomized base address for
++	  mmap() requests that do not specify one themselves.  As a result
++	  all dynamically loaded libraries will appear at random addresses
++	  and therefore be harder to exploit by a technique where an attacker
++	  attempts to execute library code for his purposes (e.g. spawn a
++	  shell from an exploited program that is running at an elevated
++	  privilege level).
++
++	  Furthermore, if a program is relinked as a dynamic ELF file, its
++	  base address will be randomized as well, completing the full
++	  randomization of the address space layout.  Attacking such programs
++	  becomes a guess game.  You can find an example of doing this at
++	  http://pax.grsecurity.net/et_dyn.tar.gz and practical samples at
++	  http://www.grsecurity.net/grsec-gcc-specs.tar.gz .
++
++	  NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control this
++	  feature on a per file basis.
++
++config PAX_RANDEXEC
++	bool "Randomize ET_EXEC base"
++	depends on PAX_MPROTECT && PAX_RANDMMAP
++	help
++	  By saying Y here the kernel will randomize the base address of normal
++	  ET_EXEC ELF executables as well.  This is accomplished by mapping the
++	  executable in memory in a special way which also allows for detecting
++	  attackers who attempt to execute its code for their purposes.  Since
++	  this special mapping causes performance degradation and the attack
++	  detection may create false alarms as well, you should carefully test
++	  your executables when this feature is enabled.
++
++	  This solution is intended only as a temporary one until you relink
++	  your programs as a dynamic ELF file.
++
++	  NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control this
++	  feature on a per file basis.
++
++config PAX_NOVSYSCALL
++	bool "Disable the vsyscall page"
++	depends on PAX_ASLR && X86 && !X86_64
++	help
++	  The Linux 2.6 kernel introduced a new feature that speeds up or
++	  simplifies certain operations, such as system calls or returns
++	  from signal handlers.
++
++	  Unfortunately the implementation also gives a powerful instrument
++	  into the hands of exploit writers: the so-called vsyscall page exists
++	  in every task at the same fixed address and it contains machine code
++	  that is very useful in performing the return-to-libc style attack.
++
++	  Since this exploit technique cannot in general be protected against
++	  via kernel solutions, this option will allow you to disable the use
++	  of the vsyscall page and revert back to the old behaviour.
++
++endmenu
++
++endmenu
++
+ config SECURITY
+ 	bool "Enable different security models"
+ 	help
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/security/commoncap.c linux-2.6.7/security/commoncap.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/security/commoncap.c	2004-06-16 01:19:13.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/security/commoncap.c	2004-06-25 14:33:47.000000000 -0400
+@@ -23,11 +23,12 @@
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/xattr.h>
+ #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+ {
+ 	/* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
+-	if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap))
++	if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap) && gr_task_is_capable(tsk, cap))
+ 		return 0;
+ 	else
+ 		return -EPERM;
+@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@
+ {
+ 	/* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
+ 	if (!cap_issubset (child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
+-	    !capable (CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
++	    !capable_nolog (CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ 		return -EPERM;
+ 	else
+ 		return 0;
+@@ -141,8 +142,11 @@
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
+-	current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
++	if (!gr_check_user_change(-1, bprm->e_uid, bprm->e_uid))
++		current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
++
++	if (!gr_check_group_change(-1, bprm->e_gid, bprm->e_gid))
++		current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
+ 
+ 	/* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
+ 	 * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
+@@ -153,6 +157,8 @@
+ 		    cap_intersect (new_permitted, bprm->cap_effective);
+ 	}
+ 
++	gr_handle_chroot_caps(current);
++
+ 	/* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
+ 
+ 	current->keep_capabilities = 0;
+@@ -334,7 +340,7 @@
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Leave the last 3% for root
+ 		 */
+-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++		if (!capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ 			free -= free / 32;
+ 
+ 		if (free > pages)
+@@ -345,7 +351,7 @@
+ 		 * only call if we're about to fail.
+ 		 */
+ 		n = nr_free_pages();
+-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++		if (!capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ 			n -= n / 32;
+ 		free += n;
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/security/dummy.c linux-2.6.7/security/dummy.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/security/dummy.c	2004-06-16 01:19:01.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/security/dummy.c	2004-06-25 14:35:43.000000000 -0400
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
+ {
+@@ -182,8 +183,11 @@
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
+-	current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
++	if (!gr_check_user_change(-1, bprm->e_uid, bprm->e_uid))
++		current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
++
++	if (!gr_check_group_change(-1, bprm->e_gid, bprm->e_gid))
++		current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
+ }
+ 
+ static int dummy_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+diff -urN linux-2.6.7/security/security.c linux-2.6.7/security/security.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/security/security.c	2004-06-16 01:18:38.000000000 -0400
++++ linux-2.6.7/security/security.c	2004-06-25 14:07:21.000000000 -0400
+@@ -206,4 +206,5 @@
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mod_reg_security);
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mod_unreg_security);
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_nolog);
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ops);
diff --git a/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/1300_linux-2.6.4-selinux-hooks.patch b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/1300_linux-2.6.4-selinux-hooks.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ce033764f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/1300_linux-2.6.4-selinux-hooks.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+diff -urN linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1/security/selinux/hooks.c
+--- linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c	2004-02-22 23:03:26.000000000 -0600
++++ linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1/security/selinux/hooks.c	2004-02-22 23:46:53.000000000 -0600
+@@ -3190,6 +3190,68 @@
+ 	return size;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS
++static void avc_pax_set_flags(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
++{
++	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
++	unsigned long flags = 0;
++	int rc;
++
++	char *scontext;
++	u32 scontext_len;
++
++	/*
++	 * get the security struct from the inode of the file 
++	 * since the bprm security struct will just point to 
++	 * the user running the binary
++	 */
++	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
++	isec = inode->i_security;
++
++	rc = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__PAGEEXEC, &isec->avcr,NULL);
++	if (!rc) {
++		flags |= PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++	}
++	rc = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__EMUTRAMP, &isec->avcr, NULL);
++	if (!rc) {
++		flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++	}
++	rc = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__RANDEXEC, &isec->avcr, NULL);
++	if (!rc) {
++		flags |= PF_PAX_RANDEXEC;
++	}
++	rc = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__MPROTECT, &isec->avcr, NULL);
++	if (!rc) {
++		flags |= PF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++	}
++	rc = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__RANDMMAP, &isec->avcr, NULL);
++	if (!rc) {
++		flags |= PF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
++	}
++	rc = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__SEGMEXEC, &isec->avcr, NULL);
++	if (!rc) {
++		flags |= PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++	}
++
++	if (selinux_enforcing) {
++		/* pull all the pax flags in current */
++		current->flags &= ~(PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP | PF_PAX_MPROTECT | PF_PAX_RANDMMAP | PF_PAX_RANDEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC);
++		/* and add ours */
++		current->flags |= flags;
++
++		if (pax_check_flags(&current->flags) < 0) {
++			security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
++			printk(KERN_WARNING "avc: PaX flags overridden to %lx for %s (%s)\n",
++				current->flags,
++				scontext,
++				bprm->filename);
++			kfree(scontext);
++		}
++	}
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS */
++
++
+ struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
+ 	.ptrace =			selinux_ptrace,
+ 	.capget =			selinux_capget,
+@@ -3370,6 +3432,11 @@
+ {
+ 	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
+ 
++	#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS
++	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Setting PaX callback function.\n");
++	pax_set_flags_func = avc_pax_set_flags;
++	#endif
++
+ 	/* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
+ 	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
+ 	spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1.orig/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+--- linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1.orig/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h	2004-02-22 23:03:26.000000000 -0600
++++ linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h	2004-02-20 16:50:39.000000000 -0600
+@@ -114,6 +120,12 @@
+    { SECCLASS_PASSWD, PASSWD__PASSWD, "passwd" },
+    { SECCLASS_PASSWD, PASSWD__CHFN, "chfn" },
+    { SECCLASS_PASSWD, PASSWD__CHSH, "chsh" },
++   { SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__PAGEEXEC, "pageexec" },
++   { SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__EMUTRAMP, "emutramp" },
++   { SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__MPROTECT, "mprotect" },
++   { SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__RANDMMAP, "randmmap" },
++   { SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__RANDEXEC, "randexec" },
++   { SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__SEGMEXEC, "segmexec" },
+ };
+ 
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1.orig/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+--- linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1.orig/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h	2004-02-22 23:03:26.000000000 -0600
++++ linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h	2004-02-20 16:50:40.000000000 -0600
+@@ -546,5 +554,12 @@
+ #define PASSWD__CHFN                              0x00000002UL
+ #define PASSWD__CHSH                              0x00000004UL
+ 
++#define PAX__PAGEEXEC                             0x00000001UL
++#define PAX__EMUTRAMP                             0x00000002UL
++#define PAX__MPROTECT                             0x00000004UL
++#define PAX__RANDMMAP                             0x00000008UL
++#define PAX__RANDEXEC                             0x00000010UL
++#define PAX__SEGMEXEC                             0x00000020UL
++
+ 
+ /* FLASK */
+diff -urN linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1.orig/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
+--- linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1.orig/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h	2004-02-22 23:03:26.000000000 -0600
++++ linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h	2004-02-20 16:50:40.000000000 -0600
+@@ -35,5 +35,6 @@
+     "shm",
+     "ipc",
+     "passwd",
++    "pax",
+ };
+ 
+diff -urN linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1.orig/security/selinux/include/flask.h linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+--- linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1.orig/security/selinux/include/flask.h	2004-02-22 23:03:26.000000000 -0600
++++ linux-2.4.24-hardened-r1/security/selinux/include/flask.h	2004-02-20 16:50:41.000000000 -0600
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
+ #define SECCLASS_SHM                                     28
+ #define SECCLASS_IPC                                     29
+ #define SECCLASS_PASSWD                                  30
++#define SECCLASS_PAX                                     31
+ 
+ /*
+  * Security identifier indices for initial entities
diff --git a/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/1305_linux-2.6.4-selinux-ipaddr.patch b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/1305_linux-2.6.4-selinux-ipaddr.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c1a9c2f0a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/1305_linux-2.6.4-selinux-ipaddr.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+--- linux-2.6.3-openpax/security/selinux/avc.c	2004-02-17 21:58:52.000000000 -0600
++++ linux-2.6.3/security/selinux/avc.c	2004-03-07 18:24:57.000000000 -0600
+@@ -143,6 +143,11 @@
+ 	char *scontext;
+ 	u32 scontext_len;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++	if (current->curr_ip)
++		printk("ipaddr=%u.%u.%u.%u ", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
++#endif /* CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR */
++
+  	rc = security_sid_to_context(ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+ 	if (rc)
+ 		printk("ssid=%d", ssid);
diff --git a/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/1310_linux-2.6.5-extra_sec_ops.patch b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/1310_linux-2.6.5-extra_sec_ops.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fee0ff623e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/1310_linux-2.6.5-extra_sec_ops.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+--- linux-2.6.4/security/selinux/hooks.c	2004-04-13 00:51:48.225259424 -0500
++++ linux-2.6.5-hardened/security/selinux/hooks.c	2004-04-13 00:34:15.067464600 -0500
+@@ -1673,6 +1673,11 @@
+ 
+ static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ {
++	int rc;
++
++	rc = secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
++	if (rc) 
++		return rc;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2013,6 +2018,11 @@
+ 
+ static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+ {
++	int rc;
++	
++	rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
++	if (rc)
++		return rc;
+ 	return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2081,11 +2091,17 @@
+ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+ 				    struct nameidata *nd)
+ {
++	int rc;
++
+ 	if (!mask) {
+ 		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
++	rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
++	if (rc)
++		return rc;
++
+ 	return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
+ 			       file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL, NULL);
+ }
+@@ -2358,6 +2374,7 @@
+ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+ {
+ 	u32 av;
++	int rc;
+ 
+ 	if (file) {
+ 		/* read access is always possible with a mapping */
+@@ -2369,6 +2386,10 @@
+ 
+ 		if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+ 			av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
++	
++		rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, prot, flags);
++		if (rc)
++			return rc;
+ 
+ 		return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
+ 	}
diff --git a/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/2005_modules_off-2.6.3.patch b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/2005_modules_off-2.6.3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..73d9f8c411
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/2005_modules_off-2.6.3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.3-vanilla/fs/proc/proc_misc.c modules_off/linux-2.6.3-modules_off/fs/proc/proc_misc.c
+--- linux-2.6.3-vanilla/fs/proc/proc_misc.c	2004-02-18 04:57:16.000000000 +0100
++++ modules_off/linux-2.6.3-modules_off/fs/proc/proc_misc.c	2004-03-09 19:10:10.016286832 +0100
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern int get_locks_status (char *, cha
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SGI_DS1286
+ extern int get_ds1286_status(char *);
+ #endif
++extern int module_loading_enabled;
+ 
+ static int proc_calc_metrics(char *page, char **start, off_t off,
+ 				 int count, int *eof, int len)
+@@ -334,9 +335,31 @@ static int modules_open(struct inode *in
+ {
+ 	return seq_open(file, &modules_op);
+ }
++
++static int modules_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
++                                   size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
++{
++                char tmp[4];
++
++		if (!count)
++		    return -EINVAL;
++		if (count > 4)
++		    count = 4;
++		if (copy_from_user(&tmp[0], buf, count))
++		    return -EFAULT;
++		if (tmp[0]=='o') {
++		    printk(KERN_INFO "Disabled module (un)loading\n");
++		    module_loading_enabled = 0;
++		}
++		
++		return count;
++
++}
++
+ static struct file_operations proc_modules_operations = {
+ 	.open		= modules_open,
+ 	.read		= seq_read,
++	.write		= modules_write,
+ 	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
+ 	.release	= seq_release,
+ };
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.3-vanilla/kernel/module.c modules_off/linux-2.6.3-modules_off/kernel/module.c
+--- linux-2.6.3-vanilla/kernel/module.c	2004-02-18 04:58:48.000000000 +0100
++++ modules_off/linux-2.6.3-modules_off/kernel/module.c	2004-03-09 18:47:10.709973264 +0100
+@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
+ #define symbol_is(literal, string)				\
+ 	(strcmp(MODULE_SYMBOL_PREFIX literal, (string)) == 0)
+ 
++int module_loading_enabled = 1;
++
+ /* Protects module list */
+ static spinlock_t modlist_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
+ 
+@@ -667,6 +669,9 @@ sys_delete_module(const char __user *nam
+ 
+ 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
+ 		return -EPERM;
++		
++	if (!module_loading_enabled)
++		return -ENOSYS;
+ 
+ 	if (strncpy_from_user(name, name_user, MODULE_NAME_LEN-1) < 0)
+ 		return -EFAULT;
+@@ -1720,6 +1725,9 @@ sys_init_module(void __user *umod,
+ 	/* Must have permission */
+ 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
+ 		return -EPERM;
++		
++	if (!module_loading_enabled)
++		return -ENOSYS;
+ 
+ 	/* Only one module load at a time, please */
+ 	if (down_interruptible(&module_mutex) != 0)
diff --git a/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/2010_tcp-stealth-2.6.7.patch b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/2010_tcp-stealth-2.6.7.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cd2eb529cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/2010_tcp-stealth-2.6.7.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/include/linux/sysctl.h linux-2.6.7-tcp-stealth/include/linux/sysctl.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/sysctl.h	2004-06-16 07:19:35.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-tcp-stealth/include/linux/sysctl.h	2004-06-24 11:27:56.753248176 +0200
+@@ -338,6 +338,10 @@ enum
+ 	NET_TCP_BIC_LOW_WINDOW=104,
+ 	NET_TCP_DEFAULT_WIN_SCALE=105,
+ 	NET_TCP_MODERATE_RCVBUF=106,
++        NET_IPV4_IP_MASQ_UDP_DLOOSE=107,
++        NET_TCP_STACK_SYNFIN=108,
++        NET_TCP_STACK_BOGUS=109,
++        NET_TCP_STACK_ACK=110,
+ };
+ 
+ enum {
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/Kconfig linux-2.6.7-tcp-stealth/net/ipv4/Kconfig
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/Kconfig	2004-06-16 07:19:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-tcp-stealth/net/ipv4/Kconfig	2004-06-24 11:25:42.504657064 +0200
+@@ -324,6 +324,29 @@ config SYN_COOKIES
+ 
+ 	  If unsure, say N.
+ 
++config NET_STEALTH
++	bool "IP: TCP stealth options (enabled per default)"
++	depends on INET
++	default n
++	---help---
++	  If you say Y here, note that these options are now enabled by
++	  default; you can disable them by executing the commands
++
++	    echo 0 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_ignore_ack
++	    echo 0 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_ignore_bogus
++	    echo 0 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_ignore_synfin
++
++	  at boot time after the /proc file system has been mounted.
++
++	  If security is more important, say Y.
++
++config NET_STEALTH_LOG
++	bool 'Log all dropped packets'
++	depends on NET_STEALTH
++	---help---
++	  This turns on a logging facility that logs all tcp packets with
++	  bad flags.  If you said Y to "TCP stealth options", say Y too.
++
+ config INET_AH
+ 	tristate "IP: AH transformation"
+ 	select XFRM
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c linux-2.6.7-tcp-stealth/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c	2004-06-16 07:19:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-tcp-stealth/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c	2004-06-24 11:25:42.516655240 +0200
+@@ -48,6 +48,11 @@ extern int inet_peer_maxttl;
+ extern int inet_peer_gc_mintime;
+ extern int inet_peer_gc_maxtime;
+ 
++/* stealth stuff */
++extern int sysctl_tcp_ignore_synfin;
++extern int sysctl_tcp_ignore_bogus;
++extern int sysctl_tcp_ignore_ack;
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+ static int tcp_retr1_max = 255; 
+ static int ip_local_port_range_min[] = { 1, 1 };
+@@ -320,6 +325,32 @@ ctl_table ipv4_table[] = {
+ 		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec
+ 	},
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_STEALTH
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= NET_TCP_STACK_SYNFIN,
++		.procname	= "tcp_ignore_synfin",
++		.data		= &sysctl_tcp_ignore_synfin,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec
++	},
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= NET_TCP_STACK_BOGUS,
++		.procname	= "tcp_ignore_bogus",
++		.data		= &sysctl_tcp_ignore_bogus,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec
++	},
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= NET_TCP_STACK_ACK,
++		.procname	= "tcp_ignore_ack",
++		.data		= &sysctl_tcp_ignore_ack,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec
++	},
++#endif
+ 	{
+ 		.ctl_name	= NET_TCP_TW_RECYCLE,
+ 		.procname	= "tcp_tw_recycle",
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c linux-2.6.7-tcp-stealth/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c	2004-06-16 07:19:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-tcp-stealth/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c	2004-06-24 11:25:42.538651896 +0200
+@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@
+ int sysctl_tcp_timestamps = 1;
+ int sysctl_tcp_window_scaling = 1;
+ int sysctl_tcp_sack = 1;
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_STEALTH
++int sysctl_tcp_ignore_synfin = 1;
++int sysctl_tcp_ignore_bogus = 1;
++int sysctl_tcp_ignore_ack = 1;
++#endif
+ int sysctl_tcp_fack = 1;
+ int sysctl_tcp_reordering = TCP_FASTRETRANS_THRESH;
+ int sysctl_tcp_ecn;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c linux-2.6.7-tcp-stealth/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c	2004-06-16 07:19:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-tcp-stealth/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c	2004-06-24 11:25:42.551649920 +0200
+@@ -79,6 +79,12 @@ extern int sysctl_ip_dynaddr;
+ int sysctl_tcp_tw_reuse;
+ int sysctl_tcp_low_latency;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_STEALTH
++extern int sysctl_tcp_ignore_synfin;
++extern int sysctl_tcp_ignore_bogus;
++extern int sysctl_tcp_ignore_ack;
++#endif
++
+ /* Check TCP sequence numbers in ICMP packets. */
+ #define ICMP_MIN_LENGTH 8
+ 
+@@ -1763,6 +1769,23 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ 	     tcp_v4_checksum_init(skb) < 0))
+ 		goto bad_packet;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_STEALTH
++	if(sysctl_tcp_ignore_synfin) {
++		if(th->fin && th->syn)
++			goto tcp_bad_flags;
++	}
++
++	if(sysctl_tcp_ignore_bogus) {
++		if(!(th->ack || th->syn || th->rst) || th->res1)
++			goto tcp_bad_flags;
++	}
++
++	if(sysctl_tcp_ignore_ack) { 
++		if(th->fin && th->psh && th->urg)
++			goto tcp_bad_flags;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	th = skb->h.th;
+ 	TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
+ 	TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th->syn + th->fin +
+@@ -1804,6 +1827,33 @@ process:
+ 
+ 	return ret;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_STEALTH_LOG
++tcp_bad_flags:
++	printk(KERN_INFO
++		"Packet log: badflag DENY %s PROTO=TCP %d.%d.%d.%d:%d "
++		"%d.%d.%d.%d:%d L=%hu:%u:%u S=0x%2.2hX I=%hu:%u:%u "
++		"T=%hu %c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c\n",
++		skb->dev->name, NIPQUAD(skb->nh.iph->saddr), ntohs(th->source),
++		NIPQUAD(skb->nh.iph->daddr), ntohs(th->dest),
++		ntohs(skb->nh.iph->tot_len), skb->len, skb->len - th->doff*4,
++		skb->nh.iph->tos, ntohs(skb->nh.iph->id), ntohl(th->seq),
++		ntohl(th->ack_seq), skb->nh.iph->ttl,
++		th->res1 ? '1' : '.',
++		th->ece ? 'E' : '.',
++		th->cwr ? 'C' : '.',
++		th->ack ? 'A' : '.',
++		th->syn ? 'S' : '.',
++		th->fin ? 'F' : '.',
++		th->rst ? 'R' : '.',
++		th->psh ? 'P' : '.',
++		th->urg ? 'U' : '.' );
++	goto bad_packet;
++#else
++tcp_bad_flags:
++	goto bad_packet;
++
++#endif	/* CONFIG_NET_STEALTH_LOG */
++
+ no_tcp_socket:
+ 	if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
+ 		goto discard_it;
diff --git a/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/2015_tcp-nmap-freak-2.6.7.patch b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/2015_tcp-nmap-freak-2.6.7.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c2f1a4bdff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/2015_tcp-nmap-freak-2.6.7.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/include/linux/sysctl.h linux-2.6.7-tcp-nmap-freak/include/linux/sysctl.h
+--- linux-2.6.7/include/linux/sysctl.h	2004-06-24 11:46:04.972813656 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-tcp-nmap-freak/include/linux/sysctl.h	2004-06-24 11:45:38.577826304 +0200
+@@ -342,6 +342,8 @@ enum
+         NET_TCP_STACK_SYNFIN=108,
+         NET_TCP_STACK_BOGUS=109,
+         NET_TCP_STACK_ACK=110,
++        NET_IPV4_ICMP_RESTRICT=111,
++        NET_IPV4_TCP_RESTRICT=112,
+ };
+ 
+ enum {
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/icmp.c linux-2.6.7-tcp-nmap-freak/net/ipv4/icmp.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/icmp.c	2004-06-16 07:20:03.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-tcp-nmap-freak/net/ipv4/icmp.c	2004-06-24 11:42:41.157798248 +0200
+@@ -190,6 +190,10 @@ struct icmp_err icmp_err_convert[] = {
+ int sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_all;
+ int sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_IP_NMAP_FREAK
++int sysctl_icmp_restrict = 0;
++#endif
++
+ /* Control parameter - ignore bogus broadcast responses? */
+ int sysctl_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses;
+ 
+@@ -782,7 +786,12 @@ static void icmp_echo(struct sk_buff *sk
+ 		icmp_param.offset	   = 0;
+ 		icmp_param.data_len	   = skb->len;
+ 		icmp_param.head_len	   = sizeof(struct icmphdr);
++#ifdef CONFIG_IP_NMAP_FREAK
++		if (!sysctl_icmp_restrict)
++			icmp_reply(&icmp_param, skb);
++#else
+ 		icmp_reply(&icmp_param, skb);
++#endif
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/Kconfig linux-2.6.7-tcp-nmap-freak/net/ipv4/Kconfig
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/Kconfig	2004-06-24 11:46:05.000809400 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-tcp-nmap-freak/net/ipv4/Kconfig	2004-06-24 11:44:48.391455792 +0200
+@@ -324,6 +324,21 @@ config SYN_COOKIES
+ 
+ 	  If unsure, say N.
+ 
++config IP_NMAP_FREAK
++	bool "IP: NMAP freak (disabled per default)"
++	depends on INET
++	default n
++	---help---
++	  This is a feature to prevent stealth,fin,rst scans and slows down
++	  the tcp connect scan, it also does not show the Operating System.
++
++	  You can turn this on(1) and off(0) using /proc
++
++	   echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_restrict
++	   echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_restrict
++
++	  If unsure, say N.
++
+ config NET_STEALTH
+ 	bool "IP: TCP stealth options (enabled per default)"
+ 	depends on INET
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c linux-2.6.7-tcp-nmap-freak/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c	2004-06-24 11:46:05.015807120 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-tcp-nmap-freak/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c	2004-06-24 11:44:48.393455488 +0200
+@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@ extern int sysctl_ip_dynaddr;
+ extern int sysctl_icmp_ratelimit;
+ extern int sysctl_icmp_ratemask;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_IP_NMAP_FREAK
++extern int sysctl_icmp_restrict;
++extern int sysctl_tcp_restrict;
++#endif
++
+ /* From igmp.c */
+ extern int sysctl_igmp_max_memberships;
+ extern int sysctl_igmp_max_msf;
+@@ -325,6 +330,24 @@ ctl_table ipv4_table[] = {
+ 		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec
+ 	},
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_IP_NMAP_FREAK
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= NET_IPV4_ICMP_RESTRICT,
++		.procname	= "icmp_restrict",
++		.data		= &sysctl_icmp_restrict,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec
++	},
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= NET_IPV4_TCP_RESTRICT,
++		.procname	= "tcp_restrict",
++		.data		= &sysctl_tcp_restrict,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec
++	},
++#endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_NET_STEALTH
+ 	{
+ 		.ctl_name	= NET_TCP_STACK_SYNFIN,
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c linux-2.6.7-tcp-nmap-freak/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c	2004-06-24 11:46:05.115791920 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-tcp-nmap-freak/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c	2004-06-24 11:44:48.427450320 +0200
+@@ -79,6 +79,10 @@ extern int sysctl_ip_dynaddr;
+ int sysctl_tcp_tw_reuse;
+ int sysctl_tcp_low_latency;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_IP_NMAP_FREAK
++int sysctl_tcp_restrict = 0;
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_NET_STEALTH
+ extern int sysctl_tcp_ignore_synfin;
+ extern int sysctl_tcp_ignore_bogus;
+@@ -1179,6 +1183,11 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(struct sk_
+ 	struct tcphdr rth;
+ 	struct ip_reply_arg arg;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_IP_NMAP_FREAK
++	if (sysctl_tcp_restrict)
++		return;
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Never send a reset in response to a reset. */
+ 	if (th->rst)
+ 		return;
diff --git a/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/3000_netdev-random-core-2.6.7.patch b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/3000_netdev-random-core-2.6.7.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..40f1b0132e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/3000_netdev-random-core-2.6.7.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/Kconfig linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/Kconfig
+--- /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/Kconfig	2004-06-16 07:19:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/Kconfig	2004-06-23 23:16:46.124597472 +0200
+@@ -104,6 +104,22 @@ config TUN
+ 
+ 	  If you don't know what to use this for, you don't need it.
+ 
++config NET_RANDOM
++	bool "Allow Net Devices to contribute to /dev/random"
++	depends on NETDEVICES && EXPERIMENTAL
++	---help---
++    	  If you say Y here, network device interrupts will contribute to the
++          kernel entropy pool. Normally, block devices and some other devices
++          feed the pool. Some systems, such as those that are headless or diskless,
++          need additional entropy sources.  Some people, however, feel that network
++          devices should not contribute to /dev/random because an external attacker
++          could observe incoming packets in an attempt to learn the entropy pool's
++          state.  If you say N, no network device will contribute entropy.
++
++          If you believe there is a chance of your network packets being observed
++          and you doubt the security of the entropy pool's one-way hash, do not
++	  enable this.  If unsure, say N.
++
+ config ETHERTAP
+ 	tristate "Ethertap network tap"
+ 	depends on NETDEVICES && EXPERIMENTAL && NETLINK_DEV
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/signal.h linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-alpha/signal.h
+--- /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-alpha/signal.h	2004-06-16 07:19:23.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-alpha/signal.h	2004-06-23 23:16:46.133596104 +0200
+@@ -121,8 +121,15 @@ typedef unsigned long sigset_t;
+ #define SA_PROBE		SA_ONESHOT
+ #define SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM	SA_RESTART
+ #define SA_SHIRQ		0x40000000
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDOM
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM
++#else
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	0
+ #endif
+ 
++#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
++
+ #define SIG_BLOCK          1	/* for blocking signals */
+ #define SIG_UNBLOCK        2	/* for unblocking signals */
+ #define SIG_SETMASK        3	/* for setting the signal mask */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-arm/signal.h linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-arm/signal.h
+--- /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-arm/signal.h	2004-06-16 07:19:22.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-arm/signal.h	2004-06-23 23:16:46.141594888 +0200
+@@ -126,8 +126,15 @@ typedef unsigned long sigset_t;
+ #define SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM	0x10000000
+ #define SA_IRQNOMASK		0x08000000
+ #define SA_SHIRQ		0x04000000
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDOM
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM
++#else
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	0
+ #endif
+ 
++#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
++
+ #define SIG_BLOCK          0	/* for blocking signals */
+ #define SIG_UNBLOCK        1	/* for unblocking signals */
+ #define SIG_SETMASK        2	/* for setting the signal mask */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-cris/signal.h linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-cris/signal.h
+--- /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-cris/signal.h	2004-06-16 07:19:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-cris/signal.h	2004-06-23 23:16:46.152593216 +0200
+@@ -120,8 +120,15 @@ typedef unsigned long sigset_t;
+ #define SA_PROBE		SA_ONESHOT
+ #define SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM	SA_RESTART
+ #define SA_SHIRQ		0x04000000
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDOM
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM
++#else
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	0
+ #endif
+ 
++#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
++
+ #define SIG_BLOCK          0	/* for blocking signals */
+ #define SIG_UNBLOCK        1	/* for unblocking signals */
+ #define SIG_SETMASK        2	/* for setting the signal mask */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/signal.h linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-i386/signal.h
+--- /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-i386/signal.h	2004-06-16 07:18:59.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-i386/signal.h	2004-06-23 23:16:46.161591848 +0200
+@@ -121,8 +121,15 @@ typedef unsigned long sigset_t;
+ #define SA_PROBE		SA_ONESHOT
+ #define SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM	SA_RESTART
+ #define SA_SHIRQ		0x04000000
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDOM
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM
++#else
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	0
+ #endif
+ 
++#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
++
+ #define SIG_BLOCK          0	/* for blocking signals */
+ #define SIG_UNBLOCK        1	/* for unblocking signals */
+ #define SIG_SETMASK        2	/* for setting the signal mask */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/signal.h linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-ia64/signal.h
+--- /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ia64/signal.h	2004-06-16 07:18:58.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-ia64/signal.h	2004-06-23 23:16:46.169590632 +0200
+@@ -126,6 +126,12 @@
+ #define SA_SHIRQ		0x04000000
+ #define SA_PERCPU_IRQ		0x02000000
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDOM
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM
++#else
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	0
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ 
+ #define SIG_BLOCK          0	/* for blocking signals */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-m68k/signal.h linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-m68k/signal.h
+--- /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-m68k/signal.h	2004-06-16 07:19:01.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-m68k/signal.h	2004-06-23 23:16:46.178589264 +0200
+@@ -116,8 +116,15 @@ typedef unsigned long sigset_t;
+ #define SA_PROBE		SA_ONESHOT
+ #define SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM	SA_RESTART
+ #define SA_SHIRQ		0x04000000
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDOM
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM
++#else
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	0
+ #endif
+ 
++#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
++
+ #define SIG_BLOCK          0	/* for blocking signals */
+ #define SIG_UNBLOCK        1	/* for unblocking signals */
+ #define SIG_SETMASK        2	/* for setting the signal mask */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-mips/signal.h linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-mips/signal.h
+--- /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-mips/signal.h	2004-06-16 07:19:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-mips/signal.h	2004-06-23 23:16:46.188587744 +0200
+@@ -111,6 +111,12 @@ typedef unsigned long old_sigset_t;		/* 
+ #define SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM	SA_RESTART
+ #define SA_SHIRQ		0x02000000
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDOM
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM
++#else
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	0
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ 
+ #define SIG_BLOCK	1	/* for blocking signals */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/signal.h linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-parisc/signal.h
+--- /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-parisc/signal.h	2004-06-16 07:20:04.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-parisc/signal.h	2004-06-23 23:16:46.223582424 +0200
+@@ -100,6 +100,12 @@
+ #define SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM	SA_RESTART
+ #define SA_SHIRQ		0x04000000
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDOM
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM
++#else
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	0
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ 
+ #define SIG_BLOCK          0	/* for blocking signals */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/signal.h linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-ppc64/signal.h
+--- /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-ppc64/signal.h	2004-06-16 07:19:22.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-ppc64/signal.h	2004-06-23 23:16:46.231581208 +0200
+@@ -107,8 +107,15 @@ typedef struct {
+ #define SA_PROBE		SA_ONESHOT
+ #define SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM	SA_RESTART
+ #define SA_SHIRQ		0x04000000
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDOM
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM
++#else
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	0
+ #endif
+ 
++#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
++
+ #define SIG_BLOCK          0	/* for blocking signals */
+ #define SIG_UNBLOCK        1	/* for unblocking signals */
+ #define SIG_SETMASK        2	/* for setting the signal mask */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-s390/signal.h linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-s390/signal.h
+--- /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-s390/signal.h	2004-06-16 07:19:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-s390/signal.h	2004-06-23 23:16:46.240579840 +0200
+@@ -129,8 +129,15 @@ typedef unsigned long sigset_t;
+ #define SA_PROBE                SA_ONESHOT
+ #define SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM        SA_RESTART
+ #define SA_SHIRQ                0x04000000
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDOM
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM
++#else
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	0
+ #endif
+ 
++#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
++
+ #define SIG_BLOCK          0    /* for blocking signals */
+ #define SIG_UNBLOCK        1    /* for unblocking signals */
+ #define SIG_SETMASK        2    /* for setting the signal mask */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sh/signal.h linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-sh/signal.h
+--- /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sh/signal.h	2004-06-16 07:19:36.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-sh/signal.h	2004-06-23 23:16:46.257577256 +0200
+@@ -120,8 +120,15 @@ typedef unsigned long sigset_t;
+ #define SA_PROBE		SA_ONESHOT
+ #define SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM	SA_RESTART
+ #define SA_SHIRQ		0x04000000
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDOM
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM
++#else
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	0
+ #endif
+ 
++#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
++
+ #define SIG_BLOCK          0	/* for blocking signals */
+ #define SIG_UNBLOCK        1	/* for unblocking signals */
+ #define SIG_SETMASK        2	/* for setting the signal mask */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/signal.h linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-sparc/signal.h
+--- /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc/signal.h	2004-06-16 07:19:36.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-sparc/signal.h	2004-06-23 23:16:46.268575584 +0200
+@@ -176,8 +176,15 @@ struct sigstack {
+ #define SA_PROBE SA_ONESHOT
+ #define SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM SA_RESTART
+ #define SA_STATIC_ALLOC		0x80
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDOM
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM
++#else
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	0
+ #endif
+ 
++#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
++
+ /* Type of a signal handler.  */
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+ typedef void (*__sighandler_t)(int, int, struct sigcontext *, char *);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/signal.h linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-sparc64/signal.h
+--- /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-sparc64/signal.h	2004-06-16 07:19:02.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-sparc64/signal.h	2004-06-23 23:16:46.278574064 +0200
+@@ -182,8 +182,15 @@ struct sigstack {
+ #define SA_PROBE SA_ONESHOT
+ #define SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM SA_RESTART
+ #define SA_STATIC_ALLOC		0x80
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDOM
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM
++#else
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	0
+ #endif
+ 
++#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
++
+ /* Type of a signal handler.  */
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+ typedef void (*__sighandler_t)(int, struct sigcontext *);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/signal.h linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-x86_64/signal.h
+--- /home/albeiro/src/rsbac/linux-2.6.7/include/asm-x86_64/signal.h	2004-06-16 07:18:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/include/asm-x86_64/signal.h	2004-06-23 23:16:46.288572544 +0200
+@@ -128,8 +128,15 @@ typedef unsigned long sigset_t;
+ #define SA_PROBE		SA_ONESHOT
+ #define SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM	SA_RESTART
+ #define SA_SHIRQ		0x04000000
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDOM
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM
++#else
++#define SA_NET_RANDOM	0
+ #endif
+ 
++#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
++
+ #define SIG_BLOCK          0	/* for blocking signals */
+ #define SIG_UNBLOCK        1	/* for unblocking signals */
+ #define SIG_SETMASK        2	/* for setting the signal mask */
diff --git a/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/3005_netdev-random-drivers-2.6.7.patch b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/3005_netdev-random-drivers-2.6.7.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c462150bd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-7.1/3005_netdev-random-drivers-2.6.7.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,2362 @@
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c501.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c501.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c501.c	2004-06-16 07:18:45.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c501.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.089264664 +0200
+@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static int el_open(struct net_device *de
+ 	if (el_debug > 2)
+ 		printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Doing el_open()...", dev->name);
+ 
+-	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &el_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev)))
++	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &el_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)))
+ 		return retval;
+ 
+ 	spin_lock_irqsave(&lp->lock, flags);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c503.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c503.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c503.c	2004-06-16 07:19:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c503.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.094263904 +0200
+@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ el2_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 		outb_p(0x00, E33G_IDCFR);
+ 		if (*irqp == probe_irq_off(cookie)	/* It's a good IRQ line! */
+ 		    && ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq = *irqp, 
+-		    ei_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev)) == 0))
++		    ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)) == 0))
+ 		    break;
+ 	    }
+ 	} while (*++irqp);
+@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ el2_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 	    return retval;
+ 	}
+     } else {
+-	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev))) {
++	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev))) {
+ 	    return retval;
+ 	}
+     }
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c505.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c505.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c505.c	2004-06-16 07:20:26.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c505.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.097263448 +0200
+@@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ static int elp_open(struct net_device *d
+ 	/*
+ 	 * install our interrupt service routine
+ 	 */
+-	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &elp_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev))) {
++	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &elp_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev))) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: could not allocate IRQ%d\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		return retval;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c507.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c507.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c507.c	2004-06-16 07:19:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c507.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.102262688 +0200
+@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ static int __init el16_probe1(struct net
+ 
+ 	irq = inb(ioaddr + IRQ_CONFIG) & 0x0f;
+ 
+-	irqval = request_irq(irq, &el16_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++	irqval = request_irq(irq, &el16_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (irqval) {
+ 		printk ("unable to get IRQ %d (irqval=%d).\n", irq, irqval);
+ 		retval = -EAGAIN;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c509.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c509.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c509.c	2004-06-16 07:18:55.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c509.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.105262232 +0200
+@@ -809,7 +809,7 @@ el3_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 	outw(RxReset, ioaddr + EL3_CMD);
+ 	outw(SetStatusEnb | 0x00, ioaddr + EL3_CMD);
+ 
+-	i = request_irq(dev->irq, &el3_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++	i = request_irq(dev->irq, &el3_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (i)
+ 		return i;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c515.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c515.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c515.c	2004-06-16 07:18:59.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c515.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.176251440 +0200
+@@ -756,11 +756,11 @@ static int corkscrew_open(struct net_dev
+ 		/* Corkscrew: Cannot share ISA resources. */
+ 		if (dev->irq == 0
+ 		    || dev->dma == 0
+-		    || request_irq(dev->irq, &corkscrew_interrupt, 0,
++		    || request_irq(dev->irq, &corkscrew_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 				   vp->product_name, dev)) return -EAGAIN;
+ 		enable_dma(dev->dma);
+ 		set_dma_mode(dev->dma, DMA_MODE_CASCADE);
+-	} else if (request_irq(dev->irq, &corkscrew_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ,
++	} else if (request_irq(dev->irq, &corkscrew_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			       vp->product_name, dev)) {
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c523.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c523.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c523.c	2004-06-16 07:19:23.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c523.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.182250528 +0200
+@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ static int elmc_open(struct net_device *
+ 
+ 	elmc_id_attn586();	/* disable interrupts */
+ 
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &elmc_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM,
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &elmc_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			  dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (ret) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: couldn't get irq %d\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c527.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c527.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c527.c	2004-06-16 07:19:36.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c527.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.195248552 +0200
+@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ static int __init mc32_probe1(struct net
+ 	 *	Grab the IRQ
+ 	 */
+ 
+-	err = request_irq(dev->irq, &mc32_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
++	err = request_irq(dev->irq, &mc32_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (err) {
+ 		release_region(dev->base_addr, MC32_IO_EXTENT);
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: unable to get IRQ %d.\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c59x.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c59x.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/3c59x.c	2004-06-16 07:18:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/3c59x.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.209246424 +0200
+@@ -1735,7 +1735,7 @@ vortex_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 
+ 	/* Use the now-standard shared IRQ implementation. */
+ 	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, vp->full_bus_master_rx ?
+-				&boomerang_interrupt : &vortex_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev))) {
++				&boomerang_interrupt : &vortex_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev))) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Could not reserve IRQ %d\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/7990.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/7990.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/7990.c	2004-06-16 07:19:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/7990.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.215245512 +0200
+@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ int lance_open (struct net_device *dev)
+         DECLARE_LL;
+         
+         /* Install the Interrupt handler. Or we could shunt this out to specific drivers? */
+-        if (request_irq(lp->irq, lance_interrupt, 0, lp->name, dev))
++        if (request_irq(lp->irq, lance_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, lp->name, dev))
+                 return -EAGAIN;
+ 
+         res = lance_reset(dev);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/8139cp.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/8139cp.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/8139cp.c	2004-06-16 07:19:22.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/8139cp.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.230243232 +0200
+@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ static int cp_open (struct net_device *d
+ 
+ 	cp_init_hw(cp);
+ 
+-	rc = request_irq(dev->irq, cp_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	rc = request_irq(dev->irq, cp_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (rc)
+ 		goto err_out_hw;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/8139too.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/8139too.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/8139too.c	2004-06-16 07:18:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/8139too.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.244241104 +0200
+@@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ static int rtl8139_open (struct net_devi
+ 	int retval;
+ 	void *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr;
+ 
+-	retval = request_irq (dev->irq, rtl8139_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	retval = request_irq (dev->irq, rtl8139_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (retval)
+ 		return retval;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/82596.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/82596.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/82596.c	2004-06-16 07:19:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/82596.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.252239888 +0200
+@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ static int i596_open(struct net_device *
+ 
+ 	DEB(DEB_OPEN,printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: i596_open() irq %d.\n", dev->name, dev->irq));
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, i596_interrupt, 0, "i82596", dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, i596_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "i82596", dev)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: IRQ %d not free\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/a2065.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/a2065.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/a2065.c	2004-06-16 07:19:36.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/a2065.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.267237608 +0200
+@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ static int lance_open (struct net_device
+ 	ll->rdp = LE_C0_STOP;
+ 
+ 	/* Install the Interrupt handler */
+-	ret = request_irq(IRQ_AMIGA_PORTS, lance_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ,
++	ret = request_irq(IRQ_AMIGA_PORTS, lance_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			  dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (ret) return ret;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ac3200.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ac3200.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ac3200.c	2004-06-16 07:19:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ac3200.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.274236544 +0200
+@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ static int __init ac_probe1(int ioaddr, 
+ 		printk(", assigning");
+ 	}
+ 
+-	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (retval) {
+ 		printk (" nothing! Unable to get IRQ %d.\n", dev->irq);
+ 		goto out1;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/acenic.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/acenic.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/acenic.c	2004-06-16 07:19:22.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/acenic.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.291233960 +0200
+@@ -1194,7 +1194,7 @@ static int __init ace_init(struct net_de
+ 		goto init_error;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	ecode = request_irq(pdev->irq, ace_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ,
++	ecode = request_irq(pdev->irq, ace_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			    dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (ecode) {
+ 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Requested IRQ %d is busy\n",
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/amd8111e.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/amd8111e.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/amd8111e.c	2004-06-16 07:19:36.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/amd8111e.c	2004-06-24 10:46:11.580092384 +0200
+@@ -1372,7 +1372,7 @@ static int amd8111e_open(struct net_devi
+ {
+ 	struct amd8111e_priv *lp = netdev_priv(dev);
+ 
+-	if(dev->irq ==0 || request_irq(dev->irq, amd8111e_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ,
++	if(dev->irq ==0 || request_irq(dev->irq, amd8111e_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 					 dev->name, dev)) 
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/apne.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/apne.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/apne.c	2004-06-16 07:20:26.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/apne.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.301232440 +0200
+@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ static int __init apne_probe1(struct net
+     dev->base_addr = ioaddr;
+ 
+     /* Install the Interrupt handler */
+-    i = request_irq(IRQ_AMIGA_PORTS, apne_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++    i = request_irq(IRQ_AMIGA_PORTS, apne_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+     if (i) return i;
+ 
+     for(i = 0; i < ETHER_ADDR_LEN; i++) {
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/appletalk/cops.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/appletalk/cops.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/appletalk/cops.c	2004-06-16 07:19:23.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/appletalk/cops.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.325228792 +0200
+@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ static int __init cops_probe1(struct net
+ 
+ 	/* Reserve any actual interrupt. */
+ 	if (dev->irq) {
+-		retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &cops_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++		retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &cops_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 		if (retval)
+ 			goto err_out;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/appletalk/ltpc.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/appletalk/ltpc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/appletalk/ltpc.c	2004-06-16 07:19:03.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/appletalk/ltpc.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.333227576 +0200
+@@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ struct net_device * __init ltpc_probe(vo
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* grab it and don't let go :-) */
+-	if (irq && request_irq( irq, &ltpc_interrupt, 0, "ltpc", dev) >= 0)
++	if (irq && request_irq( irq, &ltpc_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "ltpc", dev) >= 0)
+ 	{
+ 		(void) inb_p(io+7);  /* enable interrupts from board */
+ 		(void) inb_p(io+7);  /* and reset irq line */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arcnet/arc-rimi.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arcnet/arc-rimi.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arcnet/arc-rimi.c	2004-06-16 07:18:56.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arcnet/arc-rimi.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.341226360 +0200
+@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static int __init arcrimi_found(struct n
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	/* reserve the irq */
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &arcnet_interrupt, 0, "arcnet (RIM I)", dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &arcnet_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "arcnet (RIM I)", dev)) {
+ 		release_mem_region(dev->mem_start, BUFFER_SIZE);
+ 		BUGMSG(D_NORMAL, "Can't get IRQ %d!\n", dev->irq);
+ 		return -ENODEV;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arcnet/com20020.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arcnet/com20020.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arcnet/com20020.c	2004-06-16 07:19:09.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arcnet/com20020.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.351224840 +0200
+@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ int com20020_found(struct net_device *de
+ 	outb(dev->dev_addr[0], _XREG);
+ 
+ 	/* reserve the irq */
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &arcnet_interrupt, shared,
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &arcnet_interrupt, shared | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			"arcnet (COM20020)", dev)) {
+ 		BUGMSG(D_NORMAL, "Can't get IRQ %d!\n", dev->irq);
+ 		return -ENODEV;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arcnet/com90io.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arcnet/com90io.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arcnet/com90io.c	2004-06-16 07:19:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arcnet/com90io.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.358223776 +0200
+@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static int __init com90io_found(struct n
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	/* Reserve the irq */
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &arcnet_interrupt, 0, "arcnet (COM90xx-IO)", dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &arcnet_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "arcnet (COM90xx-IO)", dev)) {
+ 		BUGMSG(D_NORMAL, "Can't get IRQ %d!\n", dev->irq);
+ 		return -ENODEV;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arcnet/com90xx.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arcnet/com90xx.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arcnet/com90xx.c	2004-06-16 07:19:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arcnet/com90xx.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.366222560 +0200
+@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ static int __init com90xx_found(int ioad
+ 		goto err_free_dev;
+ 
+ 	/* reserve the irq */
+-	if (request_irq(airq, &arcnet_interrupt, 0, "arcnet (90xx)", dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(airq, &arcnet_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "arcnet (90xx)", dev)) {
+ 		BUGMSG(D_NORMAL, "Can't get IRQ %d!\n", airq);
+ 		goto err_release_mem;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ariadne.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ariadne.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ariadne.c	2004-06-16 07:19:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ariadne.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.384219824 +0200
+@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static int ariadne_open(struct net_devic
+ 
+     netif_start_queue(dev);
+ 
+-    i = request_irq(IRQ_AMIGA_PORTS, ariadne_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ,
++    i = request_irq(IRQ_AMIGA_PORTS, ariadne_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+                     dev->name, dev);
+     if (i) return i;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arm/am79c961a.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arm/am79c961a.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arm/am79c961a.c	2004-06-16 07:19:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arm/am79c961a.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.398217696 +0200
+@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ am79c961_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 
+ 	memset (&priv->stats, 0, sizeof (priv->stats));
+ 
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, am79c961_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, am79c961_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arm/ether00.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arm/ether00.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arm/ether00.c	2004-06-16 07:20:26.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arm/ether00.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.414215264 +0200
+@@ -706,11 +706,11 @@ static int ether00_open(struct net_devic
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+ 	/* Install interrupt handlers */
+-	result=request_irq(dev->irq,ether00_int,0,"ether00",dev);
++	result=request_irq(dev->irq,ether00_int,SA_NET_RANDOM,"ether00",dev);
+ 	if(result)
+ 		goto open_err1;
+ 
+-	result=request_irq(2,ether00_phy_int,0,"ether00_phy",dev);
++	result=request_irq(2,ether00_phy_int,SA_NET_RANDOM,"ether00_phy",dev);
+ 	if(result)
+ 		goto open_err2;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arm/ether1.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arm/ether1.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arm/ether1.c	2004-06-16 07:19:36.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arm/ether1.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.423213896 +0200
+@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ ether1_open (struct net_device *dev)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ether1_interrupt, 0, "ether1", dev))
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ether1_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "ether1", dev))
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 
+ 	memset (&priv->stats, 0, sizeof (struct net_device_stats));
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arm/ether3.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arm/ether3.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arm/ether3.c	2004-06-16 07:20:19.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arm/ether3.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.432212528 +0200
+@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ ether3_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ether3_interrupt, 0, "ether3", dev))
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ether3_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "ether3", dev))
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 
+ 	ether3_init_for_open(dev);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arm/etherh.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arm/etherh.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/arm/etherh.c	2004-06-16 07:19:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/arm/etherh.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.450209792 +0200
+@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ etherh_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev))
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev))
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 
+ 	/*
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/at1700.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/at1700.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/at1700.c	2004-06-16 07:19:13.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/at1700.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.460208272 +0200
+@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ found:
+ 	lp->jumpered = is_fmv18x;
+ 	lp->mca_slot = slot;
+ 	/* Snarf the interrupt vector now. */
+-	ret = request_irq(irq, &net_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++	ret = request_irq(irq, &net_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (ret) {
+ 		printk ("  AT1700 at %#3x is unusable due to a conflict on"
+ 				"IRQ %d.\n", ioaddr, irq);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/atarilance.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/atarilance.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/atarilance.c	2004-06-16 07:19:01.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/atarilance.c	2004-06-24 10:48:56.429031536 +0200
+@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ static unsigned long __init lance_probe1
+ 	if (lp->cardtype == PAM_CARD ||
+ 		memaddr == (unsigned short *)0xffe00000) {
+ 		/* PAMs card and Riebl on ST use level 5 autovector */
+-		if (request_irq(IRQ_AUTO_5, lance_interrupt, IRQ_TYPE_PRIO,
++		if (request_irq(IRQ_AUTO_5, lance_interrupt, IRQ_TYPE_PRIO | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 		            "PAM/Riebl-ST Ethernet", dev)) { 
+ 			printk( "Lance: request for irq %d failed\n", IRQ_AUTO_5 );
+ 			return( 0 );
+@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ static unsigned long __init lance_probe1
+ 			printk( "Lance: request for VME interrupt failed\n" );
+ 			return( 0 );
+ 		}
+-		if (request_irq(irq, lance_interrupt, IRQ_TYPE_PRIO,
++		if (request_irq(irq, lance_interrupt, IRQ_TYPE_PRIO | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 		            "Riebl-VME Ethernet", dev)) {
+ 			printk( "Lance: request for irq %ld failed\n", irq );
+ 			return( 0 );
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/atp.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/atp.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/atp.c	2004-06-16 07:20:26.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/atp.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.471206600 +0200
+@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ static int net_open(struct net_device *d
+ 	/* The interrupt line is turned off (tri-stated) when the device isn't in
+ 	   use.  That's especially important for "attached" interfaces where the
+ 	   port or interrupt may be shared. */
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &atp_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &atp_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/au1000_eth.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/au1000_eth.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/au1000_eth.c	2004-06-16 07:19:29.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/au1000_eth.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.482204928 +0200
+@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ static int au1000_open(struct net_device
+ 	}
+ 	netif_start_queue(dev);
+ 
+-	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &au1000_interrupt, 0, 
++	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &au1000_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, 
+ 					dev->name, dev))) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: unable to get IRQ %d\n", 
+ 				dev->name, dev->irq);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/b44.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/b44.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/b44.c	2004-06-16 07:19:22.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/b44.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.499202344 +0200
+@@ -1247,7 +1247,7 @@ static int b44_open(struct net_device *d
+ 	if (err)
+ 		return err;
+ 
+-	err = request_irq(dev->irq, b44_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	err = request_irq(dev->irq, b44_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (err)
+ 		goto err_out_free;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/bagetlance.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/bagetlance.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/bagetlance.c	2004-06-16 07:18:54.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/bagetlance.c	2004-06-24 10:49:20.606356024 +0200
+@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ static int __init lance_probe1( struct n
+ 	if (lp->cardtype == PAM_CARD ||
+ 		memaddr == (unsigned short *)0xffe00000) {
+ 		/* PAMs card and Riebl on ST use level 5 autovector */
+-		if (request_irq(BAGET_LANCE_IRQ, lance_interrupt, IRQ_TYPE_PRIO,
++		if (request_irq(BAGET_LANCE_IRQ, lance_interrupt, IRQ_TYPE_PRIO | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 		            "PAM/Riebl-ST Ethernet", dev))
+ 			goto probe_fail;
+ 		dev->irq = (unsigned short)BAGET_LANCE_IRQ;
+@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ static int __init lance_probe1( struct n
+ 			printk( "Lance: request for VME interrupt failed\n" );
+ 			goto probe_fail;
+ 		}
+-		if (request_irq(irq, lance_interrupt, IRQ_TYPE_PRIO,
++		if (request_irq(irq, lance_interrupt, IRQ_TYPE_PRIO | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 		            "Riebl-VME Ethernet", dev))
+ 			goto probe_fail;
+ 		dev->irq = irq;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/bmac.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/bmac.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/bmac.c	2004-06-16 07:18:55.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/bmac.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.517199608 +0200
+@@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ static int __devinit bmac_probe(struct m
+ 
+ 	init_timer(&bp->tx_timeout);
+ 
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, bmac_misc_intr, 0, "BMAC-misc", dev);
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, bmac_misc_intr, SA_NET_RANDOM, "BMAC-misc", dev);
+ 	if (ret) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "BMAC: can't get irq %d\n", dev->irq);
+ 		goto err_out_iounmap_rx;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/cs89x0.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/cs89x0.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/cs89x0.c	2004-06-16 07:19:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/cs89x0.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.527198088 +0200
+@@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@ net_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 
+ 		for (i = 2; i < CS8920_NO_INTS; i++) {
+ 			if ((1 << i) & lp->irq_map) {
+-				if (request_irq(i, net_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev) == 0) {
++				if (request_irq(i, net_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev) == 0) {
+ 					dev->irq = i;
+ 					write_irq(dev, lp->chip_type, i);
+ 					/* writereg(dev, PP_BufCFG, GENERATE_SW_INTERRUPT); */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/de600.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/de600.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/de600.c	2004-06-16 07:20:04.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/de600.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.535196872 +0200
+@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static inline u8 de600_read_byte(unsigne
+ static int de600_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ {
+ 	unsigned long flags;
+-	int ret = request_irq(DE600_IRQ, de600_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++	int ret = request_irq(DE600_IRQ, de600_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (ret) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: unable to get IRQ %d\n", dev->name, DE600_IRQ);
+ 		return ret;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/de620.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/de620.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/de620.c	2004-06-16 07:19:23.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/de620.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.545195352 +0200
+@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ de620_get_register(struct net_device *de
+  */
+ static int de620_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ {
+-	int ret = request_irq(dev->irq, de620_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++	int ret = request_irq(dev->irq, de620_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (ret) {
+ 		printk (KERN_ERR "%s: unable to get IRQ %d\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		return ret;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/declance.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/declance.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/declance.c	2004-06-16 07:19:36.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/declance.c	2004-06-24 10:18:39.248285000 +0200
+@@ -785,14 +785,14 @@ static int lance_open(struct net_device 
+ 	netif_start_queue(dev);
+ 
+ 	/* Associate IRQ with lance_interrupt */
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &lance_interrupt, 0, "lance", dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &lance_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "lance", dev)) {
+ 		printk("%s: Can't get IRQ %d\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+ 	if (lp->dma_irq >= 0) {
+ 		unsigned long flags;
+ 
+-		if (request_irq(lp->dma_irq, &lance_dma_merr_int, 0,
++		if (request_irq(lp->dma_irq, &lance_dma_merr_int, SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 				"lance error", dev)) {
+ 			free_irq(dev->irq, dev);
+ 			printk("%s: Can't get DMA IRQ %d\n", dev->name,
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/defxx.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/defxx.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/defxx.c	2004-06-16 07:18:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/defxx.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.583189576 +0200
+@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ static int dfx_open(struct net_device *d
+ 	
+ 	/* Register IRQ - support shared interrupts by passing device ptr */
+ 
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, (void *)dfx_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, (void *)dfx_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (ret) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Requested IRQ %d is busy\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		return ret;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/depca.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/depca.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/depca.c	2004-06-16 07:19:23.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/depca.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.593188056 +0200
+@@ -840,7 +840,7 @@ static int depca_open(struct net_device 
+ 
+ 	depca_dbg_open(dev);
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &depca_interrupt, 0, lp->adapter_name, dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &depca_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, lp->adapter_name, dev)) {
+ 		printk("depca_open(): Requested IRQ%d is busy\n", dev->irq);
+ 		status = -EAGAIN;
+ 	} else {
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/dgrs.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/dgrs.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/dgrs.c	2004-06-16 07:18:56.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/dgrs.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.612185168 +0200
+@@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ dgrs_probe1(struct net_device *dev)
+ 	if (priv->plxreg)
+ 		OUTL(dev->base_addr + PLX_LCL2PCI_DOORBELL, 1);
+ 	
+-	rc = request_irq(dev->irq, &dgrs_intr, SA_SHIRQ, "RightSwitch", dev);
++	rc = request_irq(dev->irq, &dgrs_intr, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, "RightSwitch", dev);
+ 	if (rc)
+ 		goto err_out;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/dl2k.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/dl2k.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/dl2k.c	2004-06-16 07:19:17.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/dl2k.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.622183648 +0200
+@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ rio_open (struct net_device *dev)
+ 	int i;
+ 	u16 macctrl;
+ 	
+-	i = request_irq (dev->irq, &rio_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	i = request_irq (dev->irq, &rio_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (i)
+ 		return i;
+ 	
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/e1000/e1000_main.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/e1000/e1000_main.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/e1000/e1000_main.c	2004-06-16 07:19:13.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/e1000/e1000_main.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.691173160 +0200
+@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ e1000_up(struct e1000_adapter *adapter)
+ 	e1000_alloc_rx_buffers(adapter);
+ 
+ 	if((err = request_irq(adapter->pdev->irq, &e1000_intr,
+-		              SA_SHIRQ | SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM,
++		              SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 		              netdev->name, netdev)))
+ 		return err;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/e100.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/e100.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/e100.c	2004-06-16 07:20:26.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/e100.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.642180608 +0200
+@@ -1660,7 +1660,7 @@ static int e100_up(struct nic *nic)
+ 	e100_set_multicast_list(nic->netdev);
+ 	e100_start_receiver(nic);
+ 	mod_timer(&nic->watchdog, jiffies);
+-	if((err = request_irq(nic->pdev->irq, e100_intr, SA_SHIRQ,
++	if((err = request_irq(nic->pdev->irq, e100_intr, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 		nic->netdev->name, nic->netdev)))
+ 		goto err_no_irq;
+ 	e100_enable_irq(nic);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/e2100.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/e2100.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/e2100.c	2004-06-16 07:20:03.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/e2100.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.707170728 +0200
+@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ e21_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 	short ioaddr = dev->base_addr;
+ 	int retval;
+ 
+-	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev)))
++	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)))
+ 		return retval;
+ 
+ 	/* Set the interrupt line and memory base on the hardware. */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/eepro100.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/eepro100.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/eepro100.c	2004-06-16 07:19:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/eepro100.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.738166016 +0200
+@@ -1032,7 +1032,7 @@ speedo_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 	sp->in_interrupt = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* .. we can safely take handler calls during init. */
+-	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &speedo_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &speedo_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (retval) {
+ 		return retval;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/eepro.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/eepro.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/eepro.c	2004-06-16 07:19:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/eepro.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.719168904 +0200
+@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ static int eepro_open(struct net_device 
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq , &eepro_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq , &eepro_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: unable to get IRQ %d.\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/eexpress.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/eexpress.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/eexpress.c	2004-06-16 07:18:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/eexpress.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.748164496 +0200
+@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static int eexp_open(struct net_device *
+ 	if (!dev->irq || !irqrmap[dev->irq])
+ 		return -ENXIO;
+ 
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq,&eexp_irq,0,dev->name,dev);
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq,&eexp_irq,SA_NET_RANDOM,dev->name,dev);
+ 	if (ret) return ret;
+ 
+ 	if (!request_region(ioaddr, EEXP_IO_EXTENT, "EtherExpress")) {
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/epic100.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/epic100.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/epic100.c	2004-06-16 07:19:22.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/epic100.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.767161608 +0200
+@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ static int epic_open(struct net_device *
+ 	/* Soft reset the chip. */
+ 	outl(0x4001, ioaddr + GENCTL);
+ 
+-	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &epic_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev)))
++	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &epic_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)))
+ 		return retval;
+ 
+ 	epic_init_ring(dev);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/es3210.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/es3210.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/es3210.c	2004-06-16 07:19:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/es3210.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.775160392 +0200
+@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static int __init es_probe1(struct net_d
+ 		printk(" assigning IRQ %d", dev->irq);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, "es3210", dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "es3210", dev)) {
+ 		printk (" unable to get IRQ %d.\n", dev->irq);
+ 		retval = -EAGAIN;
+ 		goto out;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/eth16i.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/eth16i.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/eth16i.c	2004-06-16 07:19:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/eth16i.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.787158568 +0200
+@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int __init eth16i_probe1(struct n
+ 
+ 	/* Try to obtain interrupt vector */
+ 
+-	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, (void *)&eth16i_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev))) {
++	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, (void *)&eth16i_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev))) {
+ 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: %s at %#3x, but is unusable due conflicting IRQ %d.\n", 
+ 		       dev->name, cardname, ioaddr, dev->irq);
+ 		goto out;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ewrk3.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ewrk3.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ewrk3.c	2004-06-16 07:20:04.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ewrk3.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.797157048 +0200
+@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ static int ewrk3_open(struct net_device 
+ 	STOP_EWRK3;
+ 
+ 	if (!lp->hard_strapped) {
+-		if (request_irq(dev->irq, (void *) ewrk3_interrupt, 0, "ewrk3", dev)) {
++		if (request_irq(dev->irq, (void *) ewrk3_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "ewrk3", dev)) {
+ 			printk("ewrk3_open(): Requested IRQ%d is busy\n", dev->irq);
+ 			status = -EAGAIN;
+ 		} else {
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/fc/iph5526.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/fc/iph5526.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/fc/iph5526.c	2004-06-16 07:19:01.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/fc/iph5526.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.814154464 +0200
+@@ -3786,7 +3786,7 @@ int iph5526_detect(Scsi_Host_Template *t
+ 		int irqval = 0;
+ 			/* Found it, get IRQ.
+ 			 */
+-			irqval = request_irq(pci_irq_line, &tachyon_interrupt, pci_irq_line ? SA_SHIRQ : 0, fi->name, host);
++			irqval = request_irq(pci_irq_line, &tachyon_interrupt, pci_irq_line ? SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM : 0, fi->name, host);
+ 			if (irqval) {
+ 				printk("iph5526.c : Unable to get IRQ %d (irqval = %d).\n", pci_irq_line, irqval);
+ 				scsi_unregister(host);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/fealnx.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/fealnx.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/fealnx.c	2004-06-16 07:19:42.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/fealnx.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.832151728 +0200
+@@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ static int netdev_open(struct net_device
+ 
+ 	writel(0x00000001, ioaddr + BCR);	/* Reset */
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &intr_handler, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev))
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &intr_handler, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev))
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 
+ 	init_ring(dev);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/fec.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/fec.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/fec.c	2004-06-16 07:18:57.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/fec.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.842150208 +0200
+@@ -1057,13 +1057,13 @@ static void __inline__ fec_request_intrs
+ 	volatile unsigned long *icrp;
+ 
+ 	/* Setup interrupt handlers. */
+-	if (request_irq(86, fec_enet_interrupt, 0, "fec(RX)", dev) != 0)
++	if (request_irq(86, fec_enet_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "fec(RX)", dev) != 0)
+ 		printk("FEC: Could not allocate FEC(RC) IRQ(86)!\n");
+-	if (request_irq(87, fec_enet_interrupt, 0, "fec(TX)", dev) != 0)
++	if (request_irq(87, fec_enet_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "fec(TX)", dev) != 0)
+ 		printk("FEC: Could not allocate FEC(RC) IRQ(87)!\n");
+-	if (request_irq(88, fec_enet_interrupt, 0, "fec(OTHER)", dev) != 0)
++	if (request_irq(88, fec_enet_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "fec(OTHER)", dev) != 0)
+ 		printk("FEC: Could not allocate FEC(OTHER) IRQ(88)!\n");
+-	if (request_irq(66, mii_link_interrupt, 0, "fec(MII)", dev) != 0)
++	if (request_irq(66, mii_link_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "fec(MII)", dev) != 0)
+ 		printk("FEC: Could not allocate MII IRQ(66)!\n");
+ 
+ 	/* Unmask interrupt at ColdFire 5272 SIM */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/fmv18x.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/fmv18x.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/fmv18x.c	2004-06-16 07:18:57.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/fmv18x.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.853148536 +0200
+@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static int __init fmv18x_probe1(struct n
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Snarf the interrupt vector now. */
+-	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &net_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &net_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (retval) {
+ 		printk ("FMV-18x found at %#3x, but it's unusable due to a conflict on"
+ 				"IRQ %d.\n", ioaddr, dev->irq);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/forcedeth.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/forcedeth.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/forcedeth.c	2004-06-16 07:18:55.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/forcedeth.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.863147016 +0200
+@@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ static int nv_open(struct net_device *de
+ 	writel(NVREG_IRQSTAT_MASK, base + NvRegIrqStatus);
+ 	pci_push(base);
+ 
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &nv_nic_irq, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &nv_nic_irq, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		goto out_drain;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/gt96100eth.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/gt96100eth.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/gt96100eth.c	2004-06-16 07:19:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/gt96100eth.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.884143824 +0200
+@@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@ gt96100_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &gt96100_interrupt,
+-				  SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev))) {
++				  SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev))) {
+ 		err("unable to get IRQ %d\n", dev->irq);
+ 		return retval;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hamachi.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hamachi.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hamachi.c	2004-06-16 07:20:26.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hamachi.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.895142152 +0200
+@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ static int hamachi_open(struct net_devic
+ 	u32 rx_int_var, tx_int_var;
+ 	u16 fifo_info;
+ 
+-	i = request_irq(dev->irq, &hamachi_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	i = request_irq(dev->irq, &hamachi_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (i)
+ 		return i;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_ser_fdx.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_ser_fdx.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_ser_fdx.c	2004-06-16 07:19:36.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_ser_fdx.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.924137744 +0200
+@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ static int ser12_open(struct net_device 
+ 	outb(0, FCR(dev->base_addr));  /* disable FIFOs */
+ 	outb(0x0d, MCR(dev->base_addr));
+ 	outb(0, IER(dev->base_addr));
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ser12_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT | SA_SHIRQ,
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ser12_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT | SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			"baycom_ser_fdx", dev)) {
+ 		release_region(dev->base_addr, SER12_EXTENT);
+ 		return -EBUSY;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_ser_hdx.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_ser_hdx.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_ser_hdx.c	2004-06-16 07:18:55.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_ser_hdx.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.933136376 +0200
+@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ static int ser12_open(struct net_device 
+ 	outb(0, FCR(dev->base_addr));  /* disable FIFOs */
+ 	outb(0x0d, MCR(dev->base_addr));
+ 	outb(0, IER(dev->base_addr));
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ser12_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT | SA_SHIRQ,
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ser12_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT | SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			"baycom_ser12", dev)) {
+ 		release_region(dev->base_addr, SER12_EXTENT);       
+ 		return -EBUSY;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hamradio/dmascc.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hamradio/dmascc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hamradio/dmascc.c	2004-06-16 07:19:22.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hamradio/dmascc.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.965131512 +0200
+@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ static int scc_open(struct net_device *d
+ 
+   /* Request IRQ if not already used by other channel */
+   if (!info->irq_used) {
+-    if (request_irq(dev->irq, scc_isr, 0, "dmascc", info)) {
++    if (request_irq(dev->irq, scc_isr, SA_NET_RANDOM, "dmascc", info)) {
+       return -EAGAIN;
+     }
+   }
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hamradio/scc.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hamradio/scc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hamradio/scc.c	2004-06-16 07:19:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hamradio/scc.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.982128928 +0200
+@@ -1742,7 +1742,7 @@ static int scc_net_ioctl(struct net_devi
+ 				
+ 			if (!Ivec[hwcfg.irq].used && hwcfg.irq)
+ 			{
+-				if (request_irq(hwcfg.irq, scc_isr, SA_INTERRUPT, "AX.25 SCC", NULL))
++				if (request_irq(hwcfg.irq, scc_isr, SA_INTERRUPT | SA_NET_RANDOM, "AX.25 SCC", NULL))
+ 					printk(KERN_WARNING "z8530drv: warning, cannot get IRQ %d\n", hwcfg.irq);
+ 				else
+ 					Ivec[hwcfg.irq].used = 1;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hamradio/yam.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hamradio/yam.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hamradio/yam.c	2004-06-16 07:19:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hamradio/yam.c	2004-06-24 10:16:08.992127408 +0200
+@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ static int yam_open(struct net_device *d
+ 		goto out_release_base;
+ 	}
+ 	outb(0, IER(dev->base_addr));
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, yam_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT | SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, yam_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT | SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: irq %d busy\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		ret = -EBUSY;
+ 		goto out_release_base;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hp100.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hp100.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hp100.c	2004-06-16 07:19:13.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hp100.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.035120872 +0200
+@@ -1064,7 +1064,7 @@ static int hp100_open(struct net_device 
+ 	/* New: if bus is PCI or EISA, interrupts might be shared interrupts */
+ 	if (request_irq(dev->irq, hp100_interrupt,
+ 			lp->bus == HP100_BUS_PCI || lp->bus ==
+-			HP100_BUS_EISA ? SA_SHIRQ : SA_INTERRUPT,
++			HP100_BUS_EISA ? SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM : SA_INTERRUPT,
+ 			"hp100", dev)) {
+ 		printk("hp100: %s: unable to get IRQ %d\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hp.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hp.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hp.c	2004-06-16 07:19:01.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hp.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.020123152 +0200
+@@ -176,13 +176,13 @@ static int __init hp_probe1(struct net_d
+ 		int *irqp = wordmode ? irq_16list : irq_8list;
+ 		do {
+ 			int irq = *irqp;
+-			if (request_irq (irq, NULL, 0, "bogus", NULL) != -EBUSY) {
++			if (request_irq (irq, NULL, SA_NET_RANDOM, "bogus", NULL) != -EBUSY) {
+ 				unsigned long cookie = probe_irq_on();
+ 				/* Twinkle the interrupt, and check if it's seen. */
+ 				outb_p(irqmap[irq] | HP_RUN, ioaddr + HP_CONFIGURE);
+ 				outb_p( 0x00 | HP_RUN, ioaddr + HP_CONFIGURE);
+ 				if (irq == probe_irq_off(cookie)		 /* It's a good IRQ line! */
+-					&& request_irq (irq, ei_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev) == 0) {
++					&& request_irq (irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev) == 0) {
+ 					printk(" selecting IRQ %d.\n", irq);
+ 					dev->irq = *irqp;
+ 					break;
+@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static int __init hp_probe1(struct net_d
+ 	} else {
+ 		if (dev->irq == 2)
+ 			dev->irq = 9;
+-		if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev))) {
++		if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev))) {
+ 			printk (" unable to get IRQ %d.\n", dev->irq);
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hp-plus.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hp-plus.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hp-plus.c	2004-06-16 07:18:57.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hp-plus.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.011124520 +0200
+@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ hpp_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 	int option_reg;
+ 	int retval;
+ 
+-	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev))) {
++	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev))) {
+ 	    return retval;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hydra.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hydra.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/hydra.c	2004-06-16 07:19:22.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/hydra.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.046119200 +0200
+@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static int __devinit hydra_init(struct z
+     dev->irq = IRQ_AMIGA_PORTS;
+ 
+     /* Install the Interrupt handler */
+-    if (request_irq(IRQ_AMIGA_PORTS, ei_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, "Hydra Ethernet",
++    if (request_irq(IRQ_AMIGA_PORTS, ei_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, "Hydra Ethernet",
+ 		    dev)) {
+ 	free_netdev(dev);
+ 	return -EAGAIN;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ibmlana.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ibmlana.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ibmlana.c	2004-06-16 07:19:01.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ibmlana.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.062116768 +0200
+@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ static int ibmlana_open(struct net_devic
+ 
+ 	/* register resources - only necessary for IRQ */
+ 
+-	result = request_irq(priv->realirq, irq_handler, SA_SHIRQ | SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
++	result = request_irq(priv->realirq, irq_handler, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (result != 0) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: failed to register irq %d\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		return result;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ibmveth.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ibmveth.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ibmveth.c	2004-06-16 07:18:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ibmveth.c	2004-06-24 10:51:53.501112488 +0200
+@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ static int ibmveth_open(struct net_devic
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	ibmveth_debug_printk("registering irq 0x%x\n", netdev->irq);
+-	if((rc = request_irq(netdev->irq, &ibmveth_interrupt, 0, netdev->name, netdev)) != 0) {
++	if((rc = request_irq(netdev->irq, &ibmveth_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, netdev->name, netdev)) != 0) {
+ 		ibmveth_error_printk("unable to request irq 0x%x, rc %d\n", netdev->irq, rc);
+ 		do {
+ 			rc = h_free_logical_lan(adapter->vdev->unit_address);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ioc3-eth.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ioc3-eth.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ioc3-eth.c	2004-06-16 07:18:57.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ioc3-eth.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.081113880 +0200
+@@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ static int ioc3_open(struct net_device *
+ {
+ 	struct ioc3_private *ip = netdev_priv(dev);
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ioc3_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, ioc3_str, dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ioc3_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, ioc3_str, dev)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Can't get irq %d\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/ali-ircc.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/ali-ircc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/ali-ircc.c	2004-06-16 07:19:13.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/ali-ircc.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.094111904 +0200
+@@ -1317,7 +1317,7 @@ static int ali_ircc_net_open(struct net_
+ 	iobase = self->io.fir_base;
+ 	
+ 	/* Request IRQ and install Interrupt Handler */
+-	if (request_irq(self->io.irq, ali_ircc_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev)) 
++	if (request_irq(self->io.irq, ali_ircc_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)) 
+ 	{
+ 		WARNING("%s, unable to allocate irq=%d\n", driver_name, 
+ 			self->io.irq);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/au1k_ir.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/au1k_ir.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/au1k_ir.c	2004-06-16 07:19:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/au1k_ir.c	2004-06-24 10:19:15.515771504 +0200
+@@ -353,13 +353,13 @@ static int au1k_irda_start(struct net_de
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((retval = request_irq(AU1000_IRDA_TX_INT, &au1k_irda_interrupt, 
+-					0, dev->name, dev))) {
++					SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev))) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: unable to get IRQ %d\n", 
+ 				dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		return retval;
+ 	}
+ 	if ((retval = request_irq(AU1000_IRDA_RX_INT, &au1k_irda_interrupt, 
+-					0, dev->name, dev))) {
++					SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev))) {
+ 		free_irq(AU1000_IRDA_TX_INT, dev);
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: unable to get IRQ %d\n", 
+ 				dev->name, dev->irq);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/donauboe.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/donauboe.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/donauboe.c	2004-06-16 07:19:22.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/donauboe.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.139105064 +0200
+@@ -1372,7 +1372,7 @@ toshoboe_net_open (struct net_device *de
+     return 0;
+ 
+   if (request_irq (self->io.irq, toshoboe_interrupt,
+-                   SA_SHIRQ | SA_INTERRUPT, dev->name, (void *) self))
++                   SA_SHIRQ | SA_INTERRUPT | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, (void *) self))
+     {
+       return -EAGAIN;
+     }
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/irport.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/irport.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/irport.c	2004-06-16 07:19:42.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/irport.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.151103240 +0200
+@@ -902,7 +902,7 @@ int irport_net_open(struct net_device *d
+ 
+ 	iobase = self->io.sir_base;
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(self->io.irq, self->interrupt, 0, dev->name, 
++	if (request_irq(self->io.irq, self->interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, 
+ 			(void *) dev)) {
+ 		IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(), unable to allocate irq=%d\n",
+ 			   __FUNCTION__, self->io.irq);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/nsc-ircc.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/nsc-ircc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/nsc-ircc.c	2004-06-16 07:18:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/nsc-ircc.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.163101416 +0200
+@@ -2008,7 +2008,7 @@ static int nsc_ircc_net_open(struct net_
+ 	
+ 	iobase = self->io.fir_base;
+ 	
+-	if (request_irq(self->io.irq, nsc_ircc_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(self->io.irq, nsc_ircc_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)) {
+ 		WARNING("%s, unable to allocate irq=%d\n", driver_name, 
+ 			self->io.irq);
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/sa1100_ir.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/sa1100_ir.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/sa1100_ir.c	2004-06-16 07:19:13.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/sa1100_ir.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.173099896 +0200
+@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ static int sa1100_irda_start(struct net_
+ 
+ 	si->speed = 9600;
+ 
+-	err = request_irq(dev->irq, sa1100_irda_irq, 0, dev->name, dev);
++	err = request_irq(dev->irq, sa1100_irda_irq, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (err)
+ 		goto err_irq;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/smsc-ircc2.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/smsc-ircc2.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/smsc-ircc2.c	2004-06-16 07:19:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/smsc-ircc2.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.186097920 +0200
+@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ static int smsc_ircc_net_open(struct net
+ 	
+ 	iobase = self->io.fir_base;
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(self->io.irq, smsc_ircc_interrupt, 0, dev->name, 
++	if (request_irq(self->io.irq, smsc_ircc_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, 
+ 			(void *) dev)) {
+ 		IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(), unable to allocate irq=%d\n",
+ 			   __FUNCTION__, self->io.irq);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/via-ircc.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/via-ircc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/via-ircc.c	2004-06-16 07:18:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/via-ircc.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.197096248 +0200
+@@ -1467,7 +1467,7 @@ static int via_ircc_net_open(struct net_
+ 	ASSERT(self != NULL, return 0;);
+ 	iobase = self->io.fir_base;
+ 	if (request_irq
+-	    (self->io.irq, via_ircc_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev)) {
++	    (self->io.irq, via_ircc_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)) {
+ 		WARNING("%s, unable to allocate irq=%d\n", driver_name,
+ 			self->io.irq);
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/vlsi_ir.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/vlsi_ir.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/vlsi_ir.c	2004-06-16 07:18:55.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/vlsi_ir.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.215093512 +0200
+@@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@ static int vlsi_open(struct net_device *
+ 
+ 	outb(IRINTR_INT_MASK, ndev->base_addr+VLSI_PIO_IRINTR);
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(ndev->irq, vlsi_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ,
++	if (request_irq(ndev->irq, vlsi_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			drivername, ndev)) {
+ 		WARNING("%s: couldn't get IRQ: %d\n", __FUNCTION__, ndev->irq);
+ 		goto errout_io;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/w83977af_ir.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/w83977af_ir.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/irda/w83977af_ir.c	2004-06-16 07:19:13.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/irda/w83977af_ir.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.227091688 +0200
+@@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ static int w83977af_net_open(struct net_
+ 	
+ 	iobase = self->io.fir_base;
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(self->io.irq, w83977af_interrupt, 0, dev->name, 
++	if (request_irq(self->io.irq, w83977af_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, 
+ 			(void *) dev)) {
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/isa-skeleton.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/isa-skeleton.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/isa-skeleton.c	2004-06-16 07:20:04.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/isa-skeleton.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.236090320 +0200
+@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static int __init netcard_probe1(struct 
+ 		dev->irq = 9;
+ 
+ 	{
+-		int irqval = request_irq(dev->irq, &net_interrupt, 0, cardname, dev);
++		int irqval = request_irq(dev->irq, &net_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, cardname, dev);
+ 		if (irqval) {
+ 			printk("%s: unable to get IRQ %d (irqval=%d).\n",
+ 				   dev->name, dev->irq, irqval);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ixgb/ixgb_main.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ixgb/ixgb_main.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ixgb/ixgb_main.c	2004-06-16 07:19:01.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ixgb/ixgb_main.c	2004-06-24 10:19:36.823532232 +0200
+@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ int ixgb_up(struct ixgb_adapter *adapter
+ 	ixgb_alloc_rx_buffers(adapter);
+ 
+ 	if ((err = request_irq(adapter->pdev->irq, &ixgb_intr,
+-			       SA_SHIRQ | SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM,
++			       SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			       netdev->name, netdev)))
+ 		return err;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/lance.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/lance.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/lance.c	2004-06-16 07:18:57.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/lance.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.303080136 +0200
+@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ lance_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (dev->irq == 0 ||
+-		request_irq(dev->irq, &lance_interrupt, 0, lp->name, dev)) {
++		request_irq(dev->irq, &lance_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, lp->name, dev)) {
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/lasi_82596.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/lasi_82596.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/lasi_82596.c	2004-06-16 07:18:58.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/lasi_82596.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.322077248 +0200
+@@ -1017,7 +1017,7 @@ static int i596_open(struct net_device *
+ {
+ 	DEB(DEB_OPEN,printk("%s: i596_open() irq %d.\n", dev->name, dev->irq));
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &i596_interrupt, 0, "i82596", dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &i596_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "i82596", dev)) {
+ 		printk("%s: IRQ %d not free\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/lne390.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/lne390.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/lne390.c	2004-06-16 07:20:03.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/lne390.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.339074664 +0200
+@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int __init lne390_probe1(struct n
+ 	}
+ 	printk(" IRQ %d,", dev->irq);
+ 
+-	if ((ret = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev))) {
++	if ((ret = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev))) {
+ 		printk (" unable to get IRQ %d.\n", dev->irq);
+ 		return ret;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/lp486e.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/lp486e.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/lp486e.c	2004-06-16 07:19:03.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/lp486e.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.350072992 +0200
+@@ -849,7 +849,7 @@ static int i596_open(struct net_device *
+ {
+ 	int i;
+ 
+-	i = request_irq(dev->irq, &i596_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	i = request_irq(dev->irq, &i596_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (i) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: IRQ %d not free\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		return i;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/mac8390.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/mac8390.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/mac8390.c	2004-06-16 07:19:35.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/mac8390.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.370069952 +0200
+@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int __init mac8390_initdev(struct
+ static int mac8390_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ {
+ 	ei_open(dev);
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, "8390 Ethernet", dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "8390 Ethernet", dev)) {
+ 		printk ("%s: unable to get IRQ %d.\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}	
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/mac89x0.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/mac89x0.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/mac89x0.c	2004-06-16 07:19:23.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/mac89x0.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.382068128 +0200
+@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ net_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 	writereg(dev, PP_BusCTL, readreg(dev, PP_BusCTL) & ~ENABLE_IRQ);
+ 
+ 	/* Grab the interrupt */
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &net_interrupt, 0, "cs89x0", dev))
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &net_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "cs89x0", dev))
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 
+ 	/* Set up the IRQ - Apparently magic */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/mace.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/mace.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/mace.c	2004-06-16 07:19:03.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/mace.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.401065240 +0200
+@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static int __devinit mace_probe(struct m
+ 	 */
+ 	mace_reset(dev);
+ 
+-	rc = request_irq(dev->irq, mace_interrupt, 0, "MACE", dev);
++	rc = request_irq(dev->irq, mace_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "MACE", dev);
+ 	if (rc) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "MACE: can't get irq %d\n", dev->irq);
+ 		goto err_unmap_rx_dma;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/macmace.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/macmace.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/macmace.c	2004-06-16 07:19:13.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/macmace.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.413063416 +0200
+@@ -319,11 +319,11 @@ static int mace_open(struct net_device *
+ 	mb->plscc = PORTSEL_AUI;
+ 	/* mb->utr = RTRD; */
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, mace_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, mace_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: can't get irq %d\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+-	if (request_irq(mp->dma_intr, mace_dma_intr, 0, dev->name, dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(mp->dma_intr, mace_dma_intr, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: can't get irq %d\n", dev->name, mp->dma_intr);
+ 		free_irq(dev->irq, dev);
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/meth.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/meth.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/meth.c	2004-06-16 07:19:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/meth.c	2004-06-24 10:20:05.957103256 +0200
+@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ static int meth_open(struct net_device *
+ 	if (ret < 0)
+ 		goto out_free_tx_ring;
+ 
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, meth_interrupt, 0, meth_str, dev);
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, meth_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, meth_str, dev);
+ 	if (ret) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Can't get irq %d\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		goto out_free_rx_ring;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/myri_sbus.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/myri_sbus.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/myri_sbus.c	2004-06-16 07:18:57.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/myri_sbus.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.482052928 +0200
+@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ static int __init myri_ether_init(struct
+ 	/* Register interrupt handler now. */
+ 	DET(("Requesting MYRIcom IRQ line.\n"));
+ 	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &myri_interrupt,
+-			SA_SHIRQ, "MyriCOM Ethernet", (void *) dev)) {
++			SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, "MyriCOM Ethernet", (void *) dev)) {
+ 		printk("MyriCOM: Cannot register interrupt handler.\n");
+ 		goto err;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/natsemi.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/natsemi.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/natsemi.c	2004-06-16 07:18:56.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/natsemi.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.504049584 +0200
+@@ -1088,7 +1088,7 @@ static int netdev_open(struct net_device
+ 	/* Reset the chip, just in case. */
+ 	natsemi_reset(dev);
+ 
+-	i = request_irq(dev->irq, &intr_handler, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	i = request_irq(dev->irq, &intr_handler, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (i) return i;
+ 
+ 	if (netif_msg_ifup(np))
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ne2.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ne2.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ne2.c	2004-06-16 07:20:26.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ne2.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.527046088 +0200
+@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static int __init ne2_probe1(struct net_
+ 
+ 	/* Snarf the interrupt now.  There's no point in waiting since we cannot
+ 	   share and the board will usually be enabled. */
+-	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (retval) {
+ 		printk (" unable to get IRQ %d (irqval=%d).\n", 
+ 				dev->irq, retval);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ne2k_cbus.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ne2k_cbus.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ne2k_cbus.c	2004-06-16 07:19:09.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ne2k_cbus.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.561040920 +0200
+@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static int __init ne_probe1(struct net_d
+ 
+ 	/* Snarf the interrupt now.  There's no point in waiting since we cannot
+ 	   share and the board will usually be enabled. */
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, name, dev);
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, name, dev);
+ 	if (ret) {
+ 		printk (" unable to get IRQ %d (errno=%d).\n", dev->irq, ret);
+ 		goto err_out_kfree;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ne2k-pci.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ne2k-pci.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ne2k-pci.c	2004-06-16 07:19:01.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ne2k-pci.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.548042896 +0200
+@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static int ne2k_pci_set_fdx(struct net_d
+ 
+ static int ne2k_pci_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ {
+-	int ret = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	int ret = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ne3210.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ne3210.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ne3210.c	2004-06-16 07:19:17.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ne3210.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.571039400 +0200
+@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static int __init ne3210_eisa_probe (str
+ 	dev->irq = irq_map[(inb(ioaddr + NE3210_CFG2) >> 3) & 0x07];
+ 	printk(".\nne3210.c: using IRQ %d, ", dev->irq);
+ 
+-	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (retval) {
+ 		printk (" unable to get IRQ %d.\n", dev->irq);
+ 		goto out2;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ne.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ne.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ne.c	2004-06-16 07:19:22.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ne.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.517047608 +0200
+@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ static int __init ne_probe1(struct net_d
+ 
+ 	/* Snarf the interrupt now.  There's no point in waiting since we cannot
+ 	   share and the board will usually be enabled. */
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, name, dev);
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, name, dev);
+ 	if (ret) {
+ 		printk (" unable to get IRQ %d (errno=%d).\n", dev->irq, ret);
+ 		goto err_out;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ne-h8300.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ne-h8300.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ne-h8300.c	2004-06-16 07:19:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ne-h8300.c	2004-06-24 10:52:56.320562480 +0200
+@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static int __init ne_probe1(struct net_d
+ 
+ 	/* Snarf the interrupt now.  There's no point in waiting since we cannot
+ 	   share and the board will usually be enabled. */
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, name, dev);
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, name, dev);
+ 	if (ret) {
+ 		printk (" unable to get IRQ %d (errno=%d).\n", dev->irq, ret);
+ 		goto err_out;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ni5010.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ni5010.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ni5010.c	2004-06-16 07:19:22.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ni5010.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.583037576 +0200
+@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ static int ni5010_open(struct net_device
+ 
+ 	PRINTK2((KERN_DEBUG "%s: entering ni5010_open()\n", dev->name)); 
+ 	
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &ni5010_interrupt, 0, boardname, dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &ni5010_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, boardname, dev)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Cannot get irq %#2x\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ni52.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ni52.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ni52.c	2004-06-16 07:19:36.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ni52.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.594035904 +0200
+@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ static int ni52_open(struct net_device *
+ 	startrecv586(dev);
+ 	ni_enaint();
+ 
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &ni52_interrupt,0,dev->name,dev);
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &ni52_interrupt,SA_NET_RANDOM,dev->name,dev);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 	{
+ 		ni_reset586();
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ni65.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ni65.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ni65.c	2004-06-16 07:19:02.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ni65.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.607033928 +0200
+@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static void ni65_set_performance(struct 
+ static int ni65_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ {
+ 	struct priv *p = (struct priv *) dev->priv;
+-	int irqval = request_irq(dev->irq, &ni65_interrupt,0,
++	int irqval = request_irq(dev->irq, &ni65_interrupt,SA_NET_RANDOM,
+                         cards[p->cardno].cardname,dev);
+ 	if (irqval) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: unable to get IRQ %d (irqval=%d).\n",
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ns83820.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ns83820.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/ns83820.c	2004-06-16 07:20:04.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/ns83820.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.619032104 +0200
+@@ -1850,7 +1850,7 @@ static int __devinit ns83820_init_one(st
+ 	setup_ee_mem_bitbanger(&dev->ee, (long)dev->base + MEAR, 3, 2, 1, 0,
+ 		0);
+ 
+-	err = request_irq(pci_dev->irq, ns83820_irq, SA_SHIRQ,
++	err = request_irq(pci_dev->irq, ns83820_irq, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			  ndev->name, ndev);
+ 	if (err) {
+ 		printk(KERN_INFO "ns83820: unable to register irq %d\n",
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/oaknet.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/oaknet.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/oaknet.c	2004-06-16 07:19:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/oaknet.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.630030432 +0200
+@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int __init oaknet_init(void)
+ 	/* Attempt to get the interrupt line */
+ 
+ 	ret = -EAGAIN;
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, name, dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, name, dev)) {
+ 		printk("%s: unable to request interrupt %d.\n",
+ 		       dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		goto out_region;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/pci-skeleton.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/pci-skeleton.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/pci-skeleton.c	2004-06-16 07:18:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/pci-skeleton.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.644028304 +0200
+@@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@ static int netdrv_open (struct net_devic
+ 
+ 	DPRINTK ("ENTER\n");
+ 
+-	retval = request_irq (dev->irq, netdrv_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	retval = request_irq (dev->irq, netdrv_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (retval) {
+ 		DPRINTK ("EXIT, returning %d\n", retval);
+ 		return retval;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/pcnet32.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/pcnet32.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/pcnet32.c	2004-06-16 07:19:03.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/pcnet32.c	2004-06-24 10:20:35.382629896 +0200
+@@ -1364,7 +1364,7 @@ pcnet32_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 
+     if (dev->irq == 0 ||
+ 	request_irq(dev->irq, &pcnet32_interrupt,
+-		    lp->shared_irq ? SA_SHIRQ : 0, dev->name, (void *)dev)) {
++		    lp->shared_irq ? SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM : SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, (void *)dev)) {
+ 	return -EAGAIN;
+     }
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/r8169.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/r8169.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/r8169.c	2004-06-16 07:19:23.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/r8169.c	2004-06-24 10:20:52.459033888 +0200
+@@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ rtl8169_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 	int retval;
+ 
+ 	retval =
+-	    request_irq(dev->irq, rtl8169_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	    request_irq(dev->irq, rtl8169_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (retval < 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/rrunner.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/rrunner.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/rrunner.c	2004-06-16 07:19:02.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/rrunner.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.812002768 +0200
+@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ static int rr_open(struct net_device *de
+ 	readl(&regs->HostCtrl);
+ 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rrpriv->lock, flags);
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, rr_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, rr_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Requested IRQ %d is busy\n",
+ 		       dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		ecode = -EAGAIN;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/s2io.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/s2io.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/s2io.c	2004-06-16 07:19:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/s2io.c	2004-06-24 10:54:39.712844464 +0200
+@@ -2073,7 +2073,7 @@ int s2io_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 
+ /*  After proper initialization of H/W, register ISR */
+ 	err =
+-	    request_irq((int) sp->irq, s2io_isr, SA_SHIRQ, sp->name, dev);
++	    request_irq((int) sp->irq, s2io_isr, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, sp->name, dev);
+ 	if (err) {
+ 		s2io_reset(sp);
+ 		DBG_PRINT(ERR_DBG, "%s: ISR registration failed\n",
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/saa9730.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/saa9730.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/saa9730.c	2004-06-16 07:19:35.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/saa9730.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.823001096 +0200
+@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ static int lan_saa9730_open(struct net_d
+ 	    (struct lan_saa9730_private *) dev->priv;
+ 
+ 	/* Associate IRQ with lan_saa9730_interrupt */
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &lan_saa9730_interrupt, 0, "SAA9730 Eth",
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &lan_saa9730_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "SAA9730 Eth",
+ 			dev)) {
+ 		printk("lan_saa9730_open: Can't get irq %d\n", dev->irq);
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sb1000.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sb1000.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sb1000.c	2004-06-16 07:18:57.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sb1000.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.845997600 +0200
+@@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ sb1000_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 	lp->rx_frame_id[1] = 0;
+ 	lp->rx_frame_id[2] = 0;
+ 	lp->rx_frame_id[3] = 0;
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &sb1000_interrupt, 0, "sb1000", dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &sb1000_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "sb1000", dev)) {
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sb1250-mac.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sb1250-mac.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sb1250-mac.c	2004-06-16 07:20:03.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sb1250-mac.c	2004-06-24 10:21:24.934096928 +0200
+@@ -2458,7 +2458,7 @@ static int sbmac_open(struct net_device 
+ 	 */
+ 
+ 	SBMAC_READCSR(sc->sbm_isr);
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &sbmac_intr, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev))
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &sbmac_intr, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev))
+ 		return -EBUSY;
+ 
+ 	/*
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/seeq8005.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/seeq8005.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/seeq8005.c	2004-06-16 07:19:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/seeq8005.c	2004-06-24 10:16:09.894990152 +0200
+@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static int __init seeq8005_probe1(struct
+ 
+ #if 0
+ 	{
+-		 int irqval = request_irq(dev->irq, &seeq8005_interrupt, 0, "seeq8005", dev);
++		 int irqval = request_irq(dev->irq, &seeq8005_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "seeq8005", dev);
+ 		 if (irqval) {
+ 			 printk ("%s: unable to get IRQ %d (irqval=%d).\n", dev->name,
+ 					 dev->irq, irqval);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sgiseeq.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sgiseeq.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sgiseeq.c	2004-06-16 07:20:03.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sgiseeq.c	2004-06-24 10:21:41.854524632 +0200
+@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ int sgiseeq_init(struct hpc3_regs* regs,
+ 		goto err_out_free_dev;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(irq, sgiseeq_interrupt, 0, sgiseeqstr, dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(irq, sgiseeq_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, sgiseeqstr, dev)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "Seeq8003: Can't get irq %d\n", dev->irq);
+ 		err = -EAGAIN;
+ 		goto err_out_free_page;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sis900.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sis900.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sis900.c	2004-06-16 07:19:22.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sis900.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.055965680 +0200
+@@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ sis900_open(struct net_device *net_dev)
+ 	pci_read_config_byte(sis_priv->pci_dev, PCI_CLASS_REVISION, &revision);
+ 	sis630_set_eq(net_dev, revision);
+ 
+-	ret = request_irq(net_dev->irq, &sis900_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, net_dev->name, net_dev);
++	ret = request_irq(net_dev->irq, &sis900_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, net_dev->name, net_dev);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sk98lin/skge.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sk98lin/skge.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sk98lin/skge.c	2004-06-16 07:18:59.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sk98lin/skge.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.088960664 +0200
+@@ -964,9 +964,9 @@ SK_BOOL	DualNet;
+ 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pAC->SlowPathLock, Flags);
+ 
+ 	if (pAC->GIni.GIMacsFound == 2) {
+-		 Ret = request_irq(dev->irq, SkGeIsr, SA_SHIRQ, pAC->Name, dev);
++		 Ret = request_irq(dev->irq, SkGeIsr, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, pAC->Name, dev);
+ 	} else if (pAC->GIni.GIMacsFound == 1) {
+-		Ret = request_irq(dev->irq, SkGeIsrOnePort, SA_SHIRQ,
++		Ret = request_irq(dev->irq, SkGeIsrOnePort, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			pAC->Name, dev);
+ 	} else {
+ 		printk(KERN_WARNING "sk98lin: Illegal number of ports: %d\n",
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/skfp/skfddi.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/skfp/skfddi.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/skfp/skfddi.c	2004-06-16 07:18:57.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/skfp/skfddi.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.160949720 +0200
+@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static int skfp_open(struct net_device *
+ 
+ 	PRINTK(KERN_INFO "entering skfp_open\n");
+ 	/* Register IRQ - support shared interrupts by passing device ptr */
+-	err = request_irq(dev->irq, (void *) skfp_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ,
++	err = request_irq(dev->irq, (void *) skfp_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			  dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (err)
+ 		return err;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sk_g16.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sk_g16.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sk_g16.c	2004-06-16 07:20:26.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sk_g16.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.103958384 +0200
+@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ static int SK_open(struct net_device *de
+ 
+ 	do
+ 	{
+-	  irqval = request_irq(irqtab[i], &SK_interrupt, 0, "sk_g16", dev);
++	  irqval = request_irq(irqtab[i], &SK_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "sk_g16", dev);
+ 	  i++;
+ 	} while (irqval && irqtab[i]);
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sk_mca.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sk_mca.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sk_mca.c	2004-06-16 07:19:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sk_mca.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.131954128 +0200
+@@ -830,7 +830,7 @@ static int skmca_open(struct net_device 
+ 	/* register resources - only necessary for IRQ */
+ 	result =
+ 	    request_irq(priv->realirq, irq_handler,
+-			SA_SHIRQ | SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM, "sk_mca", dev);
++			SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, "sk_mca", dev);
+ 	if (result != 0) {
+ 		printk("%s: failed to register irq %d\n", dev->name,
+ 		       dev->irq);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/smc9194.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/smc9194.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/smc9194.c	2004-06-16 07:19:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/smc9194.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.254935432 +0200
+@@ -1001,7 +1001,7 @@ static int __init smc_probe(struct net_d
+ 	memset(dev->priv, 0, sizeof(struct smc_local));
+ 
+ 	/* Grab the IRQ */
+-      	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &smc_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++      	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &smc_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+       	if (retval) {
+ 		printk("%s: unable to get IRQ %d (irqval=%d).\n", dev->name,
+ 			dev->irq, retval);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/smc-mca.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/smc-mca.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/smc-mca.c	2004-06-16 07:18:58.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/smc-mca.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.187945616 +0200
+@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ static int ultramca_open(struct net_devi
+ 	int ioaddr = dev->base_addr - ULTRA_NIC_OFFSET; /* ASIC addr */
+ 	int retval;
+ 
+-	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev)))
++	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)))
+ 		return retval;
+ 
+ 	outb(ULTRA_MEMENB, ioaddr); /* Enable memory */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/smc-ultra32.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/smc-ultra32.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/smc-ultra32.c	2004-06-16 07:19:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/smc-ultra32.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.239937712 +0200
+@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ out:
+ static int ultra32_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ {
+ 	int ioaddr = dev->base_addr - ULTRA32_NIC_OFFSET; /* ASIC addr */
+-	int irq_flags = (inb(ioaddr + ULTRA32_CFG5) & 0x08) ? 0 : SA_SHIRQ;
++	int irq_flags = (inb(ioaddr + ULTRA32_CFG5) & 0x08) ? 0 : SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM;
+ 	int retval;
+ 
+ 	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, irq_flags, dev->name, dev);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/smc-ultra.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/smc-ultra.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/smc-ultra.c	2004-06-16 07:18:59.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/smc-ultra.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.212941816 +0200
+@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ ultra_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 	unsigned char irq2reg[] = {0, 0, 0x04, 0x08, 0, 0x0C, 0, 0x40,
+ 				   0, 0x04, 0x44, 0x48, 0, 0, 0, 0x4C, };
+ 
+-	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (retval)
+ 		return retval;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sonic.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sonic.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sonic.c	2004-06-16 07:20:04.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sonic.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.269933152 +0200
+@@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ static int sonic_open(struct net_device 
+  * covering another bug otherwise corrupting data.  This doesn't mean
+  * this glue works ok under all situations.
+  */
+-//    if (sonic_request_irq(dev->irq, &sonic_interrupt, 0, "sonic", dev)) {
+-	if (sonic_request_irq(dev->irq, &sonic_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT,
++//    if (sonic_request_irq(dev->irq, &sonic_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "sonic", dev)) {
++	if (sonic_request_irq(dev->irq, &sonic_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 	                      "sonic", dev)) {
+ 		printk("\n%s: unable to get IRQ %d .\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/starfire.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/starfire.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/starfire.c	2004-06-16 07:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/starfire.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.284930872 +0200
+@@ -1111,7 +1111,7 @@ static int netdev_open(struct net_device
+ 
+ 	COMPAT_MOD_INC_USE_COUNT;
+ 
+-	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &intr_handler, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &intr_handler, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (retval) {
+ 		COMPAT_MOD_DEC_USE_COUNT;
+ 		return retval;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/stnic.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/stnic.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/stnic.c	2004-06-16 07:19:42.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/stnic.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.309927072 +0200
+@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int __init stnic_probe(void)
+ 
+   /* Snarf the interrupt now.  There's no point in waiting since we cannot
+      share and the board will usually be enabled. */
+-  err = request_irq (dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++  err = request_irq (dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+   if (err)  {
+       printk (KERN_EMERG " unable to get IRQ %d.\n", dev->irq);
+       free_netdev(dev);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sun3_82586.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sun3_82586.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sun3_82586.c	2004-06-16 07:19:29.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sun3_82586.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.324924792 +0200
+@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ static int sun3_82586_open(struct net_de
+ 	startrecv586(dev);
+ 	sun3_enaint();
+ 
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &sun3_82586_interrupt,0,dev->name,dev);
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &sun3_82586_interrupt,SA_NET_RANDOM,dev->name,dev);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 	{
+ 		sun3_reset586();
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sun3lance.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sun3lance.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sun3lance.c	2004-06-16 07:19:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sun3lance.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.336922968 +0200
+@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static int __init lance_probe( struct ne
+ 
+ 	REGA(CSR0) = CSR0_STOP; 
+ 
+-	request_irq(LANCE_IRQ, lance_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT, "SUN3 Lance", dev);
++	request_irq(LANCE_IRQ, lance_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT | SA_NET_RANDOM, "SUN3 Lance", dev);
+ 	dev->irq = (unsigned short)LANCE_IRQ;
+ 
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sunbmac.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sunbmac.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sunbmac.c	2004-06-16 07:19:29.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sunbmac.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.361919168 +0200
+@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ static int bigmac_open(struct net_device
+ 	struct bigmac *bp = (struct bigmac *) dev->priv;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &bigmac_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, bp);
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &bigmac_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, bp);
+ 	if (ret) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "BIGMAC: Can't order irq %d to go.\n", dev->irq);
+ 		return ret;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sundance.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sundance.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sundance.c	2004-06-16 07:19:36.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sundance.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.374917192 +0200
+@@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ static int netdev_open(struct net_device
+ 
+ 	/* Do we need to reset the chip??? */
+ 
+-	i = request_irq(dev->irq, &intr_handler, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	i = request_irq(dev->irq, &intr_handler, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (i)
+ 		return i;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sungem.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sungem.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sungem.c	2004-06-16 07:20:04.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sungem.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.400913240 +0200
+@@ -2171,7 +2171,7 @@ static int gem_open(struct net_device *d
+ 	 * on the controller
+ 	 */
+ 	if (request_irq(gp->pdev->irq, gem_interrupt,
+-			SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, (void *)dev)) {
++			SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, (void *)dev)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: failed to request irq !\n", gp->dev->name);
+ 
+ 		spin_lock_irq(&gp->lock);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sunhme.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sunhme.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sunhme.c	2004-06-16 07:19:11.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sunhme.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.425909440 +0200
+@@ -2209,7 +2209,7 @@ static int happy_meal_open(struct net_de
+ 	 */
+ 	if ((hp->happy_flags & (HFLAG_QUATTRO|HFLAG_PCI)) != HFLAG_QUATTRO) {
+ 		if (request_irq(dev->irq, &happy_meal_interrupt,
+-				SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, (void *)dev)) {
++				SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, (void *)dev)) {
+ 			HMD(("EAGAIN\n"));
+ #ifdef __sparc__
+ 			printk(KERN_ERR "happy_meal(SBUS): Can't order irq %s to go.\n",
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sunlance.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sunlance.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sunlance.c	2004-06-16 07:19:03.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sunlance.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.440907160 +0200
+@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static int lance_open(struct net_device 
+ 
+ 	STOP_LANCE(lp);
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &lance_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ,
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &lance_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			lancestr, (void *) dev)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "Lance: Can't get irq %s\n", __irq_itoa(dev->irq));
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sunqe.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sunqe.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/sunqe.c	2004-06-16 07:19:13.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/sunqe.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.454905032 +0200
+@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ static int __init qec_ether_init(struct 
+ 	 * for it now.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (request_irq(sdev->irqs[0], &qec_interrupt,
+-			SA_SHIRQ, "QuadEther", (void *) qecp)) {
++			SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, "QuadEther", (void *) qecp)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "QuadEther: Can't register QEC master irq handler.\n");
+ 		res = -EAGAIN;
+ 		goto out4;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tc35815.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tc35815.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tc35815.c	2004-06-16 07:18:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tc35815.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.477901536 +0200
+@@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ tc35815_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 	 */
+ 
+ 	if (dev->irq == 0  ||
+-	    request_irq(dev->irq, &tc35815_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, cardname, dev)) {
++	    request_irq(dev->irq, &tc35815_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, cardname, dev)) {
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tg3.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tg3.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tg3.c	2004-06-16 07:19:36.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tg3.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.515895760 +0200
+@@ -5620,7 +5620,7 @@ static int tg3_open(struct net_device *d
+ 		return err;
+ 
+ 	err = request_irq(dev->irq, tg3_interrupt,
+-			  SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++			  SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 
+ 	if (err) {
+ 		tg3_free_consistent(tp);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tlan.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tlan.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tlan.c	2004-06-16 07:18:58.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tlan.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.541891808 +0200
+@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ static int TLan_Open( struct net_device 
+ 	int		err;
+ 	
+ 	priv->tlanRev = TLan_DioRead8( dev->base_addr, TLAN_DEF_REVISION );
+-	err = request_irq( dev->irq, TLan_HandleInterrupt, SA_SHIRQ, TLanSignature, dev );
++	err = request_irq( dev->irq, TLan_HandleInterrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, TLanSignature, dev );
+ 	
+ 	if ( err ) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "TLAN:  Cannot open %s because IRQ %d is already in use.\n", dev->name, dev->irq );
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/3c359.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/3c359.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/3c359.c	2004-06-16 07:20:25.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/3c359.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.563888464 +0200
+@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static int xl_open(struct net_device *de
+ 
+ 	u16 switchsettings, switchsettings_eeprom  ;
+  
+-	if(request_irq(dev->irq, &xl_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ , "3c359", dev)) {
++	if(request_irq(dev->irq, &xl_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, "3c359", dev)) {
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/abyss.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/abyss.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/abyss.c	2004-06-16 07:19:02.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/abyss.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.574886792 +0200
+@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static int __devinit abyss_attach(struct
+ 		goto err_out_trdev;
+ 	}
+ 		
+-	ret = request_irq(pdev->irq, tms380tr_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ,
++	ret = request_irq(pdev->irq, tms380tr_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			  dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		goto err_out_region;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/ibmtr.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/ibmtr.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/ibmtr.c	2004-06-16 07:19:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/ibmtr.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.586884968 +0200
+@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ static int __devinit ibmtr_probe1(struct
+ 
+ 	/* The PCMCIA has already got the interrupt line and the io port, 
+ 	   so no chance of anybody else getting it - MLP */
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq = irq, &tok_interrupt, 0, "ibmtr", dev) != 0) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq = irq, &tok_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "ibmtr", dev) != 0) {
+ 		DPRINTK("Could not grab irq %d.  Halting Token Ring driver.\n",
+ 					irq);
+ 		iounmap(t_mmio);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/lanstreamer.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/lanstreamer.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/lanstreamer.c	2004-06-16 07:20:04.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/lanstreamer.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.607881776 +0200
+@@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ static int streamer_open(struct net_devi
+ 	        rc=streamer_reset(dev);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &streamer_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, "lanstreamer", dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &streamer_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, "lanstreamer", dev)) {
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+ #if STREAMER_DEBUG
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/madgemc.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/madgemc.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/madgemc.c	2004-06-16 07:20:04.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/madgemc.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.619879952 +0200
+@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static int __init madgemc_probe(void)
+ 		 */ 
+ 		outb(0, dev->base_addr + MC_CONTROL_REG0); /* sanity */
+ 		madgemc_setsifsel(dev, 1);
+-		if (request_irq(dev->irq, madgemc_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ,
++		if (request_irq(dev->irq, madgemc_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			       "madgemc", dev)) 
+ 			goto getout;
+ 		
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/olympic.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/olympic.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/olympic.c	2004-06-16 07:19:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/olympic.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.639876912 +0200
+@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static int olympic_open(struct net_devic
+ 
+ 	DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait,current) ; 
+ 
+-	if(request_irq(dev->irq, &olympic_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ , "olympic", dev)) {
++	if(request_irq(dev->irq, &olympic_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, "olympic", dev)) {
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/proteon.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/proteon.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/proteon.c	2004-06-16 07:20:04.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/proteon.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.648875544 +0200
+@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static int __init setup_card(struct net_
+ 		for(j = 0; irqlist[j] != 0; j++)
+ 		{
+ 			dev->irq = irqlist[j];
+-			if (!request_irq(dev->irq, tms380tr_interrupt, 0, 
++			if (!request_irq(dev->irq, tms380tr_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, 
+ 				cardname, dev))
+ 				break;
+                 }
+@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static int __init setup_card(struct net_
+ 				dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 			goto out3;
+ 		}
+-		if (request_irq(dev->irq, tms380tr_interrupt, 0, 
++		if (request_irq(dev->irq, tms380tr_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, 
+ 			cardname, dev))
+ 		{
+                         printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Selected IRQ %d not available\n", 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/skisa.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/skisa.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/skisa.c	2004-06-16 07:18:57.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/skisa.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.658874024 +0200
+@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ static int __init setup_card(struct net_
+ 		for(j = 0; irqlist[j] != 0; j++)
+ 		{
+ 			dev->irq = irqlist[j];
+-			if (!request_irq(dev->irq, tms380tr_interrupt, 0, 
++			if (!request_irq(dev->irq, tms380tr_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, 
+ 				isa_cardname, dev))
+ 				break;
+                 }
+@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static int __init setup_card(struct net_
+ 				dev->name, dev->irq);
+ 			goto out3;
+ 		}
+-		if (request_irq(dev->irq, tms380tr_interrupt, 0, 
++		if (request_irq(dev->irq, tms380tr_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, 
+ 			isa_cardname, dev))
+ 		{
+                         printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Selected IRQ %d not available\n", 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/smctr.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/smctr.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/smctr.c	2004-06-16 07:19:23.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/smctr.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.678870984 +0200
+@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ static int __init smctr_chk_mca(struct n
+ 			dev->irq = 15;
+                		break;
+ 	}
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, smctr_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, smctr_name, dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, smctr_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, smctr_name, dev)) {
+ 		release_region(dev->base_addr, SMCTR_IO_EXTENT);
+ 		return -ENODEV;
+ 	}
+@@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@ static int __init smctr_chk_isa(struct n
+                         goto out2;
+          }
+ 
+-        if (request_irq(dev->irq, smctr_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, smctr_name, dev))
++        if (request_irq(dev->irq, smctr_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, smctr_name, dev))
+                 goto out2;
+ 
+         /* Get 58x Rom Base */
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/tmspci.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/tmspci.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tokenring/tmspci.c	2004-06-16 07:19:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tokenring/tmspci.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.687869616 +0200
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static int __devinit tms_pci_attach(stru
+ 		goto err_out_trdev;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	ret = request_irq(pdev->irq, tms380tr_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ,
++	ret = request_irq(pdev->irq, tms380tr_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			  dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		goto err_out_region;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tulip/de2104x.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tulip/de2104x.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tulip/de2104x.c	2004-06-16 07:19:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tulip/de2104x.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.705866880 +0200
+@@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@ static int de_open (struct net_device *d
+ 		goto err_out_free;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	rc = request_irq(dev->irq, de_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	rc = request_irq(dev->irq, de_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (rc) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: IRQ %d request failure, err=%d\n",
+ 		       dev->name, dev->irq, rc);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tulip/de4x5.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tulip/de4x5.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tulip/de4x5.c	2004-06-16 07:18:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tulip/de4x5.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.724863992 +0200
+@@ -1320,10 +1320,10 @@ de4x5_open(struct net_device *dev)
+     lp->state = OPEN;
+     de4x5_dbg_open(dev);
+     
+-    if (request_irq(dev->irq, (void *)de4x5_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, 
++    if (request_irq(dev->irq, (void *)de4x5_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, 
+ 		                                     lp->adapter_name, dev)) {
+ 	printk("de4x5_open(): Requested IRQ%d is busy - attemping FAST/SHARE...", dev->irq);
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, de4x5_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT | SA_SHIRQ,
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, de4x5_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT | SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			                             lp->adapter_name, dev)) {
+ 	    printk("\n              Cannot get IRQ- reconfigure your hardware.\n");
+ 	    disable_ast(dev);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tulip/dmfe.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tulip/dmfe.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tulip/dmfe.c	2004-06-16 07:19:53.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tulip/dmfe.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.742861256 +0200
+@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ static int dmfe_open(struct DEVICE *dev)
+ 
+ 	DMFE_DBUG(0, "dmfe_open", 0);
+ 
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &dmfe_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &dmfe_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tulip/tulip_core.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tulip/tulip_core.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tulip/tulip_core.c	2004-06-16 07:19:36.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tulip/tulip_core.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.763858064 +0200
+@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ tulip_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ {
+ 	int retval;
+ 
+-	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &tulip_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev)))
++	if ((retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &tulip_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)))
+ 		return retval;
+ 
+ 	tulip_init_ring (dev);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tulip/winbond-840.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tulip/winbond-840.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tulip/winbond-840.c	2004-06-16 07:19:01.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tulip/winbond-840.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.773856544 +0200
+@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ static int netdev_open(struct net_device
+ 	writel(0x00000001, ioaddr + PCIBusCfg);		/* Reset */
+ 
+ 	netif_device_detach(dev);
+-	i = request_irq(dev->irq, &intr_handler, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	i = request_irq(dev->irq, &intr_handler, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (i)
+ 		goto out_err;
+ 
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tulip/xircom_cb.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tulip/xircom_cb.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tulip/xircom_cb.c	2004-06-16 07:19:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tulip/xircom_cb.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.783855024 +0200
+@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ static int xircom_open(struct net_device
+ 	int retval;
+ 	enter("xircom_open");
+ 	printk(KERN_INFO "xircom cardbus adaptor found, registering as %s, using irq %i \n",dev->name,dev->irq);
+-	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &xircom_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	retval = request_irq(dev->irq, &xircom_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (retval) {
+ 		leave("xircom_open - No IRQ");
+ 		return retval;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tulip/xircom_tulip_cb.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tulip/xircom_tulip_cb.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/tulip/xircom_tulip_cb.c	2004-06-16 07:18:59.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/tulip/xircom_tulip_cb.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.796853048 +0200
+@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ xircom_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ {
+ 	struct xircom_private *tp = dev->priv;
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &xircom_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev))
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &xircom_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev))
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 
+ 	xircom_up(dev);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/typhoon.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/typhoon.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/typhoon.c	2004-06-16 07:19:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/typhoon.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.815850160 +0200
+@@ -2113,7 +2113,7 @@ typhoon_open(struct net_device *dev)
+ 		goto out_sleep;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	err = request_irq(dev->irq, &typhoon_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ,
++	err = request_irq(dev->irq, &typhoon_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 				dev->name, dev);
+ 	if(err < 0)
+ 		goto out_sleep;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/via-rhine.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/via-rhine.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/via-rhine.c	2004-06-16 07:20:04.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/via-rhine.c	2004-06-24 10:22:33.447681280 +0200
+@@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ static int rhine_open(struct net_device 
+ 	/* Reset the chip. */
+ 	writew(CmdReset, ioaddr + ChipCmd);
+ 
+-	i = request_irq(rp->pdev->irq, &rhine_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name,
++	i = request_irq(rp->pdev->irq, &rhine_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name,
+ 			dev);
+ 	if (i)
+ 		return i;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/c101.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/c101.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/c101.c	2004-06-16 07:19:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/c101.c	2004-06-24 10:16:10.854844232 +0200
+@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static int __init c101_run(unsigned long
+ 		return -ENOBUFS;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(irq, sca_intr, 0, devname, card)) {
++	if (request_irq(irq, sca_intr, SA_NET_RANDOM, devname, card)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "c101: could not allocate IRQ\n");
+ 		c101_destroy_card(card);
+ 		return(-EBUSY);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/cosa.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/cosa.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/cosa.c	2004-06-16 07:18:52.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/cosa.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.401761088 +0200
+@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ static int cosa_probe(int base, int irq,
+ 	cosa->usage = 0;
+ 	cosa->nchannels = 2;	/* FIXME: how to determine this? */
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(cosa->irq, cosa_interrupt, 0, cosa->type, cosa)) {
++	if (request_irq(cosa->irq, cosa_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, cosa->type, cosa)) {
+ 		err = -1;
+ 		goto err_out;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/cycx_main.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/cycx_main.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/cycx_main.c	2004-06-16 07:19:23.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/cycx_main.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.420758200 +0200
+@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static int cycx_wan_setup(struct wan_dev
+ 	/* Allocate IRQ */
+ 	irq = conf->irq == 2 ? 9 : conf->irq;	/* IRQ2 -> IRQ9 */
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(irq, cycx_isr, 0, wandev->name, card)) {
++	if (request_irq(irq, cycx_isr, SA_NET_RANDOM, wandev->name, card)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: can't reserve IRQ %d!\n",
+ 				wandev->name, irq);
+ 		goto out;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/dscc4.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/dscc4.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/dscc4.c	2004-06-16 07:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/dscc4.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.453753184 +0200
+@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ static int __devinit dscc4_init_one(stru
+ 
+ 	priv = (struct dscc4_pci_priv *)pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(pdev->irq, &dscc4_irq, SA_SHIRQ, DRV_NAME, priv->root)){
++	if (request_irq(pdev->irq, &dscc4_irq, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, DRV_NAME, priv->root)){
+ 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: IRQ %d busy\n", DRV_NAME, pdev->irq);
+ 		goto err_out_free1;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/farsync.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/farsync.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/farsync.c	2004-06-16 07:19:42.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/farsync.c	2004-06-24 10:23:43.843979416 +0200
+@@ -2521,7 +2521,7 @@ fst_add_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const 
+ 	dbg(DBG_PCI, "kernel mem %p, ctlmem %p\n", card->mem, card->ctlmem);
+ 
+ 	/* Register the interrupt handler */
+-	if (request_irq(pdev->irq, fst_intr, SA_SHIRQ, FST_DEV_NAME, card)) {
++	if (request_irq(pdev->irq, fst_intr, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, FST_DEV_NAME, card)) {
+ 		printk_err("Unable to register interrupt %d\n", card->irq);
+ 		pci_release_regions(pdev);
+ 		pci_disable_device(pdev);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/hostess_sv11.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/hostess_sv11.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/hostess_sv11.c	2004-06-16 07:19:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/hostess_sv11.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.518743304 +0200
+@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static struct sv11_device *sv11_init(int
+ 	/* We want a fast IRQ for this device. Actually we'd like an even faster
+ 	   IRQ ;) - This is one driver RtLinux is made for */
+ 	   
+-	if(request_irq(irq, &z8530_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT, "Hostess SV/11", dev)<0)
++	if(request_irq(irq, &z8530_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT | SA_NET_RANDOM, "Hostess SV/11", dev)<0)
+ 	{
+ 		printk(KERN_WARNING "hostess: IRQ %d already in use.\n", irq);
+ 		goto fail1;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/lmc/lmc_main.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/lmc/lmc_main.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/lmc/lmc_main.c	2004-06-16 07:19:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/lmc/lmc_main.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.557737376 +0200
+@@ -1060,7 +1060,7 @@ static int lmc_open (struct net_device *
+     lmc_softreset (sc);
+ 
+     /* Since we have to use PCI bus, this should work on x86,alpha,ppc */
+-    if (request_irq (dev->irq, &lmc_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev)){
++    if (request_irq (dev->irq, &lmc_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)){
+         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: could not get irq: %d\n", dev->name, dev->irq);
+         lmc_trace(dev, "lmc_open irq failed out");
+         return -EAGAIN;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/n2.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/n2.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/n2.c	2004-06-16 07:19:01.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/n2.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.573734944 +0200
+@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ static int __init n2_run(unsigned long i
+ 	}
+ 	card->io = io;
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(irq, &sca_intr, 0, devname, card)) {
++	if (request_irq(irq, &sca_intr, SA_NET_RANDOM, devname, card)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "n2: could not allocate IRQ\n");
+ 		n2_destroy_card(card);
+ 		return(-EBUSY);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/pc300_drv.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/pc300_drv.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/pc300_drv.c	2004-06-16 07:20:04.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/pc300_drv.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.592732056 +0200
+@@ -3603,7 +3603,7 @@ cpc_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Allocate IRQ */
+-	if (request_irq(card->hw.irq, cpc_intr, SA_SHIRQ, "Cyclades-PC300", card)) {
++	if (request_irq(card->hw.irq, cpc_intr, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, "Cyclades-PC300", card)) {
+ 		printk ("PC300 found at RAM 0x%08lx, but could not allocate IRQ%d.\n",
+ 			 card->hw.ramphys, card->hw.irq);
+ 		goto err_io_unmap;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/pci200syn.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/pci200syn.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/pci200syn.c	2004-06-16 07:19:01.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/pci200syn.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.609729472 +0200
+@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int __devinit pci200_pci_init_one
+ 	writew(readw(p) | 0x0040, p);
+ 
+ 	/* Allocate IRQ */
+-	if(request_irq(pdev->irq, sca_intr, SA_SHIRQ, devname, card)) {
++	if(request_irq(pdev->irq, sca_intr, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, devname, card)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_WARNING "pci200syn: could not allocate IRQ%d.\n",
+ 		       pdev->irq);
+ 		pci200_pci_remove_one(pdev);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/sbni.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/sbni.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/sbni.c	2004-06-16 07:19:13.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/sbni.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.637725216 +0200
+@@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@ sbni_open( struct net_device  *dev )
+ 			}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if( request_irq(dev->irq, sbni_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev) ) {
++	if( request_irq(dev->irq, sbni_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev) ) {
+ 		printk( KERN_ERR "%s: unable to get IRQ %d.\n",
+ 			dev->name, dev->irq );
+ 		return  -EAGAIN;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/sdla.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/sdla.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/sdla.c	2004-06-16 07:20:26.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/sdla.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.666720808 +0200
+@@ -1461,7 +1461,7 @@ got_type:
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	err = -EAGAIN;
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &sdla_isr, 0, dev->name, dev)) 
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &sdla_isr, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev)) 
+ 		goto fail;
+ 
+ 	if (flp->type == SDLA_S507) {
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/sdlamain.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/sdlamain.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/sdlamain.c	2004-06-16 07:19:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/sdlamain.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.681718528 +0200
+@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ static int setup(struct wan_device* wand
+ 		/* when using the S514 PCI adapter */
+ 		
+        		if(request_irq(irq, sdla_isr, 
+-		      (card->hw.type == SDLA_S514) ? SA_SHIRQ : 0, 
++		      (card->hw.type == SDLA_S514) ? SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM : 0, 
+ 		       wandev->name, card)){
+ 
+ 			printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Can't reserve IRQ %d!\n", wandev->name, irq);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/sealevel.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/sealevel.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/sealevel.c	2004-06-16 07:19:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/sealevel.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.709714272 +0200
+@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static __init struct slvl_board *slvl_in
+ 	/* We want a fast IRQ for this device. Actually we'd like an even faster
+ 	   IRQ ;) - This is one driver RtLinux is made for */
+    
+-	if(request_irq(irq, &z8530_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT, "SeaLevel", dev)<0)
++	if(request_irq(irq, &z8530_interrupt, SA_INTERRUPT | SA_NET_RANDOM, "SeaLevel", dev)<0)
+ 	{
+ 		printk(KERN_WARNING "sealevel: IRQ %d already in use.\n", irq);
+ 		goto fail1_1;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/wanxl.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/wanxl.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wan/wanxl.c	2004-06-16 07:20:03.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wan/wanxl.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.735710320 +0200
+@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ static int __devinit wanxl_pci_init_one(
+ 	       card_name(pdev), plx_phy, ramsize / 1024, mem_phy, pdev->irq);
+ 
+ 	/* Allocate IRQ */
+-	if (request_irq(pdev->irq, wanxl_intr, SA_SHIRQ, "wanXL", card)) {
++	if (request_irq(pdev->irq, wanxl_intr, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, "wanXL", card)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_WARNING "wanXL %s: could not allocate IRQ%i.\n",
+ 		       card_name(pdev), pdev->irq);
+ 		wanxl_pci_remove_one(pdev);
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wd.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wd.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wd.c	2004-06-16 07:18:57.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wd.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.748708344 +0200
+@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static int __init wd_probe1(struct net_d
+ 
+ 	/* Snarf the interrupt now.  There's no point in waiting since we cannot
+ 	   share and the board will usually be enabled. */
+-	i = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++	i = request_irq(dev->irq, ei_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (i) {
+ 		printk (" unable to get IRQ %d.\n", dev->irq);
+ 		return i;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/airo.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/airo.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/airo.c	2004-06-16 07:18:58.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/airo.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.791701808 +0200
+@@ -2745,7 +2745,7 @@ struct net_device *_init_airo_card( unsi
+ 		SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, &pci->dev);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	rc = request_irq( dev->irq, airo_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev );
++	rc = request_irq( dev->irq, airo_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev );
+ 	if (rc) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "airo: register interrupt %d failed, rc %d\n", irq, rc );
+ 		goto err_out_unlink;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/airport.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/airport.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/airport.c	2004-06-16 07:20:04.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/airport.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.804699832 +0200
+@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ airport_attach(struct macio_dev *mdev, c
+ 	/* Reset it before we get the interrupt */
+ 	hermes_init(hw);
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, orinoco_interrupt, 0, "Airport", dev)) {
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, orinoco_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "Airport", dev)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "airport: Couldn't get IRQ %d\n", dev->irq);
+ 		goto failed;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/arlan-main.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/arlan-main.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/arlan-main.c	2004-06-16 07:19:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/arlan-main.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.819697552 +0200
+@@ -1116,7 +1116,7 @@ static int arlan_open(struct net_device 
+ 
+ 	ARLAN_DEBUG_ENTRY("arlan_open");
+ 
+-	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &arlan_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);
++	ret = request_irq(dev->irq, &arlan_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 	{
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: unable to get IRQ %d .\n",
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/atmel.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/atmel.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/atmel.c	2004-06-16 07:19:02.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/atmel.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.848693144 +0200
+@@ -1579,7 +1579,7 @@ struct net_device *init_atmel_card( unsi
+ 	dev->irq = irq;
+ 	dev->base_addr = port;
+ 	
+-	if ((rc = request_irq(dev->irq, service_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev))) {
++	if ((rc = request_irq(dev->irq, service_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev))) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: register interrupt %d failed, rc %d\n", dev->name, irq, rc );
+ 		goto err_out_free;
+ 	}
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco_pci.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco_pci.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco_pci.c	2004-06-16 07:19:42.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco_pci.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.872689496 +0200
+@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static int orinoco_pci_init_one(struct p
+ 			   HERMES_MEM, HERMES_32BIT_REGSPACING);
+ 	pci_set_drvdata(pdev, dev);
+ 
+-	err = request_irq(pdev->irq, orinoco_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ,
++	err = request_irq(pdev->irq, orinoco_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM,
+ 			  dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (err) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "orinoco_pci: Error allocating IRQ %d.\n",
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco_plx.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco_plx.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco_plx.c	2004-06-16 07:20:04.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco_plx.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.884687672 +0200
+@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static int orinoco_plx_init_one(struct p
+ 			HERMES_IO, HERMES_16BIT_REGSPACING);
+ 	pci_set_drvdata(pdev, dev);
+ 
+-	err = request_irq(pdev->irq, orinoco_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	err = request_irq(pdev->irq, orinoco_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (err) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "orinoco_plx: Error allocating IRQ %d.\n", pdev->irq);
+ 		err = -EBUSY;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco_tmd.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco_tmd.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco_tmd.c	2004-06-16 07:18:59.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco_tmd.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.895686000 +0200
+@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static int orinoco_tmd_init_one(struct p
+ 			HERMES_IO, HERMES_16BIT_REGSPACING);
+ 	pci_set_drvdata(pdev, dev);
+ 
+-	err = request_irq(pdev->irq, orinoco_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name,
++	err = request_irq(pdev->irq, orinoco_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name,
+ 			  dev);
+ 	if (err) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "orinoco_tmd: Error allocating IRQ %d.\n",
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/wavelan.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/wavelan.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/wireless/wavelan.c	2004-06-16 07:20:03.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/wireless/wavelan.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.929680832 +0200
+@@ -4022,7 +4022,7 @@ static int wavelan_open(struct net_devic
+ 		return -ENXIO;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &wavelan_interrupt, 0, "WaveLAN", dev) != 0) 
++	if (request_irq(dev->irq, &wavelan_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "WaveLAN", dev) != 0) 
+ 	{
+ #ifdef DEBUG_CONFIG_ERROR
+ 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: wavelan_open(): invalid IRQ\n",
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/yellowfin.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/yellowfin.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/yellowfin.c	2004-06-16 07:19:13.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/yellowfin.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.942678856 +0200
+@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ static int yellowfin_open(struct net_dev
+ 	/* Reset the chip. */
+ 	outl(0x80000000, ioaddr + DMACtrl);
+ 
+-	i = request_irq(dev->irq, &yellowfin_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++	i = request_irq(dev->irq, &yellowfin_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+ 	if (i) return i;
+ 
+ 	if (yellowfin_debug > 1)
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/znet.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/znet.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/znet.c	2004-06-16 07:18:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/znet.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.955676880 +0200
+@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static int znet_request_resources (struc
+ 	struct znet_private *znet = dev->priv;
+ 	unsigned long flags;
+ 		
+-	if (request_irq (dev->irq, &znet_interrupt, 0, "ZNet", dev))
++	if (request_irq (dev->irq, &znet_interrupt, SA_NET_RANDOM, "ZNet", dev))
+ 		goto failed;
+ 	if (request_dma (znet->rx_dma, "ZNet rx"))
+ 		goto free_irq;
+diff -uprN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/zorro8390.c linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/zorro8390.c
+--- linux-2.6.7/drivers/net/zorro8390.c	2004-06-16 07:19:36.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.7-netdev_random/drivers/net/zorro8390.c	2004-06-24 10:16:11.968674904 +0200
+@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static int __devinit zorro8390_init(stru
+     dev->irq = IRQ_AMIGA_PORTS;
+ 
+     /* Install the Interrupt handler */
+-    i = request_irq(IRQ_AMIGA_PORTS, ei_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ, dev->name, dev);
++    i = request_irq(IRQ_AMIGA_PORTS, ei_interrupt, SA_SHIRQ | SA_NET_RANDOM, dev->name, dev);
+     if (i) return i;
+ 
+     for(i = 0; i < ETHER_ADDR_LEN; i++) {