diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-5.2/1000_grsecurity-2.0-2.6.5.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-5.2/1000_grsecurity-2.0-2.6.5.patch | 21375 |
1 files changed, 21375 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-5.2/1000_grsecurity-2.0-2.6.5.patch b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-5.2/1000_grsecurity-2.0-2.6.5.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ead9fb831f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/kernel/hardened-patches/hardened-patches-2.6-5.2/1000_grsecurity-2.0-2.6.5.patch @@ -0,0 +1,21375 @@ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/Makefile linux-2.6.5/Makefile +--- linux-2.6.5/Makefile 2004-04-03 22:37:36.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/Makefile 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + VERSION = 2 + PATCHLEVEL = 6 + SUBLEVEL = 5 +-EXTRAVERSION = ++EXTRAVERSION = -grsec + NAME=Zonked Quokka + + # *DOCUMENTATION* +@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ + CFLAGS := $(CPPFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) + AFLAGS := $(CPPFLAGS) $(AFLAGS) + +-core-y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ ++core-y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ grsecurity/ + + SUBDIRS += $(patsubst %/,%,$(filter %/, $(init-y) $(init-m) \ + $(core-y) $(core-m) $(drivers-y) $(drivers-m) \ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c linux-2.6.5/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c 2004-04-03 22:36:11.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ + #include <linux/namei.h> + #include <linux/uio.h> + #include <linux/vfs.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/fpu.h> + #include <asm/io.h> +@@ -179,6 +180,11 @@ + struct file *file = NULL; + unsigned long ret = -EBADF; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) ++ return -EINVAL; ++#endif ++ + #if 0 + if (flags & (_MAP_HASSEMAPHORE | _MAP_INHERIT | _MAP_UNALIGNED)) + printk("%s: unimplemented OSF mmap flags %04lx\n", +@@ -189,6 +195,13 @@ + if (!file) + goto out; + } ++ ++ if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) { ++ fput(file); ++ ret = -EACCES; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flags, off); +@@ -1295,6 +1308,10 @@ + merely specific addresses, but regions of memory -- perhaps + this feature should be incorporated into all ports? */ + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp) ++#endif ++ + if (addr) { + addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(addr), len, limit); + if (addr != (unsigned long) -ENOMEM) +@@ -1302,8 +1319,16 @@ + } + + /* Next, try allocating at TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE. */ +- addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE), +- len, limit); ++ ++ addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) ++ addr += current->mm->delta_mmap; ++#endif ++ ++ addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(addr), len, limit); ++ + if (addr != (unsigned long) -ENOMEM) + return addr; + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.5/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-03 22:38:13.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ + #include <linux/user.h> + #include <linux/slab.h> + #include <linux/security.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/pgtable.h> +@@ -288,6 +289,9 @@ + if (!child) + goto out_notsk; + ++ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) ++ goto out; ++ + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { + ret = ptrace_attach(child); + goto out; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.5/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c 2004-04-03 22:36:54.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include <linux/smp_lock.h> + #include <linux/interrupt.h> + #include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/binfmts.h> + + #include <asm/system.h> + #include <asm/uaccess.h> +@@ -56,6 +57,142 @@ + __reload_thread(pcb); + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++/* ++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->pc = fault address) ++ * ++ * returns 1 when task should be killed ++ * 2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected ++ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected ++ * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected ++ */ ++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) ++{ ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT ++ int err; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { ++ if (regs->pc >= current->mm->start_code && ++ regs->pc < current->mm->end_code) ++ { ++ if (regs->r26 == regs->pc) ++ return 1; ++ ++ regs->pc += current->mm->delta_exec; ++ return 4; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT ++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */ ++ unsigned int ldah, ldq, jmp; ++ ++ err = get_user(ldah, (unsigned int *)regs->pc); ++ err |= get_user(ldq, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4)); ++ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((ldah & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x277B0000U && ++ (ldq & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0xA77B0000U && ++ jmp == 0x6BFB0000U) ++ { ++ unsigned long r27, addr; ++ unsigned long addrh = (ldah | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL) << 16; ++ unsigned long addrl = ldq | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL; ++ ++ addr = regs->r27 + ((addrh ^ 0x80000000UL) + 0x80000000UL) + ((addrl ^ 0x8000UL) + 0x8000UL); ++ err = get_user(r27, (unsigned long*)addr); ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ regs->r27 = r27; ++ regs->pc = r27; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */ ++ unsigned int ldah, lda, br; ++ ++ err = get_user(ldah, (unsigned int *)regs->pc); ++ err |= get_user(lda, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4)); ++ err |= get_user(br, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((ldah & 0xFFFF0000U)== 0x277B0000U && ++ (lda & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0xA77B0000U && ++ (br & 0xFFE00000U) == 0xC3E00000U) ++ { ++ unsigned long addr = br | 0xFFFFFFFFFFE00000UL; ++ unsigned long addrh = (ldah | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL) << 16; ++ unsigned long addrl = lda | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL; ++ ++ regs->r27 += ((addrh ^ 0x80000000UL) + 0x80000000UL) + ((addrl ^ 0x8000UL) + 0x8000UL); ++ regs->pc += 12 + (((addr ^ 0x00100000UL) + 0x00100000UL) << 2); ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation */ ++ unsigned int br; ++ ++ err = get_user(br, (unsigned int *)regs->pc); ++ ++ if (!err && (br & 0xFFE00000U) == 0xC3800000U) { ++ unsigned int br2, ldq, nop, jmp; ++ unsigned long addr = br | 0xFFFFFFFFFFE00000UL, resolver; ++ ++ addr = regs->pc + 4 + (((addr ^ 0x00100000UL) + 0x00100000UL) << 2); ++ err = get_user(br2, (unsigned int *)addr); ++ err |= get_user(ldq, (unsigned int *)(addr+4)); ++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(addr+8)); ++ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned int *)(addr+12)); ++ err |= get_user(resolver, (unsigned long *)(addr+16)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if (br2 == 0xC3600000U && ++ ldq == 0xA77B000CU && ++ nop == 0x47FF041FU && ++ jmp == 0x6B7B0000U) ++ { ++ regs->r28 = regs->pc+4; ++ regs->r27 = addr+16; ++ regs->pc = resolver; ++ return 3; ++ } ++ } ++ } while (0); ++#endif ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) ++{ ++ unsigned long i; ++ ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); ++ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { ++ unsigned int c; ++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) { ++ printk("<invalid address>."); ++ break; ++ } ++ printk("%08x ", c); ++ } ++ printk("\n"); ++} ++#endif + + /* + * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address, +@@ -133,8 +270,34 @@ + good_area: + si_code = SEGV_ACCERR; + if (cause < 0) { +- if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) ++ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || address != regs->pc) ++ goto bad_area; ++ ++ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); ++ switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT ++ case 2: ++ case 3: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ case 4: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++ } ++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->pc, (void*)rdusp()); ++ do_exit(SIGKILL); ++#else + goto bad_area; ++#endif ++ ++ } + } else if (!cause) { + /* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */ + if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE))) +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/Kconfig linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/Kconfig +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/Kconfig 2004-04-03 22:36:25.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/Kconfig 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ + + config X86_ALIGNMENT_16 + bool +- depends on MWINCHIP3D || MWINCHIP2 || MWINCHIPC6 || MCYRIXIII || X86_ELAN || MK6 || M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || MVIAC3_2 ++ depends on MWINCHIP3D || MWINCHIP2 || MWINCHIPC6 || MCYRIXIII || X86_ELAN || MK8 || MK7 || MK6 || MPENTIUM4 || MPENTIUMIII || MPENTIUMII || M686 || M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || MVIAC3_2 + default y + + config X86_GOOD_APIC +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c 2004-04-03 22:36:16.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -597,19 +597,40 @@ + int cpu; + struct desc_struct save_desc_40; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ unsigned long cr3; ++#endif ++ + cpus = apm_save_cpus(); + + cpu = get_cpu(); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3); ++#endif ++ + save_desc_40 = cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8]; + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc; + ++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + local_save_flags(flags); + APM_DO_CLI; ++#endif ++ + APM_DO_SAVE_SEGS; + apm_bios_call_asm(func, ebx_in, ecx_in, eax, ebx, ecx, edx, esi); + APM_DO_RESTORE_SEGS; ++ ++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + local_irq_restore(flags); ++#endif ++ + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3); ++#endif ++ + put_cpu(); + apm_restore_cpus(cpus); + +@@ -639,20 +660,40 @@ + int cpu; + struct desc_struct save_desc_40; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ unsigned long cr3; ++#endif + + cpus = apm_save_cpus(); + + cpu = get_cpu(); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3); ++#endif ++ + save_desc_40 = cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8]; + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc; + ++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + local_save_flags(flags); + APM_DO_CLI; ++#endif ++ + APM_DO_SAVE_SEGS; + error = apm_bios_call_simple_asm(func, ebx_in, ecx_in, eax); + APM_DO_RESTORE_SEGS; ++ ++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + local_irq_restore(flags); ++#endif ++ + cpu_gdt_table[smp_processor_id()][0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3); ++#endif ++ + put_cpu(); + apm_restore_cpus(cpus); + return error; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c 2004-04-03 22:36:16.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -319,6 +319,10 @@ + if (this_cpu->c_init) + this_cpu->c_init(c); + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL) ++ clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_SEP, c->x86_capability); ++#endif ++ + /* Disable the PN if appropriate */ + squash_the_stupid_serial_number(c); + +@@ -514,7 +518,7 @@ + set_tss_desc(cpu,t); + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_TSS].b &= 0xfffffdff; + load_TR_desc(); +- load_LDT(&init_mm.context); ++ _load_LDT(&init_mm.context); + + /* Set up doublefault TSS pointer in the GDT */ + __set_tss_desc(cpu, GDT_ENTRY_DOUBLEFAULT_TSS, &doublefault_tss); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S 2004-04-03 22:36:52.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -272,6 +272,11 @@ + movl TI_FLAGS(%ebp), %ecx + testw $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, %cx + jne syscall_exit_work ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK ++ call pax_randomize_kstack ++#endif ++ + /* if something modifies registers it must also disable sysexit */ + movl EIP(%esp), %edx + movl OLDESP(%esp), %ecx +@@ -299,6 +304,11 @@ + movl TI_FLAGS(%ebp), %ecx + testw $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, %cx # current->work + jne syscall_exit_work ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK ++ call pax_randomize_kstack ++#endif ++ + restore_all: + RESTORE_ALL + +@@ -591,7 +601,13 @@ + jmp error_code + + ENTRY(page_fault) ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ ALIGN ++ pushl $pax_do_page_fault ++#else + pushl $do_page_fault ++#endif ++ + jmp error_code + + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE +@@ -606,7 +622,7 @@ + pushl $do_spurious_interrupt_bug + jmp error_code + +-.data ++.section .rodata,"a",@progbits + ENTRY(sys_call_table) + .long sys_restart_syscall /* 0 - old "setup()" system call, used for restarting */ + .long sys_exit +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/head.S linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/head.S +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/head.S 2004-04-03 22:36:18.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/head.S 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ + + + /* ++ * Real beginning of normal "text" segment ++ */ ++ENTRY(stext) ++ENTRY(_stext) ++ ++/* + * 32-bit kernel entrypoint; only used by the boot CPU. On entry, + * %esi points to the real-mode code as a 32-bit pointer. + * CS and DS must be 4 GB flat segments, but we don't depend on +@@ -80,9 +86,9 @@ + + movl $(pg0 - __PAGE_OFFSET), %edi + movl $(swapper_pg_dir - __PAGE_OFFSET), %edx +- movl $0x007, %eax /* 0x007 = PRESENT+RW+USER */ ++ movl $0x067, %eax /* 0x067 = DIRTY+ACCESSED+PRESENT+RW+USER */ + 10: +- leal 0x007(%edi),%ecx /* Create PDE entry */ ++ leal 0x067(%edi),%ecx /* Create PDE entry */ + movl %ecx,(%edx) /* Store identity PDE entry */ + movl %ecx,page_pde_offset(%edx) /* Store kernel PDE entry */ + addl $4,%edx +@@ -92,8 +98,8 @@ + addl $0x1000,%eax + loop 11b + /* End condition: we must map up to and including INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END */ +- /* bytes beyond the end of our own page tables; the +0x007 is the attribute bits */ +- leal (INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END+0x007)(%edi),%ebp ++ /* bytes beyond the end of our own page tables; the +0x067 is the attribute bits */ ++ leal (INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END+0x067)(%edi),%ebp + cmpl %ebp,%eax + jb 10b + movl %edi,(init_pg_tables_end - __PAGE_OFFSET) +@@ -152,7 +158,7 @@ + movl %cr0,%eax + orl $0x80000000,%eax + movl %eax,%cr0 /* ..and set paging (PG) bit */ +- ljmp $__BOOT_CS,$1f /* Clear prefetch and normalize %eip */ ++ ljmp $__BOOT_CS,$1f + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET /* Clear prefetch and normalize %eip */ + 1: + /* Set up the stack pointer */ + lss stack_start,%esp +@@ -304,8 +310,6 @@ + jmp L6 # main should never return here, but + # just in case, we know what happens. + +-ready: .byte 0 +- + /* + * We depend on ET to be correct. This checks for 287/387. + */ +@@ -353,13 +357,6 @@ + jne rp_sidt + ret + +-ENTRY(stack_start) +- .long init_thread_union+THREAD_SIZE +- .long __BOOT_DS +- +-/* This is the default interrupt "handler" :-) */ +-int_msg: +- .asciz "Unknown interrupt or fault at EIP %p %p %p\n" + ALIGN + ignore_int: + cld +@@ -386,6 +383,47 @@ + iret + + /* ++ * This starts the data section. Note that the above is all ++ * in the text section because it has alignment requirements ++ * that we cannot fulfill any other way except for PaX ;-). ++ */ ++.data ++ready: .byte 0 ++ ++/* ++ * swapper_pg_dir is the main page directory, address 0x00101000 ++ * ++ * This is initialized to create an identity-mapping at 0 (for bootup ++ * purposes) and another mapping at virtual address PAGE_OFFSET. The ++ * values put here should be all invalid (zero); the valid ++ * entries are created dynamically at boot time. ++ * ++ * The code creates enough page tables to map 0-_end, the page tables ++ * themselves, plus INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END bytes; see comment at beginning. ++ */ ++.section .data.swapper_pg_dir,"a",@progbits ++ENTRY(swapper_pg_dir) ++ .fill 1024,4,0 ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ENTRY(kernexec_pg_dir) ++ .fill 1024,4,0 ++#endif ++ ++.section .rodata.empty_zero_page,"a",@progbits ++ENTRY(empty_zero_page) ++ .fill 4096,1,0 ++ ++.section .rodata,"a",@progbits ++ENTRY(stack_start) ++ .long init_thread_union+THREAD_SIZE ++ .long __BOOT_DS ++ ++/* This is the default interrupt "handler" :-) */ ++int_msg: ++ .asciz "Unknown interrupt or fault at EIP %p %p %p\n" ++ ++/* + * The IDT and GDT 'descriptors' are a strange 48-bit object + * only used by the lidt and lgdt instructions. They are not + * like usual segment descriptors - they consist of a 16-bit +@@ -417,47 +455,14 @@ + .fill NR_CPUS-1,8,0 # space for the other GDT descriptors + + /* +- * swapper_pg_dir is the main page directory, address 0x00101000 +- * +- * This is initialized to create an identity-mapping at 0 (for bootup +- * purposes) and another mapping at virtual address PAGE_OFFSET. The +- * values put here should be all invalid (zero); the valid +- * entries are created dynamically at boot time. +- * +- * The code creates enough page tables to map 0-_end, the page tables +- * themselves, plus INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END bytes; see comment at beginning. +- */ +-.org 0x1000 +-ENTRY(swapper_pg_dir) +- .fill 1024,4,0 +- +-.org 0x2000 +-ENTRY(empty_zero_page) +- .fill 4096,1,0 +- +-.org 0x3000 +-/* +- * Real beginning of normal "text" segment +- */ +-ENTRY(stext) +-ENTRY(_stext) +- +-/* +- * This starts the data section. Note that the above is all +- * in the text section because it has alignment requirements +- * that we cannot fulfill any other way. +- */ +-.data +- +-/* + * The boot_gdt_table must mirror the equivalent in setup.S and is + * used only for booting. + */ + .align L1_CACHE_BYTES + ENTRY(boot_gdt_table) + .fill GDT_ENTRY_BOOT_CS,8,0 +- .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */ +- .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */ ++ .quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff /* kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */ ++ .quad 0x00cf93000000ffff /* kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */ + + /* + * The Global Descriptor Table contains 28 quadwords, per-CPU. +@@ -468,7 +473,13 @@ + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x0b reserved */ + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x13 reserved */ + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x1b reserved */ ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_PCI_BIOS) ++ .quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff /* 0x20 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */ ++#else + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x20 unused */ ++#endif ++ + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x28 unused */ + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x33 TLS entry 1 */ + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x3b TLS entry 2 */ +@@ -477,27 +488,32 @@ + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x53 reserved */ + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x5b reserved */ + +- .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* 0x60 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */ +- .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* 0x68 kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */ +- .quad 0x00cffa000000ffff /* 0x73 user 4GB code at 0x00000000 */ +- .quad 0x00cff2000000ffff /* 0x7b user 4GB data at 0x00000000 */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ .quad 0xc0cf9b400000ffff /* 0x60 kernel 4GB code at 0xc0400000 */ ++#else ++ .quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff /* 0x60 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */ ++#endif ++ ++ .quad 0x00cf93000000ffff /* 0x68 kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */ ++ .quad 0x00cffb000000ffff /* 0x73 user 4GB code at 0x00000000 */ ++ .quad 0x00cff3000000ffff /* 0x7b user 4GB data at 0x00000000 */ + + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x80 TSS descriptor */ + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x88 LDT descriptor */ + + /* Segments used for calling PnP BIOS */ +- .quad 0x00c09a0000000000 /* 0x90 32-bit code */ +- .quad 0x00809a0000000000 /* 0x98 16-bit code */ +- .quad 0x0080920000000000 /* 0xa0 16-bit data */ +- .quad 0x0080920000000000 /* 0xa8 16-bit data */ +- .quad 0x0080920000000000 /* 0xb0 16-bit data */ ++ .quad 0x00c09b0000000000 /* 0x90 32-bit code */ ++ .quad 0x00809b0000000000 /* 0x98 16-bit code */ ++ .quad 0x0080930000000000 /* 0xa0 16-bit data */ ++ .quad 0x0080930000000000 /* 0xa8 16-bit data */ ++ .quad 0x0080930000000000 /* 0xb0 16-bit data */ + /* + * The APM segments have byte granularity and their bases + * and limits are set at run time. + */ +- .quad 0x00409a0000000000 /* 0xb8 APM CS code */ +- .quad 0x00009a0000000000 /* 0xc0 APM CS 16 code (16 bit) */ +- .quad 0x0040920000000000 /* 0xc8 APM DS data */ ++ .quad 0x00409b0000000000 /* 0xb8 APM CS code */ ++ .quad 0x00009b0000000000 /* 0xc0 APM CS 16 code (16 bit) */ ++ .quad 0x0040930000000000 /* 0xc8 APM DS data */ + + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0xd0 - unused */ + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0xd8 - unused */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c 2004-04-03 22:37:06.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ + #include <linux/stddef.h> + #include <linux/slab.h> + #include <linux/thread_info.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + /* Set EXTENT bits starting at BASE in BITMAP to value TURN_ON. */ + static void set_bitmap(unsigned long *bitmap, unsigned int base, unsigned int extent, int new_value) +@@ -62,9 +63,16 @@ + + if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS)) + return -EINVAL; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO ++ if (turn_on) { ++ gr_handle_ioperm(); ++#else + if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) ++#endif + return -EPERM; +- ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO ++ } ++#endif + /* + * If it's the first ioperm() call in this thread's lifetime, set the + * IO bitmap up. ioperm() is much less timing critical than clone(), +@@ -115,8 +123,13 @@ + return -EINVAL; + /* Trying to gain more privileges? */ + if (level > old) { ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO ++ gr_handle_iopl(); ++ return -EPERM; ++#else + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + return -EPERM; ++#endif + } + regs->eflags = (regs->eflags &~ 0x3000UL) | (level << 12); + /* Make sure we return the long way (not sysenter) */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c 2004-04-03 22:37:37.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ + { + int err; + unsigned long size; +- void *address; ++ const void *address; + + err = 0; + address = &default_ldt[0]; +@@ -211,6 +211,13 @@ + } + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (ldt_info.contents & 2)) { ++ error = -EINVAL; ++ goto out_unlock; ++ } ++#endif ++ + entry_1 = LDT_entry_a(&ldt_info); + entry_2 = LDT_entry_b(&ldt_info); + if (oldmode) +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/process.c linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/process.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/process.c 2004-04-03 22:36:10.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/process.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ + struct task_struct *tsk; + int err; + +- childregs = ((struct pt_regs *) (THREAD_SIZE + (unsigned long) p->thread_info)) - 1; ++ childregs = ((struct pt_regs *) (THREAD_SIZE + (unsigned long) p->thread_info - sizeof(unsigned long))) - 1; + struct_cpy(childregs, regs); + childregs->eax = 0; + childregs->esp = esp; +@@ -446,9 +446,8 @@ + int dump_task_regs(struct task_struct *tsk, elf_gregset_t *regs) + { + struct pt_regs ptregs; +- +- ptregs = *(struct pt_regs *) +- ((unsigned long)tsk->thread_info+THREAD_SIZE - sizeof(ptregs)); ++ ++ ptregs = *(struct pt_regs *)(tsk->thread.esp0 - sizeof(ptregs)); + ptregs.xcs &= 0xffff; + ptregs.xds &= 0xffff; + ptregs.xes &= 0xffff; +@@ -501,10 +500,22 @@ + int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + cpu; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ unsigned long flags, cr3; ++#endif ++ + /* never put a printk in __switch_to... printk() calls wake_up*() indirectly */ + + __unlazy_fpu(prev_p); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3); ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ pax_switch_segments(next_p, cpu); ++#endif ++ + /* + * Reload esp0, LDT and the page table pointer: + */ +@@ -515,6 +526,10 @@ + */ + load_TLS(next, cpu); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3); ++#endif ++ + /* + * Save away %fs and %gs. No need to save %es and %ds, as + * those are always kernel segments while inside the kernel. +@@ -689,6 +704,10 @@ + struct desc_struct *desc; + int cpu, idx; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ unsigned long flags, cr3; ++#endif ++ + if (copy_from_user(&info, u_info, sizeof(info))) + return -EFAULT; + idx = info.entry_number; +@@ -722,8 +741,17 @@ + desc->a = LDT_entry_a(&info); + desc->b = LDT_entry_b(&info); + } ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3); ++#endif ++ + load_TLS(t, cpu); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3); ++#endif ++ + put_cpu(); + + return 0; +@@ -777,3 +805,29 @@ + return 0; + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK ++asmlinkage void pax_randomize_kstack(void) ++{ ++ struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + smp_processor_id(); ++ unsigned long time; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++ if (!pax_aslr) ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++ rdtscl(time); ++ ++ /* P4 seems to return a 0 LSB, ignore it */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_MPENTIUM4 ++ time &= 0x3EUL; ++ time <<= 1; ++#else ++ time &= 0x1FUL; ++ time <<= 2; ++#endif ++ ++ tss->esp0 ^= time; ++ current->thread.esp0 = tss->esp0; ++} ++#endif +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-03 22:36:54.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ + #include <linux/ptrace.h> + #include <linux/user.h> + #include <linux/security.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/pgtable.h> +@@ -262,6 +263,9 @@ + if (pid == 1) /* you may not mess with init */ + goto out_tsk; + ++ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) ++ goto out_tsk; ++ + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { + ret = ptrace_attach(child); + goto out_tsk; +@@ -340,6 +344,17 @@ + if(addr == (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[5]) break; + if(addr < (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[4] && + ((unsigned long) data) >= TASK_SIZE-3) break; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ if(addr >= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0] && ++ addr <= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[3]){ ++ long reg = (addr - (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0]) >> 2; ++ long type = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 4*reg)) & 3; ++ long align = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 2 + 4*reg)) & 3; ++ if((type & 1) && (data & align)) ++ break; ++ } ++#endif + + if(addr == (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[7]) { + data &= ~DR_CONTROL_RESERVED; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c 2004-04-03 22:36:54.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -74,18 +74,18 @@ + doesn't work with at least one type of 486 motherboard. It is easy + to stop this code working; hence the copious comments. */ + +-static unsigned long long ++static const unsigned long long + real_mode_gdt_entries [3] = + { + 0x0000000000000000ULL, /* Null descriptor */ +- 0x00009a000000ffffULL, /* 16-bit real-mode 64k code at 0x00000000 */ +- 0x000092000100ffffULL /* 16-bit real-mode 64k data at 0x00000100 */ ++ 0x00009b000000ffffULL, /* 16-bit real-mode 64k code at 0x00000000 */ ++ 0x000093000100ffffULL /* 16-bit real-mode 64k data at 0x00000100 */ + }; + + static struct + { + unsigned short size __attribute__ ((packed)); +- unsigned long long * base __attribute__ ((packed)); ++ const unsigned long long * base __attribute__ ((packed)); + } + real_mode_gdt = { sizeof (real_mode_gdt_entries) - 1, real_mode_gdt_entries }, + real_mode_idt = { 0x3ff, 0 }, +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c 2004-04-03 22:37:06.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -1202,6 +1202,15 @@ + #endif + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++static int __init setup_pax_softmode(char *str) ++{ ++ get_option (&str, &pax_softmode); ++ return 1; ++} ++__setup("pax_softmode=", setup_pax_softmode); ++#endif ++ + #include "setup_arch_post.h" + /* + * Local Variables: +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c 2004-04-03 22:36:58.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -371,7 +371,17 @@ + if (err) + goto give_sigsegv; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL ++ restorer = frame->retcode; ++#else + restorer = &__kernel_sigreturn; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ++ restorer -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; ++#endif ++#endif ++ + if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) + restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer; + +@@ -454,7 +464,18 @@ + goto give_sigsegv; + + /* Set up to return from userspace. */ ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL ++ restorer = frame->retcode; ++#else + restorer = &__kernel_rt_sigreturn; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ++ restorer -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; ++#endif ++#endif ++ + if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) + restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer; + err |= __put_user(restorer, &frame->pretcode); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c 2004-04-03 22:38:21.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ + #include <linux/mman.h> + #include <linux/file.h> + #include <linux/utsname.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/ipc.h> +@@ -49,6 +50,11 @@ + int error = -EBADF; + struct file * file = NULL; + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) ++ return -EINVAL; ++#endif ++ + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); + if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { + file = fget(fd); +@@ -56,8 +62,14 @@ + goto out; + } + ++ if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) { ++ fput(file); ++ error = -EACCES; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); +- error = do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff); ++ error = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT); + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + + if (file) +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c 2004-04-03 22:38:24.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -41,13 +41,15 @@ + extern const char vsyscall_int80_start, vsyscall_int80_end; + extern const char vsyscall_sysenter_start, vsyscall_sysenter_end; + ++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL + static int __init sysenter_setup(void) + { + unsigned long page = get_zeroed_page(GFP_ATOMIC); + + __set_fixmap(FIX_VSYSCALL, __pa(page), PAGE_READONLY); + +- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEP)) { ++ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEP)) ++ { + memcpy((void *) page, + &vsyscall_int80_start, + &vsyscall_int80_end - &vsyscall_int80_start); +@@ -63,3 +65,4 @@ + } + + __initcall(sysenter_setup); ++#endif +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/trampoline.S linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/trampoline.S +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/trampoline.S 2004-04-03 22:36:56.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/trampoline.S 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ + inc %ax # protected mode (PE) bit + lmsw %ax # into protected mode + # flush prefetch and jump to startup_32_smp in arch/i386/kernel/head.S +- ljmpl $__BOOT_CS, $(startup_32_smp-__PAGE_OFFSET) ++ ljmpl $__BOOT_CS, $(startup_32_smp+__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET-__PAGE_OFFSET) + + # These need to be in the same 64K segment as the above; + # hence we don't use the boot_gdt_descr defined in head.S +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c 2004-04-03 22:36:25.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ + asmlinkage void lcall7(void); + asmlinkage void lcall27(void); + +-struct desc_struct default_ldt[] = { { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 }, ++const struct desc_struct default_ldt[] = { { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 }, + { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 } }; + + /* Do we ignore FPU interrupts ? */ +@@ -70,7 +70,9 @@ + * F0 0F bug workaround.. We have a special link segment + * for this. + */ +-struct desc_struct idt_table[256] __attribute__((__section__(".data.idt"))) = { {0, 0}, }; ++__asm__(".section .rodata.idt,\"a\",@progbits"); ++struct desc_struct idt_table[256] = { {0, 0}, }; ++__asm__(".previous"); + + asmlinkage void divide_error(void); + asmlinkage void debug(void); +@@ -97,6 +99,7 @@ + void show_trace(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long * stack) + { + unsigned long addr; ++ int i = kstack_depth_to_print; + + if (!stack) + stack = (unsigned long*)&stack; +@@ -105,11 +108,12 @@ + #ifdef CONFIG_KALLSYMS + printk("\n"); + #endif +- while (!kstack_end(stack)) { ++ while (i && !kstack_end(stack)) { + addr = *stack++; + if (kernel_text_address(addr)) { + printk(" [<%08lx>] ", addr); + print_symbol("%s\n", addr); ++ --i; + } + } + printk("\n"); +@@ -199,14 +203,23 @@ + show_stack(NULL, (unsigned long*)esp); + + printk("Code: "); ++ ++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + if(regs->eip < PAGE_OFFSET) + goto bad; ++#endif + + for(i=0;i<20;i++) + { + unsigned char c; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ if(__get_user(c, &((unsigned char*)regs->eip)[i+__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET])) { ++#else + if(__get_user(c, &((unsigned char*)regs->eip)[i])) { + bad: ++#endif ++ + printk(" Bad EIP value."); + break; + } +@@ -229,8 +242,13 @@ + + eip = regs->eip; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ eip += __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; ++#else + if (eip < PAGE_OFFSET) + goto no_bug; ++#endif ++ + if (__get_user(ud2, (unsigned short *)eip)) + goto no_bug; + if (ud2 != 0x0b0f) +@@ -238,7 +256,13 @@ + if (__get_user(line, (unsigned short *)(eip + 2))) + goto bug; + if (__get_user(file, (char **)(eip + 4)) || ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ __get_user(c, file + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET)) ++#else + (unsigned long)file < PAGE_OFFSET || __get_user(c, file)) ++#endif ++ + file = "<bad filename>"; + + printk("------------[ cut here ]------------\n"); +@@ -411,8 +435,16 @@ + return; + + gp_in_kernel: +- if (!fixup_exception(regs)) ++ if (!fixup_exception(regs)) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ if ((regs->xcs & 0xFFFF) == __KERNEL_CS) ++ die("PAX: suspicious general protection fault", regs, error_code); ++ else ++#endif ++ + die("general protection fault", regs, error_code); ++ } + } + + static void mem_parity_error(unsigned char reason, struct pt_regs * regs) +@@ -845,7 +877,7 @@ + _set_gate(idt_table+n,15,3,addr,__KERNEL_CS); + } + +-static void __init set_call_gate(void *a, void *addr) ++static void __init set_call_gate(const void *a, void *addr) + { + _set_gate(a,12,3,addr,__KERNEL_CS); + } +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S 2004-04-03 22:36:26.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -2,7 +2,12 @@ + * Written by Martin Mares <mj@atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz>; + */ + ++#include <linux/config.h> ++ + #include <asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h> ++#include <asm-i386/page.h> ++#include <asm-i386/segment.h> ++ + #include <asm/thread_info.h> + + OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf32-i386", "elf32-i386", "elf32-i386") +@@ -11,25 +16,16 @@ + jiffies = jiffies_64; + SECTIONS + { +- . = 0xC0000000 + 0x100000; +- /* read-only */ +- _text = .; /* Text and read-only data */ +- .text : { +- *(.text) +- *(.fixup) +- *(.gnu.warning) +- } = 0x9090 +- +- _etext = .; /* End of text section */ +- +- . = ALIGN(16); /* Exception table */ +- __start___ex_table = .; +- __ex_table : { *(__ex_table) } +- __stop___ex_table = .; +- +- RODATA ++ . = __PAGE_OFFSET + 0x100000; ++ .text.startup : { ++ BYTE(0xEA) /* jmp far */ ++ LONG(startup_32 + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET - __PAGE_OFFSET) ++ SHORT(__BOOT_CS) ++ } + + /* writeable */ ++ . = ALIGN(32); ++ _data = .; + .data : { /* Data */ + *(.data) + CONSTRUCTORS +@@ -41,25 +37,28 @@ + . = ALIGN(4096); + __nosave_end = .; + +- . = ALIGN(4096); +- .data.page_aligned : { *(.data.idt) } +- + . = ALIGN(32); + .data.cacheline_aligned : { *(.data.cacheline_aligned) } + +- _edata = .; /* End of data section */ +- + . = ALIGN(THREAD_SIZE); /* init_task */ + .data.init_task : { *(.data.init_task) } + ++ . = ALIGN(4096); ++ .data.page_aligned : { *(.data.swapper_pg_dir) } ++ ++ _edata = .; /* End of data section */ ++ ++ __bss_start = .; /* BSS */ ++ .bss : { ++ *(.bss) ++ LONG(0) ++ } ++ . = ALIGN(4); ++ __bss_stop = .; ++ + /* will be freed after init */ + . = ALIGN(4096); /* Init code and data */ + __init_begin = .; +- .init.text : { +- _sinittext = .; +- *(.init.text) +- _einittext = .; +- } + .init.data : { *(.init.data) } + . = ALIGN(16); + __setup_start = .; +@@ -100,16 +99,68 @@ + __per_cpu_start = .; + .data.percpu : { *(.data.percpu) } + __per_cpu_end = .; ++ ++ /* read-only */ ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ __init_text_start = .; ++ .init.text (. - __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) : AT (__init_text_start) { ++ _sinittext = .; ++ *(.init.text) ++ _einittext = .; ++ . = ALIGN(4*1024*1024) - 1; ++ BYTE(0) ++ } ++ . = ALIGN(4096); ++ __init_end = . + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; ++ /* freed after init ends here */ ++ ++/* ++ * PaX: this must be kept in synch with the KERNEL_CS base ++ * in the GDTs in arch/i386/kernel/head.S ++ */ ++ _text = .; /* Text and read-only data */ ++ .text : AT (. + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) { ++#else ++ .init.text : { ++ _sinittext = .; ++ *(.init.text) ++ _einittext = .; ++ } + . = ALIGN(4096); + __init_end = .; + /* freed after init ends here */ +- +- __bss_start = .; /* BSS */ +- .bss : { *(.bss) } +- . = ALIGN(4); +- __bss_stop = .; + ++ _text = .; /* Text and read-only data */ ++ .text : { ++#endif ++ ++ *(.text) ++ *(.fixup) ++ *(.gnu.warning) ++ } = 0x9090 ++ ++ _etext = .; /* End of text section */ ++ . += __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; ++ . = ALIGN(16); /* Exception table */ ++ __start___ex_table = .; ++ __ex_table : { *(__ex_table) } ++ __stop___ex_table = .; ++ ++ . = ALIGN(4096); ++ .rodata.page_aligned : { ++ *(.rodata.empty_zero_page) ++ *(.rodata.idt) ++ } ++ ++ RODATA ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ _end = ALIGN(4*1024*1024); ++ . = _end ; ++#else + _end = . ; ++#endif + + /* This is where the kernel creates the early boot page tables */ + . = ALIGN(4096); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/mm/fault.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/mm/fault.c 2004-04-03 22:36:13.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/mm/fault.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ + #include <linux/vt_kern.h> /* For unblank_screen() */ + #include <linux/highmem.h> + #include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/unistd.h> ++#include <linux/compiler.h> ++#include <linux/binfmts.h> + + #include <asm/system.h> + #include <asm/uaccess.h> +@@ -199,6 +202,10 @@ + + asmlinkage void do_invalid_op(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long); + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs); ++#endif ++ + /* + * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address, + * and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate +@@ -209,22 +216,31 @@ + * bit 1 == 0 means read, 1 means write + * bit 2 == 0 means kernel, 1 means user-mode + */ ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++static void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address) ++#else + asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code) ++#endif + { + struct task_struct *tsk; + struct mm_struct *mm; + struct vm_area_struct * vma; ++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + unsigned long address; ++#endif + unsigned long page; + int write; + siginfo_t info; + ++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + /* get the address */ + __asm__("movl %%cr2,%0":"=r" (address)); + + /* It's safe to allow irq's after cr2 has been saved */ + if (regs->eflags & (X86_EFLAGS_IF|VM_MASK)) + local_irq_enable(); ++#endif + + tsk = current; + +@@ -358,6 +374,34 @@ + if (is_prefetch(regs, address)) + return; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if ((error_code == 4) && (regs->eip + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE == address)) { ++ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ case 3: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP ++ case 2: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ if (address >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE) { ++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->eip, (void*)regs->esp); ++ do_exit(SIGKILL); ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + tsk->thread.cr2 = address; + /* Kernel addresses are always protection faults */ + tsk->thread.error_code = error_code | (address >= TASK_SIZE); +@@ -408,6 +452,13 @@ + + if (address < PAGE_SIZE) + printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference"); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ else if (init_mm.start_code + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET <= address && address < init_mm.end_code + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code", ++ tsk->comm, tsk->pid, tsk->uid, tsk->euid); ++#endif ++ + else + printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel paging request"); + printk(" at virtual address %08lx\n",address); +@@ -509,3 +560,361 @@ + return; + } + } ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ++/* ++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->eip = fault address) ++ * ++ * returns 1 when task should be killed ++ * 2 when gcc trampoline was detected ++ * 3 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected ++ */ ++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) ++{ ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP ++ static const unsigned char trans[8] = {6, 1, 2, 0, 13, 5, 3, 4}; ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP) ++ int err; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { ++ unsigned long esp_4; ++ ++ if (regs->eip >= current->mm->start_code && ++ regs->eip < current->mm->end_code) ++ { ++ err = get_user(esp_4, (unsigned long*)(regs->esp-4UL)); ++ if (err || esp_4 == regs->eip) ++ return 1; ++ ++ regs->eip += current->mm->delta_exec; ++ return 3; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP ++ do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #1 */ ++ unsigned char mov1, mov2; ++ unsigned short jmp; ++ unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret; ++ unsigned short call; ++ ++ err = get_user(mov1, (unsigned char *)regs->eip); ++ err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1)); ++ err |= get_user(mov2, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5)); ++ err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6)); ++ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned short *)(regs->eip + 10)); ++ err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-2)); ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((mov1 & 0xF8) == 0xB8 && ++ (mov2 & 0xF8) == 0xB8 && ++ (mov1 & 0x07) != (mov2 & 0x07) && ++ (jmp & 0xF8FF) == 0xE0FF && ++ (mov2 & 0x07) == ((jmp>>8) & 0x07) && ++ (call & 0xF8FF) == 0xD0FF && ++ regs->eip == ((unsigned long*)regs)[trans[(call>>8) & 0x07]]) ++ { ++ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov1 & 0x07]] = addr1; ++ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov2 & 0x07]] = addr2; ++ regs->eip = addr2; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #2 */ ++ unsigned char mov, jmp; ++ unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret; ++ unsigned short call; ++ ++ err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip); ++ err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1)); ++ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5)); ++ err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6)); ++ err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-2)); ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 && ++ jmp == 0xE9 && ++ (call & 0xF8FF) == 0xD0FF && ++ regs->eip == ((unsigned long*)regs)[trans[(call>>8) & 0x07]]) ++ { ++ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1; ++ regs->eip += addr2 + 10; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #3 */ ++ unsigned char mov, jmp; ++ char offset; ++ unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret; ++ unsigned short call; ++ ++ err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip); ++ err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1)); ++ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5)); ++ err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6)); ++ err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-3)); ++ err |= get_user(offset, (char *)(ret-1)); ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 && ++ jmp == 0xE9 && ++ call == 0x55FF) ++ { ++ unsigned long addr; ++ ++ err = get_user(addr, (unsigned long*)(regs->ebp + (unsigned long)(long)offset)); ++ if (err || regs->eip != addr) ++ break; ++ ++ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1; ++ regs->eip += addr2 + 10; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #4 */ ++ unsigned char mov, jmp, sib; ++ char offset; ++ unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret; ++ unsigned short call; ++ ++ err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip); ++ err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1)); ++ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5)); ++ err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6)); ++ err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-4)); ++ err |= get_user(sib, (unsigned char *)(ret-2)); ++ err |= get_user(offset, (char *)(ret-1)); ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 && ++ jmp == 0xE9 && ++ call == 0x54FF && ++ sib == 0x24) ++ { ++ unsigned long addr; ++ ++ err = get_user(addr, (unsigned long*)(regs->esp + 4 + (unsigned long)(long)offset)); ++ if (err || regs->eip != addr) ++ break; ++ ++ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1; ++ regs->eip += addr2 + 10; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #5 */ ++ unsigned char mov, jmp, sib; ++ unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret, offset; ++ unsigned short call; ++ ++ err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip); ++ err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1)); ++ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5)); ++ err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6)); ++ err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-7)); ++ err |= get_user(sib, (unsigned char *)(ret-5)); ++ err |= get_user(offset, (unsigned long *)(ret-4)); ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 && ++ jmp == 0xE9 && ++ call == 0x94FF && ++ sib == 0x24) ++ { ++ unsigned long addr; ++ ++ err = get_user(addr, (unsigned long*)(regs->esp + 4 + offset)); ++ if (err || regs->eip != addr) ++ break; ++ ++ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1; ++ regs->eip += addr2 + 10; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++#endif ++ ++ return 1; /* PaX in action */ ++} ++ ++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) ++{ ++ unsigned long i; ++ ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); ++ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { ++ unsigned char c; ++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned char*)pc+i)) { ++ printk("<invalid address>."); ++ break; ++ } ++ printk("%02x ", c); ++ } ++ printk("\n"); ++ ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at SP: "); ++ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { ++ unsigned long c; ++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned long*)sp+i)) { ++ printk("<invalid address>."); ++ break; ++ } ++ printk("%08lx ", c); ++ } ++ printk("\n"); ++} ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++/* PaX: called with the page_table_lock spinlock held */ ++static inline pte_t * pax_get_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address) ++{ ++ pgd_t *pgd; ++ pmd_t *pmd; ++ ++ pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address); ++ if (!pgd || !pgd_present(*pgd)) ++ return 0; ++ pmd = pmd_offset(pgd, address); ++ if (!pmd || !pmd_present(*pmd)) ++ return 0; ++ return pte_offset_map(pmd, address); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * PaX: handle the extra page faults or pass it down to the original handler ++ */ ++asmlinkage void pax_do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code) ++{ ++ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; ++ unsigned long address; ++ pte_t *pte; ++ unsigned char pte_mask; ++ int ret; ++ ++ __asm__("movl %%cr2,%0":"=r" (address)); ++ ++ /* It's safe to allow irq's after cr2 has been saved */ ++ if (regs->eflags & (X86_EFLAGS_IF|VM_MASK)) ++ local_irq_enable(); ++ ++ if (unlikely((error_code & 5) != 5 || ++ address >= TASK_SIZE || ++ !(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC))) ++ return do_page_fault(regs, error_code, address); ++ ++ /* PaX: it's our fault, let's handle it if we can */ ++ ++ /* PaX: take a look at read faults before acquiring any locks */ ++ if (unlikely((error_code == 5) && (regs->eip == address))) { ++ /* instruction fetch attempt from a protected page in user mode */ ++ ret = pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs); ++ switch (ret) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ case 3: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP ++ case 2: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++ case 1: ++ default: ++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->eip, (void*)regs->esp); ++ do_exit(SIGKILL); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ pte_mask = _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_USER | ((error_code & 2) << (_PAGE_BIT_DIRTY-1)); ++ ++ spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock); ++ pte = pax_get_pte(mm, address); ++ if (unlikely(!pte || !(pte_val(*pte) & _PAGE_PRESENT) || pte_exec(*pte))) { ++ pte_unmap(pte); ++ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); ++ do_page_fault(regs, error_code, address); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ if (unlikely((error_code == 7) && !pte_write(*pte))) { ++ /* write attempt to a protected page in user mode */ ++ pte_unmap(pte); ++ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); ++ do_page_fault(regs, error_code, address); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * PaX: fill DTLB with user rights and retry ++ */ ++ __asm__ __volatile__ ( ++ "orb %2,%1\n" ++#if defined(CONFIG_M586) || defined(CONFIG_M586TSC) ++/* ++ * PaX: let this uncommented 'invlpg' remind us on the behaviour of Intel's ++ * (and AMD's) TLBs. namely, they do not cache PTEs that would raise *any* ++ * page fault when examined during a TLB load attempt. this is true not only ++ * for PTEs holding a non-present entry but also present entries that will ++ * raise a page fault (such as those set up by PaX, or the copy-on-write ++ * mechanism). in effect it means that we do *not* need to flush the TLBs ++ * for our target pages since their PTEs are simply not in the TLBs at all. ++ ++ * the best thing in omitting it is that we gain around 15-20% speed in the ++ * fast path of the page fault handler and can get rid of tracing since we ++ * can no longer flush unintended entries. ++ */ ++ "invlpg %0\n" ++#endif ++ "testb $0,%0\n" ++ "xorb %3,%1\n" ++ : ++ : "m" (*(char*)address), "m" (*(char*)pte), "q" (pte_mask), "i" (_PAGE_USER) ++ : "memory", "cc"); ++ pte_unmap(pte); ++ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); ++ return; ++} ++#endif +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/mm/init.c linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/mm/init.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/mm/init.c 2004-04-03 22:37:39.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/mm/init.c 2004-04-16 12:58:32.000000000 -0400 +@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ + #include <asm/tlb.h> + #include <asm/tlbflush.h> + #include <asm/sections.h> ++#include <asm/desc.h> + + DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct mmu_gather, mmu_gathers); + unsigned long highstart_pfn, highend_pfn; +@@ -394,6 +395,10 @@ + #endif + __flush_tlb_all(); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ memcpy(kernexec_pg_dir, swapper_pg_dir, sizeof(kernexec_pg_dir)); ++#endif ++ + kmap_init(); + zone_sizes_init(); + } +@@ -488,7 +493,7 @@ + set_highmem_pages_init(bad_ppro); + + codesize = (unsigned long) &_etext - (unsigned long) &_text; +- datasize = (unsigned long) &_edata - (unsigned long) &_etext; ++ datasize = (unsigned long) &_edata - (unsigned long) &_data; + initsize = (unsigned long) &__init_end - (unsigned long) &__init_begin; + + kclist_add(&kcore_mem, __va(0), max_low_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT); +@@ -587,6 +592,42 @@ + totalram_pages++; + } + printk (KERN_INFO "Freeing unused kernel memory: %dk freed\n", (__init_end - __init_begin) >> 10); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ /* PaX: limit KERNEL_CS to actual size */ ++ { ++ unsigned long limit; ++ int cpu; ++ pgd_t *pgd; ++ pmd_t *pmd; ++ ++ limit = (unsigned long)&_etext >> PAGE_SHIFT; ++ for (cpu = 0; cpu < NR_CPUS; cpu++) { ++ cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].a = (cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].a & 0xFFFF0000UL) | (limit & 0x0FFFFUL); ++ cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].b = (cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].b & 0xFFF0FFFFUL) | (limit & 0xF0000UL); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_BIOS ++ printk(KERN_INFO "PAX: warning, PCI BIOS might still be in use, keeping flat KERNEL_CS.\n"); ++#endif ++ ++ } ++ ++ /* PaX: make KERNEL_CS read-only */ ++ for (addr = __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; addr < __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET + 0x00400000UL; addr += (1UL << PMD_SHIFT)) { ++ pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr); ++ pmd = pmd_offset(pgd, addr); ++ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)); ++ } ++ memcpy(kernexec_pg_dir, swapper_pg_dir, sizeof(kernexec_pg_dir)); ++ for (addr = __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; addr < __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET + 0x00400000UL; addr += (1UL << PMD_SHIFT)) { ++ pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr); ++ pmd = pmd_offset(pgd, addr); ++ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) & ~_PAGE_RW)); ++ } ++ flush_tlb_all(); ++ } ++#endif ++ + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c 2004-04-03 22:36:17.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ + #include <linux/init.h> + #include "pci.h" + #include "pci-functions.h" +- ++#include <asm/desc.h> + + /* BIOS32 signature: "_32_" */ + #define BIOS32_SIGNATURE (('_' << 0) + ('3' << 8) + ('2' << 16) + ('_' << 24)) +@@ -33,6 +33,12 @@ + * and the PCI BIOS specification. + */ + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_PCI_BIOS) ++#define __FLAT_KERNEL_CS 0x20 ++#else ++#define __FLAT_KERNEL_CS __KERNEL_CS ++#endif ++ + union bios32 { + struct { + unsigned long signature; /* _32_ */ +@@ -55,7 +61,7 @@ + static struct { + unsigned long address; + unsigned short segment; +-} bios32_indirect = { 0, __KERNEL_CS }; ++} bios32_indirect = { 0, __FLAT_KERNEL_CS }; + + /* + * Returns the entry point for the given service, NULL on error +@@ -96,7 +102,9 @@ + static struct { + unsigned long address; + unsigned short segment; +-} pci_indirect = { 0, __KERNEL_CS }; ++} pci_indirect = { 0, __FLAT_KERNEL_CS }; ++ ++#undef __FLAT_KERNEL_CS + + static int pci_bios_present; + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c 2004-04-03 22:38:16.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -41,6 +41,17 @@ + #undef SET_PERSONALITY + #define SET_PERSONALITY(ex, ibcs2) elf32_set_personality() + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 0x08048000UL : 0x4000000000000000UL) ++ ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) IA32_PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - IA32_PAGE_SHIFT) ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) IA32_PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - IA32_PAGE_SHIFT) ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) IA32_PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - IA32_PAGE_SHIFT) ++#endif ++ + /* Ugly but avoids duplication */ + #include "../../../fs/binfmt_elf.c" + +@@ -178,7 +189,7 @@ + mpnt->vm_mm = current->mm; + mpnt->vm_start = PAGE_MASK & (unsigned long) bprm->p; + mpnt->vm_end = IA32_STACK_TOP; +- mpnt->vm_page_prot = PAGE_COPY; ++ mpnt->vm_page_prot = protection_map[VM_STACK_FLAGS & 0x7]; + mpnt->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS; + mpnt->vm_ops = NULL; + mpnt->vm_pgoff = 0; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h 2004-04-03 22:38:22.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -295,7 +295,14 @@ + #define ELF_ARCH EM_386 + + #define IA32_PAGE_OFFSET 0xc0000000 +-#define IA32_STACK_TOP IA32_PAGE_OFFSET ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK ++#define __IA32_DELTA_STACK (current->mm->delta_stack) ++#else ++#define __IA32_DELTA_STACK 0UL ++#endif ++ ++#define IA32_STACK_TOP (IA32_PAGE_OFFSET - __IA32_DELTA_STACK) + + /* + * The system segments (GDT, TSS, LDT) have to be mapped below 4GB so the IA-32 engine can +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c 2004-04-03 22:37:24.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -475,6 +475,11 @@ + + flags = a.flags; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) ++ return -EINVAL; ++#endif ++ + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); + if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { + file = fget(a.fd); +@@ -496,6 +501,11 @@ + struct file *file = NULL; + unsigned long retval; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) ++ return -EINVAL; ++#endif ++ + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); + if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { + file = fget(fd); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-03 22:38:22.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ + #include <linux/smp_lock.h> + #include <linux/user.h> + #include <linux/security.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/pgtable.h> + #include <asm/processor.h> +@@ -1314,6 +1315,9 @@ + if (pid == 1) /* no messing around with init! */ + goto out_tsk; + ++ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) ++ goto out_tsk; ++ + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { + ret = ptrace_attach(child); + goto out_tsk; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c 2004-04-03 22:37:23.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ + #include <linux/syscalls.h> + #include <linux/highuid.h> + #include <linux/hugetlb.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/shmparam.h> + #include <asm/uaccess.h> +@@ -38,6 +39,13 @@ + if (REGION_NUMBER(addr) == REGION_HPAGE) + addr = 0; + #endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && addr && filp) ++ addr = mm->free_area_cache; ++ else ++#endif ++ + if (!addr) + addr = mm->free_area_cache; + +@@ -58,6 +66,13 @@ + if (TASK_SIZE - len < addr || RGN_MAP_LIMIT - len < REGION_OFFSET(addr)) { + if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) { + /* Start a new search --- just in case we missed some holes. */ ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) ++ addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + mm->delta_mmap; ++ else ++#endif ++ + addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + goto full_search; + } +@@ -185,6 +200,11 @@ + unsigned long roff; + struct file *file = 0; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) ++ return -EINVAL; ++#endif ++ + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); + if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { + file = fget(fd); +@@ -216,6 +236,11 @@ + goto out; + } + ++ if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) { ++ addr = -EACCES; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + addr = do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff); + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c 2004-04-03 22:38:20.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ + #include <linux/mm.h> + #include <linux/smp_lock.h> + #include <linux/interrupt.h> ++#include <linux/binfmts.h> + + #include <asm/pgtable.h> + #include <asm/processor.h> +@@ -70,6 +71,54 @@ + return pte_present(pte); + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++/* ++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->cr_iip = fault address) ++ * ++ * returns 1 when task should be killed ++ * 2 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected ++ */ ++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) ++{ ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ int err; ++ ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { ++ if (regs->cr_iip >= current->mm->start_code && ++ regs->cr_iip < current->mm->end_code) ++ { ++#if 0 ++ /* PaX: this needs fixing */ ++ if (regs->b0 == regs->cr_iip) ++ return 1; ++#endif ++ regs->cr_iip += current->mm->delta_exec; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) ++{ ++ unsigned long i; ++ ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); ++ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { ++ unsigned int c; ++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) { ++ printk("<invalid address>."); ++ break; ++ } ++ printk("%08x ", c); ++ } ++ printk("\n"); ++} ++#endif ++ + void + ia64_do_page_fault (unsigned long address, unsigned long isr, struct pt_regs *regs) + { +@@ -125,9 +174,31 @@ + | (((isr >> IA64_ISR_W_BIT) & 1UL) << VM_WRITE_BIT) + | (((isr >> IA64_ISR_R_BIT) & 1UL) << VM_READ_BIT)); + +- if ((vma->vm_flags & mask) != mask) ++ if ((vma->vm_flags & mask) != mask) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (mask & VM_EXEC)) { ++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || address != regs->cr_iip) ++ goto bad_area; ++ ++ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); ++ switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ case 2: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++ } ++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->cr_iip, (void*)regs->r12); ++ do_exit(SIGKILL); ++ } ++#endif ++ + goto bad_area; + ++ } ++ + survive: + /* + * If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault, make +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c 2004-04-03 22:37:23.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -50,6 +50,17 @@ + #undef ELF_ET_DYN_BASE + #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK32_SIZE / 3 * 2) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL) ++ ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) ++#endif ++ + #include <asm/processor.h> + #include <linux/module.h> + #include <linux/config.h> +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c 2004-04-03 22:36:55.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -52,6 +52,17 @@ + #undef ELF_ET_DYN_BASE + #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK32_SIZE / 3 * 2) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL) ++ ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) ++#endif ++ + #include <asm/processor.h> + #include <linux/module.h> + #include <linux/config.h> +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c 2004-04-03 22:37:41.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ + do_color_align = 0; + if (filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED)) + do_color_align = 1; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp) ++#endif ++ + if (addr) { + if (do_color_align) + addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff); +@@ -89,6 +94,13 @@ + (!vmm || addr + len <= vmm->vm_start)) + return addr; + } ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp)) ++ addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + current->mm->delta_mmap; ++ else ++#endif ++ + addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + if (do_color_align) + addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/mm/fault.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/mm/fault.c 2004-04-03 22:36:53.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/mips/mm/fault.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -28,6 +28,24 @@ + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/ptrace.h> + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++void pax_report_insns(void *pc) ++{ ++ unsigned long i; ++ ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); ++ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { ++ unsigned int c; ++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) { ++ printk("<invalid address>."); ++ break; ++ } ++ printk("%08x ", c); ++ } ++ printk("\n"); ++} ++#endif ++ + /* + * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address, + * and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-03 22:36:19.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ + #include <linux/personality.h> + #include <linux/security.h> + #include <linux/compat.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/pgtable.h> +@@ -114,6 +115,9 @@ + if (pid == 1) /* no messing around with init! */ + goto out_tsk; + ++ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) ++ goto out_tsk; ++ + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { + ret = ptrace_attach(child); + goto out_tsk; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c 2004-04-03 22:38:12.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ + #include <linux/shm.h> + #include <linux/smp_lock.h> + #include <linux/syscalls.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + int sys_pipe(int *fildes) + { +@@ -114,6 +115,13 @@ + { + if (len > TASK_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp)) ++ addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + current->mm->delta_mmap; ++ else ++#endif ++ + if (!addr) + addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + +@@ -131,12 +139,23 @@ + { + struct file * file = NULL; + unsigned long error = -EBADF; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) ++ return -EINVAL; ++#endif ++ + if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { + file = fget(fd); + if (!file) + goto out; + } + ++ if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) { ++ fput(file); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++ + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); + + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c 2004-04-03 22:36:55.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ + #include <linux/ptrace.h> + #include <linux/swap.h> + #include <linux/syscalls.h> ++#include <linux/random.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/types.h> + #include <asm/uaccess.h> +@@ -171,6 +173,11 @@ + struct file *file; + int retval; + int i; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ struct file *old_exec_file; ++ struct acl_subject_label *old_acl; ++ struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS]; ++#endif + + file = open_exec(filename); + +@@ -178,7 +185,26 @@ + if (IS_ERR(file)) + return retval; + ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(¤t->user->processes, 1); ++ ++ if (gr_handle_nproc()) { ++ allow_write_access(file); ++ fput(file); ++ return -EAGAIN; ++ } ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) { ++ allow_write_access(file); ++ fput(file); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++ + bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK ++ bprm.p -= (pax_get_random_long() & ~(sizeof(void *)-1)) & ~PAGE_MASK; ++#endif ++ + memset(bprm.page, 0, MAX_ARG_PAGES*sizeof(bprm.page[0])); + + DBG(("do_execve32(%s, %p, %p, %p)\n", filename, argv, envp, regs)); +@@ -209,11 +235,24 @@ + if (retval < 0) + goto out; + ++ if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) { ++ retval = -EACCES; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) { ++ retval = -EACCES; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm.filename, &bprm); + if (retval < 0) + goto out; + + bprm.exec = bprm.p; ++ ++ gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); ++ + retval = copy_strings32(bprm.envc, envp, &bprm); + if (retval < 0) + goto out; +@@ -222,10 +261,32 @@ + if (retval < 0) + goto out; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ old_acl = current->acl; ++ memcpy(old_rlim, current->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); ++ old_exec_file = current->exec_file; ++ get_file(file); ++ current->exec_file = file; ++#endif ++ ++ gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); ++ + retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs); +- if (retval >= 0) ++ if (retval >= 0) { ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ if (old_exec_file) ++ fput(old_exec_file); ++#endif + /* execve success */ + return retval; ++ } ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ current->acl = old_acl; ++ memcpy(current->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); ++ fput(current->exec_file); ++ current->exec_file = old_exec_file; ++#endif + + out: + /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c 2004-04-03 22:38:27.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -661,9 +661,7 @@ + + down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + vma = find_vma(current->mm,regs->iaoq[0]); +- if (vma && (regs->iaoq[0] >= vma->vm_start) +- && (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { +- ++ if (vma && (regs->iaoq[0] >= vma->vm_start)) { + fault_address = regs->iaoq[0]; + fault_space = regs->iasq[0]; + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c 2004-04-03 22:38:13.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ + #include <linux/sched.h> + #include <linux/interrupt.h> + #include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/unistd.h> ++#include <linux/binfmts.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/traps.h> +@@ -54,7 +56,7 @@ + static unsigned long + parisc_acctyp(unsigned long code, unsigned int inst) + { +- if (code == 6 || code == 16) ++ if (code == 6 || code == 7 || code == 16) + return VM_EXEC; + + switch (inst & 0xf0000000) { +@@ -140,6 +142,139 @@ + } + #endif + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++/* ++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (instruction_pointer(regs) = fault address) ++ * ++ * returns 1 when task should be killed ++ * 2 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected ++ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected ++ * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected ++ */ ++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) ++{ ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP) ++ int err; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { ++ if (instruction_pointer(regs) >= current->mm->start_code && ++ instruction_pointer(regs) < current->mm->end_code) ++ { ++#if 0 ++ /* PaX: this needs fixing */ ++ if ((regs->gr[2] & ~3UL) == instruction_pointer(regs)) ++ return 1; ++#endif ++ regs->iaoq[0] += current->mm->delta_exec; ++ if ((regs->iaoq[1] & ~3UL) >= current->mm->start_code && ++ (regs->iaoq[1] & ~3UL) < current->mm->end_code) ++ regs->iaoq[1] += current->mm->delta_exec; ++ return 4; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT ++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation */ ++ unsigned int bl, depwi; ++ ++ err = get_user(bl, (unsigned int*)instruction_pointer(regs)); ++ err |= get_user(depwi, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+4)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if (bl == 0xEA9F1FDDU && depwi == 0xD6801C1EU) { ++ unsigned int ldw, bv, ldw2, addr = instruction_pointer(regs)-12; ++ ++ err = get_user(ldw, (unsigned int*)addr); ++ err |= get_user(bv, (unsigned int*)(addr+4)); ++ err |= get_user(ldw2, (unsigned int*)(addr+8)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if (ldw == 0x0E801096U && ++ bv == 0xEAC0C000U && ++ ldw2 == 0x0E881095U) ++ { ++ unsigned int resolver, map; ++ ++ err = get_user(resolver, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+8)); ++ err |= get_user(map, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+12)); ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ regs->gr[20] = instruction_pointer(regs)+8; ++ regs->gr[21] = map; ++ regs->gr[22] = resolver; ++ regs->iaoq[0] = resolver | 3UL; ++ regs->iaoq[1] = regs->iaoq[0] + 4; ++ return 3; ++ } ++ } ++ } while (0); ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP ++ ++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT ++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP)) ++ return 1; ++#endif ++ ++ do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */ ++ unsigned int ldi1, ldi2, bel, nop; ++ ++ err = get_user(ldi1, (unsigned int *)instruction_pointer(regs)); ++ err |= get_user(ldi2, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+4)); ++ err |= get_user(bel, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+8)); ++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+12)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((ldi1 == 0x34190000U || ldi1 == 0x34190002U) && ++ ldi2 == 0x3414015AU && ++ bel == 0xE4008200U && ++ nop == 0x08000240U) ++ { ++ regs->gr[25] = (ldi1 & 2) >> 1; ++ regs->gr[20] = __NR_rt_sigreturn; ++ regs->gr[31] = regs->iaoq[1] + 16; ++ regs->sr[0] = regs->iasq[1]; ++ regs->iaoq[0] = 0x100UL; ++ regs->iaoq[1] = regs->iaoq[0] + 4; ++ regs->iasq[0] = regs->sr[2]; ++ regs->iasq[1] = regs->sr[2]; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++#endif ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) ++{ ++ unsigned long i; ++ ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); ++ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { ++ unsigned int c; ++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) { ++ printk("<invalid address>."); ++ break; ++ } ++ printk("%08x ", c); ++ } ++ printk("\n"); ++} ++#endif ++ + void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long code, + unsigned long address) + { +@@ -165,8 +300,38 @@ + + acc_type = parisc_acctyp(code,regs->iir); + +- if ((vma->vm_flags & acc_type) != acc_type) ++ if ((vma->vm_flags & acc_type) != acc_type) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (acc_type & VM_EXEC) && ++ (address & ~3UL) == instruction_pointer(regs)) ++ { ++ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); ++ switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ case 4: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT ++ case 3: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP ++ case 2: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++ } ++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)instruction_pointer(regs), (void*)regs->gr[30]); ++ do_exit(SIGKILL); ++ } ++#endif ++ + goto bad_area; ++ } + + /* + * If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault, make +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.5/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-03 22:36:52.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ + #include <linux/ptrace.h> + #include <linux/user.h> + #include <linux/security.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/page.h> +@@ -202,6 +203,9 @@ + if (pid == 1) /* you may not mess with init */ + goto out_tsk; + ++ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) ++ goto out_tsk; ++ + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { + ret = ptrace_attach(child); + goto out_tsk; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c linux-2.6.5/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c 2004-04-03 22:38:18.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ + #include <linux/utsname.h> + #include <linux/file.h> + #include <linux/unistd.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/ipc.h> +@@ -165,14 +166,25 @@ + struct file * file = NULL; + int ret = -EBADF; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) ++ return -EINVAL; ++#endif ++ + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); + if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { + if (!(file = fget(fd))) + goto out; + } + ++ if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) { ++ fput(file); ++ ret = -EACCES; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); +- ret = do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff); ++ ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT); + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (file) + fput(file); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.5/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c 2004-04-03 22:36:54.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ + #include <linux/interrupt.h> + #include <linux/highmem.h> + #include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/slab.h> ++#include <linux/pagemap.h> ++#include <linux/compiler.h> ++#include <linux/binfmts.h> ++#include <linux/unistd.h> + + #include <asm/page.h> + #include <asm/pgtable.h> +@@ -56,6 +61,366 @@ + void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long, unsigned long); + extern int get_pteptr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pte_t **ptep); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT ++void pax_syscall_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma) ++{ ++ vma->vm_mm->call_syscall = 0UL; ++} ++ ++static struct page* pax_syscall_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type) ++{ ++ struct page* page; ++ unsigned int *kaddr; ++ ++ page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER); ++ if (!page) ++ return NOPAGE_OOM; ++ ++ kaddr = kmap(page); ++ memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE); ++ kaddr[0] = 0x44000002U; /* sc */ ++ __flush_dcache_icache(kaddr); ++ kunmap(page); ++ if (type) ++ *type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR; ++ return page; ++} ++ ++static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = { ++ close: pax_syscall_close, ++ nopage: pax_syscall_nopage, ++}; ++ ++static void pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr) ++{ ++ vma->vm_mm = current->mm; ++ vma->vm_start = addr; ++ vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE; ++ vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC; ++ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f]; ++ vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops; ++ vma->vm_pgoff = 0UL; ++ vma->vm_file = NULL; ++ vma->vm_private_data = NULL; ++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vma->shared); ++ insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma); ++ ++current->mm->total_vm; ++} ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++/* ++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->nip = fault address) ++ * ++ * returns 1 when task should be killed ++ * 2 when patched GOT trampoline was detected ++ * 3 when patched PLT trampoline was detected ++ * 4 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected ++ * 5 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected ++ * 6 when sigreturn trampoline was detected ++ * 7 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected ++ */ ++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) ++{ ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT) ++ int err; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { ++ if (regs->nip >= current->mm->start_code && ++ regs->nip < current->mm->end_code) ++ { ++ if (regs->link == regs->nip) ++ return 1; ++ ++ regs->nip += current->mm->delta_exec; ++ return 5; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT ++ do { /* PaX: patched GOT emulation */ ++ unsigned int blrl; ++ ++ err = get_user(blrl, (unsigned int*)regs->nip); ++ ++ if (!err && blrl == 0x4E800021U) { ++ unsigned long temp = regs->nip; ++ ++ regs->nip = regs->link & 0xFFFFFFFCUL; ++ regs->link = temp + 4UL; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */ ++ unsigned int b; ++ ++ err = get_user(b, (unsigned int *)regs->nip); ++ ++ if (!err && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) { ++ regs->nip += (((b | 0xFC000000UL) ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL); ++ return 3; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #1 */ ++ unsigned int li, b; ++ ++ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip); ++ err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4)); ++ ++ if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) { ++ unsigned int rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr; ++ unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL; ++ ++ addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL); ++ err = get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int*)addr); ++ err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int*)(addr+4)); ++ err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int*)(addr+8)); ++ err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int*)(addr+12)); ++ err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+16)); ++ err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int*)(addr+20)); ++ err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int*)(addr+24)); ++ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+28)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if (rlwinm == 0x556C083CU && ++ add == 0x7D6C5A14U && ++ (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U && ++ (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U && ++ mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U && ++ (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U && ++ (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U && ++ bctr == 0x4E800420U) ++ { ++ regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); ++ regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); ++ regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16; ++ regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); ++ regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16; ++ regs->nip = regs->ctr; ++ return 4; ++ } ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++#if 0 ++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #2 */ ++ unsigned int lis, lwzu, b, bctr; ++ ++ err = get_user(lis, (unsigned int *)regs->nip); ++ err |= get_user(lwzu, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4)); ++ err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+8)); ++ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+12)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((lis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && ++ (lwzu & 0xU) == 0xU && ++ (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U && ++ bctr == 0x4E800420U) ++ { ++ unsigned int addis, addi, rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr; ++ unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL; ++ ++ addr = regs->nip + 12 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL); ++ err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int*)addr); ++ err |= get_user(addi, (unsigned int*)(addr+4)); ++ err |= get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int*)(addr+8)); ++ err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int*)(addr+12)); ++ err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int*)(addr+16)); ++ err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int*)(addr+20)); ++ err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+24)); ++ err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int*)(addr+28)); ++ err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int*)(addr+32)); ++ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+36)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U && ++ (addi & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x396B0000U && ++ rlwinm == 0x556C083CU && ++ add == 0x7D6C5A14U && ++ (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U && ++ (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U && ++ mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U && ++ (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U && ++ (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U && ++ bctr == 0x4E800420U) ++ { ++ regs->gpr[PT_R11] = ++ regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); ++ regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); ++ regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16; ++ regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); ++ regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16; ++ regs->nip = regs->ctr; ++ return 4; ++ } ++ } ++ } while (0); ++#endif ++ ++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #3 */ ++ unsigned int li, b; ++ ++ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip); ++ err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4)); ++ ++ if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) { ++ unsigned int addis, lwz, mtctr, bctr; ++ unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL; ++ ++ addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL); ++ err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int*)addr); ++ err |= get_user(lwz, (unsigned int*)(addr+4)); ++ err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+8)); ++ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+12)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U && ++ (lwz & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x816B0000U && ++ mtctr == 0x7D6903A6U && ++ bctr == 0x4E800420U) ++ { ++ unsigned int r11; ++ ++ addr = (addis << 16) + (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); ++ addr += (((lwz | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); ++ ++ err = get_user(r11, (unsigned int*)addr); ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ regs->gpr[PT_R11] = r11; ++ regs->ctr = r11; ++ regs->nip = r11; ++ return 4; ++ } ++ } ++ } while (0); ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT ++ do { /* PaX: sigreturn emulation */ ++ unsigned int li, sc; ++ ++ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip); ++ err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4)); ++ ++ if (!err && li == 0x38000000U + __NR_sigreturn && sc == 0x44000002U) { ++ struct vm_area_struct *vma; ++ unsigned long call_syscall; ++ ++ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall; ++ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (likely(call_syscall)) ++ goto emulate; ++ ++ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL); ++ ++ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (current->mm->call_syscall) { ++ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall; ++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); ++ goto emulate; ++ } ++ ++ call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE); ++ if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) { ++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall); ++ current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall; ++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ ++emulate: ++ regs->gpr[PT_R0] = __NR_sigreturn; ++ regs->nip = call_syscall; ++ return 6; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */ ++ unsigned int li, sc; ++ ++ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip); ++ err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4)); ++ ++ if (!err && li == 0x38000000U + __NR_rt_sigreturn && sc == 0x44000002U) { ++ struct vm_area_struct *vma; ++ unsigned int call_syscall; ++ ++ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall; ++ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (likely(call_syscall)) ++ goto rt_emulate; ++ ++ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL); ++ ++ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (current->mm->call_syscall) { ++ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall; ++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); ++ goto rt_emulate; ++ } ++ ++ call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE); ++ if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) { ++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall); ++ current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall; ++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ ++rt_emulate: ++ regs->gpr[PT_R0] = __NR_rt_sigreturn; ++ regs->nip = call_syscall; ++ return 7; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++#endif ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) ++{ ++ unsigned long i; ++ ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); ++ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { ++ unsigned int c; ++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) { ++ printk("<invalid address>."); ++ break; ++ } ++ printk("%08x ", c); ++ } ++ printk("\n"); ++} ++#endif ++ + /* + * Check whether the instruction at regs->nip is a store using + * an update addressing form which will update r1. +@@ -116,7 +481,7 @@ + * indicate errors in DSISR but can validly be set in SRR1. + */ + if (TRAP(regs) == 0x400) +- error_code &= 0x48200000; ++ error_code &= 0x58200000; + else + is_write = error_code & 0x02000000; + #endif /* CONFIG_4xx */ +@@ -211,15 +576,14 @@ + } else if (TRAP(regs) == 0x400) { + pte_t *ptep; + +-#if 0 ++#if 1 + /* It would be nice to actually enforce the VM execute + permission on CPUs which can do so, but far too + much stuff in userspace doesn't get the permissions + right, so we let any page be executed for now. */ + if (! (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) + goto bad_area; +-#endif +- ++#else + /* Since 4xx supports per-page execute permission, + * we lazily flush dcache to icache. */ + ptep = NULL; +@@ -240,6 +604,7 @@ + if (ptep != NULL) + pte_unmap(ptep); + #endif ++#endif + /* a read */ + } else { + /* protection fault */ +@@ -285,6 +650,38 @@ + + /* User mode accesses cause a SIGSEGV */ + if (user_mode(regs)) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) { ++ if ((TRAP(regs) == 0x400) && (regs->nip == address)) { ++ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT ++ case 2: ++ case 3: ++ case 4: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ case 5: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT ++ case 6: ++ case 7: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++ } ++ ++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->nip, (void*)regs->gpr[1]); ++ do_exit(SIGKILL); ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + info.si_signo = SIGSEGV; + info.si_errno = 0; + info.si_code = code; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-03 22:38:24.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ + #include <linux/smp.h> + #include <linux/smp_lock.h> + #include <linux/security.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/pgtable.h> + #include <asm/system.h> +@@ -320,6 +321,11 @@ + goto out; + } + ++ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) { ++ pt_error_return(regs, EPERM); ++ goto out_tsk; ++ } ++ + if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH) + || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) { + if (ptrace_attach(child)) { +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2004-04-03 22:36:56.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ + #include <linux/utsname.h> + #include <linux/smp.h> + #include <linux/smp_lock.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/ipc.h> +@@ -55,6 +56,13 @@ + return -ENOMEM; + if (ARCH_SUN4C_SUN4 && len > 0x20000000) + return -ENOMEM; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp)) ++ addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + current->mm->delta_mmap; ++ else ++#endif ++ + if (!addr) + addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + +@@ -224,6 +232,11 @@ + struct file * file = NULL; + unsigned long retval = -EBADF; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) ++ return -EINVAL; ++#endif ++ + if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { + file = fget(fd); + if (!file) +@@ -242,6 +255,12 @@ + if (len > TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE || addr + len > TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE) + goto out_putf; + ++ if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) { ++ fput(file); ++ retval = -EACCES; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); + + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c 2004-04-03 22:36:57.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@ + struct file * file = NULL; + unsigned long retval, ret_type; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) ++ return -EINVAL; ++#endif ++ + if(flags & MAP_NORESERVE) { + static int cnt; + if (cnt++ < 10) +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c 2004-04-03 22:36:55.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ + #include <linux/smp_lock.h> + #include <linux/interrupt.h> + #include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/slab.h> ++#include <linux/pagemap.h> ++#include <linux/compiler.h> ++#include <linux/binfmts.h> + + #include <asm/system.h> + #include <asm/segment.h> +@@ -201,6 +205,272 @@ + return 0; + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++void pax_emuplt_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma) ++{ ++ vma->vm_mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL; ++} ++ ++static struct page* pax_emuplt_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type) ++{ ++ struct page* page; ++ unsigned int *kaddr; ++ ++ page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER); ++ if (!page) ++ return NOPAGE_OOM; ++ ++ kaddr = kmap(page); ++ memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE); ++ kaddr[0] = 0x9DE3BFA8U; /* save */ ++ flush_dcache_page(page); ++ kunmap(page); ++ if (type) ++ *type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR; ++ ++ return page; ++} ++ ++static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = { ++ close: pax_emuplt_close, ++ nopage: pax_emuplt_nopage, ++}; ++ ++static void pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr) ++{ ++ vma->vm_mm = current->mm; ++ vma->vm_start = addr; ++ vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE; ++ vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC; ++ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f]; ++ vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops; ++ vma->vm_pgoff = 0UL; ++ vma->vm_file = NULL; ++ vma->vm_private_data = NULL; ++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vma->shared); ++ insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma); ++ ++current->mm->total_vm; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->pc = fault address) ++ * ++ * returns 1 when task should be killed ++ * 2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected ++ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected ++ * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected ++ */ ++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) ++{ ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT ++ int err; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { ++ if (regs->pc >= current->mm->start_code && ++ regs->pc < current->mm->end_code) ++ { ++ if (regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] + 8UL == regs->pc) ++ return 1; ++ ++ regs->pc += current->mm->delta_exec; ++ if (regs->npc >= current->mm->start_code && ++ regs->npc < current->mm->end_code) ++ regs->npc += current->mm->delta_exec; ++ return 4; ++ } ++ if (regs->pc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec && ++ regs->pc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec) ++ { ++ regs->pc -= current->mm->delta_exec; ++ if (regs->npc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec && ++ regs->npc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec) ++ regs->npc -= current->mm->delta_exec; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT ++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */ ++ unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, jmpl; ++ ++ err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->pc); ++ err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4)); ++ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && ++ (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && ++ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U) ++ { ++ unsigned int addr; ++ ++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10; ++ addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1]; ++ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFE000U) ^ 0x00001000U) + 0x00001000U); ++ regs->pc = addr; ++ regs->npc = addr+4; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */ ++ unsigned int ba; ++ ++ err = get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)regs->pc); ++ ++ if (!err && (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) { ++ unsigned int addr; ++ ++ addr = regs->pc + 4 + (((ba | 0xFFC00000U) ^ 0x00200000U) + 0x00200000U); ++ regs->pc = addr; ++ regs->npc = addr+4; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #3 */ ++ unsigned int sethi, jmpl, nop; ++ ++ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->pc); ++ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4)); ++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && ++ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U && ++ nop == 0x01000000U) ++ { ++ unsigned int addr; ++ ++ addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10; ++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr; ++ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFE000U) ^ 0x00001000U) + 0x00001000U); ++ regs->pc = addr; ++ regs->npc = addr+4; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 1 */ ++ unsigned int sethi, ba, nop; ++ ++ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->pc); ++ err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4)); ++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && ++ ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U || (ba & 0xFFF80000U) == 0x30680000U) && ++ nop == 0x01000000U) ++ { ++ unsigned int addr, save, call; ++ ++ if ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) ++ addr = regs->pc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFC00000U) ^ 0x00200000U) + 0x00200000U) << 2); ++ else ++ addr = regs->pc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFF80000U) ^ 0x00040000U) + 0x00040000U) << 2); ++ ++ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)addr); ++ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(addr+4)); ++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(addr+8)); ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U && ++ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U && ++ nop == 0x01000000U) ++ { ++ struct vm_area_struct *vma; ++ unsigned long call_dl_resolve; ++ ++ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve; ++ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (likely(call_dl_resolve)) ++ goto emulate; ++ ++ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL); ++ ++ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (current->mm->call_dl_resolve) { ++ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve; ++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); ++ goto emulate; ++ } ++ ++ call_dl_resolve = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE); ++ if (!vma || (call_dl_resolve & ~PAGE_MASK)) { ++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ pax_insert_vma(vma, call_dl_resolve); ++ current->mm->call_dl_resolve = call_dl_resolve; ++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ ++emulate: ++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10; ++ regs->pc = call_dl_resolve; ++ regs->npc = addr+4; ++ return 3; ++ } ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 2 */ ++ unsigned int save, call, nop; ++ ++ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc-4)); ++ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)regs->pc); ++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4)); ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U && ++ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U && ++ nop == 0x01000000U) ++ { ++ unsigned int dl_resolve = regs->pc + ((((call | 0xC0000000U) ^ 0x20000000U) + 0x20000000U) << 2); ++ ++ regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] = regs->pc; ++ regs->pc = dl_resolve; ++ regs->npc = dl_resolve+4; ++ return 3; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++#endif ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) ++{ ++ unsigned long i; ++ ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); ++ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { ++ unsigned int c; ++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) { ++ printk("<invalid address>."); ++ break; ++ } ++ printk("%08x ", c); ++ } ++ printk("\n"); ++} ++#endif ++ + asmlinkage void do_sparc_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, int text_fault, int write, + unsigned long address) + { +@@ -264,6 +534,29 @@ + if(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) + goto bad_area; + } else { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && text_fault && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { ++ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); ++ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT ++ case 2: ++ case 3: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ case 4: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++ } ++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->pc, (void*)regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]); ++ do_exit(SIGKILL); ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */ + if(!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC))) + goto bad_area; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/mm/init.c linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/mm/init.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/mm/init.c 2004-04-03 22:36:57.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/mm/init.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -337,17 +337,17 @@ + + /* Initialize the protection map with non-constant, MMU dependent values. */ + protection_map[0] = PAGE_NONE; +- protection_map[1] = PAGE_READONLY; +- protection_map[2] = PAGE_COPY; +- protection_map[3] = PAGE_COPY; ++ protection_map[1] = PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC; ++ protection_map[2] = PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC; ++ protection_map[3] = PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC; + protection_map[4] = PAGE_READONLY; + protection_map[5] = PAGE_READONLY; + protection_map[6] = PAGE_COPY; + protection_map[7] = PAGE_COPY; + protection_map[8] = PAGE_NONE; +- protection_map[9] = PAGE_READONLY; +- protection_map[10] = PAGE_SHARED; +- protection_map[11] = PAGE_SHARED; ++ protection_map[9] = PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC; ++ protection_map[10] = PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC; ++ protection_map[11] = PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC; + protection_map[12] = PAGE_READONLY; + protection_map[13] = PAGE_READONLY; + protection_map[14] = PAGE_SHARED; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c 2004-04-03 22:37:23.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -2138,6 +2138,13 @@ + BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_shared, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED)); + BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_copy, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_COPY)); + BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_readonly, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY)); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_shared_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC)); ++ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_copy_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC)); ++ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_readonly_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY_NOEXEC)); ++#endif ++ + BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_kernel, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL)); + page_kernel = pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL); + pg_iobits = SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_WRITE | SRMMU_REF; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/itlb_base.S linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/itlb_base.S +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/itlb_base.S 2004-04-03 22:36:18.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/itlb_base.S 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -41,7 +41,9 @@ + CREATE_VPTE_OFFSET2(%g4, %g6) ! Create VPTE offset + ldxa [%g3 + %g6] ASI_P, %g5 ! Load VPTE + 1: brgez,pn %g5, 3f ! Not valid, branch out +- nop ! Delay-slot ++ and %g5, _PAGE_EXEC, %g4 ++ brz,pn %g4, 3f ! Not executable, branch out ++ nop ! Delay-slot + 2: stxa %g5, [%g0] ASI_ITLB_DATA_IN ! Load PTE into TLB + retry ! Trap return + 3: rdpr %pstate, %g4 ! Move into alternate globals +@@ -74,8 +76,6 @@ + nop + nop + nop +- nop +- nop + CREATE_VPTE_NOP + + #undef CREATE_VPTE_OFFSET1 +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-03 22:38:22.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ + #include <linux/smp.h> + #include <linux/smp_lock.h> + #include <linux/security.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/asi.h> + #include <asm/pgtable.h> +@@ -169,6 +170,11 @@ + goto out; + } + ++ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, (long)request)) { ++ pt_error_return(regs, EPERM); ++ goto out_tsk; ++ } ++ + if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH) + || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) { + if (ptrace_attach(child)) { +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2004-04-03 22:37:23.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include <linux/syscalls.h> + #include <linux/ipc.h> + #include <linux/personality.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/ipc.h> +@@ -71,6 +72,10 @@ + if (filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED)) + do_color_align = 1; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp) ++#endif ++ + if (addr) { + if (do_color_align) + addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff); +@@ -101,6 +106,13 @@ + } + if (task_size < addr) { + if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) ++ start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + mm->delta_mmap; ++ else ++#endif ++ + start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + goto full_search; + } +@@ -310,11 +322,22 @@ + struct file * file = NULL; + unsigned long retval = -EBADF; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) ++ return -EINVAL; ++#endif ++ + if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { + file = fget(fd); + if (!file) + goto out; + } ++ ++ if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) { ++ retval = -EACCES; ++ goto out_putf; ++ } ++ + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); + len = PAGE_ALIGN(len); + retval = -EINVAL; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c 2004-04-03 22:37:36.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ + #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h> + #include <linux/ptrace.h> + #include <linux/highuid.h> ++#include <linux/random.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/types.h> + #include <asm/ipc.h> +@@ -1759,6 +1761,11 @@ + struct file * file; + int retval; + int i; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ struct file *old_exec_file; ++ struct acl_subject_label *old_acl; ++ struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS]; ++#endif + + sched_balance_exec(); + +@@ -1768,7 +1775,26 @@ + if (IS_ERR(file)) + return retval; + ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(¤t->user->processes), 1); ++ ++ if (gr_handle_nproc()) { ++ allow_write_access(file); ++ fput(file); ++ return -EAGAIN; ++ } ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) { ++ allow_write_access(file); ++ fput(file); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++ + bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK ++ bprm.p -= (pax_get_random_long() & ~(sizeof(void *)-1)) & ~PAGE_MASK; ++#endif ++ + memset(bprm.page, 0, MAX_ARG_PAGES * sizeof(bprm.page[0])); + + bprm.file = file; +@@ -1803,11 +1829,24 @@ + if (retval < 0) + goto out; + ++ if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) { ++ retval = -EACCES; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) { ++ retval = -EACCES; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm.filename, &bprm); + if (retval < 0) + goto out; + + bprm.exec = bprm.p; ++ ++ gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); ++ + retval = copy_strings32(bprm.envc, envp, &bprm); + if (retval < 0) + goto out; +@@ -1816,13 +1855,34 @@ + if (retval < 0) + goto out; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ old_acl = current->acl; ++ memcpy(old_rlim, current->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); ++ old_exec_file = current->exec_file; ++ get_file(file); ++ current->exec_file = file; ++#endif ++ ++ gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); ++ + retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm, regs); + if (retval >= 0) { + /* execve success */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ if (old_exec_file) ++ fput(old_exec_file); ++#endif + security_bprm_free(&bprm); + return retval; + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ current->acl = old_acl; ++ memcpy(current->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); ++ fput(current->exec_file); ++ current->exec_file = old_exec_file; ++#endif ++ + out: + /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/ + for (i = 0 ; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) { +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c 2004-04-03 22:37:24.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ + struct file *file = NULL; + unsigned long retval, ret_type; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) ++ return -EINVAL; ++#endif ++ + if (flags & MAP_NORESERVE) { + static int cnt; + if (cnt++ < 10) +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c 2004-04-03 22:38:20.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ + #include <linux/smp_lock.h> + #include <linux/init.h> + #include <linux/interrupt.h> ++#include <linux/slab.h> ++#include <linux/pagemap.h> ++#include <linux/compiler.h> ++#include <linux/binfmts.h> + + #include <asm/page.h> + #include <asm/pgtable.h> +@@ -303,6 +307,364 @@ + unhandled_fault (address, current, regs); + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT ++static void pax_emuplt_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma) ++{ ++ vma->vm_mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL; ++} ++ ++static struct page* pax_emuplt_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type) ++{ ++ struct page* page; ++ unsigned int *kaddr; ++ ++ page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER); ++ if (!page) ++ return NOPAGE_OOM; ++ ++ kaddr = kmap(page); ++ memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE); ++ kaddr[0] = 0x9DE3BFA8U; /* save */ ++ flush_dcache_page(page); ++ kunmap(page); ++ if (type) ++ *type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR; ++ return page; ++} ++ ++static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = { ++ close: pax_emuplt_close, ++ nopage: pax_emuplt_nopage, ++}; ++ ++static void pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr) ++{ ++ vma->vm_mm = current->mm; ++ vma->vm_start = addr; ++ vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE; ++ vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC; ++ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f]; ++ vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops; ++ vma->vm_pgoff = 0UL; ++ vma->vm_file = NULL; ++ vma->vm_private_data = NULL; ++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vma->shared); ++ insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma); ++ ++current->mm->total_vm; ++} ++#endif ++ ++/* ++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->tpc = fault address) ++ * ++ * returns 1 when task should be killed ++ * 2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected ++ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected ++ * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected ++ */ ++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) ++{ ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT ++ int err; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { ++ if (regs->tpc >= current->mm->start_code && ++ regs->tpc < current->mm->end_code) ++ { ++ if (regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] + 8UL == regs->tpc) ++ return 1; ++ ++ regs->tpc += current->mm->delta_exec; ++ if (regs->tnpc >= current->mm->start_code && ++ regs->tnpc < current->mm->end_code) ++ regs->tnpc += current->mm->delta_exec; ++ return 4; ++ } ++ if (regs->tpc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec && ++ regs->tpc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec) ++ { ++ regs->tpc -= current->mm->delta_exec; ++ if (regs->tnpc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec && ++ regs->tnpc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec) ++ regs->tnpc -= current->mm->delta_exec; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT ++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */ ++ unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, jmpl; ++ ++ err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); ++ err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4)); ++ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && ++ (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && ++ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U) ++ { ++ unsigned long addr; ++ ++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10; ++ addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1]; ++ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE000UL) ^ 0x00001000UL) + 0x00001000UL); ++ regs->tpc = addr; ++ regs->tnpc = addr+4; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */ ++ unsigned int ba; ++ ++ err = get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); ++ ++ if (!err && (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) { ++ unsigned long addr; ++ ++ addr = regs->tpc + 4 + (((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFC00000UL) ^ 0x00200000UL) + 0x00200000UL); ++ regs->tpc = addr; ++ regs->tnpc = addr+4; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #3 */ ++ unsigned int sethi, jmpl, nop; ++ ++ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); ++ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4)); ++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && ++ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U && ++ nop == 0x01000000U) ++ { ++ unsigned long addr; ++ ++ addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10; ++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr; ++ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE000UL) ^ 0x00001000UL) + 0x00001000UL); ++ regs->tpc = addr; ++ regs->tnpc = addr+4; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #4 */ ++ unsigned int mov1, call, mov2; ++ ++ err = get_user(mov1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); ++ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4)); ++ err |= get_user(mov2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if (mov1 == 0x8210000FU && ++ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U && ++ mov2 == 0x9E100001U) ++ { ++ unsigned long addr; ++ ++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC]; ++ addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((call | 0xFFFFFFFFC0000000UL) ^ 0x20000000UL) + 0x20000000UL) << 2); ++ regs->tpc = addr; ++ regs->tnpc = addr+4; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #5 */ ++ unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, or1, or2, sllx, jmpl, nop; ++ ++ err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); ++ err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4)); ++ err |= get_user(or1, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8)); ++ err |= get_user(or2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+12)); ++ err |= get_user(sllx, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+16)); ++ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+20)); ++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+24)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && ++ (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x0B000000U && ++ (or1 & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x82106000U && ++ (or2 & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x8A116000U && ++ sllx == 0x83287020 && ++ jmpl == 0x81C04005U && ++ nop == 0x01000000U) ++ { ++ unsigned long addr; ++ ++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = ((sethi1 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or1 & 0x000003FFU); ++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] <<= 32; ++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G5] = ((sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or2 & 0x000003FFU); ++ addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] + regs->u_regs[UREG_G5]; ++ regs->tpc = addr; ++ regs->tnpc = addr+4; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #6 */ ++ unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, sllx, or, jmpl, nop; ++ ++ err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); ++ err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4)); ++ err |= get_user(sllx, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8)); ++ err |= get_user(or, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+12)); ++ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+16)); ++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+20)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && ++ (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x0B000000U && ++ sllx == 0x83287020 && ++ (or & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x8A116000U && ++ jmpl == 0x81C04005U && ++ nop == 0x01000000U) ++ { ++ unsigned long addr; ++ ++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi1 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10; ++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] <<= 32; ++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G5] = ((sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or & 0x3FFU); ++ addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] + regs->u_regs[UREG_G5]; ++ regs->tpc = addr; ++ regs->tnpc = addr+4; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 1 */ ++ unsigned int sethi, ba, nop; ++ ++ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); ++ err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4)); ++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8)); ++ ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && ++ ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U || (ba & 0xFFF80000U) == 0x30680000U) && ++ nop == 0x01000000U) ++ { ++ unsigned long addr; ++ unsigned int save, call; ++ ++ if ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) ++ addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFC00000UL) ^ 0x00200000UL) + 0x00200000UL) << 2); ++ else ++ addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFF80000UL) ^ 0x00040000UL) + 0x00040000UL) << 2); ++ ++ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)addr); ++ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(addr+4)); ++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(addr+8)); ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U && ++ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U && ++ nop == 0x01000000U) ++ { ++ struct vm_area_struct *vma; ++ unsigned long call_dl_resolve; ++ ++ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve; ++ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (likely(call_dl_resolve)) ++ goto emulate; ++ ++ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL); ++ ++ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (current->mm->call_dl_resolve) { ++ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve; ++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); ++ goto emulate; ++ } ++ ++ call_dl_resolve = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE); ++ if (!vma || (call_dl_resolve & ~PAGE_MASK)) { ++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ pax_insert_vma(vma, call_dl_resolve); ++ current->mm->call_dl_resolve = call_dl_resolve; ++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ ++emulate: ++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10; ++ regs->tpc = call_dl_resolve; ++ regs->tnpc = addr+4; ++ return 3; ++ } ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 2 */ ++ unsigned int save, call, nop; ++ ++ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc-4)); ++ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); ++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4)); ++ if (err) ++ break; ++ ++ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U && ++ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U && ++ nop == 0x01000000U) ++ { ++ unsigned long dl_resolve = regs->tpc + ((((call | 0xFFFFFFFFC0000000UL) ^ 0x20000000UL) + 0x20000000UL) << 2); ++ ++ regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] = regs->tpc; ++ regs->tpc = dl_resolve; ++ regs->tnpc = dl_resolve+4; ++ return 3; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++#endif ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) ++{ ++ unsigned long i; ++ ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); ++ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { ++ unsigned int c; ++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) { ++ printk("<invalid address>."); ++ break; ++ } ++ printk("%08x ", c); ++ } ++ printk("\n"); ++} ++#endif ++ + asmlinkage void do_sparc64_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) + { + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; +@@ -340,8 +702,10 @@ + goto intr_or_no_mm; + + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) { +- if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)) ++ if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)) { + regs->tpc &= 0xffffffff; ++ regs->tnpc &= 0xffffffff; ++ } + address &= 0xffffffff; + } + +@@ -350,6 +714,34 @@ + if (!vma) + goto bad_area; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ /* PaX: detect ITLB misses on non-exec pages */ ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && vma->vm_start <= address && ++ !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (fault_code & FAULT_CODE_ITLB)) ++ { ++ if (address != regs->tpc) ++ goto good_area; ++ ++ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); ++ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT ++ case 2: ++ case 3: ++ goto fault_done; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ case 4: ++ goto fault_done; ++#endif ++ ++ } ++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->tpc, (void*)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS)); ++ do_exit(SIGKILL); ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* Pure DTLB misses do not tell us whether the fault causing + * load/store/atomic was a write or not, it only says that there + * was no match. So in such a case we (carefully) read the +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c 2004-04-03 22:38:19.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ + struct file *file = NULL; + unsigned long retval, ret_type; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) ++ return -EINVAL; ++#endif ++ + /* Do we need it here? */ + set_personality(PER_SVR4); + if (flags & MAP_NORESERVE) { +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c 2004-04-03 22:36:15.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -185,6 +185,17 @@ + //#include <asm/ia32.h> + #include <linux/elf.h> + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 0x08048000UL : 0x400000UL) ++ ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24) ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24) ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24) ++#endif ++ + typedef struct user_i387_ia32_struct elf_fpregset_t; + typedef struct user32_fxsr_struct elf_fpxregset_t; + +@@ -354,7 +365,13 @@ + mpnt->vm_mm = mm; + mpnt->vm_start = PAGE_MASK & (unsigned long) bprm->p; + mpnt->vm_end = IA32_STACK_TOP; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ mpnt->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS; ++#else + mpnt->vm_flags = vm_stack_flags32; ++#endif ++ + mpnt->vm_page_prot = (mpnt->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) ? + PAGE_COPY_EXEC : PAGE_COPY; + mpnt->vm_ops = NULL; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c 2004-04-03 22:36:57.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -1235,6 +1235,11 @@ + unsigned long error; + struct file * file = NULL; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) ++ return -EINVAL; ++#endif ++ + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); + if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { + file = fget(fd); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-03 22:36:54.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ + #include <linux/ptrace.h> + #include <linux/user.h> + #include <linux/security.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/pgtable.h> +@@ -212,6 +213,9 @@ + if (pid == 1) /* you may not mess with init */ + goto out_tsk; + ++ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) ++ goto out_tsk; ++ + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { + ret = ptrace_attach(child); + goto out_tsk; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/kernel/setup64.c linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/kernel/setup64.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/kernel/setup64.c 2004-04-03 22:36:54.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/kernel/setup64.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -42,8 +42,15 @@ + + unsigned long __supported_pte_mask = ~0UL; + static int do_not_nx __initdata = 0; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++unsigned long vm_stack_flags = VM_GROWSDOWN | __VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS; ++unsigned long vm_stack_flags32 = VM_GROWSDOWN | __VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS; ++#else + unsigned long vm_stack_flags = __VM_STACK_FLAGS; + unsigned long vm_stack_flags32 = __VM_STACK_FLAGS; ++#endif ++ + unsigned long vm_data_default_flags = __VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS; + unsigned long vm_data_default_flags32 = __VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS; + unsigned long vm_force_exec32 = PROT_EXEC; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c 2004-04-03 22:37:36.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -48,6 +48,11 @@ + if (off & ~PAGE_MASK) + goto out; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) ++ goto out; ++#endif ++ + error = -EBADF; + file = NULL; + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); +@@ -102,6 +107,15 @@ + + find_start_end(flags, &begin, &end); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp)) { ++ if (begin == 0x40000000) ++ begin += current->mm->delta_mmap & 0x0FFFFFFFU; ++ else ++ begin += current->mm->delta_mmap; ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (len > end) + return -ENOMEM; + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c +--- linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c 2004-04-03 22:36:14.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + #include <linux/vt_kern.h> /* For unblank_screen() */ + #include <linux/compiler.h> + #include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/binfmts.h> + + #include <asm/system.h> + #include <asm/uaccess.h> +@@ -217,6 +218,63 @@ + (tsk->sighand->action[sig-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL); + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++/* ++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->rip = fault address) ++ * ++ * returns 1 when task should be killed ++ * 2 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected ++ */ ++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) ++{ ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ int err; ++ ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { ++ if (regs->rip >= current->mm->start_code && ++ regs->rip < current->mm->end_code) ++ { ++ if (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32)) { ++ unsigned int esp_4; ++ ++ err = get_user(esp_4, (unsigned int*)(regs->rsp-4UL)); ++ if (err || esp_4 == regs->rip) ++ return 1; ++ } else { ++ unsigned long esp_8; ++ ++ err = get_user(esp_8, (unsigned long*)(regs->rsp-8UL)); ++ if (err || esp_8 == regs->rip) ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ regs->rip += current->mm->delta_exec; ++ return 2; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) ++{ ++ unsigned long i; ++ ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); ++ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { ++ unsigned int c; ++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned char*)pc+i)) { ++ printk("<invalid address>."); ++ break; ++ } ++ printk("%08x ", c); ++ } ++ printk("\n"); ++} ++#endif ++ + int page_fault_trace; + int exception_trace = 1; + +@@ -302,6 +360,23 @@ + * we can handle it.. + */ + good_area: ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (error_code & 16) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { ++ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); ++ switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ case 2: ++ return; ++#endif ++ ++ } ++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->rip, (void*)regs->rsp); ++ do_exit(SIGKILL); ++ } ++#endif ++ + info.si_code = SEGV_ACCERR; + write = 0; + switch (error_code & 3) { +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/keyboard.c linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/keyboard.c +--- linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2004-04-03 22:38:28.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -606,6 +606,16 @@ + kbd->kbdmode == VC_MEDIUMRAW) && + value != KVAL(K_SAK)) + return; /* SAK is allowed even in raw mode */ ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP) ++ { ++ void *func = fn_handler[value]; ++ if (func == fn_show_state || func == fn_show_ptregs || ++ func == fn_show_mem) ++ return; ++ } ++#endif ++ + fn_handler[value](vc, regs); + } + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/mem.c linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/mem.c +--- linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/mem.c 2004-04-03 22:37:07.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/mem.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + #include <linux/devfs_fs_kernel.h> + #include <linux/ptrace.h> + #include <linux/device.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/io.h> +@@ -39,6 +40,10 @@ + extern void tapechar_init(void); + #endif + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++extern struct file_operations grsec_fops; ++#endif ++ + /* + * Architectures vary in how they handle caching for addresses + * outside of main memory. +@@ -178,6 +183,12 @@ + + if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, &count)) + return -EFAULT; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM ++ gr_handle_mem_write(); ++ return -EPERM; ++#endif ++ + return do_write_mem(__va(p), p, buf, count, ppos); + } + +@@ -192,6 +203,11 @@ + vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot); + #endif + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM ++ if (gr_handle_mem_mmap(offset, vma)) ++ return -EPERM; ++#endif ++ + /* Don't try to swap out physical pages.. */ + vma->vm_flags |= VM_RESERVED; + +@@ -285,6 +301,11 @@ + ssize_t written; + char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */ + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM ++ gr_handle_kmem_write(); ++ return -EPERM; ++#endif ++ + if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) { + + wrote = count; +@@ -411,7 +432,23 @@ + count = size; + + zap_page_range(vma, addr, count); +- zeromap_page_range(vma, addr, count, PAGE_COPY); ++ zeromap_page_range(vma, addr, count, vma->vm_page_prot); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { ++ unsigned long addr_m; ++ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m; ++ ++ addr_m = vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ vma_m = find_vma(mm, addr_m); ++ if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == addr_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) { ++ addr_m = addr + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ zap_page_range(vma_m, addr_m, count); ++ } else ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: read_zero bug, %08lx, %08lx\n", ++ addr, vma->vm_start); ++ } ++#endif + + size -= count; + buf += count; +@@ -560,6 +597,16 @@ + + static int open_port(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp) + { ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM ++ gr_handle_open_port(); ++ return -EPERM; ++#endif ++ ++ return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM; ++} ++ ++static int open_mem(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp) ++{ + return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM; + } + +@@ -568,7 +615,6 @@ + #define full_lseek null_lseek + #define write_zero write_null + #define read_full read_zero +-#define open_mem open_port + #define open_kmem open_mem + + static struct file_operations mem_fops = { +@@ -666,6 +712,11 @@ + case 9: + filp->f_op = &urandom_fops; + break; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ case 10: ++ filp->f_op = &grsec_fops; ++ break; ++#endif + case 11: + filp->f_op = &kmsg_fops; + break; +@@ -697,6 +748,9 @@ + {7, "full", S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, &full_fops}, + {8, "random", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, &random_fops}, + {9, "urandom", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, &urandom_fops}, ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ {10,"grsec", S_IRUSR | S_IWUGO, &grsec_fops}, ++#endif + {11,"kmsg", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, &kmsg_fops}, + }; + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/random.c linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/random.c +--- linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/random.c 2004-04-03 22:36:17.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/random.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -263,9 +263,15 @@ + /* + * Configuration information + */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET ++#define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 1024 ++#define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 256 ++#define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 512 ++#else + #define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 512 + #define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 128 + #define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 256 ++#endif + #define USE_SHA + + /* +@@ -2361,6 +2367,29 @@ + return halfMD4Transform(hash, keyptr->secret); + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++/* the following function is provided by PaX under the GPL */ ++unsigned long get_random_long(void) ++{ ++ static time_t rekey_time; ++ static __u32 secret[12]; ++ time_t t; ++ ++ /* ++ * Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds ++ */ ++ t = get_seconds(); ++ if (!rekey_time || (t - rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) { ++ rekey_time = t; ++ get_random_bytes(secret, sizeof(secret)); ++ } ++ ++ secret[1] = halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret); ++ secret[0] = halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret); ++ return *(unsigned long *)secret; ++} ++#endif ++ + #ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES + /* + * Secure SYN cookie computation. This is the algorithm worked out by +@@ -2460,3 +2489,25 @@ + return (cookie - tmp[17]) & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */ + } + #endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++unsigned long pax_get_random_long(void) ++{ ++ static time_t rekey_time; ++ static __u32 secret[12]; ++ time_t t; ++ ++ /* ++ * Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds. ++ */ ++ t = get_seconds(); ++ if (!rekey_time || (t - rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) { ++ rekey_time = t; ++ get_random_bytes(secret, sizeof(secret)); ++ } ++ ++ secret[1] = halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret); ++ secret[0] = halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret); ++ return *(unsigned long *)secret; ++} ++#endif +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c +--- linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c 2004-04-03 22:37:37.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -96,6 +96,12 @@ + case KDSKBENT: + if (!perm) + return -EPERM; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) ++ return -EPERM; ++#endif ++ + if (!i && v == K_NOSUCHMAP) { + /* disallocate map */ + key_map = key_maps[s]; +@@ -232,6 +238,13 @@ + goto reterr; + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) { ++ return -EPERM; ++ goto reterr; ++ } ++#endif ++ + q = func_table[i]; + first_free = funcbufptr + (funcbufsize - funcbufleft); + for (j = i+1; j < MAX_NR_FUNC && !func_table[j]; j++) +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/drivers/pci/proc.c linux-2.6.5/drivers/pci/proc.c +--- linux-2.6.5/drivers/pci/proc.c 2004-04-03 22:37:23.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/drivers/pci/proc.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -565,7 +565,15 @@ + + static void legacy_proc_init(void) + { ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER ++ struct proc_dir_entry * entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR, NULL); ++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ struct proc_dir_entry * entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL); ++#endif ++#else + struct proc_dir_entry * entry = create_proc_entry("pci", 0, NULL); ++#endif + if (entry) + entry->proc_fops = &proc_pci_operations; + } +@@ -594,7 +602,15 @@ + { + struct proc_dir_entry *entry; + struct pci_dev *dev = NULL; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER ++ proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir_mode("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, proc_bus); ++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir_mode("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, proc_bus); ++#endif ++#else + proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir("pci", proc_bus); ++#endif + entry = create_proc_entry("devices", 0, proc_bus_pci_dir); + if (entry) + entry->proc_fops = &proc_bus_pci_dev_operations; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c linux-2.6.5/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c +--- linux-2.6.5/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c 2004-04-03 22:37:37.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ + set_limit(cpu_gdt_table[cpu][(selname) >> 3], size); \ + } while(0) + +-static struct desc_struct bad_bios_desc = { 0, 0x00409200 }; ++static struct desc_struct bad_bios_desc = { 0, 0x00409300 }; + + /* + * At some point we want to use this stack frame pointer to unwind +@@ -107,6 +107,10 @@ + struct desc_struct save_desc_40; + int cpu; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ unsigned long flags, cr3; ++#endif ++ + /* + * PnP BIOSes are generally not terribly re-entrant. + * Also, don't rely on them to save everything correctly. +@@ -115,6 +119,11 @@ + return PNP_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; + + cpu = get_cpu(); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3); ++#endif ++ + save_desc_40 = cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8]; + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc; + +@@ -159,6 +168,11 @@ + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pnp_bios_lock, flags); + + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3); ++#endif ++ + put_cpu(); + + /* If we get here and this is set then the PnP BIOS faulted on us. */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c linux-2.6.5/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c +--- linux-2.6.5/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c 2004-04-03 22:36:55.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ + static const char spaces[] = " "; /* 16 of them */ + static unsigned scsi_default_dev_flags; + static LIST_HEAD(scsi_dev_info_list); +-static __init char scsi_dev_flags[256]; ++static __initdata char scsi_dev_flags[256]; + + /* + * scsi_static_device_list: deprecated list of devices that require +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/drivers/video/vesafb.c linux-2.6.5/drivers/video/vesafb.c +--- linux-2.6.5/drivers/video/vesafb.c 2004-04-03 22:36:17.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/drivers/video/vesafb.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ + if (vesafb_fix.smem_len > 16 * 1024 * 1024) + vesafb_fix.smem_len = 16 * 1024 * 1024; + +-#ifndef __i386__ ++#if !defined(__i386__) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC) + screen_info.vesapm_seg = 0; + #endif + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/Kconfig linux-2.6.5/fs/Kconfig +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/Kconfig 2004-04-03 22:37:23.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/Kconfig 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ + + config PROC_KCORE + bool ++ depends on !GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD + default y if !ARM + + config DEVFS_FS +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/binfmt_aout.c linux-2.6.5/fs/binfmt_aout.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/binfmt_aout.c 2004-04-03 22:36:26.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/binfmt_aout.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ + #include <linux/binfmts.h> + #include <linux/personality.h> + #include <linux/init.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/system.h> + #include <asm/uaccess.h> +@@ -118,10 +119,12 @@ + /* If the size of the dump file exceeds the rlimit, then see what would happen + if we wrote the stack, but not the data area. */ + #ifdef __sparc__ ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize, 1); + if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize) > + current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur) + dump.u_dsize = 0; + #else ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE, 1); + if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE > + current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur) + dump.u_dsize = 0; +@@ -129,10 +132,12 @@ + + /* Make sure we have enough room to write the stack and data areas. */ + #ifdef __sparc__ ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_ssize, 1); + if ((dump.u_ssize) > + current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur) + dump.u_ssize = 0; + #else ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE, 1); + if ((dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE > + current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur) + dump.u_ssize = 0; +@@ -281,6 +286,8 @@ + rlim = current->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur; + if (rlim >= RLIM_INFINITY) + rlim = ~0; ++ ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, ex.a_data + ex.a_bss, 1); + if (ex.a_data + ex.a_bss > rlim) + return -ENOMEM; + +@@ -309,10 +316,33 @@ + (current->mm->start_brk = N_BSSADDR(ex)); + current->mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) ++ current->mm->free_area_cache += current->mm->delta_mmap; ++#endif ++ + current->mm->rss = 0; + current->mm->mmap = NULL; + compute_creds(bprm); + current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) { ++ current->flags |= PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP ++ if (N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_EMUTRAMP) ++ current->flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++ if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_MPROTECT)) ++ current->flags |= PF_PAX_MPROTECT; ++#endif ++ ++ } ++#endif ++ + #ifdef __sparc__ + if (N_MAGIC(ex) == NMAGIC) { + loff_t pos = fd_offset; +@@ -399,7 +429,7 @@ + + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + error = do_mmap(bprm->file, N_DATADDR(ex), ex.a_data, +- PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, ++ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_EXECUTABLE, + fd_offset + ex.a_text); + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/binfmt_elf.c linux-2.6.5/fs/binfmt_elf.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2004-04-03 22:36:58.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -37,11 +37,17 @@ + #include <linux/pagemap.h> + #include <linux/security.h> + #include <linux/syscalls.h> ++#include <linux/random.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/param.h> + #include <asm/pgalloc.h> + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++#include <asm/desc.h> ++#endif ++ + #include <linux/elf.h> + + static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm, struct pt_regs * regs); +@@ -85,14 +91,22 @@ + + static int set_brk(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) + { ++ current->mm->start_brk = current->mm->brk = end; + start = ELF_PAGEALIGN(start); + end = ELF_PAGEALIGN(end); + if (end > start) { + unsigned long addr = do_brk(start, end - start); + if (BAD_ADDR(addr)) + return addr; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ addr = do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGEALIGN(start + current->mm->delta_exec), 0UL, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_MIRROR, start); ++ if (BAD_ADDR(addr)) ++ return addr; ++#endif ++ + } +- current->mm->start_brk = current->mm->brk = end; + return 0; + } + +@@ -444,6 +458,203 @@ + return elf_entry; + } + ++#if (defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE) ++static unsigned long pax_parse_softmode(const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata) ++{ ++ unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_PAGEEXEC) ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_SEGMEXEC) { ++ pax_flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC; ++ } ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP ++ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_EMUTRAMP) ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_MPROTECT) ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_MPROTECT; ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++ if (pax_aslr) ++#endif ++ ++ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_RANDMMAP) ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_RANDMMAP; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++ if (pax_aslr) ++#endif ++ ++ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_RANDEXEC) ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_RANDEXEC; ++#endif ++ ++ return pax_flags; ++} ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS ++static unsigned long pax_parse_hardmode(const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata) ++{ ++ unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOPAGEEXEC)) ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOSEGMEXEC)) { ++ pax_flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC; ++ } ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP ++ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOEMUTRAMP)) ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT)) ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_MPROTECT; ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++ if (pax_aslr) ++#endif ++ ++ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NORANDMMAP)) ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_RANDMMAP; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++ if (pax_aslr) ++#endif ++ ++ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NORANDEXEC)) ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_RANDEXEC; ++#endif ++ ++ return pax_flags; ++} ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX ++static int pax_parse_ei_pax(const struct elfhdr * const elf_ex) ++{ ++ unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) { ++ pax_flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC; ++ } ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP ++ if ((pax_flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) && (elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP)) ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++ if ((pax_flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) && !(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_MPROTECT)) ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_MPROTECT; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++ if (pax_aslr) ++#endif ++ ++ if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_RANDMMAP)) ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_RANDMMAP; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++ if (pax_aslr) ++#endif ++ ++ if ((elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_RANDEXEC) && (elf_ex->e_type == ET_EXEC) && (pax_flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)) ++ pax_flags |= PF_PAX_RANDEXEC; ++#endif ++ ++ return pax_flags; ++} ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS) ++static int pax_parse_elf_flags(const struct elfhdr * const elf_ex, const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata) ++{ ++ unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS ++ unsigned long i; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX ++ pax_flags = pax_parse_ei_pax(elf_ex); ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS ++ for (i = 0UL; i < elf_ex->e_phnum; i++) ++ if (elf_phdata[i].p_type == PT_PAX_FLAGS) { ++ if (((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_PAGEEXEC) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOPAGEEXEC)) || ++ ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_SEGMEXEC) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOSEGMEXEC)) || ++ ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_EMUTRAMP) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOEMUTRAMP)) || ++ ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_MPROTECT) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT)) || ++ ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_RANDMMAP) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NORANDMMAP)) || ++ ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_RANDEXEC) && ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NORANDEXEC) || elf_ex->e_type == ET_DYN || !(elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_MPROTECT))) || ++ (!(elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NORANDEXEC) && (elf_ex->e_type == ET_DYN || (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT)))) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++ if (pax_softmode) ++ pax_flags = pax_parse_softmode(&elf_phdata[i]); ++ else ++#endif ++ ++ pax_flags = pax_parse_hardmode(&elf_phdata[i]); ++ break; ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ if (0 > pax_check_flags(&pax_flags)) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ current->flags |= pax_flags; ++ return 0; ++} ++#endif ++ + /* + * These are the functions used to load ELF style executables and shared + * libraries. There is no binary dependent code anywhere else. +@@ -476,7 +687,12 @@ + struct exec interp_ex; + char passed_fileno[6]; + struct files_struct *files; +- ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ unsigned long load_addr_random = 0UL; ++ unsigned long load_bias_random = 0UL; ++#endif ++ + /* Get the exec-header */ + elf_ex = *((struct elfhdr *) bprm->buf); + +@@ -664,8 +880,44 @@ + current->mm->end_data = 0; + current->mm->end_code = 0; + current->mm->mmap = NULL; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++ current->mm->delta_mmap = 0UL; ++ current->mm->delta_exec = 0UL; ++ current->mm->delta_stack = 0UL; ++#endif ++ + current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC; + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS) ++ if (0 > pax_parse_elf_flags(&elf_ex, elf_phdata)) { ++ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); ++ goto out_free_dentry; ++ } ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS ++ pax_set_flags(bprm); ++#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS) ++ if (pax_set_flags_func) ++ (pax_set_flags_func)(bprm); ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DLRESOLVE ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) ++ current->mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) { ++#define pax_delta_mask(delta, lsb, len) (((delta) & ((1UL << (len)) - 1)) << (lsb)) ++ ++ current->mm->delta_mmap = pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(current)); ++ current->mm->delta_exec = pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(current)); ++ current->mm->delta_stack = pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(current)); ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* Do this immediately, since STACK_TOP as used in setup_arg_pages + may depend on the personality. */ + SET_PERSONALITY(elf_ex, ibcs2_interpreter); +@@ -674,6 +926,12 @@ + change some of these later */ + current->mm->rss = 0; + current->mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) ++ current->mm->free_area_cache += current->mm->delta_mmap; ++#endif ++ + retval = setup_arg_pages(bprm); + if (retval < 0) { + send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); +@@ -729,11 +987,85 @@ + base, as well as whatever program they might try to exec. This + is because the brk will follow the loader, and is not movable. */ + load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ /* PaX: randomize base address at the default exe base if requested */ ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) { ++ load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(current) - vaddr + current->mm->delta_exec); ++ elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED; ++ } ++#endif ++ + } + +- error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot, elf_flags); +- if (BAD_ADDR(error)) +- continue; ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) && (elf_ex.e_type == ET_EXEC)) { ++ error = -ENOMEM; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) ++ error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot & ~PROT_EXEC, elf_flags); ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { ++ unsigned long addr, len; ++ ++ addr = ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias + vaddr); ++ len = elf_ppnt->p_filesz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr); ++ if (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len) ++ continue; ++ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ error = do_mmap_pgoff(bprm->file, addr, len, elf_prot, elf_flags, (elf_ppnt->p_offset - ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr)) >> PAGE_SHIFT); ++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ if (BAD_ADDR(error)) ++ continue; ++ ++ /* PaX: mirror at a randomized base */ ++ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ ++ if (!load_addr_set) { ++ load_addr_random = get_unmapped_area(bprm->file, 0UL, elf_ppnt->p_filesz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr), (elf_ppnt->p_offset - ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr)) >> PAGE_SHIFT, MAP_PRIVATE); ++ if (BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random)) { ++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ continue; ++ } ++ load_bias_random = load_addr_random - vaddr; ++ } ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) ++ load_addr_random = do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr), 0UL, elf_prot, elf_flags | MAP_MIRROR, error); ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { ++ if (elf_prot & PROT_EXEC) { ++ load_addr_random = do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr), elf_ppnt->p_memsz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr), PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, 0UL); ++ if (!BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random)) { ++ load_addr_random = do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE), 0UL, elf_prot, elf_flags | MAP_MIRROR, error); ++ if (!BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random)) ++ load_addr_random -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; ++ } ++ } else ++ load_addr_random = do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr), 0UL, elf_prot, elf_flags | MAP_MIRROR, error); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ++ if (BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random)) ++ continue; ++ } else ++#endif ++ ++ { ++ error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot, elf_flags); ++ if (BAD_ADDR(error)) ++ continue; ++ } + + if (!load_addr_set) { + load_addr_set = 1; +@@ -744,6 +1076,11 @@ + load_addr += load_bias; + reloc_func_desc = load_bias; + } ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ current->mm->delta_exec = load_addr_random - load_addr; ++#endif ++ + } + k = elf_ppnt->p_vaddr; + if (k < start_code) start_code = k; +@@ -770,6 +1107,16 @@ + start_data += load_bias; + end_data += load_bias; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++ if (pax_aslr) ++#endif ++ ++ elf_brk += pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), 4, PAGE_SHIFT); ++#undef pax_delta_mask ++#endif ++ + /* Calling set_brk effectively mmaps the pages that we need + * for the bss and break sections. We must do this before + * mapping in the interpreter, to make sure it doesn't wind +@@ -850,6 +1197,26 @@ + ELF_PLAT_INIT(regs, reloc_func_desc); + #endif + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ i = get_cpu(); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ { ++ unsigned long flags, cr3; ++ ++ pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3); ++#endif ++ ++ pax_switch_segments(current, i); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ put_cpu(); ++#endif ++ + start_thread(regs, elf_entry, bprm->p); + if (unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) { + if (current->ptrace & PT_TRACE_EXEC) +@@ -1062,8 +1429,11 @@ + #undef DUMP_SEEK + + #define DUMP_WRITE(addr, nr) \ ++ do { \ ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, size + (nr), 1); \ + if ((size += (nr)) > limit || !dump_write(file, (addr), (nr))) \ +- goto end_coredump; ++ goto end_coredump; \ ++ } while (0); + #define DUMP_SEEK(off) \ + if (!dump_seek(file, (off))) \ + goto end_coredump; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/binfmt_misc.c linux-2.6.5/fs/binfmt_misc.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/binfmt_misc.c 2004-04-03 22:36:56.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/binfmt_misc.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -108,9 +108,11 @@ + int retval; + + retval = -ENOEXEC; +- if (!enabled) ++ if (!enabled || bprm->misc) + goto _ret; + ++ bprm->misc++; ++ + /* to keep locking time low, we copy the interpreter string */ + read_lock(&entries_lock); + fmt = check_file(bprm); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/buffer.c linux-2.6.5/fs/buffer.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/buffer.c 2004-04-03 22:37:23.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/buffer.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ + #include <linux/bio.h> + #include <linux/notifier.h> + #include <linux/cpu.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + #include <asm/bitops.h> + + static void invalidate_bh_lrus(void); +@@ -2162,6 +2163,9 @@ + int err; + + err = -EFBIG; ++ ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, (unsigned long) size, 1); ++ + limit = current->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur; + if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && size > (loff_t)limit) { + send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/dcache.c linux-2.6.5/fs/dcache.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/dcache.c 2004-04-03 22:36:24.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/dcache.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@ + * + * "buflen" should be positive. Caller holds the dcache_lock. + */ +-static char * __d_path( struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt, ++char * __d_path( struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt, + struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt, + char *buffer, int buflen) + { +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/exec.c linux-2.6.5/fs/exec.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/exec.c 2004-04-03 22:36:56.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/exec.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ + #include <linux/security.h> + #include <linux/syscalls.h> + #include <linux/rmap-locking.h> ++#include <linux/random.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/pgalloc.h> +@@ -62,6 +64,20 @@ + static struct linux_binfmt *formats; + static rwlock_t binfmt_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK) ++unsigned int pax_aslr=1; ++#endif ++ ++unsigned int pax_softmode; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS ++void (*pax_set_flags_func)(struct linux_binprm * bprm); ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(pax_set_flags_func); ++#endif ++ + int register_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt) + { + struct linux_binfmt ** tmp = &formats; +@@ -303,7 +319,12 @@ + pte_t * pte; + struct pte_chain *pte_chain; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (page_count(page) != 1 && (!(tsk->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || page_count(page) != 3)) ++#else + if (page_count(page) != 1) ++#endif ++ + printk(KERN_ERR "mem_map disagrees with %p at %08lx\n", + page, address); + +@@ -322,8 +343,18 @@ + pte_unmap(pte); + goto out; + } ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (page_count(page) == 1) { ++#endif ++ + lru_cache_add_active(page); + flush_dcache_page(page); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ } ++#endif ++ + set_pte(pte, pte_mkdirty(pte_mkwrite(mk_pte(page, prot)))); + pte_chain = page_add_rmap(page, pte, pte_chain); + pte_unmap(pte); +@@ -350,6 +381,10 @@ + int i; + long arg_size; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ struct vm_area_struct *mpnt_m = NULL; ++#endif ++ + #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP + /* Move the argument and environment strings to the bottom of the + * stack space. +@@ -409,6 +444,16 @@ + if (!mpnt) + return -ENOMEM; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (VM_STACK_FLAGS & VM_MAYEXEC)) { ++ mpnt_m = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL); ++ if (!mpnt_m) { ++ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt); ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (security_vm_enough_memory(arg_size >> PAGE_SHIFT)) { + kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt); + return -ENOMEM; +@@ -425,6 +470,13 @@ + mpnt->vm_start = PAGE_MASK & (unsigned long) bprm->p; + mpnt->vm_end = STACK_TOP; + #endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) ++ mpnt->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(VM_STACK_FLAGS | VM_EXEC) & 0x7]; ++ else ++#endif ++ + mpnt->vm_page_prot = protection_map[VM_STACK_FLAGS & 0x7]; + mpnt->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS; + mpnt->vm_ops = NULL; +@@ -434,6 +486,26 @@ + mpnt->vm_private_data = (void *) 0; + insert_vm_struct(mm, mpnt); + mm->total_vm = (mpnt->vm_end - mpnt->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (mpnt_m) { ++ *mpnt_m = *mpnt; ++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mpnt_m->shared); ++ if (!(VM_STACK_FLAGS & VM_EXEC)) { ++ mpnt_m->vm_flags &= ~(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC); ++ mpnt_m->vm_page_prot = PAGE_NONE; ++ } ++ mpnt_m->vm_start += SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; ++ mpnt_m->vm_end += SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; ++ mpnt_m->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR; ++ mpnt->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR; ++ mpnt_m->vm_private_data = (void *)(mpnt->vm_start - mpnt_m->vm_start); ++ mpnt->vm_private_data = (void *)(mpnt_m->vm_start - mpnt->vm_start); ++ insert_vm_struct(mm, mpnt_m); ++ current->mm->total_vm = (mpnt_m->vm_end - mpnt_m->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT; ++ } ++#endif ++ + } + + for (i = 0 ; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) { +@@ -442,6 +514,15 @@ + bprm->page[i] = NULL; + put_dirty_page(current, page, stack_base, + mpnt->vm_page_prot); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT) ++ if (mpnt_m) { ++ page_cache_get(page); ++ put_dirty_page(current, page, stack_base + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, ++ mpnt_m->vm_page_prot); ++ } ++#endif ++ + } + stack_base += PAGE_SIZE; + } +@@ -830,6 +911,30 @@ + } + current->comm[i] = '\0'; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP ++ current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++ current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_MPROTECT; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++ current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_RANDMMAP; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_RANDEXEC; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC; ++#endif ++ + flush_thread(); + + if (bprm->e_uid != current->euid || bprm->e_gid != current->egid || +@@ -908,6 +1013,9 @@ + if (retval) + return retval; + ++ if (gr_handle_ptrace_exec(bprm->file->f_dentry, bprm->file->f_vfsmnt)) ++ return -EACCES; ++ + memset(bprm->buf,0,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE); + return kernel_read(bprm->file,0,bprm->buf,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE); + } +@@ -946,8 +1054,13 @@ + } + } + +- current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; +- current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; ++ if (!gr_check_user_change(-1, bprm->e_uid, bprm->e_uid)) ++ current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; ++ ++ if (!gr_check_group_change(-1, bprm->e_gid, bprm->e_gid)) ++ current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; ++ ++ gr_handle_chroot_caps(current); + + task_unlock(current); + +@@ -1091,6 +1204,11 @@ + struct file *file; + int retval; + int i; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ struct file *old_exec_file; ++ struct acl_subject_label *old_acl; ++ struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS]; ++#endif + + sched_balance_exec(); + +@@ -1100,13 +1218,39 @@ + if (IS_ERR(file)) + return retval; + ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(¤t->user->processes), 1); ++ ++ if (gr_handle_nproc()) { ++ allow_write_access(file); ++ fput(file); ++ return -EAGAIN; ++ } ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) { ++ allow_write_access(file); ++ fput(file); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++ ++ + bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++ if (pax_aslr) ++#endif ++ ++ bprm.p -= (pax_get_random_long() & ~(sizeof(void *)-1)) & ~PAGE_MASK; ++#endif ++ + memset(bprm.page, 0, MAX_ARG_PAGES*sizeof(bprm.page[0])); + + bprm.file = file; + bprm.filename = filename; + bprm.interp = filename; + bprm.sh_bang = 0; ++ bprm.misc = 0; + bprm.loader = 0; + bprm.exec = 0; + bprm.security = NULL; +@@ -1135,11 +1279,26 @@ + if (retval < 0) + goto out; + ++ if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) { ++ retval = -EACCES; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) { ++ retval = -EACCES; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm.filename, &bprm); + if (retval < 0) + goto out; + + bprm.exec = bprm.p; ++ ++ gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); ++ ++ gr_handle_exec_args(&bprm, argv); ++ + retval = copy_strings(bprm.envc, envp, &bprm); + if (retval < 0) + goto out; +@@ -1148,8 +1307,22 @@ + if (retval < 0) + goto out; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ old_acl = current->acl; ++ memcpy(old_rlim, current->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); ++ old_exec_file = current->exec_file; ++ get_file(file); ++ current->exec_file = file; ++#endif ++ ++ gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); ++ + retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs); + if (retval >= 0) { ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ if (old_exec_file) ++ fput(old_exec_file); ++#endif + free_arg_pages(&bprm); + + /* execve success */ +@@ -1157,6 +1330,13 @@ + return retval; + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ current->acl = old_acl; ++ memcpy(current->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); ++ fput(current->exec_file); ++ current->exec_file = old_exec_file; ++#endif ++ + out: + /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/ + for (i = 0 ; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) { +@@ -1314,6 +1494,128 @@ + *out_ptr = 0; + } + ++int pax_check_flags(unsigned long * flags) ++{ ++ int retval = 0; ++ ++#if !defined(__i386__) || !defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ++ if (*flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ++ { ++ *flags &= ~PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC; ++ retval = -EINVAL; ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ if ((*flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ && (*flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ++#endif ++ ++ ) ++ { ++ *flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; ++ retval = -EINVAL; ++ } ++ ++ if ((*flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++ && !(*flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) ++#endif ++ ++ ) ++ { ++ *flags &= ~PF_PAX_MPROTECT; ++ retval = -EINVAL; ++ } ++ ++ if ((*flags & PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP) ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP ++ && !(*flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) ++#endif ++ ++ ) ++ { ++ *flags &= ~PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP; ++ retval = -EINVAL; ++ } ++ ++ if ((*flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ && !(*flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) ++#endif ++ ++ ) ++ { ++ *flags &= ~PF_PAX_RANDEXEC; ++ retval = -EINVAL; ++ } ++ ++ return retval; ++} ++ ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(pax_check_flags); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ++void pax_report_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void *pc, void *sp) ++{ ++ struct task_struct *tsk = current; ++ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; ++ char* buffer_exec = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC); ++ char* buffer_fault = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC); ++ char* path_exec=NULL; ++ char* path_fault=NULL; ++ unsigned long start=0UL, end=0UL, offset=0UL; ++ ++ if (buffer_exec && buffer_fault) { ++ struct vm_area_struct* vma, * vma_exec=NULL, * vma_fault=NULL; ++ ++ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); ++ vma = mm->mmap; ++ while (vma && (!vma_exec || !vma_fault)) { ++ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) ++ vma_exec = vma; ++ if (vma->vm_start <= (unsigned long)pc && (unsigned long)pc < vma->vm_end) ++ vma_fault = vma; ++ vma = vma->vm_next; ++ } ++ if (vma_exec) { ++ path_exec = d_path(vma_exec->vm_file->f_dentry, vma_exec->vm_file->f_vfsmnt, buffer_exec, PAGE_SIZE); ++ if (IS_ERR(path_exec)) ++ path_exec = "<path too long>"; ++ } ++ if (vma_fault) { ++ start = vma_fault->vm_start; ++ end = vma_fault->vm_end; ++ offset = vma_fault->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT; ++ if (vma_fault->vm_file) { ++ path_fault = d_path(vma_fault->vm_file->f_dentry, vma_fault->vm_file->f_vfsmnt, buffer_fault, PAGE_SIZE); ++ if (IS_ERR(path_fault)) ++ path_fault = "<path too long>"; ++ } else ++ path_fault = "<anonymous mapping>"; ++ } ++ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); ++ } ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ if (tsk->curr_ip) ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: execution attempt from %u.%u.%u.%u in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", NIPQUAD(tsk->curr_ip), path_fault, start, end, offset); ++ else ++#endif ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", path_fault, start, end, offset); ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: terminating task: %s(%s):%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, " ++ "PC: %p, SP: %p\n", path_exec, tsk->comm, tsk->pid, ++ tsk->uid, tsk->euid, pc, sp); ++ if (buffer_exec) free_page((unsigned long)buffer_exec); ++ if (buffer_fault) free_page((unsigned long)buffer_fault); ++ pax_report_insns(pc, sp); ++ do_coredump(SIGKILL, SIGKILL, regs); ++} ++#endif ++ + static void zap_threads (struct mm_struct *mm) + { + struct task_struct *g, *p; +@@ -1383,6 +1685,7 @@ + current->signal->group_exit_code = exit_code; + coredump_wait(mm); + ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, binfmt->min_coredump, 1); + if (current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur < binfmt->min_coredump) + goto fail_unlock; + +@@ -1402,7 +1705,7 @@ + goto close_fail; + if (!file->f_op->write) + goto close_fail; +- if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0) != 0) ++ if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0, file->f_vfsmnt) != 0) + goto close_fail; + + retval = binfmt->core_dump(signr, regs, file); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/fcntl.c linux-2.6.5/fs/fcntl.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/fcntl.c 2004-04-03 22:37:36.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/fcntl.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ + #include <linux/module.h> + #include <linux/security.h> + #include <linux/ptrace.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/poll.h> + #include <asm/siginfo.h> +@@ -86,6 +87,9 @@ + int error; + + error = -EINVAL; ++ ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, orig_start, 0); ++ + if (orig_start >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur) + goto out; + +@@ -105,6 +109,9 @@ + } + + error = -EMFILE; ++ ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd, 0); ++ + if (newfd >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur) + goto out; + +@@ -154,6 +161,8 @@ + struct file * file, *tofree; + struct files_struct * files = current->files; + ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd, 0); ++ + spin_lock(&files->file_lock); + if (!(file = fcheck(oldfd))) + goto out_unlock; +@@ -485,13 +494,15 @@ + if (pid > 0) { + p = find_task_by_pid(pid); + if (p) { +- send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band); ++ if (!gr_check_protected_task(p)) ++ send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band); + } + } else { + struct list_head *l; + struct pid *pidptr; + for_each_task_pid(-pid, PIDTYPE_PGID, p, l, pidptr) { +- send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band); ++ if (!gr_check_protected_task(p) && !gr_pid_is_chrooted(p)) ++ send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band); + } + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/namei.c linux-2.6.5/fs/namei.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/namei.c 2004-04-03 22:36:55.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/namei.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ + #include <linux/personality.h> + #include <linux/security.h> + #include <linux/mount.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + #include <asm/namei.h> + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + +@@ -410,6 +411,13 @@ + err = security_inode_follow_link(dentry, nd); + if (err) + goto loop; ++ ++ if (gr_handle_follow_link(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, ++ dentry->d_inode, dentry, nd->mnt)) { ++ err = -EACCES; ++ goto loop; ++ } ++ + current->link_count++; + current->total_link_count++; + touch_atime(nd->mnt, dentry); +@@ -761,6 +769,10 @@ + break; + } + return_base: ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(nd->dentry, nd->mnt)) { ++ path_release(nd); ++ return -ENOENT; ++ } + return 0; + out_dput: + dput(next.dentry); +@@ -1214,7 +1226,7 @@ + if (!error) { + DQUOT_INIT(inode); + +- error = do_truncate(dentry, 0); ++ error = do_truncate(dentry, 0, nd->mnt); + } + put_write_access(inode); + if (error) +@@ -1265,6 +1277,17 @@ + error = path_lookup(pathname, lookup_flags(flag)|LOOKUP_OPEN, nd); + if (error) + return error; ++ ++ if (gr_handle_rawio(nd->dentry->d_inode)) { ++ error = -EPERM; ++ goto exit; ++ } ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_open(nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) { ++ error = -EACCES; ++ goto exit; ++ } ++ + goto ok; + } + +@@ -1298,9 +1321,19 @@ + + /* Negative dentry, just create the file */ + if (!dentry->d_inode) { ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_creat(dentry, nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag, mode)) { ++ error = -EACCES; ++ up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); ++ goto exit_dput; ++ } ++ + if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode)) + mode &= ~current->fs->umask; + error = vfs_create(dir->d_inode, dentry, mode, nd); ++ ++ if (!error) ++ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd->mnt); ++ + up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); + dput(nd->dentry); + nd->dentry = dentry; +@@ -1315,6 +1348,25 @@ + /* + * It already exists. + */ ++ ++ if (gr_handle_rawio(dentry->d_inode)) { ++ error = -EPERM; ++ up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); ++ goto exit_dput; ++ } ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_open(dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) { ++ up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); ++ error = -EACCES; ++ goto exit_dput; ++ } ++ ++ if (gr_handle_fifo(dentry, nd->mnt, dir, flag, acc_mode)) { ++ up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); ++ error = -EACCES; ++ goto exit_dput; ++ } ++ + up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); + + error = -EEXIST; +@@ -1368,6 +1420,13 @@ + error = security_inode_follow_link(dentry, nd); + if (error) + goto exit_dput; ++ ++ if (gr_handle_follow_link(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry->d_inode, ++ dentry, nd->mnt)) { ++ error = -EACCES; ++ goto exit_dput; ++ } ++ + touch_atime(nd->mnt, dentry); + error = dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, nd); + dput(dentry); +@@ -1475,6 +1534,22 @@ + if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.dentry->d_inode)) + mode &= ~current->fs->umask; + if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { ++ if (gr_handle_chroot_mknod(dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) { ++ error = -EPERM; ++ dput(dentry); ++ up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); ++ path_release(&nd); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) { ++ error = -EACCES; ++ dput(dentry); ++ up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); ++ path_release(&nd); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + switch (mode & S_IFMT) { + case 0: case S_IFREG: + error = vfs_create(nd.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,&nd); +@@ -1492,6 +1567,10 @@ + default: + error = -EINVAL; + } ++ ++ if (!error) ++ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt); ++ + dput(dentry); + } + up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); +@@ -1543,9 +1622,19 @@ + dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 1); + error = PTR_ERR(dentry); + if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { ++ error = 0; + if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.dentry->d_inode)) + mode &= ~current->fs->umask; +- error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode); ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_mkdir(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) ++ error = -EACCES; ++ ++ if (!error) ++ error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode); ++ ++ if (!error) ++ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt); ++ + dput(dentry); + } + up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); +@@ -1629,6 +1718,8 @@ + char * name; + struct dentry *dentry; + struct nameidata nd; ++ ino_t saved_ino = 0; ++ dev_t saved_dev = 0; + + name = getname(pathname); + if(IS_ERR(name)) +@@ -1653,7 +1744,21 @@ + dentry = lookup_hash(&nd.last, nd.dentry); + error = PTR_ERR(dentry); + if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { +- error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry); ++ error = 0; ++ if (dentry->d_inode) { ++ if (dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1) { ++ saved_ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino; ++ saved_dev = dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev; ++ } ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_rmdir(dentry, nd.mnt)) ++ error = -EACCES; ++ } ++ ++ if (!error) ++ error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry); ++ if (!error && (saved_dev || saved_ino)) ++ gr_handle_delete(saved_ino, saved_dev); + dput(dentry); + } + up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); +@@ -1707,6 +1812,8 @@ + struct dentry *dentry; + struct nameidata nd; + struct inode *inode = NULL; ++ ino_t saved_ino = 0; ++ dev_t saved_dev = 0; + + name = getname(pathname); + if(IS_ERR(name)) +@@ -1722,13 +1829,26 @@ + dentry = lookup_hash(&nd.last, nd.dentry); + error = PTR_ERR(dentry); + if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { ++ error = 0; + /* Why not before? Because we want correct error value */ + if (nd.last.name[nd.last.len]) + goto slashes; + inode = dentry->d_inode; +- if (inode) ++ if (inode) { ++ if (inode->i_nlink <= 1) { ++ saved_ino = inode->i_ino; ++ saved_dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; ++ } ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_unlink(dentry, nd.mnt)) ++ error = -EACCES; ++ + atomic_inc(&inode->i_count); +- error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry); ++ } ++ if (!error) ++ error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry); ++ if (!error && (saved_ino || saved_dev)) ++ gr_handle_delete(saved_ino, saved_dev); + exit2: + dput(dentry); + } +@@ -1792,7 +1912,15 @@ + dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0); + error = PTR_ERR(dentry); + if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { +- error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from); ++ error = 0; ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_symlink(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, from)) ++ error = -EACCES; ++ ++ if (!error) ++ error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from); ++ ++ if (!error) ++ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt); + dput(dentry); + } + up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); +@@ -1876,7 +2004,20 @@ + new_dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0); + error = PTR_ERR(new_dentry); + if (!IS_ERR(new_dentry)) { +- error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry); ++ error = 0; ++ if (gr_handle_hardlink(old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt, ++ old_nd.dentry->d_inode, ++ old_nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode, to)) ++ error = -EPERM; ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_link(new_dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, ++ old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt, to)) ++ error = -EACCES; ++ if (!error) ++ error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry); ++ ++ if (!error) ++ gr_handle_create(new_dentry, nd.mnt); ++ + dput(new_dentry); + } + up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); +@@ -2098,8 +2239,16 @@ + if (new_dentry == trap) + goto exit5; + +- error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry, ++ error = gr_acl_handle_rename(new_dentry, newnd.dentry, newnd.mnt, ++ old_dentry, old_dir->d_inode, oldnd.mnt, ++ newname); ++ ++ if (!error) ++ error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry, + new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry); ++ if (!error) ++ gr_handle_rename(old_dir->d_inode, newnd.dentry->d_inode, old_dentry, ++ new_dentry, oldnd.mnt, new_dentry->d_inode ? 1 : 0); + exit5: + dput(new_dentry); + exit4: +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/namespace.c linux-2.6.5/fs/namespace.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/namespace.c 2004-04-03 22:37:36.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/namespace.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ + #include <linux/namei.h> + #include <linux/security.h> + #include <linux/mount.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + + extern int __init init_rootfs(void); +@@ -334,6 +336,8 @@ + lock_kernel(); + retval = do_remount_sb(sb, MS_RDONLY, 0, 0); + unlock_kernel(); ++ ++ gr_log_remount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval); + } + up_write(&sb->s_umount); + return retval; +@@ -362,6 +366,9 @@ + if (retval) + security_sb_umount_busy(mnt); + up_write(¤t->namespace->sem); ++ ++ gr_log_unmount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval); ++ + return retval; + } + +@@ -780,6 +787,11 @@ + if (retval) + goto dput_out; + ++ if (gr_handle_chroot_mount(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, dev_name)) { ++ retval = -EPERM; ++ goto dput_out; ++ } ++ + if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) + retval = do_remount(&nd, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags, + data_page); +@@ -792,6 +804,9 @@ + dev_name, data_page); + dput_out: + path_release(&nd); ++ ++ gr_log_mount(dev_name, dir_name, retval); ++ + return retval; + } + +@@ -1014,6 +1029,9 @@ + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + ++ if (gr_handle_chroot_pivot()) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + lock_kernel(); + + error = __user_walk(new_root, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &new_nd); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/open.c linux-2.6.5/fs/open.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/open.c 2004-04-03 22:36:16.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/open.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <linux/fs.h> + #include <linux/pagemap.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + int vfs_statfs(struct super_block *sb, struct kstatfs *buf) + { +@@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ + return error; + } + +-int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length) ++int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, struct vfsmount *mnt) + { + int err; + struct iattr newattrs; +@@ -189,6 +190,9 @@ + if (length < 0) + return -EINVAL; + ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_truncate(dentry, mnt)) ++ return -EACCES; ++ + newattrs.ia_size = length; + newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE | ATTR_CTIME; + down(&dentry->d_inode->i_sem); +@@ -247,7 +251,7 @@ + error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, NULL, length); + if (!error) { + DQUOT_INIT(inode); +- error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length); ++ error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length, nd.mnt); + } + put_write_access(inode); + +@@ -299,7 +303,7 @@ + + error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, file, length); + if (!error) +- error = do_truncate(dentry, length); ++ error = do_truncate(dentry, length, file->f_vfsmnt); + out_putf: + fput(file); + out: +@@ -378,6 +382,11 @@ + (error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE,&nd)) != 0) + goto dput_and_out; + } ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) { ++ error = -EACCES; ++ goto dput_and_out; ++ } ++ + down(&inode->i_sem); + error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs); + up(&inode->i_sem); +@@ -431,6 +440,12 @@ + (error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE,&nd)) != 0) + goto dput_and_out; + } ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) { ++ error = -EACCES; ++ goto dput_and_out; ++ } ++ + down(&inode->i_sem); + error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs); + up(&inode->i_sem); +@@ -492,6 +507,10 @@ + if(!res && (mode & S_IWOTH) && IS_RDONLY(nd.dentry->d_inode) + && !special_file(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) + res = -EROFS; ++ ++ if (!res && !gr_acl_handle_access(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) ++ res = -EACCES; ++ + path_release(&nd); + } + +@@ -515,6 +534,8 @@ + if (error) + goto dput_and_out; + ++ gr_log_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt); ++ + set_fs_pwd(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry); + + dput_and_out: +@@ -545,6 +566,13 @@ + goto out_putf; + + error = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, NULL); ++ ++ if (!error && !gr_chroot_fchdir(dentry, mnt)) ++ error = -EPERM; ++ ++ if (!error) ++ gr_log_chdir(dentry, mnt); ++ + if (!error) + set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry); + out_putf: +@@ -570,8 +598,16 @@ + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT)) + goto dput_and_out; + ++ if (gr_handle_chroot_chroot(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) ++ goto dput_and_out; ++ + set_fs_root(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry); + set_fs_altroot(); ++ ++ gr_handle_chroot_caps(current); ++ ++ gr_handle_chroot_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt); ++ + error = 0; + dput_and_out: + path_release(&nd); +@@ -600,9 +636,22 @@ + err = -EPERM; + if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode)) + goto out_putf; ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_fchmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) { ++ err = -EACCES; ++ goto out_putf; ++ } ++ + down(&inode->i_sem); + if (mode == (mode_t) -1) + mode = inode->i_mode; ++ ++ if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) { ++ err = -EPERM; ++ up(&inode->i_sem); ++ goto out_putf; ++ } ++ + newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO); + newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME; + err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs); +@@ -634,9 +683,21 @@ + if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode)) + goto dput_and_out; + ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) { ++ error = -EACCES; ++ goto dput_and_out; ++ } ++ + down(&inode->i_sem); + if (mode == (mode_t) -1) + mode = inode->i_mode; ++ ++ if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) { ++ error = -EACCES; ++ up(&inode->i_sem); ++ goto dput_and_out; ++ } ++ + newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO); + newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME; + error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs); +@@ -648,7 +709,7 @@ + return error; + } + +-static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group) ++static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group, struct vfsmount *mnt) + { + struct inode * inode; + int error; +@@ -665,6 +726,12 @@ + error = -EPERM; + if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode)) + goto out; ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_chown(dentry, mnt)) { ++ error = -EACCES; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_CTIME; + if (user != (uid_t) -1) { + newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_UID; +@@ -690,7 +757,7 @@ + + error = user_path_walk(filename, &nd); + if (!error) { +- error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group); ++ error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt); + path_release(&nd); + } + return error; +@@ -703,7 +770,7 @@ + + error = user_path_walk_link(filename, &nd); + if (!error) { +- error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group); ++ error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt); + path_release(&nd); + } + return error; +@@ -717,7 +784,8 @@ + + file = fget(fd); + if (file) { +- error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, group); ++ error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, ++ group, file->f_vfsmnt); + fput(file); + } + return error; +@@ -839,6 +907,7 @@ + * N.B. For clone tasks sharing a files structure, this test + * will limit the total number of files that can be opened. + */ ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, fd, 0); + if (fd >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur) + goto out; + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/array.c linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/array.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/array.c 2004-04-03 22:37:23.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/array.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -271,6 +271,19 @@ + cap_t(p->cap_effective)); + } + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR) ++static inline char *task_pax(struct task_struct *p, char *buffer) ++{ ++ return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "PaX:\t%c%c%c%c%c%c\n", ++ p->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC ? 'P' : 'p', ++ p->flags & PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP ? 'E' : 'e', ++ p->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT ? 'M' : 'm', ++ p->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP ? 'R' : 'r', ++ p->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC ? 'X' : 'x', ++ p->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 'S' : 's'); ++} ++#endif ++ + extern char *task_mem(struct mm_struct *, char *); + int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer) + { +@@ -289,9 +302,20 @@ + #if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_S390) + buffer = task_show_regs(task, buffer); + #endif ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR) ++ buffer = task_pax(task, buffer); ++#endif ++ + return buffer - orig; + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP ++#define PAX_RAND_FLAGS (task->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP || \ ++ task->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC || \ ++ task->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++#endif ++ + extern unsigned long task_vsize(struct mm_struct *); + int proc_pid_stat(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer) + { +@@ -326,6 +350,19 @@ + + wchan = get_wchan(task); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP ++ if (PAX_RAND_FLAGS) { ++ eip = 0; ++ esp = 0; ++ wchan = 0; ++ } ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM ++ wchan = 0; ++ eip =0; ++ esp =0; ++#endif ++ + sigemptyset(&sigign); + sigemptyset(&sigcatch); + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); +@@ -374,9 +411,15 @@ + vsize, + mm ? mm->rss : 0, /* you might want to shift this left 3 */ + task->rlim[RLIMIT_RSS].rlim_cur, ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP ++ PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0 : (mm ? mm->start_code : 0), ++ PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0 : (mm ? mm->end_code : 0), ++ PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0 : (mm ? mm->start_stack : 0), ++#else + mm ? mm->start_code : 0, + mm ? mm->end_code : 0, + mm ? mm->start_stack : 0, ++#endif + esp, + eip, + /* The signal information here is obsolete. +@@ -416,3 +459,14 @@ + return sprintf(buffer,"%d %d %d %d %d %d %d\n", + size, resident, shared, text, lib, data, 0); + } ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR ++int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer) ++{ ++ int len; ++ ++ len = sprintf(buffer, "%u.%u.%u.%u\n", NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip)); ++ return len; ++} ++#endif ++ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/base.c linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/base.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/base.c 2004-04-03 22:37:25.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/base.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ + #include <linux/mount.h> + #include <linux/security.h> + #include <linux/ptrace.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + /* + * For hysterical raisins we keep the same inumbers as in the old procfs. +@@ -67,6 +68,9 @@ + PROC_TGID_ATTR_EXEC, + PROC_TGID_ATTR_FSCREATE, + #endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR ++ PROC_TGID_IPADDR, ++#endif + PROC_TGID_FD_DIR, + PROC_TID_INO, + PROC_TID_STATUS, +@@ -117,6 +121,9 @@ + E(PROC_TGID_ROOT, "root", S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO), + E(PROC_TGID_EXE, "exe", S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO), + E(PROC_TGID_MOUNTS, "mounts", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO), ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR ++ E(PROC_TGID_IPADDR, "ipaddr", S_IFREG|S_IRUSR), ++#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + E(PROC_TGID_ATTR, "attr", S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO), + #endif +@@ -181,6 +188,9 @@ + int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct*,char*); + int proc_pid_statm(struct task_struct*,char*); + int proc_pid_cpu(struct task_struct*,char*); ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR ++int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct*,char*); ++#endif + + static int proc_fd_link(struct inode *inode, struct dentry **dentry, struct vfsmount **mnt) + { +@@ -281,7 +291,7 @@ + (task == current || \ + (task->parent == current && \ + (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && task->state == TASK_STOPPED && \ +- security_ptrace(current,task) == 0)) ++ security_ptrace(current,task) == 0 && !gr_handle_proc_ptrace(task))) + + static int may_ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task) + { +@@ -296,13 +306,15 @@ + (current->uid != task->uid) || + (current->gid != task->egid) || + (current->gid != task->sgid) || +- (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) ++ (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + goto out; + rmb(); +- if (!task->mm->dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) ++ if (!task->mm->dumpable && !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + goto out; + if (security_ptrace(current, task)) + goto out; ++ if (gr_handle_proc_ptrace(task)) ++ goto out; + + retval = 1; + out: +@@ -449,9 +461,22 @@ + + static int proc_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd) + { ++ int ret; ++ struct task_struct *task; ++ + if (vfs_permission(inode, mask) != 0) + return -EACCES; +- return proc_check_root(inode); ++ ret = proc_check_root(inode); ++ ++ if (ret) ++ return ret; ++ ++ task = proc_task(inode); ++ ++ if (!task) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(task); + } + + extern struct seq_operations proc_pid_maps_op; +@@ -962,6 +987,9 @@ + inode->i_uid = task->euid; + inode->i_gid = task->egid; + } ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID; ++#endif + security_task_to_inode(task, inode); + + out: +@@ -990,7 +1018,9 @@ + if (pid_alive(task)) { + if (proc_type(inode) == PROC_TGID_INO || proc_type(inode) == PROC_TID_INO || task_dumpable(task)) { + inode->i_uid = task->euid; ++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + inode->i_gid = task->egid; ++#endif + } else { + inode->i_uid = 0; + inode->i_gid = 0; +@@ -1334,6 +1364,12 @@ + inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations; + ei->op.proc_read = proc_pid_status; + break; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR ++ case PROC_TGID_IPADDR: ++ inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations; ++ ei->op.proc_read = proc_pid_ipaddr; ++ break; ++#endif + case PROC_TID_STAT: + case PROC_TGID_STAT: + inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations; +@@ -1583,6 +1619,22 @@ + if (!task) + goto out; + ++ if (gr_check_hidden_task(task)) { ++ put_task_struct(task); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP) ++ if (current->uid && (task->uid != current->uid) ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID) ++#endif ++ ) { ++ put_task_struct(task); ++ goto out; ++ } ++#endif ++ + inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, PROC_TGID_INO); + + +@@ -1590,7 +1642,15 @@ + put_task_struct(task); + goto out; + } ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER ++ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR; ++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXGRP; ++ inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID; ++#else + inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO; ++#endif + inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations; + inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations; + inode->i_nlink = 3; +@@ -1674,6 +1734,9 @@ + static int get_tgid_list(int index, unsigned long version, unsigned int *tgids) + { + struct task_struct *p; ++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP) ++ struct task_struct *tmp = current; ++#endif + int nr_tgids = 0; + + index--; +@@ -1694,6 +1757,18 @@ + int tgid = p->pid; + if (!pid_alive(p)) + continue; ++ if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(p)) ++ continue; ++ if (gr_check_hidden_task(p)) ++ continue; ++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP) ++ if (tmp->uid && (p->uid != tmp->uid) ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID) ++#endif ++ ) ++ continue; ++#endif + if (--index >= 0) + continue; + tgids[nr_tgids] = tgid; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/inode.c linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/inode.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/inode.c 2004-04-03 22:38:14.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/inode.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -205,7 +205,11 @@ + if (de->mode) { + inode->i_mode = de->mode; + inode->i_uid = de->uid; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID; ++#else + inode->i_gid = de->gid; ++#endif + } + if (de->size) + inode->i_size = de->size; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/proc_misc.c linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/proc_misc.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2004-04-03 22:36:24.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -654,6 +654,8 @@ + void __init proc_misc_init(void) + { + struct proc_dir_entry *entry; ++ int gr_mode = 0; ++ + static struct { + char *name; + int (*read_proc)(char*,char**,off_t,int,int*,void*); +@@ -668,9 +670,13 @@ + #ifdef CONFIG_STRAM_PROC + {"stram", stram_read_proc}, + #endif ++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD + {"devices", devices_read_proc}, ++#endif + {"filesystems", filesystems_read_proc}, ++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD + {"cmdline", cmdline_read_proc}, ++#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_SGI_DS1286 + {"rtc", ds1286_read_proc}, + #endif +@@ -681,24 +687,39 @@ + for (p = simple_ones; p->name; p++) + create_proc_read_entry(p->name, 0, NULL, p->read_proc, NULL); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER ++ gr_mode = S_IRUSR; ++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ gr_mode = S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD ++ create_proc_read_entry("devices", gr_mode, NULL, &devices_read_proc, NULL); ++ create_proc_read_entry("cmdline", gr_mode, NULL, &cmdline_read_proc, NULL); ++#endif ++ + proc_symlink("mounts", NULL, "self/mounts"); + + /* And now for trickier ones */ + entry = create_proc_entry("kmsg", S_IRUSR, &proc_root); + if (entry) + entry->proc_fops = &proc_kmsg_operations; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD ++ create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", gr_mode, &proc_cpuinfo_operations); ++ create_seq_entry("slabinfo",gr_mode,&proc_slabinfo_operations); ++#else + create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", 0, &proc_cpuinfo_operations); ++ create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO,&proc_slabinfo_operations); ++#endif + create_seq_entry("partitions", 0, &proc_partitions_operations); + create_seq_entry("stat", 0, &proc_stat_operations); + create_seq_entry("interrupts", 0, &proc_interrupts_operations); +- create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO,&proc_slabinfo_operations); + create_seq_entry("buddyinfo",S_IRUGO, &fragmentation_file_operations); + create_seq_entry("vmstat",S_IRUGO, &proc_vmstat_file_operations); + create_seq_entry("diskstats", 0, &proc_diskstats_operations); + #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES +- create_seq_entry("modules", 0, &proc_modules_operations); ++ create_seq_entry("modules", gr_mode, &proc_modules_operations); + #endif +-#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_KCORE ++#if defined(CONFIG_PROC_KCORE) + proc_root_kcore = create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL); + if (proc_root_kcore) { + proc_root_kcore->proc_fops = &proc_kcore_operations; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/root.c linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/root.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/root.c 2004-04-03 22:37:40.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/root.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -52,13 +52,26 @@ + return; + } + proc_misc_init(); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER ++ proc_net = proc_mkdir_mode("net", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, 0); ++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ proc_net = proc_mkdir_mode("net", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, 0); ++#else + proc_net = proc_mkdir("net", 0); ++#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC + proc_mkdir("sysvipc", 0); + #endif + #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER ++ proc_sys_root = proc_mkdir_mode("sys", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, 0); ++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ proc_sys_root = proc_mkdir_mode("sys", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, 0); ++#else + proc_sys_root = proc_mkdir("sys", 0); + #endif ++#endif + #if defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC) || defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC_MODULE) + proc_mkdir("sys/fs", 0); + proc_mkdir("sys/fs/binfmt_misc", 0); +@@ -74,7 +87,15 @@ + #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_DEVICETREE + proc_device_tree_init(); + #endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER ++ proc_bus = proc_mkdir_mode("bus", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, 0); ++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ proc_bus = proc_mkdir_mode("bus", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, 0); ++#endif ++#else + proc_bus = proc_mkdir("bus", 0); ++#endif + } + + static struct dentry *proc_root_lookup(struct inode * dir, struct dentry * dentry, struct nameidata *nd) +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/task_mmu.c linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/task_mmu.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/task_mmu.c 2004-04-03 22:36:24.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/proc/task_mmu.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -76,8 +76,17 @@ + return size; + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP ++#define PAX_RAND_FLAGS (task->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP || \ ++ task->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC || \ ++ task->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++#endif ++ + static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, void *v) + { ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP ++ struct task_struct *task = m->private; ++#endif + struct vm_area_struct *map = v; + struct file *file = map->vm_file; + int flags = map->vm_flags; +@@ -92,8 +101,14 @@ + } + + seq_printf(m, "%08lx-%08lx %c%c%c%c %08lx %02x:%02x %lu %n", ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP ++ PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0UL : map->vm_start, ++ PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0UL : map->vm_end, ++#else + map->vm_start, + map->vm_end, ++#endif ++ + flags & VM_READ ? 'r' : '-', + flags & VM_WRITE ? 'w' : '-', + flags & VM_EXEC ? 'x' : '-', +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/fs/readdir.c linux-2.6.5/fs/readdir.c +--- linux-2.6.5/fs/readdir.c 2004-04-03 22:37:06.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/fs/readdir.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ + #include <linux/fs.h> + #include <linux/dirent.h> + #include <linux/security.h> ++#include <linux/namei.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + +@@ -64,6 +66,7 @@ + struct readdir_callback { + struct old_linux_dirent __user * dirent; + int result; ++ struct nameidata nd; + }; + + static int fillonedir(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, loff_t offset, +@@ -74,6 +77,10 @@ + + if (buf->result) + return -EINVAL; ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->nd.dentry, buf->nd.mnt, ino)) ++ return 0; ++ + buf->result++; + dirent = buf->dirent; + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, (unsigned long)dirent, +@@ -106,6 +113,9 @@ + buf.result = 0; + buf.dirent = dirent; + ++ buf.nd.dentry = file->f_dentry; ++ buf.nd.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt; ++ + error = vfs_readdir(file, fillonedir, &buf); + if (error >= 0) + error = buf.result; +@@ -133,6 +143,7 @@ + struct linux_dirent __user * previous; + int count; + int error; ++ struct nameidata nd; + }; + + static int filldir(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, loff_t offset, +@@ -145,6 +156,10 @@ + buf->error = -EINVAL; /* only used if we fail.. */ + if (reclen > buf->count) + return -EINVAL; ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->nd.dentry, buf->nd.mnt, ino)) ++ return 0; ++ + dirent = buf->previous; + if (dirent) { + if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off)) +@@ -192,6 +207,9 @@ + buf.count = count; + buf.error = 0; + ++ buf.nd.dentry = file->f_dentry; ++ buf.nd.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt; ++ + error = vfs_readdir(file, filldir, &buf); + if (error < 0) + goto out_putf; +@@ -217,6 +235,7 @@ + struct linux_dirent64 __user * previous; + int count; + int error; ++ struct nameidata nd; + }; + + static int filldir64(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, loff_t offset, +@@ -229,6 +248,10 @@ + buf->error = -EINVAL; /* only used if we fail.. */ + if (reclen > buf->count) + return -EINVAL; ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->nd.dentry, buf->nd.mnt, ino)) ++ return 0; ++ + dirent = buf->previous; + if (dirent) { + if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off)) +@@ -278,6 +301,9 @@ + buf.count = count; + buf.error = 0; + ++ buf.nd.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt; ++ buf.nd.dentry = file->f_dentry; ++ + error = vfs_readdir(file, filldir64, &buf); + if (error < 0) + goto out_putf; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/Kconfig linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/Kconfig +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/Kconfig 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/Kconfig 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,864 @@ ++# ++# grecurity configuration ++# ++ ++menu "Grsecurity" ++ ++config GRKERNSEC ++ bool "Grsecurity" ++ select CRYPTO ++ select CRYPTO_SHA256 ++ help ++ If you say Y here, you will be able to configure many features ++ that will enhance the security of your system. It is highly ++ recommended that you say Y here and read through the help ++ for each option so that you fully understand the features and ++ can evaluate their usefulness for your machine. ++ ++choice ++ prompt "Security Level" ++ depends GRKERNSEC ++ default GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_LOW ++ bool "Low" ++ select GRKERNSEC_LINK ++ select GRKERNSEC_FIFO ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDPID ++ select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDISN ++ select GRKERNSEC_DMESG ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDID ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR ++ help ++ If you choose this option, several of the grsecurity options will ++ be enabled that will give you greater protection against a number ++ of attacks, while assuring that none of your software will have any ++ conflicts with the additional security measures. If you run a lot ++ of unusual software, or you are having problems with the higher ++ security levels, you should say Y here. With this option, the ++ following features are enabled: ++ ++ - Linking Restrictions ++ - FIFO Restrictions ++ - Randomized PIDs ++ - Enforcing RLIMIT_NPROC on execve ++ - Restricted dmesg ++ - Randomized IP IDs ++ - Enforced chdir("/") on chroot ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_MEDIUM ++ bool "Medium" ++ select PAX_EI_PAX ++ select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS ++ select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS ++ select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL ++ select GRKERNSEC_LINK ++ select GRKERNSEC_FIFO ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDPID ++ select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE ++ select GRKERNSEC_DMESG ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDID ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDISN ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC ++ select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL ++ select GRKERNSEC_TIME ++ select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD ++ select GRKERNSEC_PROC ++ select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ select PAX_RANDUSTACK ++ select PAX_ASLR ++ select PAX_RANDMMAP ++ ++ help ++ If you say Y here, several features in addition to those included ++ in the low additional security level will be enabled. These ++ features provide even more security to your system, though in rare ++ cases they may be incompatible with very old or poorly written ++ software. If you enable this option, make sure that your auth ++ service (identd) is running as gid 1001. With this option, ++ the following features (in addition to those provided in the ++ low additional security level) will be enabled: ++ ++ - Randomized TCP Source Ports ++ - Failed Fork Logging ++ - Time Change Logging ++ - Signal Logging ++ - Deny Mounts in chroot ++ - Deny Double chrooting ++ - Deny Sysctl Writes in chroot ++ - Deny Mknod in chroot ++ - Deny Access to Abstract AF_UNIX Sockets out of chroot ++ - Deny pivot_root in chroot ++ - Denied Writes of /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port ++ - /proc restrictions with special GID set to 10 (usually wheel) ++ - Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_HIGH ++ bool "High" ++ select GRKERNSEC_LINK ++ select GRKERNSEC_FIFO ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDPID ++ select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE ++ select GRKERNSEC_DMESG ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDID ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC ++ select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL ++ select GRKERNSEC_TIME ++ select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK ++ select GRKERNSEC_PROC ++ select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP ++ select GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM ++ select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ select GRKERNSEC_KMEM ++ select GRKERNSEC_RESLOG ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET ++ select GRKERNSEC_RANDISN ++ select GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD ++ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE ++ select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT ++ select PAX_RANDUSTACK ++ select PAX_ASLR ++ select PAX_RANDMMAP ++ select PAX_NOEXEC ++ select PAX_MPROTECT ++ select PAX_EI_PAX ++ select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS ++ select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS ++ select PAX_KERNEXEC ++ select PAX_RANDKSTACK ++ select PAX_RANDEXEC ++ select PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ select PAX_EMUTRAMP ++ select PAX_NOVSYSCALL ++ help ++ If you say Y here, many of the features of grsecurity will be ++ enabled, which will protect you against many kinds of attacks ++ against your system. The heightened security comes at a cost ++ of an increased chance of incompatibilities with rare software ++ on your machine. Since this security level enables PaX, you should ++ view <http://pax.grsecurity.net> and read about the PaX ++ project. While you are there, download chpax and run it on ++ binaries that cause problems with PaX. Also remember that ++ since the /proc restrictions are enabled, you must run your ++ identd as gid 1001. This security level enables the following ++ features in addition to those listed in the low and medium ++ security levels: ++ ++ - Additional /proc Restrictions ++ - Chmod Restrictions in chroot ++ - No Signals, Ptrace, or Viewing of Processes Outside of chroot ++ - Capability Restrictions in chroot ++ - Deny fchdir out of chroot ++ - Priority Restrictions in chroot ++ - Segmentation-based Implementation of PaX ++ - Mprotect Restrictions ++ - Removal of Addresses from /proc/<pid>/[maps|stat] ++ - Kernel Stack Randomization ++ - Mount/Unmount/Remount Logging ++ - Kernel Symbol Hiding ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM ++ bool "Custom" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, you will be able to configure every grsecurity ++ option, which allows you to enable many more features that aren't ++ covered in the basic security levels. These additional features ++ include TPE, socket restrictions, and the sysctl system for ++ grsecurity. It is advised that you read through the help for ++ each option to determine its usefulness in your situation. ++ ++endchoice ++ ++menu "Address Space Protection" ++depends on GRKERNSEC ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_KMEM ++ bool "Deny writing to /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, /dev/kmem and /dev/mem won't be allowed to ++ be written to via mmap or otherwise to modify the running kernel. ++ /dev/port will also not be allowed to be opened. If you have module ++ support disabled, enabling this will close up four ways that are ++ currently used to insert malicious code into the running kernel. ++ Even with all these features enabled, we still highly recommend that ++ you use the ACL system, as it is still possible for an attacker to ++ modify the running kernel through privileged I/O granted by ioperm/iopl. ++ If you are not using XFree86, you may be able to stop this additional ++ case by enabling the 'Disable privileged I/O' option. Though nothing ++ legitimately writes to /dev/kmem, XFree86 does need to write to /dev/mem, ++ but only to video memory, which is the only writing we allow in this ++ case. If /dev/kmem or /dev/mem are mmaped without PROT_WRITE, they will ++ not be allowed to mprotect it with PROT_WRITE later. ++ Enabling this feature could make certain apps like VMWare stop working, ++ as they need to write to other locations in /dev/mem. ++ It is highly recommended that you say Y here if you meet all the ++ conditions above. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_IO ++ bool "Disable privileged I/O" ++ depends on X86 ++ select RTC ++ help ++ If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error. ++ Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel. ++ Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly, ++ the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be ++ remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so CONFIG_RTC is ++ enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure that hwclock operates ++ correctly. XFree86 still will not operate correctly with this option ++ enabled, so DO NOT CHOOSE Y IF YOU USE XFree86. If you use XFree86 ++ and you still want to protect your kernel against modification, ++ use the ACL system. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP ++ bool "Remove addresses from /proc/<pid>/[maps|stat]" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, the /proc/<pid>/maps and /proc/<pid>/stat files will ++ give no information about the addresses of its mappings if ++ PaX features that rely on random addresses are enabled on the task. ++ If you use PaX it is greatly recommended that you say Y here as it ++ closes up a hole that makes the full ASLR useless for suid ++ binaries. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM ++ bool "Hide kernel symbols" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, getting information on loaded modules, and ++ displaying all kernel symbols through a syscall will be restricted ++ to users with CAP_SYS_MODULE. This option is only effective ++ provided the following conditions are met: ++ 1) The kernel using grsecurity is not precompiled by some distribution ++ 2) You are using the ACL system and hiding other files such as your ++ kernel image and System.map ++ 3) You have the additional /proc restrictions enabled, which removes ++ /proc/kcore ++ If the above conditions are met, this option will aid to provide a ++ useful protection against local and remote kernel exploitation of ++ overflows and arbitrary read/write vulnerabilities. ++ ++endmenu ++menu "Role Based Access Control Options" ++depends on GRKERNSEC ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN ++ bool "Hide kernel processes" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, when the RBAC system is enabled via gradm -E, ++ an additional ACL will be passed to the kernel that hides all kernel ++ processes. These processes will only be viewable by the authenticated ++ admin, or processes that have viewing access set. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES ++ int "Maximum tries before password lockout" ++ default 3 ++ help ++ This option enforces the maximum number of times a user can attempt ++ to authorize themselves with the grsecurity ACL system before being ++ denied the ability to attempt authorization again for a specified time. ++ The lower the number, the harder it will be to brute-force a password. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT ++ int "Time to wait after max password tries, in seconds" ++ default 30 ++ help ++ This option specifies the time the user must wait after attempting to ++ authorize to the ACL system with the maximum number of invalid ++ passwords. The higher the number, the harder it will be to brute-force ++ a password. ++ ++endmenu ++menu "Filesystem Protections" ++depends on GRKERNSEC ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_PROC ++ bool "Proc restrictions" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, the permissions of the /proc filesystem ++ will be altered to enhance system security and privacy. Depending ++ upon the options you choose, you can either restrict users to see ++ only the processes they themselves run, or choose a group that can ++ view all processes and files normally restricted to root if you choose ++ the "restrict to user only" option. NOTE: If you're running identd as ++ a non-root user, you will have to run it as the group you specify here. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER ++ bool "Restrict /proc to user only" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC ++ help ++ If you say Y here, non-root users will only be able to view their own ++ processes, and restricts them from viewing network-related information, ++ and viewing kernel symbol and module information. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ bool "Allow special group" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER ++ help ++ If you say Y here, you will be able to select a group that will be ++ able to view all processes, network-related information, and ++ kernel and symbol information. This option is useful if you want ++ to run identd as a non-root user. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID ++ int "GID for special group" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ default 1001 ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD ++ bool "Additional restrictions" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER || GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ help ++ If you say Y here, additional restrictions will be placed on ++ /proc that keep normal users from viewing cpu and device information. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_LINK ++ bool "Linking restrictions" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users ++ will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in ++ world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of the ++ symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be ++ able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is ++ enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_FIFO ++ bool "FIFO restrictions" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't ++ own in world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of ++ the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl ++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is ++ created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT ++ bool "Chroot jail restrictions" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose several options that will ++ make breaking out of a chrooted jail much more difficult. If you ++ encounter no software incompatibilities with the following options, it ++ is recommended that you enable each one. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT ++ bool "Deny mounts" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT ++ help ++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to ++ mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a ++ sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE ++ bool "Deny double-chroots" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT ++ help ++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot ++ again outside the chroot. This is a widely used method of breaking ++ out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed. If the sysctl ++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name ++ "chroot_deny_chroot" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT ++ bool "Deny pivot_root in chroot" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT ++ help ++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use ++ a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It ++ works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This ++ function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out ++ of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl ++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is ++ created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR ++ bool "Enforce chdir(\"/\") on all chroots" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT ++ help ++ If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted ++ applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot. ++ The man page on chroot(2) states: ++ Note that this call does not change the current working ++ directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at ++ `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a ++ `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'. ++ ++ It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break ++ any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with ++ name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD ++ bool "Deny (f)chmod +s" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT ++ help ++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod ++ or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects ++ against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl ++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is ++ created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR ++ bool "Deny fchdir out of chroot" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT ++ help ++ If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing ++ to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory ++ outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option ++ is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD ++ bool "Deny mknod" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT ++ help ++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to ++ mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it ++ would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same ++ as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from ++ anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which ++ they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended ++ that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities. ++ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name ++ "chroot_deny_mknod" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT ++ bool "Deny shmat() out of chroot" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT ++ help ++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach ++ to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail. ++ It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, ++ a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX ++ bool "Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT ++ help ++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to ++ connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix ++ domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended ++ that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option ++ with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK ++ bool "Protect outside processes" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT ++ help ++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to ++ kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, setpgid, getpgid, ++ getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl ++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is ++ created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE ++ bool "Restrict priority changes" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT ++ help ++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise ++ the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of ++ processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply ++ removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the ++ sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice" ++ is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL ++ bool "Deny sysctl writes" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT ++ help ++ If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to ++ write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc ++ interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the ++ sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name ++ "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS ++ bool "Capability restrictions" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT ++ help ++ If you say Y here, the capabilities on all root processes within a ++ chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o, ++ system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable ++ files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time. ++ This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this ++ if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of ++ tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with ++ name "chroot_caps" is created. ++ ++endmenu ++menu "Kernel Auditing" ++depends on GRKERNSEC ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP ++ bool "Single group for auditing" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, the exec, chdir, (un)mount, and ipc logging features ++ will only operate on a group you specify. This option is recommended ++ if you only want to watch certain users instead of having a large ++ amount of logs from the entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, ++ a sysctl option with name "audit_group" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID ++ int "GID for auditing" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP ++ default 1007 ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG ++ bool "Exec logging" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the ++ other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution ++ will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track ++ of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with ++ name "exec_logging" is created. ++ WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially ++ on an active system. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_RESLOG ++ bool "Resource logging" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will ++ be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current ++ limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG ++ bool "Log execs within chroot" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged ++ to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain ++ applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and ++ is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a ++ sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR ++ bool "Chdir logging" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, all chdir() calls will be logged. If the sysctl ++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_chdir" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT ++ bool "(Un)Mount logging" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the ++ sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is ++ created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC ++ bool "IPC logging" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, creation and removal of message queues, semaphores, ++ and shared memory will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a ++ sysctl option with name "audit_ipc" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL ++ bool "Signal logging" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as ++ SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program ++ occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt. ++ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name ++ "signal_logging" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL ++ bool "Fork failure logging" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged. ++ This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep ++ their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option ++ with name "forkfail_logging" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_TIME ++ bool "Time change logging" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged. ++ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name ++ "timechange_logging" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR ++ bool "/proc/<pid>/ipaddr support" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, a new entry will be added to each /proc/<pid> ++ directory that contains the IP address of the person using the task. ++ The IP is carried across local TCP and AF_UNIX stream sockets. ++ This information can be useful for IDS/IPSes to perform remote response ++ to a local attack. The entry is readable by only the owner of the ++ process (and root if he has CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, which can be removed via ++ the RBAC system), and thus does not create privacy concerns. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL ++ bool 'ELF text relocations logging (READ HELP)' ++ depends on PAX_MPROTECT ++ help ++ If you say Y here, text relocations will be logged with the filename ++ of the offending library or binary. The purpose of the feature is ++ to help Linux distribution developers get rid of libraries and ++ binaries that need text relocations which hinder the future progress ++ of PaX. Only Linux distribution developers should say Y here, and ++ never on a production machine, as this option creates an information ++ leak that could aid an attacker in defeating the randomization of ++ a single memory region. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl ++ option with name "audit_textrel" is created. ++ ++endmenu ++ ++menu "Executable Protections" ++depends on GRKERNSEC ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_EXECVE ++ bool "Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC on execs" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, users with a resource limit on processes will ++ have the value checked during execve() calls. The current system ++ only checks the system limit during fork() calls. If the sysctl option ++ is enabled, a sysctl option with name "execve_limiting" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_DMESG ++ bool "Dmesg(8) restriction" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8) ++ to view up to the last 4kb of messages in the kernel's log buffer. ++ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is ++ created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_RANDPID ++ bool "Randomized PIDs" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, all PIDs created on the system will be ++ pseudo-randomly generated. This is extremely effective along ++ with the /proc restrictions to disallow an attacker from guessing ++ pids of daemons, etc. PIDs are also used in some cases as part ++ of a naming system for temporary files, so this option would keep ++ those filenames from being predicted as well. We also use code ++ to make sure that PID numbers aren't reused too soon. If the sysctl ++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rand_pids" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_TPE ++ bool "Trusted Path Execution (TPE)" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the ++ supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted." ++ These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in ++ root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option ++ is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL ++ bool "Partially restrict non-root users" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE ++ help ++ If you say Y here, All non-root users other than the ones in the ++ group specified in the main TPE option will only be allowed to ++ execute files in directories they own that are not group or ++ world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by ++ root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name ++ "tpe_restrict_all" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID ++ int "GID for untrusted users" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE ++ default 1005 ++ help ++ Here you can choose the GID to enable trusted path protection for. ++ Remember to add the users you want protection enabled for to the GID ++ specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose ++ here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup ++ script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help ++ on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is ++ enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe_gid" is created. ++ ++endmenu ++menu "Network Protections" ++depends on GRKERNSEC ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_RANDNET ++ bool "Larger entropy pools" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, the entropy pools used for many features of Linux ++ and grsecurity will be doubled in size. Since several grsecurity ++ features use additional randomness, it is recommended that you say Y ++ here. Saying Y here has a similar effect as modifying ++ /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_RANDISN ++ bool "Truly random TCP ISN selection" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, Linux's default selection of TCP Initial Sequence ++ Numbers (ISNs) will be replaced with that of OpenBSD. Linux uses ++ an MD4 hash based on the connection plus a time value to create the ++ ISN, while OpenBSD's selection is random. If the sysctl option is ++ enabled, a sysctl option with name "rand_isns" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_RANDID ++ bool "Randomized IP IDs" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, all the id field on all outgoing packets ++ will be randomized. This hinders os fingerprinters and ++ keeps your machine from being used as a bounce for an untraceable ++ portscan. Ids are used for fragmented packets, fragments belonging ++ to the same packet have the same id. By default linux only ++ increments the id value on each packet sent to an individual host. ++ We use a port of the OpenBSD random ip id code to achieve the ++ randomness, while keeping the possibility of id duplicates to ++ near none. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name ++ "rand_ip_ids" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC ++ bool "Randomized TCP source ports" ++ default n if GRKERNSEC_LOW || GRKERNSEC_MID ++ default y if GRKERNSEC_HIGH ++ help ++ If you say Y here, situations where a source port is generated on the ++ fly for the TCP protocol (ie. with connect() ) will be altered so that ++ the source port is generated at random, instead of a simple incrementing ++ algorithm. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name ++ "rand_tcp_src_ports" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC ++ bool "Randomized RPC XIDs" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, the method of determining XIDs for RPC requests will ++ be randomized, instead of using linux's default behavior of simply ++ incrementing the XID. If you want your RPC connections to be more ++ secure, say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option ++ with name "rand_rpc" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET ++ bool "Socket restrictions" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose from several options. ++ If you assign a GID on your system and add it to the supplementary ++ groups of users you want to restrict socket access to, this patch ++ will perform up to three things, based on the option(s) you choose. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL ++ bool "Deny any sockets to group" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET ++ help ++ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will ++ be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server ++ applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a ++ sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID ++ int "GID to deny all sockets for" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL ++ default 1004 ++ help ++ Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to ++ add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID ++ specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose ++ here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup ++ script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help ++ on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is ++ enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_all_gid" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT ++ bool "Deny client sockets to group" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET ++ help ++ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will ++ be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be ++ able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group ++ you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers ++ from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a ++ sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID ++ int "GID to deny client sockets for" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT ++ default 1003 ++ help ++ Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for. ++ Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to ++ the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you ++ choose here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup ++ script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help ++ on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is ++ enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_client_gid" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER ++ bool "Deny server sockets to group" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET ++ help ++ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will ++ be unable to run server applications from your machine. If the sysctl ++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server" is created. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID ++ int "GID to deny server sockets for" ++ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER ++ default 1002 ++ help ++ Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for. ++ Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to ++ the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you ++ choose here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup ++ script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help ++ on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is ++ enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server_gid" is created. ++ ++endmenu ++menu "Sysctl support" ++depends on GRKERNSEC && SYSCTL ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL ++ bool "Sysctl support" ++ help ++ If you say Y here, you will be able to change the options that ++ grsecurity runs with at bootup, without having to recompile your ++ kernel. You can echo values to files in /proc/sys/kernel/grsecurity ++ to enable (1) or disable (0) various features. All the sysctl entries ++ are mutable until the "grsec_lock" entry is set to a non-zero value. ++ All features are disabled by default. Please note that this option could ++ reduce the effectiveness of the added security of this patch if an ACL ++ system is not put in place. Your init scripts should be read-only, and ++ root should not have access to adding modules or performing raw i/o ++ operations. All options should be set at startup, and the grsec_lock ++ entry should be set to a non-zero value after all the options are set. ++ *THIS IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT* ++ ++endmenu ++menu "Logging Options" ++depends on GRKERNSEC ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME ++ int "Seconds in between log messages (minimum)" ++ default 10 ++ help ++ This option allows you to enforce the number of seconds between ++ grsecurity log messages. The default should be suitable for most ++ people, however, if you choose to change it, choose a value small enough ++ to allow informative logs to be produced, but large enough to ++ prevent flooding. ++ ++config GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST ++ int "Number of messages in a burst (maximum)" ++ default 4 ++ help ++ This option allows you to choose the maximum number of messages allowed ++ within the flood time interval you chose in a separate option. The ++ default should be suitable for most people, however if you find that ++ many of your logs are being interpreted as flooding, you may want to ++ raise this value. ++ ++endmenu ++ ++endmenu +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/Makefile linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/Makefile +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/Makefile 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/Makefile 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ ++# grsecurity's ACL system was originally written in 2001 by Michael Dalton ++# during 2001, 2002, and 2003 it has been completely redesigned by ++# Brad Spengler ++# ++# All code in this directory and various hooks inserted throughout the kernel ++# are copyright Brad Spengler, and released under the GPL, unless otherwise ++# noted (as in obsd_rand.c) ++ ++obj-y = grsec_chdir.o grsec_chroot.o grsec_exec.o grsec_fifo.o grsec_fork.o \ ++ grsec_mount.o grsec_rand.o grsec_sig.o grsec_sock.o grsec_sysctl.o \ ++ grsec_time.o grsec_tpe.o grsec_ipc.o grsec_link.o grsec_textrel.o ++ ++obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC) += grsec_init.o grsum.o gracl.o gracl_ip.o gracl_segv.o obsd_rand.o \ ++ gracl_cap.o gracl_alloc.o gracl_shm.o grsec_mem.o gracl_fs.o \ ++ gracl_learn.o ++obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG) += gracl_res.o ++ ++ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++obj-y += grsec_disabled.o ++endif ++ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,3340 @@ ++/* ++ * grsecurity/gracl.c ++ * Copyright Brad Spengler 2001, 2002, 2003 ++ * ++ */ ++ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/mm.h> ++#include <linux/file.h> ++#include <linux/fs.h> ++#include <linux/namei.h> ++#include <linux/mount.h> ++#include <linux/tty.h> ++#include <linux/proc_fs.h> ++#include <linux/smp_lock.h> ++#include <linux/slab.h> ++#include <linux/vmalloc.h> ++#include <linux/types.h> ++#include <linux/capability.h> ++#include <linux/sysctl.h> ++#include <linux/ptrace.h> ++#include <linux/gracl.h> ++#include <linux/gralloc.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++#include <linux/percpu.h> ++ ++#include <asm/uaccess.h> ++#include <asm/errno.h> ++#include <asm/mman.h> ++ ++static struct acl_role_db acl_role_set; ++static struct acl_role_label *role_list_head; ++static struct name_db name_set; ++static struct name_db inodev_set; ++ ++/* for keeping track of userspace pointers used for subjects, so we ++ can share references in the kernel as well ++*/ ++static struct acl_subj_map_db subj_map_set; ++ ++static struct acl_role_label *default_role; ++ ++static u16 acl_sp_role_value; ++ ++extern char *gr_shared_page[4]; ++static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_dev_sem); ++rwlock_t gr_inode_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED; ++ ++struct gr_arg *gr_usermode; ++ ++static unsigned long gr_status = GR_STATUS_INIT; ++ ++extern int chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum); ++extern void gr_clear_learn_entries(void); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG ++extern void gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task, ++ const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt); ++#endif ++ ++extern char * __d_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt, ++ struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt, ++ char *buffer, int buflen); ++ ++unsigned char *gr_system_salt; ++unsigned char *gr_system_sum; ++ ++static struct sprole_pw **acl_special_roles = NULL; ++static __u16 num_sprole_pws = 0; ++ ++static struct acl_role_label *kernel_role = NULL; ++ ++/* The following are used to keep a place held in the hash table when we move ++ entries around. They can be replaced during insert. */ ++ ++static struct acl_subject_label *deleted_subject; ++static struct acl_object_label *deleted_object; ++static struct name_entry *deleted_inodev; ++ ++/* for keeping track of the last and final allocated subjects, since ++ nested subject parsing is tricky ++*/ ++static struct acl_subject_label *s_last = NULL; ++static struct acl_subject_label *s_final = NULL; ++ ++static unsigned int gr_auth_attempts = 0; ++static unsigned long gr_auth_expires = 0UL; ++ ++extern int gr_init_uidset(void); ++extern void gr_free_uidset(void); ++extern void gr_remove_uid(uid_t uid); ++extern int gr_find_uid(uid_t uid); ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_acl_is_enabled(void) ++{ ++ return (gr_status & GR_READY); ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_acl_tpe_check(void) ++{ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return 0; ++ if (current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_TPE) ++ return 1; ++ else ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode) ++{ ++ if (inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) && ++ ((gr_status & GR_READY) ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS ++ || (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current)) ++#endif ++ )) ++ return 1; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ ++static __inline__ int ++gr_streq(const char *a, const char *b, const __u16 lena, const __u16 lenb) ++{ ++ int i; ++ unsigned long *l1; ++ unsigned long *l2; ++ unsigned char *c1; ++ unsigned char *c2; ++ int num_longs; ++ ++ if (likely(lena != lenb)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ l1 = (unsigned long *)a; ++ l2 = (unsigned long *)b; ++ ++ num_longs = lena / sizeof(unsigned long); ++ ++ for (i = num_longs; i--; l1++, l2++) { ++ if (unlikely(*l1 != *l2)) ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ c1 = (unsigned char *) l1; ++ c2 = (unsigned char *) l2; ++ ++ i = lena - (num_longs * sizeof(unsigned long)); ++ ++ for (; i--; c1++, c2++) { ++ if (unlikely(*c1 != *c2)) ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ char * ++__d_real_path(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *vfsmnt, ++ char *buf, int buflen) ++{ ++ char *res; ++ struct dentry *our_dentry; ++ struct vfsmount *our_mount; ++ struct vfsmount *rootmnt; ++ struct dentry *root; ++ ++ our_dentry = (struct dentry *) dentry; ++ our_mount = (struct vfsmount *) vfsmnt; ++ ++ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); ++ rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt); ++ root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root); ++ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); ++ ++ res = __d_path(our_dentry, our_mount, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen); ++ if (unlikely(IS_ERR(res))) ++ res = strcpy(buf, "<path too long>"); ++ dput(root); ++ mntput(rootmnt); ++ return res; ++} ++ ++char * ++gr_to_filename_nolock(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ return __d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id()), ++ PAGE_SIZE); ++} ++ ++static __inline__ char * ++d_real_path(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *vfsmnt, ++ char *buf, int buflen) ++{ ++ char *res; ++ struct dentry *our_dentry; ++ struct vfsmount *our_mount; ++ struct vfsmount *rootmnt; ++ struct dentry *root; ++ ++ our_dentry = (struct dentry *) dentry; ++ our_mount = (struct vfsmount *) vfsmnt; ++ ++ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); ++ rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt); ++ root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root); ++ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); ++ ++ spin_lock(&dcache_lock); ++ res = __d_path(our_dentry, our_mount, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen); ++ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); ++ if (unlikely(IS_ERR(res))) ++ res = strcpy(buf, "<path too long>"); ++ dput(root); ++ mntput(rootmnt); ++ return res; ++} ++ ++char * ++gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id()), ++ PAGE_SIZE); ++} ++ ++char * ++gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[1], smp_processor_id()), ++ PAGE_SIZE); ++} ++ ++char * ++gr_to_filename2(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[2], smp_processor_id()), ++ PAGE_SIZE); ++} ++ ++char * ++gr_to_filename3(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[3], smp_processor_id()), ++ PAGE_SIZE); ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode) ++{ ++ __u32 retmode = 0; ++ ++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_READ) ? GR_AUDIT_READ : 0; ++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_WRITE) ? GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_APPEND : 0; ++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_APPEND) ? GR_AUDIT_APPEND : 0; ++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_EXEC) ? GR_AUDIT_EXEC : 0; ++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_INHERIT) ? GR_AUDIT_INHERIT : 0; ++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_FIND) ? GR_AUDIT_FIND : 0; ++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_SETID) ? GR_AUDIT_SETID : 0; ++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_CREATE) ? GR_AUDIT_CREATE : 0; ++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_DELETE) ? GR_AUDIT_DELETE : 0; ++ ++ return retmode; ++} ++ ++__inline__ struct acl_subject_label * ++lookup_subject_map(const struct acl_subject_label *userp) ++{ ++ unsigned long index = shash(userp, subj_map_set.s_size); ++ struct subject_map *match; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ ++ match = subj_map_set.s_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (match && match->user != userp) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_map_set.s_size; ++ match = subj_map_set.s_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ if (match) ++ return match->kernel; ++ else ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++static void ++insert_subj_map_entry(struct subject_map *subjmap) ++{ ++ unsigned long index = shash(subjmap->user, subj_map_set.s_size); ++ struct subject_map **curr; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ ++ curr = &subj_map_set.s_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (*curr) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_map_set.s_size; ++ curr = &subj_map_set.s_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ *curr = subjmap; ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++__inline__ struct acl_role_label * ++lookup_acl_role_label(const struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, ++ const gid_t gid) ++{ ++ unsigned long index = rhash(uid, GR_ROLE_USER, acl_role_set.r_size); ++ struct acl_role_label *match; ++ struct role_allowed_ip *ipp; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ ++ match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (match ++ && (match->uidgid != uid || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_USER))) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size; ++ match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ if (match == NULL) { ++ try_group: ++ index = rhash(gid, GR_ROLE_GROUP, acl_role_set.r_size); ++ match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; ++ i = 0; ++ ++ while (match && (match->uidgid != gid ++ || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_GROUP))) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size; ++ match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ if (match == NULL) ++ match = default_role; ++ if (match->allowed_ips == NULL) ++ return match; ++ else { ++ for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) { ++ if (likely ++ ((task->curr_ip & ipp->netmask) == ++ (ipp->addr & ipp->netmask))) ++ return match; ++ } ++ match = default_role; ++ } ++ } else if (match->allowed_ips == NULL) { ++ return match; ++ } else { ++ for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) { ++ if (likely ++ ((task->curr_ip & ipp->netmask) == ++ (ipp->addr & ipp->netmask))) ++ return match; ++ } ++ goto try_group; ++ } ++ ++ return match; ++} ++ ++__inline__ struct acl_subject_label * ++lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev, ++ const struct acl_role_label *role) ++{ ++ unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size; ++ struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash; ++ unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, subj_size); ++ struct acl_subject_label *match; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ ++ match = s_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev || ++ (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size; ++ match = s_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ if (match && (match != deleted_subject) && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)) ++ return match; ++ else ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ struct acl_object_label * ++lookup_acl_obj_label(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev, ++ const struct acl_subject_label *subj) ++{ ++ unsigned long obj_size = subj->obj_hash_size; ++ struct acl_object_label **o_hash = subj->obj_hash; ++ unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size); ++ struct acl_object_label *match; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ ++ match = o_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev || ++ (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size; ++ match = o_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ if (match && (match != deleted_object) && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)) ++ return match; ++ else ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ struct acl_object_label * ++lookup_acl_obj_label_create(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev, ++ const struct acl_subject_label *subj) ++{ ++ unsigned long obj_size = subj->obj_hash_size; ++ struct acl_object_label **o_hash = subj->obj_hash; ++ unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size); ++ struct acl_object_label *match; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ ++ match = o_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev || ++ !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size; ++ match = o_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ if (match && (match != deleted_object) && (match->mode & GR_DELETED)) ++ return match; ++ ++ i = 0; ++ index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size); ++ match = o_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev || ++ (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size; ++ match = o_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ if (match && (match != deleted_object) && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)) ++ return match; ++ else ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ struct name_entry * ++lookup_name_entry(const char *name) ++{ ++ __u16 len = strlen(name); ++ unsigned long index = nhash(name, len, name_set.n_size); ++ struct name_entry *match; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ ++ match = name_set.n_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (match && !gr_streq(match->name, name, match->len, len)) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % name_set.n_size; ++ match = name_set.n_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ return match; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ struct name_entry * ++lookup_inodev_entry(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev) ++{ ++ unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, inodev_set.n_size); ++ struct name_entry *match; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ ++ match = inodev_set.n_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev)) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size; ++ match = inodev_set.n_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ if (match && (match != deleted_inodev)) ++ return match; ++ else ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++static void ++insert_inodev_entry(struct name_entry *nentry) ++{ ++ unsigned long index = fhash(nentry->inode, nentry->device, ++ inodev_set.n_size); ++ struct name_entry **curr; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ ++ curr = &inodev_set.n_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (*curr && *curr != deleted_inodev) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size; ++ curr = &inodev_set.n_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ *curr = nentry; ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static void ++insert_acl_role_label(struct acl_role_label *role) ++{ ++ unsigned long index = ++ rhash(role->uidgid, role->roletype & (GR_ROLE_USER | GR_ROLE_GROUP), acl_role_set.r_size); ++ struct acl_role_label **curr; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ ++ curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (*curr) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size; ++ curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ *curr = role; ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static int ++insert_name_entry(char *name, const ino_t inode, const dev_t device) ++{ ++ struct name_entry **curr; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ __u16 len = strlen(name); ++ unsigned long index = nhash(name, len, name_set.n_size); ++ ++ curr = &name_set.n_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (*curr && !gr_streq((*curr)->name, name, (*curr)->len, len)) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % name_set.n_size; ++ curr = &name_set.n_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ if (!(*curr)) { ++ struct name_entry *nentry = ++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry)); ++ if (!nentry) ++ return 0; ++ nentry->name = name; ++ nentry->inode = inode; ++ nentry->device = device; ++ nentry->len = len; ++ *curr = nentry; ++ /* insert us into the table searchable by inode/dev */ ++ insert_inodev_entry(nentry); ++ } ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static void ++insert_acl_obj_label(struct acl_object_label *obj, ++ struct acl_subject_label *subj) ++{ ++ unsigned long index = ++ fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj->obj_hash_size); ++ struct acl_object_label **curr; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ ++ curr = &subj->obj_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (*curr && *curr != deleted_object) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj->obj_hash_size; ++ curr = &subj->obj_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ *curr = obj; ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static void ++insert_acl_subj_label(struct acl_subject_label *obj, ++ struct acl_role_label *role) ++{ ++ unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size; ++ struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash; ++ unsigned long index = fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj_size); ++ struct acl_subject_label **curr; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ ++ curr = &s_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (*curr && *curr != deleted_subject) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size; ++ curr = &s_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ *curr = obj; ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static void ** ++create_table(__u32 * len) ++{ ++ unsigned long table_sizes[] = { ++ 7, 13, 31, 61, 127, 251, 509, 1021, 2039, 4093, 8191, 16381, ++ 32749, 65521, 131071, 262139, 524287, 1048573, 2097143, ++ 4194301, 8388593, 16777213, 33554393, 67108859, 134217689, ++ 268435399, 536870909, 1073741789, 2147483647 ++ }; ++ void *newtable = NULL; ++ unsigned int pwr = 0; ++ ++ while ((pwr < ((sizeof (table_sizes) / sizeof (table_sizes[0])) - 1)) && ++ table_sizes[pwr] <= (2 * (*len))) ++ pwr++; ++ ++ if (table_sizes[pwr] <= (2 * (*len))) ++ return newtable; ++ ++ if ((table_sizes[pwr] * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE) ++ newtable = ++ kmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * sizeof (void *), GFP_KERNEL); ++ else ++ newtable = vmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * sizeof (void *)); ++ ++ *len = table_sizes[pwr]; ++ ++ return newtable; ++} ++ ++static int ++init_variables(const unsigned long acl_obj_size, ++ const unsigned long acl_glob_size, ++ const unsigned long acl_subj_size, ++ const unsigned long acl_ip_size, ++ const unsigned long acl_role_size, ++ const unsigned long allowed_ip_size, ++ const unsigned long acl_trans_size, ++ const __u16 num_sprole_pws) ++{ ++ unsigned long stacksize; ++ ++ subj_map_set.s_size = acl_subj_size; ++ acl_role_set.r_size = acl_role_size; ++ name_set.n_size = (acl_obj_size + acl_subj_size); ++ inodev_set.n_size = (acl_obj_size + acl_subj_size); ++ ++ if (!gr_init_uidset()) ++ return 1; ++ ++ /* set up the stack that holds allocation info */ ++ ++ stacksize = (3 * acl_obj_size) + (3 * acl_role_size) + ++ (6 * acl_subj_size) + acl_ip_size + (2 * acl_trans_size) + ++ allowed_ip_size + (2 * num_sprole_pws) + (2 * acl_glob_size) + 5; ++ ++ if (!acl_alloc_stack_init(stacksize)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ /* create our empty, fake deleted acls */ ++ deleted_subject = ++ (struct acl_subject_label *) ++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)); ++ deleted_object = ++ (struct acl_object_label *) ++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label)); ++ deleted_inodev = ++ (struct name_entry *) acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry)); ++ ++ if (!deleted_subject || !deleted_object || !deleted_inodev) ++ return 1; ++ ++ memset(deleted_subject, 0, sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)); ++ memset(deleted_object, 0, sizeof (struct acl_object_label)); ++ memset(deleted_inodev, 0, sizeof (struct name_entry)); ++ ++ /* We only want 50% full tables for now */ ++ ++ subj_map_set.s_hash = ++ (struct subject_map **) create_table(&subj_map_set.s_size); ++ acl_role_set.r_hash = ++ (struct acl_role_label **) create_table(&acl_role_set.r_size); ++ name_set.n_hash = (struct name_entry **) create_table(&name_set.n_size); ++ inodev_set.n_hash = ++ (struct name_entry **) create_table(&inodev_set.n_size); ++ ++ if (!subj_map_set.s_hash || !acl_role_set.r_hash || ++ !name_set.n_hash || !inodev_set.n_hash) ++ return 1; ++ ++ memset(subj_map_set.s_hash, 0, ++ sizeof(struct subject_map *) * subj_map_set.s_size); ++ memset(acl_role_set.r_hash, 0, ++ sizeof (struct acl_role_label *) * acl_role_set.r_size); ++ memset(name_set.n_hash, 0, ++ sizeof (struct name_entry *) * name_set.n_size); ++ memset(inodev_set.n_hash, 0, ++ sizeof (struct name_entry *) * inodev_set.n_size); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* free information not needed after startup ++ currently contains user->kernel pointer mappings for subjects ++*/ ++ ++static void ++free_init_variables(void) ++{ ++ __u32 i; ++ ++ if (subj_map_set.s_hash) { ++ for (i = 0; i < subj_map_set.s_size; i++) { ++ if (subj_map_set.s_hash[i]) { ++ kfree(subj_map_set.s_hash[i]); ++ subj_map_set.s_hash[i] = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if ((subj_map_set.s_size * sizeof (struct subject_map *)) <= ++ PAGE_SIZE) ++ kfree(subj_map_set.s_hash); ++ else ++ vfree(subj_map_set.s_hash); ++ } ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static void ++free_variables(void) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label *s; ++ struct acl_role_label *r; ++ struct task_struct *task, *task2; ++ ++ gr_clear_learn_entries(); ++ ++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); ++ for_each_process(task) { ++ task2 = task; ++ do { ++ task2->acl_sp_role = 0; ++ task2->acl_role_id = 0; ++ task2->acl = NULL; ++ task2->role = NULL; ++ } while ((task2 = next_thread(task2)) != task); ++ } ++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); ++ ++ /* free all object hash tables */ ++ ++ if (role_list_head) { ++ for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) { ++ if (!r->subj_hash) ++ break; ++ for (s = r->hash->first; s; s = s->next) { ++ if (!s->obj_hash) ++ break; ++ if ((s->obj_hash_size * ++ sizeof (struct acl_object_label *)) <= ++ PAGE_SIZE) ++ kfree(s->obj_hash); ++ else ++ vfree(s->obj_hash); ++ } ++ if ((r->subj_hash_size * ++ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *)) <= PAGE_SIZE) ++ kfree(r->subj_hash); ++ else ++ vfree(r->subj_hash); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ acl_free_all(); ++ ++ if (acl_role_set.r_hash) { ++ if ((acl_role_set.r_size * sizeof (struct acl_role_label *)) <= ++ PAGE_SIZE) ++ kfree(acl_role_set.r_hash); ++ else ++ vfree(acl_role_set.r_hash); ++ } ++ if (name_set.n_hash) { ++ if ((name_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <= ++ PAGE_SIZE) ++ kfree(name_set.n_hash); ++ else ++ vfree(name_set.n_hash); ++ } ++ ++ if (inodev_set.n_hash) { ++ if ((inodev_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <= ++ PAGE_SIZE) ++ kfree(inodev_set.n_hash); ++ else ++ vfree(inodev_set.n_hash); ++ } ++ ++ gr_free_uidset(); ++ ++ memset(&name_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db)); ++ memset(&inodev_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db)); ++ memset(&acl_role_set, 0, sizeof (struct acl_role_db)); ++ memset(&subj_map_set, 0, sizeof (struct acl_subj_map_db)); ++ ++ role_list_head = NULL; ++ default_role = NULL; ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static __u32 ++count_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp) ++{ ++ struct acl_object_label o_tmp; ++ __u32 num = 0; ++ ++ while (userp) { ++ if (copy_from_user(&o_tmp, userp, ++ sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) ++ break; ++ ++ userp = o_tmp.prev; ++ num++; ++ } ++ ++ return num; ++} ++ ++static struct acl_subject_label * ++do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role); ++ ++static int ++copy_user_glob(struct acl_object_label *obj) ++{ ++ struct acl_object_label *g_tmp, **guser, *glast = NULL; ++ unsigned int len; ++ char *tmp; ++ ++ if (obj->globbed == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ ++ guser = &obj->globbed; ++ while (*guser) { ++ g_tmp = (struct acl_object_label *) ++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label)); ++ if (g_tmp == NULL) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ ++ if (copy_from_user(g_tmp, *guser, ++ sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) ++ return -EFAULT; ++ ++ len = strnlen_user(g_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX); ++ ++ if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ ++ if (copy_from_user(tmp, g_tmp->filename, len)) ++ return -EFAULT; ++ ++ g_tmp->filename = tmp; ++ ++ if (glast) ++ glast->next = g_tmp; ++ g_tmp->prev = glast; ++ *guser = g_tmp; ++ glast = g_tmp; ++ guser = &((*guser)->next); ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int ++copy_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp, struct acl_subject_label *subj, ++ struct acl_role_label *role) ++{ ++ struct acl_object_label *o_tmp; ++ unsigned int len; ++ int ret; ++ char *tmp; ++ ++ while (userp) { ++ if ((o_tmp = (struct acl_object_label *) ++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) == NULL) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ ++ if (copy_from_user(o_tmp, userp, ++ sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) ++ return -EFAULT; ++ ++ userp = o_tmp->prev; ++ ++ len = strnlen_user(o_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX); ++ ++ if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ ++ if (copy_from_user(tmp, o_tmp->filename, len)) ++ return -EFAULT; ++ ++ o_tmp->filename = tmp; ++ ++ insert_acl_obj_label(o_tmp, subj); ++ if (!insert_name_entry(o_tmp->filename, o_tmp->inode, ++ o_tmp->device)) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ ++ ret = copy_user_glob(o_tmp); ++ if (ret) ++ return ret; ++ ++ if (o_tmp->nested) { ++ o_tmp->nested = do_copy_user_subj(o_tmp->nested, role); ++ if (IS_ERR(o_tmp->nested)) ++ return PTR_ERR(o_tmp->nested); ++ ++ s_final = o_tmp->nested; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static __u32 ++count_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label s_tmp; ++ __u32 num = 0; ++ ++ while (userp) { ++ if (copy_from_user(&s_tmp, userp, ++ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) ++ break; ++ ++ userp = s_tmp.prev; ++ /* do not count nested subjects against this count, since ++ they are not included in the hash table, but are ++ attached to objects. We have already counted ++ the subjects in userspace for the allocation ++ stack ++ */ ++ if (!(s_tmp.mode & GR_NESTED)) ++ num++; ++ } ++ ++ return num; ++} ++ ++static int ++copy_user_allowedips(struct acl_role_label *rolep) ++{ ++ struct role_allowed_ip *ruserip, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast; ++ ++ ruserip = rolep->allowed_ips; ++ ++ while (ruserip) { ++ rlast = rtmp; ++ ++ if ((rtmp = (struct role_allowed_ip *) ++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip))) == NULL) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ ++ if (copy_from_user(rtmp, ruserip, ++ sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip))) ++ return -EFAULT; ++ ++ ruserip = rtmp->prev; ++ ++ if (!rlast) { ++ rtmp->prev = NULL; ++ rolep->allowed_ips = rtmp; ++ } else { ++ rlast->next = rtmp; ++ rtmp->prev = rlast; ++ } ++ ++ if (!ruserip) ++ rtmp->next = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int ++copy_user_transitions(struct acl_role_label *rolep) ++{ ++ struct role_transition *rusertp, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast; ++ unsigned int len; ++ char *tmp; ++ ++ rusertp = rolep->transitions; ++ ++ while (rusertp) { ++ rlast = rtmp; ++ ++ if ((rtmp = (struct role_transition *) ++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_transition))) == NULL) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ ++ if (copy_from_user(rtmp, rusertp, ++ sizeof (struct role_transition))) ++ return -EFAULT; ++ ++ rusertp = rtmp->prev; ++ ++ len = strnlen_user(rtmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN); ++ ++ if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ ++ if (copy_from_user(tmp, rtmp->rolename, len)) ++ return -EFAULT; ++ ++ rtmp->rolename = tmp; ++ ++ if (!rlast) { ++ rtmp->prev = NULL; ++ rolep->transitions = rtmp; ++ } else { ++ rlast->next = rtmp; ++ rtmp->prev = rlast; ++ } ++ ++ if (!rusertp) ++ rtmp->next = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static struct acl_subject_label * ++do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label *s_tmp = NULL, *s_tmp2; ++ unsigned int len; ++ char *tmp; ++ __u32 num_objs; ++ struct acl_ip_label **i_tmp, *i_utmp2; ++ struct gr_hash_struct ghash; ++ struct subject_map *subjmap; ++ unsigned long i_num; ++ int err; ++ ++ s_tmp = lookup_subject_map(userp); ++ ++ /* we've already copied this subject into the kernel, just return ++ the reference to it, and don't copy it over again ++ */ ++ if (s_tmp) ++ return(s_tmp); ++ ++ ++ if ((s_tmp = (struct acl_subject_label *) ++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) == NULL) ++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); ++ ++ subjmap = (struct subject_map *)kmalloc(sizeof (struct subject_map), GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (subjmap == NULL) ++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); ++ ++ subjmap->user = userp; ++ subjmap->kernel = s_tmp; ++ insert_subj_map_entry(subjmap); ++ ++ if (copy_from_user(s_tmp, userp, ++ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) ++ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); ++ ++ if (!s_last) { ++ s_tmp->prev = NULL; ++ role->hash->first = s_tmp; ++ } else { ++ s_last->next = s_tmp; ++ s_tmp->prev = s_last; ++ } ++ ++ s_last = s_tmp; ++ ++ len = strnlen_user(s_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX); ++ ++ if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) ++ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); ++ ++ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) ++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); ++ ++ if (copy_from_user(tmp, s_tmp->filename, len)) ++ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); ++ ++ s_tmp->filename = tmp; ++ ++ if (!strcmp(s_tmp->filename, "/")) ++ role->root_label = s_tmp; ++ ++ if (copy_from_user(&ghash, s_tmp->hash, sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct))) ++ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); ++ ++ /* copy user and group transition tables */ ++ ++ if (s_tmp->user_trans_num) { ++ uid_t *uidlist; ++ ++ uidlist = (uid_t *)acl_alloc(s_tmp->user_trans_num * sizeof(uid_t)); ++ if (uidlist == NULL) ++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); ++ if (copy_from_user(uidlist, s_tmp->user_transitions, s_tmp->user_trans_num * sizeof(uid_t))) ++ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); ++ ++ s_tmp->user_transitions = uidlist; ++ } ++ ++ if (s_tmp->group_trans_num) { ++ gid_t *gidlist; ++ ++ gidlist = (gid_t *)acl_alloc(s_tmp->group_trans_num * sizeof(gid_t)); ++ if (gidlist == NULL) ++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); ++ if (copy_from_user(gidlist, s_tmp->group_transitions, s_tmp->group_trans_num * sizeof(gid_t))) ++ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); ++ ++ s_tmp->group_transitions = gidlist; ++ } ++ ++ /* set up object hash table */ ++ num_objs = count_user_objs(ghash.first); ++ ++ s_tmp->obj_hash_size = num_objs; ++ s_tmp->obj_hash = ++ (struct acl_object_label **) ++ create_table(&(s_tmp->obj_hash_size)); ++ ++ if (!s_tmp->obj_hash) ++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); ++ ++ memset(s_tmp->obj_hash, 0, ++ s_tmp->obj_hash_size * ++ sizeof (struct acl_object_label *)); ++ ++ /* copy before adding in objects, since a nested ++ acl could be found and be the final subject ++ copied ++ */ ++ ++ s_final = s_tmp; ++ ++ /* add in objects */ ++ err = copy_user_objs(ghash.first, s_tmp, role); ++ ++ if (err) ++ return ERR_PTR(err); ++ ++ /* set pointer for parent subject */ ++ if (s_tmp->parent_subject) { ++ s_tmp2 = do_copy_user_subj(s_tmp->parent_subject, role); ++ ++ if (IS_ERR(s_tmp2)) ++ return s_tmp2; ++ ++ s_tmp->parent_subject = s_tmp2; ++ } ++ ++ /* add in ip acls */ ++ ++ if (!s_tmp->ip_num) { ++ s_tmp->ips = NULL; ++ goto insert; ++ } ++ ++ i_tmp = ++ (struct acl_ip_label **) acl_alloc(s_tmp->ip_num * ++ sizeof (struct ++ acl_ip_label *)); ++ ++ if (!i_tmp) ++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); ++ ++ for (i_num = 0; i_num < s_tmp->ip_num; i_num++) { ++ *(i_tmp + i_num) = ++ (struct acl_ip_label *) ++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_ip_label)); ++ if (!*(i_tmp + i_num)) ++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); ++ ++ if (copy_from_user ++ (&i_utmp2, s_tmp->ips + i_num, ++ sizeof (struct acl_ip_label *))) ++ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); ++ ++ if (copy_from_user ++ (*(i_tmp + i_num), i_utmp2, ++ sizeof (struct acl_ip_label))) ++ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); ++ } ++ ++ s_tmp->ips = i_tmp; ++ ++insert: ++ if (!insert_name_entry(s_tmp->filename, s_tmp->inode, ++ s_tmp->device)) ++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); ++ ++ return s_tmp; ++} ++ ++static int ++copy_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label s_pre; ++ struct acl_subject_label * ret; ++ int err; ++ ++ while (userp) { ++ if (copy_from_user(&s_pre, userp, ++ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) ++ return -EFAULT; ++ ++ /* do not add nested subjects here, add ++ while parsing objects ++ */ ++ ++ if (s_pre.mode & GR_NESTED) { ++ userp = s_pre.prev; ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ ret = do_copy_user_subj(userp, role); ++ ++ err = PTR_ERR(ret); ++ if (IS_ERR(ret)) ++ return err; ++ ++ insert_acl_subj_label(ret, role); ++ ++ userp = s_pre.prev; ++ } ++ ++ s_final->next = NULL; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int ++copy_user_acl(struct gr_arg *arg) ++{ ++ struct acl_role_label *r_tmp = NULL, **r_utmp, *r_utmp2, *r_last; ++ struct sprole_pw *sptmp; ++ struct gr_hash_struct *ghash; ++ unsigned long r_num; ++ unsigned int len; ++ char *tmp; ++ int err = 0; ++ __u16 i; ++ __u32 num_subjs; ++ ++ /* we need a default and kernel role */ ++ if (arg->role_db.r_entries < 2) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ /* copy special role authentication info from userspace */ ++ ++ num_sprole_pws = arg->num_sprole_pws; ++ acl_special_roles = (struct sprole_pw **) acl_alloc(num_sprole_pws * sizeof(struct sprole_pw *)); ++ ++ if (!acl_special_roles) { ++ err = -ENOMEM; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) { ++ sptmp = (struct sprole_pw *) acl_alloc(sizeof(struct sprole_pw)); ++ if (!sptmp) { ++ err = -ENOMEM; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ if (copy_from_user(sptmp, arg->sprole_pws + i, ++ sizeof (struct sprole_pw))) { ++ err = -EFAULT; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ ++ len = ++ strnlen_user(sptmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN); ++ ++ if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN) { ++ err = -EINVAL; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ ++ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) { ++ err = -ENOMEM; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ ++ if (copy_from_user(tmp, sptmp->rolename, len)) { ++ err = -EFAULT; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "Copying special role %s\n", tmp); ++#endif ++ sptmp->rolename = tmp; ++ acl_special_roles[i] = sptmp; ++ } ++ ++ r_utmp = (struct acl_role_label **) arg->role_db.r_table; ++ ++ for (r_num = 0; r_num < arg->role_db.r_entries; r_num++) { ++ r_last = r_tmp; ++ ++ r_tmp = acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_role_label)); ++ ++ if (!r_tmp) { ++ err = -ENOMEM; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ ++ if (copy_from_user(&r_utmp2, r_utmp + r_num, ++ sizeof (struct acl_role_label *))) { ++ err = -EFAULT; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ ++ if (copy_from_user(r_tmp, r_utmp2, ++ sizeof (struct acl_role_label))) { ++ err = -EFAULT; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ ++ if (!r_last) { ++ r_tmp->prev = NULL; ++ role_list_head = r_tmp; ++ } else { ++ r_last->next = r_tmp; ++ r_tmp->prev = r_last; ++ } ++ ++ if (r_num == (arg->role_db.r_entries - 1)) ++ r_tmp->next = NULL; ++ ++ len = strnlen_user(r_tmp->rolename, PATH_MAX); ++ ++ if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) { ++ err = -EINVAL; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ ++ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) { ++ err = -ENOMEM; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ if (copy_from_user(tmp, r_tmp->rolename, len)) { ++ err = -EFAULT; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ r_tmp->rolename = tmp; ++ ++ if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, "default") ++ && (r_tmp->roletype & GR_ROLE_DEFAULT)) { ++ default_role = r_tmp; ++ } else if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, ":::kernel:::")) { ++ kernel_role = r_tmp; ++ } ++ ++ if ((ghash = (struct gr_hash_struct *) acl_alloc(sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct))) == NULL) { ++ err = -ENOMEM; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ if (copy_from_user(ghash, r_tmp->hash, sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct))) { ++ err = -EFAULT; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ ++ r_tmp->hash = ghash; ++ ++ num_subjs = count_user_subjs(r_tmp->hash->first); ++ ++ r_tmp->subj_hash_size = num_subjs; ++ r_tmp->subj_hash = ++ (struct acl_subject_label **) ++ create_table(&(r_tmp->subj_hash_size)); ++ ++ if (!r_tmp->subj_hash) { ++ err = -ENOMEM; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ ++ err = copy_user_allowedips(r_tmp); ++ if (err) ++ goto cleanup; ++ ++ err = copy_user_transitions(r_tmp); ++ if (err) ++ goto cleanup; ++ ++ memset(r_tmp->subj_hash, 0, ++ r_tmp->subj_hash_size * ++ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *)); ++ ++ s_last = NULL; ++ ++ err = copy_user_subjs(r_tmp->hash->first, r_tmp); ++ ++ if (err) ++ goto cleanup; ++ ++ insert_acl_role_label(r_tmp); ++ } ++ ++ goto return_err; ++ cleanup: ++ free_variables(); ++ return_err: ++ return err; ++ ++} ++ ++static int ++gracl_init(struct gr_arg *args) ++{ ++ int error = 0; ++ ++ memcpy(gr_system_salt, args->salt, GR_SALT_LEN); ++ memcpy(gr_system_sum, args->sum, GR_SHA_LEN); ++ ++ if (init_variables(args->role_db.o_entries, args->role_db.g_entries, ++ args->role_db.s_entries, args->role_db.i_entries, ++ args->role_db.r_entries, args->role_db.a_entries, ++ args->role_db.t_entries, args->num_sprole_pws)) { ++ security_alert_good(GR_INITF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION); ++ error = -ENOMEM; ++ free_variables(); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ error = copy_user_acl(args); ++ free_init_variables(); ++ if (error) { ++ free_variables(); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ((error = gr_set_acls(0))) { ++ free_variables(); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ gr_status |= GR_READY; ++ out: ++ return error; ++} ++ ++static int ++glob_match(char *pattern, char *string) ++{ ++ char *p1, *p2; ++ ++ p1 = pattern; ++ p2 = string; ++ ++ while (*p1 != '\0' && *p2 != '\0' && *p1 != '*') { ++ if (*p1 == *p2 || *p1 == '?') { ++ p1++; ++ p2++; ++ } else ++ break; ++ } ++ if (*p1 == '*') { ++ p1++; ++ while (*p2 != '\0') { ++ if (!glob_match(p1, p2)) ++ return 0; ++ else ++ p2++; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (*p2 == '\0' && *p1 == '*') ++ while (*p1 == '*') ++ p1++; ++ ++ if (*p1 == '\0' && *p2 == '\0') ++ return 0; ++ else ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static struct acl_object_label * ++chk_glob_label(struct acl_object_label *globbed, ++ struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char **path) ++{ ++ struct acl_object_label *tmp; ++ ++ if (*path == NULL) ++ *path = gr_to_filename_nolock(dentry, mnt); ++ ++ tmp = globbed; ++ ++ while (tmp) { ++ if (!glob_match(tmp->filename, *path)) ++ return tmp; ++ tmp = tmp->next; ++ } ++ ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ struct acl_object_label * ++full_lookup(const struct dentry *orig_dentry, const struct vfsmount *orig_mnt, ++ struct dentry *curr_dentry, ++ const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char **path) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label *tmpsubj; ++ struct acl_object_label *retval; ++ struct acl_object_label *retval2; ++ ++ tmpsubj = (struct acl_subject_label *) subj; ++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ do { ++ retval = lookup_acl_obj_label(curr_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, ++ curr_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, tmpsubj); ++ if (retval) { ++ if (retval->globbed) { ++ retval2 = chk_glob_label(retval->globbed, (struct dentry *)orig_dentry, ++ (struct vfsmount *)orig_mnt, path); ++ if (retval2) ++ retval = retval2; ++ } ++ break; ++ } ++ } while ((tmpsubj = tmpsubj->parent_subject)); ++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ ++ return retval; ++} ++ ++static struct acl_object_label * ++chk_obj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt, ++ const struct acl_subject_label *subj) ++{ ++ struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry; ++ struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt; ++ struct dentry *root; ++ struct vfsmount *rootmnt; ++ struct acl_object_label *retval; ++ char *path = NULL; ++ ++ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); ++ rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt); ++ root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root); ++ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); ++ spin_lock(&dcache_lock); ++ ++ for (;;) { ++ if (dentry == root && mnt == rootmnt) ++ break; ++ if (dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) { ++ if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt) ++ break; ++ ++ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path); ++ if (retval != NULL) ++ goto out; ++ ++ dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint; ++ mnt = mnt->mnt_parent; ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path); ++ if (retval != NULL) ++ goto out; ++ ++ dentry = dentry->d_parent; ++ } ++ ++ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path); ++ ++ if (retval == NULL) ++ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, root, subj, &path); ++out: ++ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); ++ dput(root); ++ mntput(rootmnt); ++ ++ return retval; ++} ++ ++static struct acl_object_label * ++chk_obj_create_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt, ++ const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char *path) ++{ ++ struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry; ++ struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt; ++ struct dentry *root; ++ struct vfsmount *rootmnt; ++ struct acl_object_label *retval; ++ ++ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); ++ rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt); ++ root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root); ++ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); ++ spin_lock(&dcache_lock); ++ ++ for (;;) { ++ if (dentry == root && mnt == rootmnt) ++ break; ++ if (dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) { ++ if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt) ++ break; ++ ++ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path); ++ if (retval != NULL) ++ goto out; ++ ++ dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint; ++ mnt = mnt->mnt_parent; ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path); ++ if (retval != NULL) ++ goto out; ++ ++ dentry = dentry->d_parent; ++ } ++ ++ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path); ++ ++ if (retval == NULL) ++ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, root, subj, &path); ++out: ++ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); ++ dput(root); ++ mntput(rootmnt); ++ ++ return retval; ++} ++ ++static struct acl_subject_label * ++chk_subj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt, ++ const struct acl_role_label *role) ++{ ++ struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry; ++ struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt; ++ struct dentry *root; ++ struct vfsmount *rootmnt; ++ struct acl_subject_label *retval; ++ ++ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); ++ rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt); ++ root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root); ++ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); ++ spin_lock(&dcache_lock); ++ ++ for (;;) { ++ if (unlikely(dentry == root && mnt == rootmnt)) ++ break; ++ if (unlikely(dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) { ++ if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt) ++ break; ++ ++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ retval = ++ lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino, ++ dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role); ++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ if (unlikely(retval != NULL)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint; ++ mnt = mnt->mnt_parent; ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ retval = ++ lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino, ++ dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role); ++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ if (unlikely(retval != NULL)) ++ goto out; ++ ++ dentry = dentry->d_parent; ++ } ++ ++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ retval = ++ lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino, ++ dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role); ++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ ++ if (unlikely(retval == NULL)) { ++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ retval = ++ lookup_acl_subj_label(root->d_inode->i_ino, ++ root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role); ++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ } ++ out: ++ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); ++ dput(root); ++ mntput(rootmnt); ++ ++ return retval; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ void ++gr_log_learn(const struct acl_role_label *role, const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid, ++ const struct task_struct *task, const char *pathname, ++ const __u32 mode) ++{ ++ security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, role->rolename, role->roletype, ++ uid, gid, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename1(task->exec_file->f_dentry, ++ task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : task->acl->filename, task->acl->filename, ++ 1, 1, pathname, (unsigned long) mode, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip)); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_check_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, ++ const struct dentry * old_dentry, const struct vfsmount * old_mnt) ++{ ++ struct acl_object_label *obj; ++ __u32 oldmode, newmode; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE); ++ ++ obj = chk_obj_label(old_dentry, old_mnt, current->acl); ++ oldmode = obj->mode; ++ ++ if (current->acl->mode & GR_LEARN) ++ oldmode |= (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE); ++ newmode = ++ gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, ++ oldmode | GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | ++ GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS); ++ ++ if ((newmode & oldmode) == oldmode) ++ return newmode; ++ else if (current->acl->mode & GR_LEARN) { ++ gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid, ++ current, gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), oldmode); ++ return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE); ++ } else if (newmode & GR_SUPPRESS) ++ return GR_SUPPRESS; ++ else ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_search_file(const struct dentry * dentry, const __u32 mode, ++ const struct vfsmount * mnt) ++{ ++ __u32 retval = mode; ++ struct acl_subject_label *curracl; ++ struct acl_object_label *currobj; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS); ++ ++ curracl = current->acl; ++ ++ currobj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, curracl); ++ retval = currobj->mode & mode; ++ ++ if (unlikely ++ ((curracl->mode & GR_LEARN) && !(mode & GR_NOPTRACE) ++ && (retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))))) { ++ __u32 new_mode = mode; ++ ++ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS); ++ ++ retval = new_mode; ++ ++ if (!(mode & GR_NOLEARN)) ++ gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid, ++ current, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), new_mode); ++ } ++ ++ return retval; ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_check_create(const struct dentry * new_dentry, const struct dentry * parent, ++ const struct vfsmount * mnt, const __u32 mode) ++{ ++ struct name_entry *match; ++ struct acl_object_label *matchpo; ++ struct acl_subject_label *curracl; ++ char *path; ++ __u32 retval; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS); ++ ++ preempt_disable(); ++ path = gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt); ++ match = lookup_name_entry(path); ++ ++ if (!match) ++ goto check_parent; ++ ++ curracl = current->acl; ++ ++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ matchpo = lookup_acl_obj_label_create(match->inode, match->device, curracl); ++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ ++ if (matchpo) { ++ if ((matchpo->mode & mode) != ++ (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS)) ++ && curracl->mode & GR_LEARN) { ++ __u32 new_mode = mode; ++ ++ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS); ++ ++ gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid, ++ current, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt), new_mode); ++ ++ preempt_enable(); ++ return new_mode; ++ } ++ preempt_enable(); ++ return (matchpo->mode & mode); ++ } ++ ++ check_parent: ++ curracl = current->acl; ++ ++ matchpo = chk_obj_create_label(parent, mnt, curracl, path); ++ retval = matchpo->mode & mode; ++ ++ if ((retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))) ++ && (curracl->mode & GR_LEARN)) { ++ __u32 new_mode = mode; ++ ++ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS); ++ ++ gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid, ++ current, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt), new_mode); ++ preempt_enable(); ++ return new_mode; ++ } ++ ++ preempt_enable(); ++ return retval; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *task) ++{ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (!(task->acl->mode & GR_FIND) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_VIEW)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task) ++{ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if ((task->acl->mode & GR_PROTECTED) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_KILL)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__inline__ void ++gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk) ++{ ++ tsk->used_accept = 0; ++ tsk->acl_sp_role = 0; ++ tsk->acl_role_id = current->acl_role_id; ++ tsk->acl = current->acl; ++ tsk->role = current->role; ++ tsk->curr_ip = current->curr_ip; ++ if (current->exec_file) ++ get_file(current->exec_file); ++ tsk->exec_file = current->exec_file; ++ tsk->is_writable = current->is_writable; ++ if (unlikely(current->used_accept)) ++ current->curr_ip = 0; ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ void ++gr_set_proc_res(void) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label *proc; ++ unsigned short i; ++ ++ proc = current->acl; ++ ++ if (proc->mode & GR_LEARN) ++ return; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { ++ if (!(proc->resmask & (1 << i))) ++ continue; ++ ++ current->rlim[i].rlim_cur = proc->res[i].rlim_cur; ++ current->rlim[i].rlim_max = proc->res[i].rlim_max; ++ } ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ void ++do_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid) ++{ ++ task->role = lookup_acl_role_label(task, uid, gid); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs) ++{ ++ unsigned int i; ++ __u16 num; ++ uid_t *uidlist; ++ int curuid; ++ int realok = 0; ++ int effectiveok = 0; ++ int fsok = 0; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return 0; ++ ++ num = current->acl->user_trans_num; ++ uidlist = current->acl->user_transitions; ++ ++ if (uidlist == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (real == -1) ++ realok = 1; ++ if (effective == -1) ++ effectiveok = 1; ++ if (fs == -1) ++ fsok = 1; ++ ++ if (current->acl->user_trans_type & GR_ID_ALLOW) { ++ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { ++ curuid = (int)uidlist[i]; ++ if (real == curuid) ++ realok = 1; ++ if (effective == curuid) ++ effectiveok = 1; ++ if (fs == curuid) ++ fsok = 1; ++ } ++ } else if (current->acl->user_trans_type & GR_ID_DENY) { ++ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { ++ curuid = (int)uidlist[i]; ++ if (real == curuid) ++ break; ++ if (effective == curuid) ++ break; ++ if (fs == curuid) ++ break; ++ } ++ /* not in deny list */ ++ if (i == num) { ++ realok = 1; ++ effectiveok = 1; ++ fsok = 1; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (realok && effectiveok && fsok) ++ return 0; ++ else { ++ security_alert(GR_USRCHANGE_ACL_MSG, ++ realok ? (effectiveok ? (fsok ? 0 : fs) : effective) : real, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 1; ++ } ++} ++ ++int ++gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs) ++{ ++ unsigned int i; ++ __u16 num; ++ gid_t *gidlist; ++ int curgid; ++ int realok = 0; ++ int effectiveok = 0; ++ int fsok = 0; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return 0; ++ ++ num = current->acl->group_trans_num; ++ gidlist = current->acl->group_transitions; ++ ++ if (gidlist == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (real == -1) ++ realok = 1; ++ if (effective == -1) ++ effectiveok = 1; ++ if (fs == -1) ++ fsok = 1; ++ ++ if (current->acl->group_trans_type & GR_ID_ALLOW) { ++ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { ++ curgid = (int)gidlist[i]; ++ if (real == curgid) ++ realok = 1; ++ if (effective == curgid) ++ effectiveok = 1; ++ if (fs == curgid) ++ fsok = 1; ++ } ++ } else if (current->acl->group_trans_type & GR_ID_DENY) { ++ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { ++ curgid = (int)gidlist[i]; ++ if (real == curgid) ++ break; ++ if (effective == curgid) ++ break; ++ if (fs == curgid) ++ break; ++ } ++ /* not in deny list */ ++ if (i == num) { ++ realok = 1; ++ effectiveok = 1; ++ fsok = 1; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (realok && effectiveok && fsok) ++ return 0; ++ else { ++ security_alert(GR_GRPCHANGE_ACL_MSG, ++ realok ? (effectiveok ? (fsok ? 0 : fs) : effective) : real, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 1; ++ } ++} ++ ++void ++gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, const uid_t gid) ++{ ++ struct acl_object_label *obj; ++ struct file *filp; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return; ++ ++ filp = task->exec_file; ++ ++ /* kernel process, we'll give them the kernel role */ ++ if (unlikely(!filp)) { ++ task->role = kernel_role; ++ task->acl = kernel_role->root_label; ++ return; ++ } else if (!task->role || !(task->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL)) ++ do_set_role_label(task, uid, gid); ++ ++ task->acl = ++ chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role); ++ ++ task->is_writable = 0; ++ ++ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable ++ by the default ACL */ ++ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label); ++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) ++ task->is_writable = 1; ++ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label); ++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) ++ task->is_writable = 1; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "Set role label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename); ++#endif ++ ++ gr_set_proc_res(); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label *newacl; ++ struct acl_object_label *obj; ++ __u32 retmode; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return; ++ ++ newacl = chk_subj_label(dentry, mnt, current->role); ++ ++ obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, current->acl); ++ retmode = obj->mode & (GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT); ++ ++ if ((newacl->mode & GR_LEARN) || !(retmode & GR_INHERIT)) { ++ if (obj->nested) ++ current->acl = obj->nested; ++ else ++ current->acl = newacl; ++ } else if (retmode & GR_INHERIT && retmode & GR_AUDIT_INHERIT) ++ security_audit(GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG, current->acl->filename, ++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ ++ current->is_writable = 0; ++ ++ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable ++ by the default ACL */ ++ obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, default_role->root_label); ++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) ++ current->is_writable = 1; ++ obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, current->role->root_label); ++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) ++ current->is_writable = 1; ++ ++ gr_set_proc_res(); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "Set subject label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", current->comm, current->pid, current->role->rolename, current->acl->filename); ++#endif ++ return; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ void ++do_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev) ++{ ++ struct acl_object_label *matchpo; ++ struct acl_subject_label *matchps; ++ struct acl_subject_label *i; ++ struct acl_role_label *role; ++ ++ for (role = role_list_head; role; role = role->next) { ++ for (i = role->hash->first; i; i = i->next) { ++ if (unlikely((i->mode & GR_NESTED) && ++ (i->inode == ino) && ++ (i->device == dev))) ++ i->mode |= GR_DELETED; ++ if (unlikely((matchpo = ++ lookup_acl_obj_label(ino, dev, i)) != NULL)) ++ matchpo->mode |= GR_DELETED; ++ } ++ ++ if (unlikely((matchps = lookup_acl_subj_label(ino, dev, role)) != NULL)) ++ matchps->mode |= GR_DELETED; ++ } ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev) ++{ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return; ++ ++ write_lock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ if (unlikely((unsigned long)lookup_inodev_entry(ino, dev))) ++ do_handle_delete(ino, dev); ++ write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ void ++update_acl_obj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice, ++ const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice, ++ struct acl_subject_label *subj) ++{ ++ unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj->obj_hash_size); ++ struct acl_object_label **match; ++ struct acl_object_label *tmp; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ ++ match = &subj->obj_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (*match && ((*match)->inode != oldinode || ++ (*match)->device != olddevice || ++ !((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED))) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj->obj_hash_size; ++ match = &subj->obj_hash[index]; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ } ++ ++ if (*match && ((*match) != deleted_object) ++ && ((*match)->inode == oldinode) ++ && ((*match)->device == olddevice) ++ && ((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED)) { ++ tmp = *match; ++ tmp->inode = newinode; ++ tmp->device = newdevice; ++ tmp->mode &= ~GR_DELETED; ++ ++ *match = deleted_object; ++ ++ insert_acl_obj_label(tmp, subj); ++ } ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ void ++update_acl_subj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice, ++ const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice, ++ struct acl_role_label *role) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash; ++ unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size; ++ unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj_size); ++ struct acl_subject_label **match; ++ struct acl_subject_label *tmp; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ ++ match = &s_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (*match && ((*match)->inode != oldinode || ++ (*match)->device != olddevice || ++ !((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED))) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ match = &s_hash[index]; ++ } ++ ++ if (*match && (*match != deleted_subject) ++ && ((*match)->inode == oldinode) ++ && ((*match)->device == olddevice) ++ && ((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED)) { ++ tmp = *match; ++ ++ tmp->inode = newinode; ++ tmp->device = newdevice; ++ tmp->mode &= ~GR_DELETED; ++ ++ *match = deleted_subject; ++ ++ insert_acl_subj_label(tmp, role); ++ } ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ void ++update_inodev_entry(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice, ++ const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice) ++{ ++ unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, inodev_set.n_size); ++ struct name_entry **match; ++ struct name_entry *tmp; ++ __u8 i = 0; ++ ++ match = &inodev_set.n_hash[index]; ++ ++ while (*match ++ && ((*match)->inode != oldinode ++ || (*match)->device != olddevice)) { ++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size; ++ i = (i + 1) % 32; ++ match = &inodev_set.n_hash[index]; ++ } ++ ++ if (*match && (*match != deleted_inodev) ++ && ((*match)->inode == oldinode) ++ && ((*match)->device == olddevice)) { ++ tmp = *match; ++ ++ tmp->inode = newinode; ++ tmp->device = newdevice; ++ ++ *match = deleted_inodev; ++ ++ insert_inodev_entry(tmp); ++ } ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ void ++do_handle_create(const struct name_entry *matchn, const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label *i; ++ struct acl_role_label *role; ++ ++ for (role = role_list_head; role; role = role->next) { ++ update_acl_subj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device, ++ dentry->d_inode->i_ino, ++ dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role); ++ ++ for (i = role->hash->first; i; i = i->next) { ++ if (unlikely((i->mode & GR_NESTED) && ++ (i->inode == dentry->d_inode->i_ino) && ++ (i->device == dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev))) { ++ i->inode = dentry->d_inode->i_ino; ++ i->device = dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev; ++ } ++ update_acl_obj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device, ++ dentry->d_inode->i_ino, ++ dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, i); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ update_inodev_entry(matchn->inode, matchn->device, ++ dentry->d_inode->i_ino, dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ struct name_entry *matchn; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return; ++ ++ preempt_disable(); ++ matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt)); ++ preempt_enable(); ++ ++ if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn)) { ++ write_lock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ do_handle_create(matchn, dentry, mnt); ++ write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ } ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir, ++ struct dentry *old_dentry, ++ struct dentry *new_dentry, ++ struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace) ++{ ++ struct name_entry *matchn; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return; ++ ++ preempt_disable(); ++ matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt)); ++ preempt_enable(); ++ ++ /* we wouldn't have to check d_inode if it weren't for ++ NFS silly-renaming ++ */ ++ ++ write_lock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ if (unlikely(replace && new_dentry->d_inode)) { ++ if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, ++ new_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) && ++ (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1))) ++ do_handle_delete(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, ++ new_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev); ++ } ++ ++ if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, ++ old_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) && ++ (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1))) ++ do_handle_delete(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, ++ old_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev); ++ ++ if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn)) ++ do_handle_create(matchn, old_dentry, mnt); ++ write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static int ++lookup_special_role_auth(const char *rolename, unsigned char **salt, ++ unsigned char **sum) ++{ ++ struct acl_role_label *r; ++ struct role_transition *trans; ++ __u16 i; ++ int found = 0; ++ ++ /* check transition table */ ++ ++ for (trans = current->role->transitions; trans; trans = trans->next) { ++ if (!strcmp(rolename, trans->rolename)) { ++ found = 1; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (!found) ++ return 0; ++ ++ /* handle special roles that do not require authentication */ ++ ++ for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) { ++ if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename) ++ && (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_NOPW)) { ++ *salt = NULL; ++ *sum = NULL; ++ return 1; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) { ++ if (!strcmp(rolename, acl_special_roles[i]->rolename)) { ++ *salt = acl_special_roles[i]->salt; ++ *sum = acl_special_roles[i]->sum; ++ return 1; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static void ++assign_special_role(char *rolename) ++{ ++ struct acl_object_label *obj; ++ struct acl_role_label *r; ++ struct acl_role_label *assigned = NULL; ++ struct task_struct *tsk; ++ struct file *filp; ++ ++ for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) ++ if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename) && ++ (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL)) ++ assigned = r; ++ ++ if (!assigned) ++ return; ++ ++ tsk = current->parent; ++ filp = tsk->exec_file; ++ ++ if (tsk && filp) { ++ tsk->is_writable = 0; ++ ++ acl_sp_role_value = (acl_sp_role_value % 65535) + 1; ++ tsk->acl_sp_role = 1; ++ tsk->acl_role_id = acl_sp_role_value; ++ tsk->role = assigned; ++ tsk->acl = ++ chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role); ++ ++ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable ++ by the default ACL */ ++ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label); ++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) ++ tsk->is_writable = 1; ++ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role->root_label); ++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) ++ tsk->is_writable = 1; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "Assigning special role:%s subject:%s to process (%s:%d)\n", tsk->role->rolename, tsk->acl->filename, tsk->comm, tsk->pid); ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++ssize_t ++write_grsec_handler(struct file *file, const char * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) ++{ ++ struct gr_arg *arg; ++ unsigned char *sprole_salt; ++ unsigned char *sprole_sum; ++ int error = sizeof (struct gr_arg); ++ int error2 = 0; ++ ++ down(&gr_dev_sem); ++ ++ arg = (struct gr_arg *) buf; ++ ++ if (count != sizeof (struct gr_arg)) { ++ security_alert_good(GR_DEV_ACL_MSG, count, ++ (int) sizeof (struct gr_arg)); ++ error = -EINVAL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ((gr_auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) ++ && time_before_eq(gr_auth_expires, get_seconds())) { ++ gr_auth_expires = 0; ++ gr_auth_attempts = 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (copy_from_user(gr_usermode, arg, sizeof (struct gr_arg))) { ++ error = -EFAULT; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if (gr_usermode->mode != SPROLE && time_after(gr_auth_expires, get_seconds())) { ++ error = -EBUSY; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ /* if non-root trying to do anything other than use a special role, ++ do not attempt authentication, do not count towards authentication ++ locking ++ */ ++ ++ if (gr_usermode->mode != SPROLE && current->uid) { ++ error = -EPERM; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ /* ensure pw and special role name are null terminated */ ++ ++ gr_usermode->pw[GR_PW_LEN - 1] = '\0'; ++ gr_usermode->sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN - 1] = '\0'; ++ ++ /* Okay. ++ * We have our enough of the argument structure..(we have yet ++ * to copy_from_user the tables themselves) . Copy the tables ++ * only if we need them, i.e. for loading operations. */ ++ ++ switch (gr_usermode->mode) { ++ case STATUS: ++ if (gr_status & GR_READY) ++ error = 1; ++ else ++ error = 2; ++ goto out; ++ case SHUTDOWN: ++ if ((gr_status & GR_READY) ++ && !(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) { ++ gr_status &= ~GR_READY; ++ security_alert_good(GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ free_variables(); ++ memset(gr_usermode, 0, sizeof (struct gr_arg)); ++ memset(gr_system_salt, 0, GR_SALT_LEN); ++ memset(gr_system_sum, 0, GR_SHA_LEN); ++ } else if (gr_status & GR_READY) { ++ security_alert(GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ error = -EPERM; ++ } else { ++ security_alert_good(GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ error = -EAGAIN; ++ } ++ break; ++ case ENABLE: ++ if (!(gr_status & GR_READY) && !(error2 = gracl_init(gr_usermode))) ++ security_alert_good(GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION); ++ else { ++ if (gr_status & GR_READY) ++ error = -EAGAIN; ++ else ++ error = error2; ++ security_alert(GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ } ++ break; ++ case RELOAD: ++ if (!(gr_status & GR_READY)) { ++ security_alert_good(GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG); ++ error = -EAGAIN; ++ } else if (!(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) { ++ lock_kernel(); ++ gr_status &= ~GR_READY; ++ free_variables(); ++ if (!(error2 = gracl_init(gr_usermode))) { ++ unlock_kernel(); ++ security_alert_good(GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG, ++ GR_VERSION); ++ } else { ++ unlock_kernel(); ++ error = error2; ++ security_alert(GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ } ++ } else { ++ security_alert(GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ error = -EPERM; ++ } ++ break; ++ case SEGVMOD: ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) { ++ security_alert_good(GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ error = -EAGAIN; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ if (!(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) { ++ security_alert_good(GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ if (gr_usermode->segv_device && gr_usermode->segv_inode) { ++ struct acl_subject_label *segvacl; ++ segvacl = ++ lookup_acl_subj_label(gr_usermode->segv_inode, ++ gr_usermode->segv_device, ++ current->role); ++ if (segvacl) { ++ segvacl->crashes = 0; ++ segvacl->expires = 0; ++ } ++ } else if (gr_find_uid(gr_usermode->segv_uid) >= 0) { ++ gr_remove_uid(gr_usermode->segv_uid); ++ } ++ } else { ++ security_alert(GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ error = -EPERM; ++ } ++ break; ++ case SPROLE: ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) { ++ security_alert_good(GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ error = -EAGAIN; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ if ((current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) ++ && time_before_eq(current->role->expires, get_seconds())) { ++ current->role->expires = 0; ++ current->role->auth_attempts = 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (time_after(current->role->expires, get_seconds())) { ++ error = -EBUSY; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if (lookup_special_role_auth ++ (gr_usermode->sp_role, &sprole_salt, &sprole_sum) ++ && ((!sprole_salt && !sprole_sum) ++ || !(chkpw(gr_usermode, sprole_salt, sprole_sum)))) { ++ assign_special_role(gr_usermode->sp_role); ++ security_alert_good(GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG, ++ (current->parent) ? current-> ++ parent->role->rolename : "", ++ acl_sp_role_value, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ } else { ++ security_alert(GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG, gr_usermode->sp_role, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ error = -EPERM; ++ current->role->auth_attempts++; ++ if (current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) { ++ current->role->expires = ++ get_seconds() + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT; ++ security_alert(GR_MAXROLEPW_ACL_MSG, ++ CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES, ++ gr_usermode->sp_role, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ } ++ ++ goto out; ++ } ++ break; ++ case UNSPROLE: ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) { ++ security_alert_good(GR_UNSPROLEI_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ error = -EAGAIN; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ if ((current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) ++ && time_before_eq(current->role->expires, get_seconds())) { ++ current->role->expires = 0; ++ current->role->auth_attempts = 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (time_after(current->role->expires, get_seconds())) { ++ error = -EBUSY; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ((current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL) && ++ lookup_special_role_auth ++ (current->role->rolename, &sprole_salt, &sprole_sum) ++ && ((!sprole_salt && !sprole_sum) ++ || !(chkpw(gr_usermode, sprole_salt, sprole_sum)))) { ++ security_alert_good(GR_UNSPROLES_ACL_MSG, ++ (current->parent) ? current-> ++ parent->role->rolename : "", ++ (current->parent) ? current-> ++ parent->acl_role_id : 0, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ gr_set_acls(1); ++ if (current->parent) ++ current->parent->acl_sp_role = 0; ++ } else { ++ security_alert(GR_UNSPROLEF_ACL_MSG, current->role->rolename, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ error = -EPERM; ++ current->role->auth_attempts++; ++ if (current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) { ++ current->role->expires = ++ get_seconds() + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT; ++ security_alert(GR_MAXROLEPW_ACL_MSG, ++ CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES, ++ current->role->rolename, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ } ++ ++ goto out; ++ } ++ break; ++ default: ++ security_alert(GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG, gr_usermode->mode, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ error = -EINVAL; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ if (error != -EPERM) ++ goto out; ++ ++ gr_auth_attempts++; ++ ++ if (gr_auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) { ++ security_alert(GR_MAXPW_ACL_MSG, CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES); ++ gr_auth_expires = get_seconds() + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT; ++ } ++ ++ out: ++ up(&gr_dev_sem); ++ return error; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_set_acls(const int type) ++{ ++ struct acl_object_label *obj; ++ struct task_struct *task, *task2; ++ struct file *filp; ++ unsigned short i; ++ ++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); ++ for_each_process(task2) { ++ task = task2; ++ do { ++ /* check to see if we're called from the exit handler, ++ if so, only replace ACLs that have inherited the admin ++ ACL */ ++ ++ if (type && (task->role != current->role || ++ task->acl_role_id != current->acl_role_id)) ++ continue; ++ ++ task->acl_role_id = 0; ++ ++ if ((filp = task->exec_file)) { ++ do_set_role_label(task, task->uid, task->gid); ++ ++ task->acl = ++ chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, ++ task->role); ++ if (task->acl) { ++ struct acl_subject_label *curr; ++ curr = task->acl; ++ ++ task->is_writable = 0; ++ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable ++ by the default ACL */ ++ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label); ++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) ++ task->is_writable = 1; ++ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label); ++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) ++ task->is_writable = 1; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "gr_set_acls for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename); ++#endif ++ if (!(curr->mode & GR_LEARN)) ++ for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { ++ if (!(curr->resmask & (1 << i))) ++ continue; ++ ++ task->rlim[i].rlim_cur = ++ curr->res[i].rlim_cur; ++ task->rlim[i].rlim_max = ++ curr->res[i].rlim_max; ++ } ++ } else { ++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); ++ security_alert_good(GR_DEFACL_MSG, task->comm, ++ task->pid); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ } else { ++ // it's a kernel process ++ task->role = kernel_role; ++ task->acl = kernel_role->root_label; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN ++ task->acl->mode &= ~GR_FIND; ++#endif ++ } ++ } while ((task = next_thread(task)) != task2); ++ } ++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_learn_resource); ++ ++void ++gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task, ++ const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label *acl; ++ ++ if (unlikely((gr_status & GR_READY) && ++ task->acl && (task->acl->mode & GR_LEARN))) ++ goto skip_reslog; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG ++ gr_log_resource(task, res, wanted, gt); ++#endif ++ skip_reslog: ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !wanted)) ++ return; ++ ++ acl = task->acl; ++ ++ if (likely(!acl || !(acl->mode & GR_LEARN) || ++ !(acl->resmask & (1 << (unsigned short) res)))) ++ return; ++ ++ if (wanted >= acl->res[res].rlim_cur) { ++ unsigned long res_add; ++ ++ res_add = wanted; ++ switch (res) { ++ case RLIMIT_CPU: ++ res_add += GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP; ++ break; ++ case RLIMIT_FSIZE: ++ res_add += GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP; ++ break; ++ case RLIMIT_DATA: ++ res_add += GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP; ++ break; ++ case RLIMIT_STACK: ++ res_add += GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP; ++ break; ++ case RLIMIT_CORE: ++ res_add += GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP; ++ break; ++ case RLIMIT_RSS: ++ res_add += GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP; ++ break; ++ case RLIMIT_NPROC: ++ res_add += GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP; ++ break; ++ case RLIMIT_NOFILE: ++ res_add += GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP; ++ break; ++ case RLIMIT_MEMLOCK: ++ res_add += GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP; ++ break; ++ case RLIMIT_AS: ++ res_add += GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP; ++ break; ++ case RLIMIT_LOCKS: ++ res_add += GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ acl->res[res].rlim_cur = res_add; ++ ++ if (wanted > acl->res[res].rlim_max) ++ acl->res[res].rlim_max = res_add; ++ ++ security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, current->role->rolename, ++ current->role->roletype, acl->filename, ++ acl->res[res].rlim_cur, acl->res[res].rlim_max, ++ "", (unsigned long) res); ++ } ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS ++void ++pax_set_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm) ++{ ++ struct task_struct *task = current; ++ struct acl_subject_label *proc; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return; ++ ++ proc = task->acl; ++ ++ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXPAGE) ++ task->flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; ++ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXSEGM) ++ task->flags &= ~PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC; ++ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXGCC) ++ task->flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP; ++ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXMPROTECT) ++ task->flags &= ~PF_PAX_MPROTECT; ++ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXRANDMMAP) ++ task->flags &= ~PF_PAX_RANDMMAP; ++ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXRANDEXEC) ++ task->flags |= PF_PAX_RANDEXEC; ++ ++ return; ++} ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL ++extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_sys_root; ++ ++ ++/* the following function is called under the BKL */ ++ ++__u32 ++gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table *table, const void *oldval, ++ const void *newval) ++{ ++ struct proc_dir_entry *tmp; ++ struct nameidata nd; ++ const char *proc_sys = "/proc/sys"; ++ char *path; ++ struct acl_object_label *obj; ++ unsigned short len = 0, pos = 0, depth = 0, i; ++ __u32 err = 0; ++ __u32 mode = 0; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return 1; ++ ++ path = per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id()); ++ ++ if (oldval) ++ mode |= GR_READ; ++ if (newval) ++ mode |= GR_WRITE; ++ ++ /* convert the requested sysctl entry into a pathname */ ++ ++ for (tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root; tmp = tmp->parent) { ++ len += strlen(tmp->name); ++ len++; ++ depth++; ++ } ++ ++ if ((len + depth + strlen(proc_sys) + 1) > PAGE_SIZE) ++ return 0; /* deny */ ++ ++ memset(path, 0, PAGE_SIZE); ++ ++ memcpy(path, proc_sys, strlen(proc_sys)); ++ ++ pos += strlen(proc_sys); ++ ++ for (; depth > 0; depth--) { ++ path[pos] = '/'; ++ pos++; ++ for (i = 1, tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root; ++ tmp = tmp->parent) { ++ if (depth == i) { ++ memcpy(path + pos, tmp->name, ++ strlen(tmp->name)); ++ pos += strlen(tmp->name); ++ } ++ i++; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ err = path_lookup(path, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd); ++ ++ if (err) ++ goto out; ++ ++ obj = chk_obj_label(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, current->acl); ++ err = obj->mode & (mode | to_gr_audit(mode) | GR_SUPPRESS); ++ ++ if (unlikely((current->acl->mode & GR_LEARN) && ((err & mode) != mode))) { ++ __u32 new_mode = mode; ++ ++ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS); ++ ++ err = new_mode; ++ gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid, ++ current, path, new_mode); ++ } else if ((err & mode) != mode && !(err & GR_SUPPRESS)) { ++ security_alert(GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "denied", path, ++ (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "", ++ (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "", ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ err = 0; ++ } else if ((err & mode) != mode) { ++ err = 0; ++ } else if (((err & mode) == mode) && (err & GR_AUDITS)) { ++ security_audit(GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "successful", ++ path, (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "", ++ (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "", ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ } ++ ++ path_release(&nd); ++ ++ out: ++ return err; ++} ++#endif ++ ++int ++gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task) ++{ ++ struct file *filp; ++ struct task_struct *tmp = task; ++ struct task_struct *curtemp = current; ++ __u32 retmode; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return 0; ++ ++ filp = task->exec_file; ++ ++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); ++ while (tmp->pid > 0) { ++ if (tmp == curtemp) ++ break; ++ tmp = tmp->parent; ++ } ++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); ++ ++ if (tmp->pid == 0 && !(current->acl->mode & GR_RELAXPTRACE)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ retmode = gr_search_file(filp->f_dentry, GR_NOPTRACE, filp->f_vfsmnt); ++ ++ if (retmode & GR_NOPTRACE) ++ return 1; ++ ++ if (!(current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) && !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) ++ && (current->acl != task->acl || (current->acl != current->role->root_label ++ && current->pid != task->pid))) ++ return 1; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request) ++{ ++ struct file *filp; ++ struct task_struct *tmp = task; ++ struct task_struct *curtemp = current; ++ __u32 retmode; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return 0; ++ ++ filp = task->exec_file; ++ ++ if (task->acl->mode & GR_NOPTRACE) { ++ security_alert(GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, filp ? ++ gr_to_filename(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt) ++ : "(none)", task->comm, task->pid, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); ++ while (tmp->pid > 0) { ++ if (tmp == curtemp) ++ break; ++ tmp = tmp->parent; ++ } ++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); ++ ++ if (tmp->pid == 0 && !(current->acl->mode & GR_RELAXPTRACE)) { ++ security_alert(GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, filp ? ++ gr_to_filename(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt) ++ : "(none)", task->comm, task->pid, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ if (unlikely(!filp)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ retmode = gr_search_file(filp->f_dentry, GR_PTRACERD | GR_NOPTRACE, filp->f_vfsmnt); ++ ++ if (retmode & GR_NOPTRACE) { ++ security_alert(GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, gr_to_filename(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt), ++ task->comm, task->pid, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ if (retmode & GR_PTRACERD) { ++ switch (request) { ++ case PTRACE_POKETEXT: ++ case PTRACE_POKEDATA: ++ case PTRACE_POKEUSR: ++#if !defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && !defined(CONFIG_PARISC) && !defined(CONFIG_ALPHA) ++ case PTRACE_SETREGS: ++ case PTRACE_SETFPREGS: ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_X86 ++ case PTRACE_SETFPXREGS: ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC ++ case PTRACE_SETVRREGS: ++#endif ++ return 1; ++ default: ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } else if (!(current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) && ++ !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) ++ && (current->acl != task->acl ++ || (current->acl != current->role->root_label ++ && current->pid != task->pid))) { ++ security_alert(GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, ++ gr_to_filename(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt), ++ task->comm, task->pid, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_ptrace_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ __u32 retmode; ++ struct acl_subject_label *subj; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (unlikely ++ ((current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) ++ && !(current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE))) ++ retmode = gr_search_file(dentry, GR_PTRACERD, mnt); ++ else ++ return 0; ++ ++ subj = chk_subj_label(dentry, mnt, current->role); ++ ++ if (!(retmode & GR_PTRACERD) && ++ !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) && ++ (current->acl != subj)) { ++ security_alert(GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG, ++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_mmap(const struct file *filp, const unsigned long prot) ++{ ++ struct acl_object_label *obj, *obj2; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || ++ (current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) || !filp || ++ !(prot & PROT_EXEC))) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (unlikely(current->is_writable)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label); ++ obj2 = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, ++ current->role->root_label); ++ if (unlikely((obj->mode & GR_WRITE) || (obj2->mode & GR_WRITE))) { ++ security_alert(GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG, ++ gr_to_filename(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot) ++{ ++ __u32 mode; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC))) ++ return 1; ++ ++ mode = ++ gr_search_file(file->f_dentry, ++ GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS, ++ file->f_vfsmnt); ++ ++ if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || (!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))) { ++ security_alert(GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, "denied", ++ gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 0; ++ } else if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || !(mode & GR_EXEC))) { ++ return 0; ++ } else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) { ++ security_audit(GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, "successful", ++ gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot) ++{ ++ __u32 mode; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC))) ++ return 1; ++ ++ mode = ++ gr_search_file(file->f_dentry, ++ GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS, ++ file->f_vfsmnt); ++ ++ if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || (!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))) { ++ security_alert(GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, "denied", ++ gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 0; ++ } else if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || !(mode & GR_EXEC))) { ++ return 0; ++ } else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) { ++ security_audit(GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, "successful", ++ gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code) ++{ ++ u64 runtime64; ++ unsigned long runtime; ++ unsigned long cputime; ++ unsigned int wday, cday; ++ __u8 whr, chr; ++ __u8 wmin, cmin; ++ __u8 wsec, csec; ++ char cur_tty[64] = { 0 }; ++ char parent_tty[64] = { 0 }; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task->acl || ++ !(task->acl->mode & GR_PROCACCT))) ++ return; ++ ++ runtime64 = get_jiffies_64() - task->start_time; ++ do_div(runtime64, HZ); ++ runtime = (unsigned long)runtime64; ++ wday = runtime / (3600 * 24); ++ runtime -= wday * (3600 * 24); ++ whr = runtime / 3600; ++ runtime -= whr * 3600; ++ wmin = runtime / 60; ++ runtime -= wmin * 60; ++ wsec = runtime; ++ ++ cputime = (task->utime + task->stime) / HZ; ++ cday = cputime / (3600 * 24); ++ cputime -= cday * (3600 * 24); ++ chr = cputime / 3600; ++ cputime -= chr * 3600; ++ cmin = cputime / 60; ++ cputime -= cmin * 60; ++ csec = cputime; ++ ++ security_audit(GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, ++ task->pid, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip), tty_name(task->tty, ++ cur_tty), ++ task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, wday, whr, ++ wmin, wsec, cday, chr, cmin, csec, ++ (task->flags & PF_SIGNALED) ? "killed by signal" : "exited", ++ code, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), ++ task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, ++ NIPQUAD(task->parent->curr_ip), ++ tty_name(task->parent->tty, parent_tty), ++ task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, ++ task->parent->egid); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_set_kernel_label); ++ ++void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task) ++{ ++ if (gr_status & GR_READY) { ++ task->role = kernel_role; ++ task->acl = kernel_role->root_label; ++ } ++ return; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ ++/* stack-based acl allocation tracking (c) Brad Spengler 2002,2003 */ ++ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/mm.h> ++#include <linux/slab.h> ++#include <linux/vmalloc.h> ++#include <linux/gracl.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++ ++static unsigned long alloc_stack_next = 1; ++static unsigned long alloc_stack_size = 1; ++static void **alloc_stack; ++ ++static __inline__ int ++alloc_pop(void) ++{ ++ if (alloc_stack_next == 1) ++ return 0; ++ ++ kfree(alloc_stack[alloc_stack_next - 2]); ++ ++ alloc_stack_next--; ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ void ++alloc_push(void *buf) ++{ ++ if (alloc_stack_next >= alloc_stack_size) ++ BUG(); ++ ++ alloc_stack[alloc_stack_next - 1] = buf; ++ ++ alloc_stack_next++; ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++void * ++acl_alloc(unsigned long len) ++{ ++ void *ret; ++ ++ if (len > PAGE_SIZE) ++ BUG(); ++ ++ ret = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); ++ ++ if (ret) ++ alloc_push(ret); ++ ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++void ++acl_free_all(void) ++{ ++ if (gr_acl_is_enabled() || !alloc_stack) ++ return; ++ ++ while (alloc_pop()) ; ++ ++ if (alloc_stack) { ++ if ((alloc_stack_size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE) ++ kfree(alloc_stack); ++ else ++ vfree(alloc_stack); ++ } ++ ++ alloc_stack = NULL; ++ alloc_stack_size = 1; ++ alloc_stack_next = 1; ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++int ++acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size) ++{ ++ if ((size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE) ++ alloc_stack = ++ (void **) kmalloc(size * sizeof (void *), GFP_KERNEL); ++ else ++ alloc_stack = (void **) vmalloc(size * sizeof (void *)); ++ ++ alloc_stack_size = size; ++ ++ if (!alloc_stack) ++ return 0; ++ else ++ return 1; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ ++/* capability handling routines, (c) Brad Spengler 2002,2003 */ ++ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/capability.h> ++#include <linux/gracl.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++static const char *captab_log[29] = { ++ "CAP_CHOWN", ++ "CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE", ++ "CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH", ++ "CAP_FOWNER", ++ "CAP_FSETID", ++ "CAP_KILL", ++ "CAP_SETGID", ++ "CAP_SETUID", ++ "CAP_SETPCAP", ++ "CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE", ++ "CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE", ++ "CAP_NET_BROADCAST", ++ "CAP_NET_ADMIN", ++ "CAP_NET_RAW", ++ "CAP_IPC_LOCK", ++ "CAP_IPC_OWNER", ++ "CAP_SYS_MODULE", ++ "CAP_SYS_RAWIO", ++ "CAP_SYS_CHROOT", ++ "CAP_SYS_PTRACE", ++ "CAP_SYS_PACCT", ++ "CAP_SYS_ADMIN", ++ "CAP_SYS_BOOT", ++ "CAP_SYS_NICE", ++ "CAP_SYS_RESOURCE", ++ "CAP_SYS_TIME", ++ "CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG", ++ "CAP_MKNOD", ++ "CAP_LEASE" ++}; ++ ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_task_is_capable); ++ ++int ++gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label *curracl; ++ __u32 cap_drop = 0, cap_mask = 0; ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled()) ++ return 1; ++ ++ curracl = task->acl; ++ ++ cap_drop = curracl->cap_lower; ++ cap_mask = curracl->cap_mask; ++ ++ while ((curracl = curracl->parent_subject)) { ++ cap_drop |= curracl->cap_lower & (cap_mask & ~curracl->cap_mask); ++ cap_mask |= curracl->cap_mask; ++ } ++ ++ if (!cap_raised(cap_drop, cap)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ curracl = task->acl; ++ ++ if ((curracl->mode & GR_LEARN) ++ && cap_raised(task->cap_effective, cap)) { ++ security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, task->role->rolename, ++ task->role->roletype, task->uid, ++ task->gid, task->exec_file ? ++ gr_to_filename(task->exec_file->f_dentry, ++ task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : curracl->filename, ++ curracl->filename, 0UL, ++ 0UL, "", (unsigned long) cap, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip)); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ if ((cap >= 0) && (cap < 29) && cap_raised(task->cap_effective, cap)) ++ security_alert(GR_CAP_ACL_MSG, captab_log[cap], ++ gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, ++ task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), ++ task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, ++ task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label *curracl; ++ __u32 cap_drop = 0, cap_mask = 0; ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled()) ++ return 1; ++ ++ curracl = current->acl; ++ ++ cap_drop = curracl->cap_lower; ++ cap_mask = curracl->cap_mask; ++ ++ while ((curracl = curracl->parent_subject)) { ++ cap_drop |= curracl->cap_lower & (cap_mask & ~curracl->cap_mask); ++ cap_mask |= curracl->cap_mask; ++ } ++ ++ if (!cap_raised(cap_drop, cap)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,460 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/types.h> ++#include <linux/fs.h> ++#include <linux/file.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++#include <linux/gracl.h> ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * mnt) ++{ ++ __u32 mode; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode)) ++ return GR_FIND; ++ ++ mode = ++ gr_search_file(dentry, GR_FIND | GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt); ++ ++ if (unlikely(mode & GR_FIND && mode & GR_AUDIT_FIND)) { ++ security_audit(GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, "successful", ++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return mode; ++ } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { ++ security_alert(GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, "denied", ++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 0; ++ } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND))) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return GR_FIND; ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt, ++ const int fmode) ++{ ++ __u32 reqmode = GR_FIND; ++ __u32 mode; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode)) ++ return reqmode; ++ ++ if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND)) ++ reqmode |= GR_APPEND; ++ else if (unlikely(fmode & FMODE_WRITE)) ++ reqmode |= GR_WRITE; ++ if (likely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY))) ++ reqmode |= GR_READ; ++ ++ mode = ++ gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS, ++ mnt); ++ ++ if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { ++ security_audit(GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, "successful", ++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), ++ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", ++ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : ++ reqmode & GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "", ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return reqmode; ++ } else ++ if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) ++ { ++ security_alert(GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, "denied", ++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), ++ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", ++ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode & ++ GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "", DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 0; ++ } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return reqmode; ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry, ++ const struct dentry * p_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode, ++ const int imode) ++{ ++ __u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE; ++ __u32 mode; ++ ++ if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND)) ++ reqmode |= GR_APPEND; ++ if (unlikely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY))) ++ reqmode |= GR_READ; ++ if (unlikely((fmode & O_CREAT) && (imode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) ++ reqmode |= GR_SETID; ++ ++ mode = ++ gr_check_create(dentry, p_dentry, p_mnt, ++ reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS); ++ ++ if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { ++ security_audit(GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, "successful", ++ gr_to_filename(dentry, p_mnt), ++ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", ++ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : ++ reqmode & GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "", ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return reqmode; ++ } else ++ if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) ++ { ++ security_alert(GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, "denied", ++ gr_to_filename(dentry, p_mnt), ++ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", ++ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode & ++ GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "", DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 0; ++ } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return reqmode; ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt, ++ const int fmode) ++{ ++ __u32 mode, reqmode = GR_FIND; ++ ++ if ((fmode & S_IXOTH) && !S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) ++ reqmode |= GR_EXEC; ++ if (fmode & S_IWOTH) ++ reqmode |= GR_WRITE; ++ if (fmode & S_IROTH) ++ reqmode |= GR_READ; ++ ++ mode = ++ gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS, ++ mnt); ++ ++ if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { ++ security_audit(GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, "successful", ++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), ++ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", ++ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "", ++ reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "", ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return reqmode; ++ } else ++ if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) ++ { ++ security_alert(GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, "denied", ++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), ++ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", ++ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "", ++ reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "", ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 0; ++ } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return reqmode; ++} ++ ++#define generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, reqmode, fmt) \ ++{ \ ++ __u32 mode; \ ++ \ ++ mode = gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt); \ ++ \ ++ if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { \ ++ security_audit(fmt, "successful", \ ++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); \ ++ return mode; \ ++ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { \ ++ security_alert(fmt, "denied", gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), \ ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); \ ++ return 0; \ ++ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode))) \ ++ return 0; \ ++ \ ++ return (reqmode); \ ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) ++{ ++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG); ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG); ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG); ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG); ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, ++ mode_t mode) ++{ ++ if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) { ++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID, ++ GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG); ++ } else { ++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG); ++ } ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, ++ mode_t mode) ++{ ++ if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) { ++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID, ++ GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG); ++ } else { ++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG); ++ } ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG); ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_EXEC, GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG); ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_READ | GR_WRITE, ++ GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG); ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, ++ const ino_t ino) ++{ ++ if (likely((unsigned long)(dentry->d_inode))) { ++ struct dentry d = *dentry; ++ struct inode inode = *(dentry->d_inode); ++ ++ inode.i_ino = ino; ++ d.d_inode = &inode; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!gr_search_file(&d, GR_FIND | GR_NOLEARN, mnt))) ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, ++ const struct dentry * old_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to) ++{ ++ __u32 needmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE; ++ __u32 mode; ++ ++ mode = ++ gr_check_link(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, old_dentry, ++ old_mnt); ++ ++ if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) == needmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { ++ security_audit(GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, "successful", ++ gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), to, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return mode; ++ } else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { ++ security_alert(GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, "denied", ++ gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), to, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 0; ++ } else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE); ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from) ++{ ++ __u32 needmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE; ++ __u32 mode; ++ ++ mode = ++ gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, ++ GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | ++ GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS); ++ ++ if (unlikely(mode & GR_WRITE && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { ++ security_audit(GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, "successful", ++ from, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return mode; ++ } else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { ++ security_alert(GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, "denied", ++ from, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 0; ++ } else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE); ++} ++ ++#define generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, reqmode, fmt) \ ++{ \ ++ __u32 mode; \ ++ \ ++ mode = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS); \ ++ \ ++ if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { \ ++ security_audit(fmt, "successful", \ ++ gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt), \ ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); \ ++ return mode; \ ++ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { \ ++ security_alert(fmt, "denied", \ ++ gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt), \ ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); \ ++ return 0; \ ++ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode))) \ ++ return 0; \ ++ \ ++ return (reqmode); \ ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, ++ const int mode) ++{ ++ __u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE; ++ if (unlikely(mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))) ++ reqmode |= GR_SETID; ++ ++ generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, ++ reqmode, GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG); ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry *parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt) ++{ ++ generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, ++ GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE, GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG); ++} ++ ++#define RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(old, new) \ ++ (((old & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) && \ ++ ((new & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ))) ++ ++int ++gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry, ++ struct dentry *parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, ++ struct dentry *old_dentry, ++ struct inode *old_parent_inode, ++ struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname) ++{ ++ __u32 comp1, comp2; ++ int error = 0; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (!new_dentry->d_inode) { ++ comp1 = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, ++ GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_READ | ++ GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_SUPPRESS); ++ comp2 = gr_search_file(old_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE | ++ GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE | ++ GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | ++ GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt); ++ } else { ++ comp1 = gr_search_file(new_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE | ++ GR_CREATE | GR_DELETE | ++ GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE | ++ GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | ++ GR_SUPPRESS, parent_mnt); ++ comp2 = ++ gr_search_file(old_dentry, ++ GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_READ | ++ GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE | ++ GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt); ++ } ++ ++ if (RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) && ++ ((comp1 & GR_AUDITS) || (comp2 & GR_AUDITS))) ++ security_audit(GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, "successful", ++ gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), ++ newname, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ else if (!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) && !(comp1 & GR_SUPPRESS) ++ && !(comp2 & GR_SUPPRESS)) { ++ security_alert(GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, "denied", ++ gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), newname, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ error = -EACCES; ++ } else if (unlikely(!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2))) ++ error = -EACCES; ++ ++ return error; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_acl_handle_exit(void) ++{ ++ u16 id; ++ char *rolename; ++ ++ if (unlikely(current->acl_sp_role && gr_acl_is_enabled())) { ++ id = current->acl_role_id; ++ rolename = current->role->rolename; ++ gr_set_acls(1); ++ security_alert_good(GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG, ++ rolename, id, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ } ++ ++ if (current->exec_file) { ++ fput(current->exec_file); ++ current->exec_file = NULL; ++ } ++} ++ ++int ++gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task) ++{ ++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTPROCFD) ++ return -EACCES; ++ ++ return 0; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ ++/* ++ * grsecurity/gracl_ip.c ++ * Copyright Brad Spengler 2002, 2003 ++ * ++ */ ++ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <asm/uaccess.h> ++#include <asm/errno.h> ++#include <net/sock.h> ++#include <linux/file.h> ++#include <linux/fs.h> ++#include <linux/net.h> ++#include <linux/in.h> ++#include <linux/skbuff.h> ++#include <linux/ip.h> ++#include <linux/udp.h> ++#include <linux/smp_lock.h> ++#include <linux/types.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/gracl.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++#define GR_BIND 0x01 ++#define GR_CONNECT 0x02 ++ ++static const char * gr_protocols[256] = { ++ "ip", "icmp", "igmp", "ggp", "ipencap", "st", "tcp", "cbt", ++ "egp", "igp", "bbn-rcc", "nvp", "pup", "argus", "emcon", "xnet", ++ "chaos", "udp", "mux", "dcn", "hmp", "prm", "xns-idp", "trunk-1", ++ "trunk-2", "leaf-1", "leaf-2", "rdp", "irtp", "iso-tp4", "netblt", "mfe-nsp", ++ "merit-inp", "sep", "3pc", "idpr", "xtp", "ddp", "idpr-cmtp", "tp++", ++ "il", "ipv6", "sdrp", "ipv6-route", "ipv6-frag", "idrp", "rsvp", "gre", ++ "mhrp", "bna", "ipv6-crypt", "ipv6-auth", "i-nlsp", "swipe", "narp", "mobile", ++ "tlsp", "skip", "ipv6-icmp", "ipv6-nonxt", "ipv6-opts", "unknown:61", "cftp", "unknown:63", ++ "sat-expak", "kryptolan", "rvd", "ippc", "unknown:68", "sat-mon", "visa", "ipcv", ++ "cpnx", "cphb", "wsn", "pvp", "br-sat-mon", "sun-nd", "wb-mon", "wb-expak", ++ "iso-ip", "vmtp", "secure-vmtp", "vines", "ttp", "nfsnet-igp", "dgp", "tcf", ++ "eigrp", "ospf", "sprite-rpc", "larp", "mtp", "ax.25", "ipip", "micp", ++ "scc-sp", "etherip", "encap", "unknown:99", "gmtp", "ifmp", "pnni", "pim", ++ "aris", "scps", "qnx", "a/n", "ipcomp", "snp", "compaq-peer", "ipx-in-ip", ++ "vrrp", "pgm", "unknown:114", "l2tp", "ddx", "iatp", "stp", "srp", ++ "uti", "smp", "sm", "ptp", "isis", "fire", "crtp", "crdup", ++ "sscopmce", "iplt", "sps", "pipe", "sctp", "fc", "unkown:134", "unknown:135", ++ "unknown:136", "unknown:137", "unknown:138", "unknown:139", "unknown:140", "unknown:141", "unknown:142", "unknown:143", ++ "unknown:144", "unknown:145", "unknown:146", "unknown:147", "unknown:148", "unknown:149", "unknown:150", "unknown:151", ++ "unknown:152", "unknown:153", "unknown:154", "unknown:155", "unknown:156", "unknown:157", "unknown:158", "unknown:159", ++ "unknown:160", "unknown:161", "unknown:162", "unknown:163", "unknown:164", "unknown:165", "unknown:166", "unknown:167", ++ "unknown:168", "unknown:169", "unknown:170", "unknown:171", "unknown:172", "unknown:173", "unknown:174", "unknown:175", ++ "unknown:176", "unknown:177", "unknown:178", "unknown:179", "unknown:180", "unknown:181", "unknown:182", "unknown:183", ++ "unknown:184", "unknown:185", "unknown:186", "unknown:187", "unknown:188", "unknown:189", "unknown:190", "unknown:191", ++ "unknown:192", "unknown:193", "unknown:194", "unknown:195", "unknown:196", "unknown:197", "unknown:198", "unknown:199", ++ "unknown:200", "unknown:201", "unknown:202", "unknown:203", "unknown:204", "unknown:205", "unknown:206", "unknown:207", ++ "unknown:208", "unknown:209", "unknown:210", "unknown:211", "unknown:212", "unknown:213", "unknown:214", "unknown:215", ++ "unknown:216", "unknown:217", "unknown:218", "unknown:219", "unknown:220", "unknown:221", "unknown:222", "unknown:223", ++ "unknown:224", "unknown:225", "unknown:226", "unknown:227", "unknown:228", "unknown:229", "unknown:230", "unknown:231", ++ "unknown:232", "unknown:233", "unknown:234", "unknown:235", "unknown:236", "unknown:237", "unknown:238", "unknown:239", ++ "unknown:240", "unknown:241", "unknown:242", "unknown:243", "unknown:244", "unknown:245", "unknown:246", "unknown:247", ++ "unknown:248", "unknown:249", "unknown:250", "unknown:251", "unknown:252", "unknown:253", "unknown:254", "unknown:255", ++ }; ++ ++static const char * gr_socktypes[11] = { ++ "unknown:0", "stream", "dgram", "raw", "rdm", "seqpacket", "unknown:6", ++ "unknown:7", "unknown:8", "unknown:9", "packet" ++ }; ++ ++__inline__ const char * ++gr_proto_to_name(unsigned char proto) ++{ ++ return gr_protocols[proto]; ++} ++ ++__inline__ const char * ++gr_socktype_to_name(unsigned char type) ++{ ++ return gr_socktypes[type]; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type, const int protocol) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label *curr; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) ++ goto exit; ++ ++ if ((domain < 0) || (type < 0) || (protocol < 0) || (domain != PF_INET) ++ || (domain >= NPROTO) || (type >= SOCK_MAX) || (protocol > 255)) ++ goto exit; // let the kernel handle it ++ ++ curr = current->acl; ++ ++ if (!curr->ips) ++ goto exit; ++ ++ if ((curr->ip_type & (1 << type)) && ++ (curr->ip_proto[protocol / 32] & (1 << (protocol % 32)))) ++ goto exit; ++ ++ if (curr->mode & GR_LEARN) { ++ /* we don't place acls on raw sockets , and sometimes ++ dgram/ip sockets are opened for ioctl and not ++ bind/connect, so we'll fake a bind learn log */ ++ if (type == SOCK_RAW || type == SOCK_PACKET) { ++ __u32 fakeip = 0; ++ security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename, ++ current->role->roletype, current->uid, ++ current->gid, current->exec_file ? ++ gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry, ++ current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : ++ curr->filename, curr->filename, ++ NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type, ++ protocol, GR_CONNECT, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip)); ++ } else if ((type == SOCK_DGRAM) && (protocol == IPPROTO_IP)) { ++ __u32 fakeip = 0; ++ security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename, ++ current->role->roletype, current->uid, ++ current->gid, current->exec_file ? ++ gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry, ++ current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : ++ curr->filename, curr->filename, ++ NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type, ++ protocol, GR_BIND, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip)); ++ } ++ /* we'll log when they use connect or bind */ ++ goto exit; ++ } ++ ++ security_alert(GR_SOCK_MSG, "inet", gr_socktype_to_name(type), ++ gr_proto_to_name(protocol), DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ ++ return 0; ++ exit: ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ int ++gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct sock *sk, ++ const struct sockaddr_in *addr, const int type) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label *curr; ++ struct acl_ip_label *ip; ++ unsigned long i; ++ __u32 ip_addr = 0; ++ __u16 ip_port = 0; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled() || sk->sk_family != PF_INET)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ curr = current->acl; ++ ++ if (!curr->ips) ++ return 1; ++ ++ ip_addr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr; ++ ip_port = ntohs(addr->sin_port); ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < curr->ip_num; i++) { ++ ip = *(curr->ips + i); ++ if ((ip->mode & mode) && ++ (ip_port >= ip->low) && ++ (ip_port <= ip->high) && ++ ((ntohl(ip_addr) & ip->netmask) == ++ (ntohl(ip->addr) & ip->netmask)) ++ && (ip-> ++ proto[sk->sk_protocol / 32] & (1 << (sk->sk_protocol % 32))) ++ && (ip->type & (1 << type))) ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ if (curr->mode & GR_LEARN) { ++ security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename, ++ current->role->roletype, current->uid, ++ current->gid, current->exec_file ? ++ gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry, ++ current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : ++ curr->filename, curr->filename, ++ NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, type, ++ sk->sk_protocol, mode, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip)); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ if (mode == GR_BIND) ++ security_alert(GR_BIND_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, ++ gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->sk_protocol), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ else if (mode == GR_CONNECT) ++ security_alert(GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, ++ gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->sk_protocol), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) ++{ ++ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sock->sk, addr, sock->type); ++} ++ ++int ++gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) ++{ ++ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, addr, sock->type); ++} ++ ++int ++gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) ++{ ++ if (addr) ++ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, addr, SOCK_DGRAM); ++ else { ++ struct sockaddr_in sin; ++ const struct inet_opt *inet = inet_sk(sk); ++ ++ sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet->daddr; ++ sin.sin_port = inet->dport; ++ ++ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM); ++ } ++} ++ ++int ++gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ struct sockaddr_in sin; ++ ++ if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof (struct udphdr))) ++ return 1; // skip this packet ++ ++ sin.sin_addr.s_addr = skb->nh.iph->saddr; ++ sin.sin_port = skb->h.uh->source; ++ ++ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM); ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c 2004-04-16 12:58:33.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/mm.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/poll.h> ++#include <linux/smp_lock.h> ++#include <linux/string.h> ++#include <linux/file.h> ++#include <linux/types.h> ++#include <linux/vmalloc.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++extern ssize_t write_grsec_handler(struct file * file, const char * buf, ++ size_t count, loff_t *ppos); ++extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void); ++ ++static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(learn_wait); ++static int gr_learn_attached; ++ ++/* use a 512k buffer */ ++#define LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE (512 * 1024) ++ ++static spinlock_t gr_learn_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; ++static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_learn_user_sem); ++ ++/* we need to maintain two buffers, so that the kernel context of grlearn ++ uses a semaphore around the userspace copying, and the other kernel contexts ++ use a spinlock when copying into the buffer, since they cannot sleep ++*/ ++static char *learn_buffer; ++static char *learn_buffer_user; ++static int learn_buffer_len; ++static int learn_buffer_user_len; ++ ++static ssize_t ++read_learn(struct file *file, char * buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos) ++{ ++ DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); ++ ssize_t retval = 0; ++ ++ add_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait); ++ set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); ++ do { ++ down(&gr_learn_user_sem); ++ spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock); ++ if (learn_buffer_len) ++ break; ++ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock); ++ up(&gr_learn_user_sem); ++ if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) { ++ retval = -EAGAIN; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (signal_pending(current)) { ++ retval = -ERESTARTSYS; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ schedule(); ++ } while (1); ++ ++ memcpy(learn_buffer_user, learn_buffer, learn_buffer_len); ++ learn_buffer_user_len = learn_buffer_len; ++ retval = learn_buffer_len; ++ learn_buffer_len = 0; ++ ++ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock); ++ ++ if (copy_to_user(buf, learn_buffer_user, learn_buffer_user_len)) ++ retval = -EFAULT; ++ ++ up(&gr_learn_user_sem); ++out: ++ set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); ++ remove_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait); ++ return retval; ++} ++ ++static unsigned int ++poll_learn(struct file * file, poll_table * wait) ++{ ++ poll_wait(file, &learn_wait, wait); ++ ++ if (learn_buffer_len) ++ return (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_clear_learn_entries(void) ++{ ++ char *tmp; ++ ++ down(&gr_learn_user_sem); ++ if (learn_buffer != NULL) { ++ spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock); ++ tmp = learn_buffer; ++ learn_buffer = NULL; ++ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock); ++ vfree(learn_buffer); ++ } ++ if (learn_buffer_user != NULL) { ++ vfree(learn_buffer_user); ++ learn_buffer_user = NULL; ++ } ++ learn_buffer_len = 0; ++ up(&gr_learn_user_sem); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...) ++{ ++ va_list args; ++ unsigned int len; ++ ++ if (!gr_learn_attached) ++ return; ++ ++ spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock); ++ ++ /* leave a gap at the end so we know when it's "full" but don't have to ++ compute the exact length of the string we're trying to append ++ */ ++ if (learn_buffer_len > LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE - 16384) { ++ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock); ++ wake_up_interruptible(&learn_wait); ++ return; ++ } ++ if (learn_buffer == NULL) { ++ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ va_start(args, fmt); ++ len = vsnprintf(learn_buffer + learn_buffer_len, LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE - learn_buffer_len, fmt, args); ++ va_end(args); ++ ++ learn_buffer_len += len + 1; ++ ++ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock); ++ wake_up_interruptible(&learn_wait); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static int ++open_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) ++{ ++ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ && gr_learn_attached) ++ return -EBUSY; ++ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) { ++ down(&gr_learn_user_sem); ++ if (learn_buffer == NULL) ++ learn_buffer = vmalloc(LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ if (learn_buffer_user == NULL) ++ learn_buffer_user = vmalloc(LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ if (learn_buffer == NULL) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ if (learn_buffer_user == NULL) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ learn_buffer_len = 0; ++ learn_buffer_user_len = 0; ++ gr_learn_attached = 1; ++ up(&gr_learn_user_sem); ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int ++close_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) ++{ ++ char *tmp; ++ ++ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) { ++ down(&gr_learn_user_sem); ++ if (learn_buffer != NULL) { ++ spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock); ++ tmp = learn_buffer; ++ learn_buffer = NULL; ++ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock); ++ vfree(tmp); ++ } ++ if (learn_buffer_user != NULL) { ++ vfree(learn_buffer_user); ++ learn_buffer_user = NULL; ++ } ++ learn_buffer_len = 0; ++ learn_buffer_user_len = 0; ++ gr_learn_attached = 0; ++ up(&gr_learn_user_sem); ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++struct file_operations grsec_fops = { ++ read: read_learn, ++ write: write_grsec_handler, ++ open: open_learn, ++ release: close_learn, ++ poll: poll_learn, ++}; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_res.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_res.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_res.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_res.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ ++/* resource handling routines (c) Brad Spengler 2002, 2003 */ ++ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/gracl.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++static const char *restab_log[11] = { ++ "RLIMIT_CPU", ++ "RLIMIT_FSIZE", ++ "RLIMIT_DATA", ++ "RLIMIT_STACK", ++ "RLIMIT_CORE", ++ "RLIMIT_RSS", ++ "RLIMIT_NPROC", ++ "RLIMIT_NOFILE", ++ "RLIMIT_MEMLOCK", ++ "RLIMIT_AS", ++ "RLIMIT_LOCKS" ++}; ++ ++__inline__ void ++gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task, ++ const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt) ++{ ++ if (unlikely(res == RLIMIT_NPROC && ++ (cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || ++ cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)))) ++ return; ++ ++ preempt_disable(); ++ ++ if (unlikely(((gt && wanted > task->rlim[res].rlim_cur) || ++ (!gt && wanted >= task->rlim[res].rlim_cur)) && ++ task->rlim[res].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY)) ++ security_alert(GR_RESOURCE_MSG, wanted, restab_log[res], ++ task->rlim[res].rlim_cur, ++ gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, ++ task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, ++ task->gid, task->egid, ++ gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), ++ task->parent->comm, ++ task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, ++ task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, ++ task->parent->egid); ++ ++ preempt_enable_no_resched(); ++ ++ return; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@ ++/* ++ * grsecurity/gracl_segv.c ++ * Copyright Brad Spengler 2002, 2003 ++ * ++ */ ++ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/mm.h> ++#include <asm/uaccess.h> ++#include <asm/errno.h> ++#include <asm/mman.h> ++#include <net/sock.h> ++#include <linux/file.h> ++#include <linux/fs.h> ++#include <linux/net.h> ++#include <linux/in.h> ++#include <linux/smp_lock.h> ++#include <linux/slab.h> ++#include <linux/types.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/timer.h> ++#include <linux/gracl.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++static struct crash_uid *uid_set; ++static unsigned short uid_used; ++static rwlock_t gr_uid_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED; ++extern rwlock_t gr_inode_lock; ++extern struct acl_subject_label * ++ lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t inode, const dev_t dev, ++ struct acl_role_label *role); ++extern int specific_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t); ++ ++int ++gr_init_uidset(void) ++{ ++ uid_set = ++ kmalloc(GR_UIDTABLE_MAX * sizeof (struct crash_uid), GFP_KERNEL); ++ uid_used = 0; ++ ++ return uid_set ? 1 : 0; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_free_uidset(void) ++{ ++ if (uid_set) ++ kfree(uid_set); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_find_uid(const uid_t uid) ++{ ++ struct crash_uid *tmp = uid_set; ++ uid_t buid; ++ int low = 0, high = uid_used - 1, mid; ++ ++ while (high >= low) { ++ mid = (low + high) >> 1; ++ buid = tmp[mid].uid; ++ if (buid == uid) ++ return mid; ++ if (buid > uid) ++ high = mid - 1; ++ if (buid < uid) ++ low = mid + 1; ++ } ++ ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ void ++gr_insertsort(void) ++{ ++ unsigned short i, j; ++ struct crash_uid index; ++ ++ for (i = 1; i < uid_used; i++) { ++ index = uid_set[i]; ++ j = i; ++ while ((j > 0) && uid_set[j - 1].uid > index.uid) { ++ uid_set[j] = uid_set[j - 1]; ++ j--; ++ } ++ uid_set[j] = index; ++ } ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ void ++gr_insert_uid(const uid_t uid, const unsigned long expires) ++{ ++ int loc; ++ ++ if (uid_used == GR_UIDTABLE_MAX) ++ return; ++ ++ loc = gr_find_uid(uid); ++ ++ if (loc >= 0) { ++ uid_set[loc].expires = expires; ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ uid_set[uid_used].uid = uid; ++ uid_set[uid_used].expires = expires; ++ uid_used++; ++ ++ gr_insertsort(); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_remove_uid(const unsigned short loc) ++{ ++ unsigned short i; ++ ++ for (i = loc + 1; i < uid_used; i++) ++ uid_set[i - i] = uid_set[i]; ++ ++ uid_used--; ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid) ++{ ++ int loc; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) ++ return 0; ++ ++ read_lock(&gr_uid_lock); ++ loc = gr_find_uid(uid); ++ read_unlock(&gr_uid_lock); ++ ++ if (loc < 0) ++ return 0; ++ ++ write_lock(&gr_uid_lock); ++ if (time_before_eq(uid_set[loc].expires, get_seconds())) ++ gr_remove_uid(loc); ++ else { ++ write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ int ++proc_is_setxid(const struct task_struct *task) ++{ ++ if (task->uid != task->euid || task->uid != task->suid || ++ task->uid != task->fsuid) ++ return 1; ++ if (task->gid != task->egid || task->gid != task->sgid || ++ task->gid != task->fsgid) ++ return 1; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++static __inline__ int ++gr_fake_force_sig(int sig, struct task_struct *t) ++{ ++ unsigned long int flags; ++ int ret; ++ ++ spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sighand->siglock, flags); ++ if (sigismember(&t->blocked, sig) || t->sighand->action[sig-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN) { ++ t->sighand->action[sig-1].sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL; ++ sigdelset(&t->blocked, sig); ++ recalc_sigpending_tsk(t); ++ } ++ ret = specific_send_sig_info(sig, (void*)1L, t); ++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags); ++ ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label *curr; ++ struct acl_subject_label *curr2; ++ struct task_struct *tsk, *tsk2; ++ ++ if (sig != SIGSEGV && sig != SIGKILL && sig != SIGBUS && sig != SIGILL) ++ return; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) ++ return; ++ ++ curr = task->acl; ++ ++ if (!(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES))) ++ return; ++ ++ if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, get_seconds())) { ++ curr->expires = 0; ++ curr->crashes = 0; ++ } ++ ++ curr->crashes++; ++ ++ if (!curr->expires) ++ curr->expires = get_seconds() + curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max; ++ ++ if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) && ++ time_after(curr->expires, get_seconds())) { ++ if (task->uid && proc_is_setxid(task)) { ++ security_alert(GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG, ++ gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, ++ task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, ++ task->gid, task->egid, ++ gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), ++ task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, ++ task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, ++ task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid, ++ task->uid, ++ curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max); ++ write_lock(&gr_uid_lock); ++ gr_insert_uid(task->uid, curr->expires); ++ write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock); ++ curr->expires = 0; ++ curr->crashes = 0; ++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); ++ for_each_process(tsk) { ++ tsk2 = tsk; ++ do { ++ if (tsk2 != task && tsk2->uid == task->uid) ++ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk2); ++ } while ((tsk2 = next_thread(tsk2)) != tsk); ++ } ++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); ++ } else { ++ security_alert(GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG, ++ gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, ++ task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, ++ task->gid, task->egid, ++ gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), ++ task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, ++ task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, ++ task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid, ++ curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max); ++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); ++ for_each_process(tsk) { ++ tsk2 = tsk; ++ do { ++ if (likely(tsk2 != task)) { ++ curr2 = tsk2->acl; ++ ++ if (curr2->device == curr->device && ++ curr2->inode == curr->inode) ++ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk2); ++ } ++ } while ((tsk2 = next_thread(tsk2)) != tsk); ++ } ++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label *curr; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) ++ return 0; ++ ++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ curr = lookup_acl_subj_label(filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, ++ filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, ++ current->role); ++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); ++ ++ if (!curr || !(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES)) || ++ (!curr->crashes && !curr->expires)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) && ++ time_after(curr->expires, get_seconds())) ++ return 1; ++ else if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, get_seconds())) { ++ curr->crashes = 0; ++ curr->expires = 0; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_handle_alertkill(void) ++{ ++ struct acl_subject_label *curracl; ++ __u32 curr_ip; ++ struct task_struct *task, *task2; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) ++ return; ++ ++ curracl = current->acl; ++ curr_ip = current->curr_ip; ++ ++ if ((curracl->mode & GR_KILLIPPROC) && curr_ip && ++ (curr_ip != 0xffffffff)) { ++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); ++ for_each_process(task) { ++ task2 = task; ++ do { ++ if (task2->curr_ip == curr_ip) ++ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, task2); ++ } while ((task2 = next_thread(task2)) != task); ++ } ++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); ++ } else if (curracl->mode & GR_KILLPROC) ++ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, current); ++ ++ return; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ ++/* shared memory handling routines, (c) Brad Spengler 2002, 2003 */ ++ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/mm.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/file.h> ++#include <linux/ipc.h> ++#include <linux/gracl.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++int ++gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid, ++ const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid) ++{ ++ struct task_struct *task; ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled()) ++ return 1; ++ ++ task = find_task_by_pid(shm_cprid); ++ ++ if (unlikely(!task)) ++ task = find_task_by_pid(shm_lapid); ++ ++ if (unlikely(task && ((task->start_time < shm_createtime) || ++ (task->pid == shm_lapid)) && ++ (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTSHM) && ++ (task->acl != current->acl))) { ++ security_alert(GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG, cuid, shm_cprid, shmid, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ return 1; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/fs.h> ++#include <linux/file.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++void ++gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR ++ if ((grsec_enable_chdir && grsec_enable_group && ++ in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid)) || (grsec_enable_chdir && ++ !grsec_enable_group)) { ++ security_audit(GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ } ++#endif ++ return; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/file.h> ++#include <linux/fs.h> ++#include <linux/mount.h> ++#include <linux/types.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++int ++gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX ++ struct pid *spid = NULL; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_unix)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current))) ++ return 1; ++ ++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); ++ ++ spid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, pid); ++ if (spid) { ++ struct task_struct *p; ++ p = pid_task(spid->task_list.next, PIDTYPE_PID); ++ if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p))) { ++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); ++ security_alert(GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } ++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); ++#endif ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_chroot_nice(void) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE ++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && proc_is_chrooted(current)) { ++ security_alert(GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EPERM; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(struct task_struct *p, const int niceval) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE ++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && (!have_same_root(p, current) ++ || (have_same_root(p, current) ++ && (niceval < task_nice(p)) ++ && proc_is_chrooted(current)))) { ++ security_alert(GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG, p->comm, p->pid, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -ESRCH; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_chroot_capset(const struct task_struct *target) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS ++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current) && ++ !have_same_root(current, target)) { ++ security_alert(GR_CAPSET_CHROOT_MSG, target->comm, target->pid, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 1; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_chroot_rawio(const struct inode *inode) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS ++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current) && ++ inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) ++ return 1; ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_pid_is_chrooted(const struct task_struct *p) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK ++ if (!grsec_enable_chroot_findtask || (current->pid <= 1)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (p && p->fs && p->fs->root && p->fs->root->d_inode && ++ child_reaper && child_reaper->fs && child_reaper->fs->root && ++ child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode && current && current->fs && ++ current->fs->root && current->fs->root->d_inode) { ++ if (proc_is_chrooted(current) && !have_same_root(current, p)) ++ return 1; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_pid_is_chrooted); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR) ++int gr_is_outside_chroot(const struct dentry *u_dentry, const struct vfsmount *u_mnt) ++{ ++ struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *)u_dentry; ++ struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *)u_mnt; ++ struct dentry *realroot; ++ struct vfsmount *realrootmnt; ++ struct dentry *currentroot; ++ struct vfsmount *currentmnt; ++ ++ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); ++ realrootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt); ++ realroot = dget(child_reaper->fs->root); ++ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); ++ ++ read_lock(¤t->fs->lock); ++ currentmnt = mntget(current->fs->rootmnt); ++ currentroot = dget(current->fs->root); ++ read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock); ++ ++ spin_lock(&dcache_lock); ++ for (;;) { ++ if (unlikely((dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt) ++ || (dentry == currentroot && mnt == currentmnt))) ++ break; ++ if (unlikely(dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) { ++ if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt) ++ break; ++ dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint; ++ mnt = mnt->mnt_parent; ++ continue; ++ } ++ dentry = dentry->d_parent; ++ } ++ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); ++ ++ dput(currentroot); ++ mntput(currentmnt); ++ ++ if (dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt) { ++ /* access is outside of chroot */ ++ dput(realroot); ++ mntput(realrootmnt); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ dput(realroot); ++ mntput(realrootmnt); ++ return 1; ++} ++#endif ++ ++int ++gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR ++ if (!grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir) ++ return 1; ++ ++ if (!proc_is_chrooted(current)) ++ return 1; ++ else if (!gr_is_outside_chroot(u_dentry, u_mnt)) { ++ security_alert(GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG, ++ gr_to_filename(u_dentry, u_mnt), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 0; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid, ++ const time_t shm_createtime) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT ++ struct pid *pid = NULL; ++ u64 starttime64; ++ time_t starttime; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_shmat)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current))) ++ return 1; ++ ++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); ++ ++ pid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, shm_cprid); ++ if (pid) { ++ struct task_struct *p; ++ p = pid_task(pid->task_list.next, PIDTYPE_PID); ++ starttime64 = p->start_time; ++ do_div(starttime64, HZ); ++ starttime = (time_t) starttime64; ++ if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p) && ++ time_before((unsigned long)starttime, (unsigned long)shm_createtime))) { ++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); ++ security_alert(GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } else { ++ pid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, shm_lapid); ++ if (pid) { ++ struct task_struct *p; ++ p = pid_task(pid->task_list.next, PIDTYPE_PID); ++ if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p))) { ++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); ++ security_alert(GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ ++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); ++#endif ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG ++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_execlog && proc_is_chrooted(current)) ++ security_audit(GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++#endif ++ return; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD ++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_mknod && !S_ISFIFO(mode) && !S_ISREG(mode) && ++ proc_is_chrooted(current)) { ++ security_alert(GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG, ++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EPERM; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *dev_name) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT ++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_mount && proc_is_chrooted(current)) { ++ security_alert(GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG, dev_name, ++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EPERM; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT ++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_pivot && proc_is_chrooted(current)) { ++ security_alert(GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EPERM; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE ++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_double && proc_is_chrooted(current) && ++ !gr_is_outside_chroot(dentry, mnt)) { ++ security_alert(GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG, ++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EPERM; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS ++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(task)) { ++ task->cap_permitted = ++ cap_drop(task->cap_permitted, GR_CHROOT_CAPS); ++ task->cap_inheritable = ++ cap_drop(task->cap_inheritable, GR_CHROOT_CAPS); ++ task->cap_effective = ++ cap_drop(task->cap_effective, GR_CHROOT_CAPS); ++ } ++#endif ++ return; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL ++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl && proc_is_chrooted(current) ++ && (op & 002)) ++ return -EACCES; ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR ++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_chdir) ++ set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry); ++#endif ++ return; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD ++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_chmod && ++ ((mode & S_ISUID) || (mode & S_ISGID)) && ++ proc_is_chrooted(current)) { ++ security_alert(GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG, ++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EPERM; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@ ++/* ++ * when grsecurity is disabled, compile all external functions into nothing ++ */ ++ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/config.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/file.h> ++#include <linux/fs.h> ++#include <linux/kdev_t.h> ++#include <linux/net.h> ++#include <linux/in.h> ++#include <linux/ip.h> ++#include <linux/skbuff.h> ++#include <linux/sysctl.h> ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS ++__inline__ void ++pax_set_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm) ++{ ++ return; ++} ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table * table, __u32 mode) ++{ ++ return mode; ++} ++#endif ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_acl_is_enabled(void) ++{ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode) ++{ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__inline__ void ++gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code) ++{ ++ return; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_handle_ptrace_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_handle_mmap(const struct file *filp, const unsigned long prot) ++{ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request) ++{ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task) ++{ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__inline__ void ++gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task, ++ const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt) ++{ ++ return; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_set_acls(const int type) ++{ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk) ++{ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task) ++{ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__inline__ void ++gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk) ++{ ++ return; ++} ++ ++__inline__ void ++gr_set_pax_flags(struct task_struct *task) ++{ ++ return; ++} ++ ++__inline__ void ++gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ return; ++} ++ ++__inline__ void ++gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev) ++{ ++ return; ++} ++ ++__inline__ void ++gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++ return; ++} ++ ++__inline__ void ++gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig) ++{ ++ return; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp) ++{ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid) ++{ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__inline__ void ++gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir, ++ struct dentry *old_dentry, ++ struct dentry *new_dentry, ++ struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace) ++{ ++ return; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_search_socket(const int family, const int type, const int protocol) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct socket *sock, ++ const struct sockaddr_in *addr) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ void ++gr_handle_alertkill(void) ++{ ++ return; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * mnt) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt, ++ const int fmode) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot, ++ unsigned int *vm_flags) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry * dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * mnt) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * mnt, const int fmode) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt, ++ mode_t mode) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt, ++ mode_t mode) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ void ++grsecurity_init(void) ++{ ++ return; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, ++ const int mode) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry * new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, ++ const struct dentry * old_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_acl_handle_rename(const struct dentry *new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry *parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, ++ const struct dentry *old_dentry, ++ const struct inode *old_parent_inode, ++ const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname) ++{ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct dentry * dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * mnt, const ino_t ino) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid, ++ const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ __u32 ++gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry, ++ const struct dentry * p_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode, ++ const int imode) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ void ++gr_acl_handle_exit(void) ++{ ++ return; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ void ++gr_set_role_label(const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid) ++{ ++ return; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task) ++{ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ int ++gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) ++{ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++__inline__ void ++gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task) ++{ ++ return; ++} ++ ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_task_is_capable); ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_learn_resource); ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_set_kernel_label); ++ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/file.h> ++#include <linux/binfmts.h> ++#include <linux/fs.h> ++#include <linux/types.h> ++#include <linux/grdefs.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++#include <linux/capability.h> ++ ++#include <asm/uaccess.h> ++ ++int ++gr_handle_nproc(void) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE ++ if (grsec_enable_execve && current->user && ++ (atomic_read(¤t->user->processes) > ++ current->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) && ++ !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) { ++ security_alert(GR_NPROC_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EAGAIN; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, char **argv) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG ++ char grarg[64] = { 0 }; ++ __u8 execlen = 0; ++ unsigned int i; ++ ++ if (!((grsec_enable_execlog && grsec_enable_group && ++ in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid)) ++ || (grsec_enable_execlog && !grsec_enable_group))) ++ return; ++ ++ if (unlikely(!argv)) ++ goto log; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < bprm->argc && execlen < 62; i++) { ++ char *p; ++ __u8 len; ++ ++ if (get_user(p, argv + i)) ++ goto log; ++ if (!p) ++ goto log; ++ len = strnlen_user(p, 62 - execlen); ++ if (len > 62 - execlen) ++ len = 62 - execlen; ++ else if (len > 0) ++ len--; ++ if (copy_from_user(grarg + execlen, p, len)) ++ goto log; ++ execlen += len; ++ *(grarg + execlen) = ' '; ++ *(grarg + execlen + 1) = '\0'; ++ execlen++; ++ } ++ ++ log: ++ security_audit(GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG, gr_to_filename(bprm->file->f_dentry, ++ bprm->file->f_vfsmnt), ++ grarg, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++#endif ++ return; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/fs.h> ++#include <linux/file.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++int ++gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, ++ const struct dentry *dir, const int flag, const int acc_mode) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO ++ if (grsec_enable_fifo && S_ISFIFO(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) && ++ !(flag & O_EXCL) && (dir->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && ++ (dentry->d_inode->i_uid != dir->d_inode->i_uid) && ++ (current->fsuid != dentry->d_inode->i_uid)) { ++ if (!vfs_permission(dentry->d_inode, acc_mode)) ++ security_alert(GR_FIFO_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), ++ dentry->d_inode->i_uid, ++ dentry->d_inode->i_gid, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++void ++gr_log_forkfail(const int retval) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL ++ if (grsec_enable_forkfail) ++ security_alert(GR_FAILFORK_MSG, retval, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++#endif ++ return; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_init.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_init.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_init.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_init.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/mm.h> ++#include <linux/smp_lock.h> ++#include <linux/gracl.h> ++#include <linux/slab.h> ++#include <linux/vmalloc.h> ++#include <linux/percpu.h> ++ ++int grsec_enable_link; ++int grsec_enable_dmesg; ++int grsec_enable_fifo; ++int grsec_enable_execve; ++int grsec_enable_execlog; ++int grsec_enable_signal; ++int grsec_enable_forkfail; ++int grsec_enable_time; ++int grsec_enable_audit_textrel; ++int grsec_enable_group; ++int grsec_audit_gid; ++int grsec_enable_chdir; ++int grsec_enable_audit_ipc; ++int grsec_enable_mount; ++int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask; ++int grsec_enable_chroot_mount; ++int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat; ++int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir; ++int grsec_enable_chroot_double; ++int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot; ++int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir; ++int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod; ++int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod; ++int grsec_enable_chroot_nice; ++int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog; ++int grsec_enable_chroot_caps; ++int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl; ++int grsec_enable_chroot_unix; ++int grsec_enable_tpe; ++int grsec_tpe_gid; ++int grsec_enable_tpe_all; ++int grsec_enable_randpid; ++int grsec_enable_randid; ++int grsec_enable_randisn; ++int grsec_enable_randsrc; ++int grsec_enable_randrpc; ++int grsec_enable_socket_all; ++int grsec_socket_all_gid; ++int grsec_enable_socket_client; ++int grsec_socket_client_gid; ++int grsec_enable_socket_server; ++int grsec_socket_server_gid; ++int grsec_lock; ++ ++spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; ++unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime = 0; ++unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet = 0; ++ ++spinlock_t grsec_alertgood_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; ++unsigned long grsec_alertgood_wtime = 0; ++unsigned long grsec_alertgood_fyet = 0; ++ ++spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; ++ ++char *gr_shared_page[4]; ++extern struct gr_arg *gr_usermode; ++extern unsigned char *gr_system_salt; ++extern unsigned char *gr_system_sum; ++extern struct task_struct **gr_conn_table; ++extern const unsigned int gr_conn_table_size; ++ ++void ++grsecurity_init(void) ++{ ++ int j; ++ /* create the per-cpu shared pages */ ++ ++ preempt_disable(); ++ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { ++ gr_shared_page[j] = (char *)__alloc_percpu(PAGE_SIZE, __alignof__(char *)); ++ if (gr_shared_page[j] == NULL) { ++ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity shared page"); ++ return; ++ } ++ } ++ preempt_enable(); ++ ++ /* create hash tables for ip tagging */ ++ ++ gr_conn_table = (struct task_struct **) vmalloc(gr_conn_table_size * sizeof(struct task_struct *)); ++ if (gr_conn_table == NULL) { ++ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity IP tagging table"); ++ return; ++ } ++ memset(gr_conn_table, 0, gr_conn_table_size * sizeof(struct task_struct *)); ++ ++ /* allocate memory for authentication structure */ ++ gr_usermode = kmalloc(sizeof(struct gr_arg), GFP_KERNEL); ++ gr_system_salt = kmalloc(GR_SALT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); ++ gr_system_sum = kmalloc(GR_SHA_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); ++ ++ if (!gr_usermode || !gr_system_salt || !gr_system_sum) { ++ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity authentication structure"); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL ++ grsec_lock = 1; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL ++ grsec_enable_audit_textrel = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP ++ grsec_enable_group = 1; ++ grsec_audit_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR ++ grsec_enable_chdir = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC ++ grsec_enable_audit_ipc = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT ++ grsec_enable_mount = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK ++ grsec_enable_link = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG ++ grsec_enable_dmesg = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO ++ grsec_enable_fifo = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE ++ grsec_enable_execve = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG ++ grsec_enable_execlog = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL ++ grsec_enable_signal = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL ++ grsec_enable_forkfail = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME ++ grsec_enable_time = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK ++ grsec_enable_chroot_findtask = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX ++ grsec_enable_chroot_unix = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT ++ grsec_enable_chroot_mount = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR ++ grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT ++ grsec_enable_chroot_shmat = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE ++ grsec_enable_chroot_double = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT ++ grsec_enable_chroot_pivot = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR ++ grsec_enable_chroot_chdir = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD ++ grsec_enable_chroot_chmod = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD ++ grsec_enable_chroot_mknod = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE ++ grsec_enable_chroot_nice = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG ++ grsec_enable_chroot_execlog = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS ++ grsec_enable_chroot_caps = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL ++ grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE ++ grsec_enable_tpe = 1; ++ grsec_tpe_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL ++ grsec_enable_tpe_all = 1; ++#endif ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID ++ grsec_enable_randpid = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID ++ grsec_enable_randid = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN ++ grsec_enable_randisn = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC ++ grsec_enable_randsrc = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC ++ grsec_enable_randrpc = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL ++ grsec_enable_socket_all = 1; ++ grsec_socket_all_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT ++ grsec_enable_socket_client = 1; ++ grsec_socket_client_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER ++ grsec_enable_socket_server = 1; ++ grsec_socket_server_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID; ++#endif ++#endif ++ ++ return; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/types.h> ++#include <linux/ipc.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++void ++gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC ++ if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && ++ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && ++ !grsec_enable_group)) && (ret >= 0) ++ && (msgflg & IPC_CREAT)) ++ security_audit(GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++#endif ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC ++ if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && ++ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || ++ (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group)) ++ security_audit(GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++#endif ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC ++ if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && ++ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && ++ !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0) ++ && (semflg & IPC_CREAT)) ++ security_audit(GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++#endif ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC ++ if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && ++ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || ++ (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group)) ++ security_audit(GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++#endif ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC ++ if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && ++ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && ++ !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0) ++ && (shmflg & IPC_CREAT)) ++ security_audit(GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG, size, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++#endif ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC ++ if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && ++ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || ++ (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group)) ++ security_audit(GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++#endif ++ return; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_link.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_link.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_link.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_link.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/fs.h> ++#include <linux/file.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++int ++gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent, ++ const struct inode *inode, ++ const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK ++ if (grsec_enable_link && S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) && ++ (parent->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && (parent->i_uid != inode->i_uid) && ++ (parent->i_mode & S_IWOTH) && (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid)) { ++ security_alert(GR_SYMLINK_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), ++ inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, ++ struct inode *inode, const int mode, const char *to) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK ++ if (grsec_enable_link && current->fsuid != inode->i_uid && ++ (!S_ISREG(mode) || (mode & S_ISUID) || ++ ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) || ++ (vfs_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))) && ++ !capable(CAP_FOWNER) && current->uid) { ++ security_alert(GR_HARDLINK_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), ++ inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, to, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EPERM; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/mm.h> ++#include <linux/mman.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++void ++gr_handle_ioperm(void) ++{ ++ security_alert(GR_IOPERM_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_handle_iopl(void) ++{ ++ security_alert(GR_IOPL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_handle_mem_write(void) ++{ ++ security_alert(GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_handle_kmem_write(void) ++{ ++ security_alert(GR_KMEM_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_handle_open_port(void) ++{ ++ security_alert(GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset, struct vm_area_struct *vma) ++{ ++ if (offset < __pa(high_memory) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) && ++ !(offset == 0xf0000 && ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) <= 0x10000)) && ++ !(offset == 0xa0000 && ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) <= 0x20000))) { ++ security_alert(GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EPERM; ++ } else if (offset < __pa(high_memory)) ++ vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE; ++ ++ return 0; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++void ++gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT ++ if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0)) ++ security_audit(GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname ? devname : "none", DEFAULTSECARGS); ++#endif ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT ++ if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0)) ++ security_audit(GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname ? devname : "none", DEFAULTSECARGS); ++#endif ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT ++ if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0)) ++ security_audit(GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, from, to, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++#endif ++ return; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/smp_lock.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++extern int pid_max; ++ ++int ++gr_random_pid(void) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID ++ int pid; ++ ++ if (grsec_enable_randpid && current->fs->root) { ++ ++ pid = 1 + (get_random_long() % pid_max); ++ return pid; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++void ++gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL ++ if (grsec_enable_signal && ((sig == SIGSEGV) || (sig == SIGILL) || ++ (sig == SIGABRT) || (sig == SIGBUS))) { ++ if (t->pid == current->pid) { ++ security_alert_good(GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG, sig, ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ } else { ++ security_alert_good(GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG, sig, ++ gr_task_fullpath0(t), t->comm, ++ t->pid, t->uid, t->euid, t->gid, ++ t->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath0(t), ++ t->parent->comm, ++ t->parent->pid, t->parent->uid, ++ t->parent->euid, t->parent->gid, ++ t->parent->egid, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ return; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ if (current->pid > 1 && gr_check_protected_task(p)) { ++ security_alert(GR_SIG_ACL_MSG, sig, gr_task_fullpath0(p), ++ p->comm, p->pid, p->uid, ++ p->euid, p->gid, p->egid, ++ gr_parent_task_fullpath0(p), p->parent->comm, ++ p->parent->pid, p->parent->uid, ++ p->parent->euid, p->parent->gid, ++ p->parent->egid, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EPERM; ++ } else if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(p)) { ++ return -EPERM; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/file.h> ++#include <linux/net.h> ++#include <linux/in.h> ++#include <linux/ip.h> ++#include <net/sock.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++#include <linux/gracl.h> ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH_MODULE) ++extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif); ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_v4_lookup); ++#endif ++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID) ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_randomid); ++#endif ++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC) ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_long); ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_randomisn); ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randisn); ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randid); ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randsrc); ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randrpc); ++#endif ++ ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_cap_rtnetlink); ++ ++extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb); ++extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr); ++ ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_recvmsg); ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_sendmsg); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX_MODULE ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_unix); ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_mknod); ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_chroot_unix); ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_create); ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++struct task_struct **gr_conn_table; ++const unsigned int gr_conn_table_size = 65521; ++struct task_struct *deleted_conn = (struct task_struct *)~0; ++spinlock_t gr_conn_table_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; ++ ++extern __inline__ const char * gr_socktype_to_name(unsigned char type); ++extern __inline__ const char * gr_proto_to_name(unsigned char proto); ++ ++static __inline__ int ++conn_hash(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport, __u16 dport, unsigned int size) ++{ ++ return ((daddr + saddr + (sport << 8) + (dport << 16)) % size); ++} ++ ++static __inline__ int ++conn_match(const struct task_struct *task, __u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, ++ __u16 sport, __u16 dport) ++{ ++ if (unlikely(task != deleted_conn && task->gr_saddr == saddr && ++ task->gr_daddr == daddr && task->gr_sport == sport && ++ task->gr_dport == dport)) ++ return 1; ++ else ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++void gr_add_to_task_ip_table(struct task_struct *task) ++{ ++ unsigned int index; ++ ++ if (unlikely(gr_conn_table == NULL)) ++ return; ++ ++ if (!thread_group_leader(task)) ++ task = task->group_leader; ++ ++ index = conn_hash(task->gr_saddr, task->gr_daddr, ++ task->gr_sport, task->gr_dport, ++ gr_conn_table_size); ++ ++ spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock); ++ ++ while (gr_conn_table[index] && gr_conn_table[index] != deleted_conn) { ++ index = (index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size; ++ } ++ ++ gr_conn_table[index] = task; ++ ++ spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++void gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(struct task_struct *task) ++{ ++ unsigned int index; ++ ++ if (unlikely(gr_conn_table == NULL)) ++ return; ++ ++ if (!thread_group_leader(task)) ++ task = task->group_leader; ++ ++ index = conn_hash(task->gr_saddr, task->gr_daddr, ++ task->gr_sport, task->gr_dport, ++ gr_conn_table_size); ++ ++ while (gr_conn_table[index] && !conn_match(gr_conn_table[index], ++ task->gr_saddr, task->gr_daddr, task->gr_sport, ++ task->gr_dport)) { ++ index = (index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size; ++ } ++ ++ if (gr_conn_table[index]) { ++ if (gr_conn_table[(index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size]) ++ gr_conn_table[index] = deleted_conn; ++ else ++ gr_conn_table[index] = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++struct task_struct * gr_lookup_task_ip_table(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, ++ __u16 sport, __u16 dport) ++{ ++ unsigned int index; ++ ++ if (unlikely(gr_conn_table == NULL)) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ index = conn_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, gr_conn_table_size); ++ ++ while (gr_conn_table[index] && !conn_match(gr_conn_table[index], ++ saddr, daddr, sport, dport)) { ++ index = (index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size; ++ } ++ ++ return gr_conn_table[index]; ++} ++ ++#endif ++ ++void gr_del_task_from_ip_table(struct task_struct *task) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock); ++ if (!thread_group_leader(task)) ++ gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(task->group_leader); ++ else ++ gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(task); ++ spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock); ++#endif ++ return; ++} ++ ++void ++gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ struct task_struct *p; ++ struct task_struct *set; ++ const struct inet_opt *inet = inet_sk(sk); ++ ++ if (unlikely(sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)) ++ return; ++ ++ set = current; ++ if (!thread_group_leader(set)) ++ set = set->group_leader; ++ ++ spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock); ++ p = gr_lookup_task_ip_table(inet->daddr, inet->rcv_saddr, ++ inet->dport, inet->sport); ++ if (unlikely(p != NULL)) { ++ set->curr_ip = p->curr_ip; ++ set->used_accept = 1; ++ gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(p); ++ spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock); ++ return; ++ } ++ spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock); ++ ++ set->curr_ip = inet->daddr; ++ set->used_accept = 1; ++#endif ++ return; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type, const int protocol) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL ++ if (grsec_enable_socket_all && in_group_p(grsec_socket_all_gid) && ++ (family != AF_UNIX) && (family != AF_LOCAL)) { ++ security_alert(GR_SOCK2_MSG, family, gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(protocol), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER ++ if (grsec_enable_socket_server && ++ in_group_p(grsec_socket_server_gid) && ++ sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) && ++ (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) { ++ security_alert(GR_BIND_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT ++ if (grsec_enable_socket_client && in_group_p(grsec_socket_client_gid) && ++ sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) && ++ (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) { ++ security_alert(GR_CONNECT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++__u32 ++gr_cap_rtnetlink(void) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled()) ++ return current->cap_effective; ++ else ++ return (current->cap_effective & ~(current->acl->cap_lower)); ++#else ++ return current->cap_effective; ++#endif ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/sysctl.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++int ++gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name, const int op) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL ++ if (!strcmp(dirname, "grsecurity") && grsec_lock && (op & 002)) { ++ security_alert(GR_SYSCTL_MSG, name, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL ++enum {GS_LINK=1, GS_FIFO, GS_EXECVE, GS_EXECLOG, GS_SIGNAL, ++GS_FORKFAIL, GS_TIME, GS_CHROOT_SHMAT, GS_CHROOT_UNIX, GS_CHROOT_MNT, ++GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR, GS_CHROOT_DBL, GS_CHROOT_PVT, GS_CHROOT_CD, GS_CHROOT_CM, ++GS_CHROOT_MK, GS_CHROOT_NI, GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG, GS_CHROOT_CAPS, ++GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL, GS_TPE, GS_TPE_GID, GS_TPE_ALL, GS_SIDCAPS, ++GS_RANDPID, GS_RANDID, GS_RANDSRC, GS_RANDISN, ++GS_SOCKET_ALL, GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, GS_SOCKET_CLIENT, ++GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID, GS_SOCKET_SERVER, GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID, GS_TTY, GS_TTYS, ++GS_PTY, GS_GROUP, GS_GID, GS_ACHDIR, GS_AMOUNT, GS_AIPC, GS_DMSG, GS_RANDRPC, ++GS_TEXTREL, GS_FINDTASK, GS_LOCK}; ++ ++ ++ctl_table grsecurity_table[] = { ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_LINK, ++ .procname = "linking_restrictions", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_link, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_FIFO, ++ .procname = "fifo_restrictions", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_fifo, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_EXECVE, ++ .procname = "execve_limiting", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_execve, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_EXECLOG, ++ .procname = "exec_logging", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_execlog, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_SIGNAL, ++ .procname = "signal_logging", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_signal, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_FORKFAIL, ++ .procname = "forkfail_logging", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_forkfail, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_TIME, ++ .procname = "timechange_logging", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_time, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_SHMAT, ++ .procname = "chroot_deny_shmat", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_shmat, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_UNIX, ++ .procname = "chroot_deny_unix", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_unix, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_MNT, ++ .procname = "chroot_deny_mount", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_mount, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR, ++ .procname = "chroot_deny_fchdir", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_DBL, ++ .procname = "chroot_deny_chroot", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_double, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_PVT, ++ .procname = "chroot_deny_pivot", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_pivot, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_CD, ++ .procname = "chroot_enforce_chdir", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_chdir, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_CM, ++ .procname = "chroot_deny_chmod", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_chmod, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_MK, ++ .procname = "chroot_deny_mknod", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_mknod, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_NI, ++ .procname = "chroot_restrict_nice", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_nice, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG, ++ .procname = "chroot_execlog", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_execlog, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_CAPS, ++ .procname = "chroot_caps", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_caps, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL, ++ .procname = "chroot_deny_sysctl", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_TPE, ++ .procname = "tpe", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_tpe, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_TPE_GID, ++ .procname = "tpe_gid", ++ .data = &grsec_tpe_gid, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_TPE_ALL, ++ .procname = "tpe_restrict_all", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_tpe_all, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_RANDPID, ++ .procname = "rand_pids", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_randpid, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_RANDID, ++ .procname = "rand_ip_ids", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_randid, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_RANDSRC, ++ .procname = "rand_tcp_src_ports", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_randsrc, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_RANDISN, ++ .procname = "rand_isns", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_randisn, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_ALL, ++ .procname = "socket_all", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_socket_all, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, ++ .procname = "socket_all_gid", ++ .data = &grsec_socket_all_gid, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_CLIENT, ++ .procname = "socket_client", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_socket_client, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID, ++ .procname = "socket_client_gid", ++ .data = &grsec_socket_client_gid, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_SERVER, ++ .procname = "socket_server", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_socket_server, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID, ++ .procname = "socket_server_gid", ++ .data = &grsec_socket_server_gid, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_GROUP, ++ .procname = "audit_group", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_group, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_GID, ++ .procname = "audit_gid", ++ .data = &grsec_audit_gid, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_ACHDIR, ++ .procname = "audit_chdir", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_chdir, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_AMOUNT, ++ .procname = "audit_mount", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_mount, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_AIPC, ++ .procname = "audit_ipc", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_audit_ipc, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_TEXTREL, ++ .procname = "audit_textrel", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_audit_textrel, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_DMSG, ++ .procname = "dmesg", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_dmesg, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_RANDRPC, ++ .procname = "rand_rpc", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_randrpc, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_FINDTASK, ++ .procname = "chroot_findtask", ++ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_findtask, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++ { ++ .ctl_name = GS_LOCK, ++ .procname = "grsec_lock", ++ .data = &grsec_lock, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++ { .ctl_name = 0 } ++}; ++#endif +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/mm.h> ++#include <linux/file.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++ ++void ++gr_log_textrel(struct vm_area_struct * vma) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL ++ if (grsec_enable_audit_textrel) ++ security_audit(GR_TEXTREL_AUDIT_MSG, vma->vm_file ? ++ gr_to_filename(vma->vm_file->f_dentry, vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt) ++ : "<anonymous mapping>", vma->vm_start, ++ vma->vm_pgoff, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++#endif ++ return; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_time.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_time.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_time.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_time.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++void ++gr_log_timechange(void) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME ++ if (grsec_enable_time) ++ security_alert_good(GR_TIME_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); ++#endif ++ return; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/file.h> ++#include <linux/fs.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++extern int gr_acl_tpe_check(void); ++ ++int ++gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode; ++ ++ if (current->uid && ((grsec_enable_tpe && in_group_p(grsec_tpe_gid)) || gr_acl_tpe_check()) && ++ (inode->i_uid || (!inode->i_uid && ((inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) || ++ (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))))) { ++ security_alert(GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG, ++ gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 0; ++ } ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL ++ if (current->uid && grsec_enable_tpe && grsec_enable_tpe_all && ++ ((inode->i_uid && (inode->i_uid != current->uid)) || ++ (inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) || (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))) { ++ security_alert(GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG, ++ gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt), ++ DEFAULTSECARGS); ++ return 0; ++ } ++#endif ++#endif ++ return 1; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsum.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsum.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsum.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/grsum.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/mm.h> ++#include <asm/scatterlist.h> ++#include <linux/crypto.h> ++#include <linux/gracl.h> ++ ++ ++#if !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MODULE) || !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_MODULE) ++#error "crypto and sha256 must be built into the kernel" ++#endif ++ ++int ++chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum) ++{ ++ char *p; ++ struct crypto_tfm *tfm; ++ unsigned char temp_sum[GR_SHA_LEN]; ++ struct scatterlist sg[2]; ++ volatile int retval = 0; ++ volatile int dummy = 0; ++ unsigned int i; ++ ++ tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("sha256", 0); ++ if (tfm == NULL) { ++ /* should never happen, since sha256 should be built in */ ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ crypto_digest_init(tfm); ++ ++ p = salt; ++ sg[0].page = virt_to_page(p); ++ sg[0].offset = ((long) p & ~PAGE_MASK); ++ sg[0].length = GR_SALT_LEN; ++ ++ crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1); ++ ++ p = entry->pw; ++ sg[0].page = virt_to_page(p); ++ sg[0].offset = ((long) p & ~PAGE_MASK); ++ sg[0].length = strlen(entry->pw); ++ ++ crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1); ++ ++ crypto_digest_final(tfm, temp_sum); ++ ++ memset(entry->pw, 0, GR_PW_LEN); ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < GR_SHA_LEN; i++) ++ if (sum[i] != temp_sum[i]) ++ retval = 1; ++ else ++ dummy = 1; // waste a cycle ++ ++ crypto_free_tfm(tfm); ++ ++ return retval; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c +--- linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ ++ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 1996, 1997, 2000-2002 Michael Shalayeff. ++ * ++ * Version 1.89, last modified 19-Sep-99 ++ * ++ * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. ++ * All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Copyright 1998 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> ++ * All rights reserved. ++ * Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org> came up with the idea of using ++ * such a mathematical system to generate more random (yet non-repeating) ++ * ids to solve the resolver/named problem. But Niels designed the ++ * actual system based on the constraints. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer, ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/time.h> ++#include <linux/timer.h> ++#include <linux/smp_lock.h> ++#include <linux/random.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++ ++#define RU_OUT 180 ++#define RU_MAX 30000 ++#define RU_GEN 2 ++#define RU_N 32749 ++#define RU_AGEN 7 ++#define RU_M 31104 ++#define PFAC_N 3 ++const static __u16 pfacts[PFAC_N] = { 2, 3, 2729 }; ++ ++static __u16 ru_x; ++static __u16 ru_seed, ru_seed2; ++static __u16 ru_a, ru_b; ++static __u16 ru_g; ++static __u16 ru_counter = 0; ++static __u16 ru_msb = 0; ++static unsigned long ru_reseed = 0; ++static __u32 tmp; ++ ++#define TCP_RNDISS_ROUNDS 15 ++#define TCP_RNDISS_OUT 7200 ++#define TCP_RNDISS_MAX 30000 ++ ++static __u8 tcp_rndiss_sbox[128]; ++static __u16 tcp_rndiss_msb; ++static __u16 tcp_rndiss_cnt; ++static unsigned long tcp_rndiss_reseed; ++ ++static __u16 pmod(__u16, __u16, __u16); ++static void ip_initid(void); ++__u16 ip_randomid(void); ++ ++static __u16 ++pmod(__u16 gen, __u16 exp, __u16 mod) ++{ ++ __u16 s, t, u; ++ ++ s = 1; ++ t = gen; ++ u = exp; ++ ++ while (u) { ++ if (u & 1) ++ s = (s * t) % mod; ++ u >>= 1; ++ t = (t * t) % mod; ++ } ++ return (s); ++} ++ ++static void ++ip_initid(void) ++{ ++ __u16 j, i; ++ int noprime = 1; ++ ++ ru_x = ((tmp = get_random_long()) & 0xFFFF) % RU_M; ++ ++ ru_seed = (tmp >> 16) & 0x7FFF; ++ ru_seed2 = get_random_long() & 0x7FFF; ++ ++ ru_b = ((tmp = get_random_long()) & 0xfffe) | 1; ++ ru_a = pmod(RU_AGEN, (tmp >> 16) & 0xfffe, RU_M); ++ while (ru_b % 3 == 0) ++ ru_b += 2; ++ ++ j = (tmp = get_random_long()) % RU_N; ++ tmp = tmp >> 16; ++ ++ while (noprime) { ++ for (i = 0; i < PFAC_N; i++) ++ if (j % pfacts[i] == 0) ++ break; ++ ++ if (i >= PFAC_N) ++ noprime = 0; ++ else ++ j = (j + 1) % RU_N; ++ } ++ ++ ru_g = pmod(RU_GEN, j, RU_N); ++ ru_counter = 0; ++ ++ ru_reseed = xtime.tv_sec + RU_OUT; ++ ru_msb = ru_msb == 0x8000 ? 0 : 0x8000; ++} ++ ++__u16 ++ip_randomid(void) ++{ ++ int i, n; ++ ++ if (ru_counter >= RU_MAX || time_after(get_seconds(), ru_reseed)) ++ ip_initid(); ++ ++ if (!tmp) ++ tmp = get_random_long(); ++ ++ n = tmp & 0x3; ++ tmp = tmp >> 2; ++ if (ru_counter + n >= RU_MAX) ++ ip_initid(); ++ for (i = 0; i <= n; i++) ++ ru_x = (ru_a * ru_x + ru_b) % RU_M; ++ ru_counter += i; ++ ++ return ((ru_seed ^ pmod(ru_g, ru_seed2 ^ ru_x, RU_N)) | ru_msb); ++} ++ ++__u16 ++tcp_rndiss_encrypt(__u16 val) ++{ ++ __u16 sum = 0, i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < TCP_RNDISS_ROUNDS; i++) { ++ sum += 0x79b9; ++ val ^= ((__u16) tcp_rndiss_sbox[(val ^ sum) & 0x7f]) << 7; ++ val = ((val & 0xff) << 7) | (val >> 8); ++ } ++ ++ return val; ++} ++ ++static void ++tcp_rndiss_init(void) ++{ ++ get_random_bytes(tcp_rndiss_sbox, sizeof (tcp_rndiss_sbox)); ++ tcp_rndiss_reseed = get_seconds() + TCP_RNDISS_OUT; ++ tcp_rndiss_msb = tcp_rndiss_msb == 0x8000 ? 0 : 0x8000; ++ tcp_rndiss_cnt = 0; ++} ++ ++__u32 ++ip_randomisn(void) ++{ ++ if (tcp_rndiss_cnt >= TCP_RNDISS_MAX || ++ time_after(get_seconds(), tcp_rndiss_reseed)) ++ tcp_rndiss_init(); ++ ++ return (((tcp_rndiss_encrypt(tcp_rndiss_cnt++) | ++ tcp_rndiss_msb) << 16) | (get_random_long() & 0x7fff)); ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h 2004-04-03 22:37:37.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ + set_personality (((BFPM->sh_bang || EX.ah.entry < 0x100000000 \ + ? ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT : 0) | PER_OSF4)) + +-#define STACK_TOP \ ++#define __STACK_TOP \ + (current->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 0x80000000 : 0x00120000000UL) + + #endif +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/elf.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/elf.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/elf.h 2004-04-03 22:37:07.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/elf.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -84,6 +84,17 @@ + + #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + 0x1000000) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 0x10000 : 0x120000000UL) ++ ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 28) ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 28) ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 19) ++#endif ++ + /* $0 is set by ld.so to a pointer to a function which might be + registered using atexit. This provides a mean for the dynamic + linker to call DT_FINI functions for shared libraries that have +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/mman.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/mman.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/mman.h 2004-04-03 22:36:14.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/mman.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ + #define MAP_POPULATE 0x20000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */ + #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x40000 /* do not block on IO */ + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++#define MAP_MIRROR 0x20000 ++#endif ++ + #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */ + #define MS_SYNC 2 /* synchronous memory sync */ + #define MS_INVALIDATE 4 /* invalidate the caches */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/page.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/page.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/page.h 2004-04-03 22:37:40.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/page.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -98,6 +98,15 @@ + #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ + VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ ++ ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#else ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#endif ++#endif ++ + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ + + #endif /* _ALPHA_PAGE_H */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h 2004-04-03 22:36:54.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -96,6 +96,17 @@ + #define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS) + #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW) + #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW) ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOE) ++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW | _PAGE_FOE) ++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW | _PAGE_FOE) ++#else ++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED ++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY ++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY ++#endif ++ + #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_ASM | _PAGE_KRE | _PAGE_KWE) + + #define _PAGE_NORMAL(x) __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | (x)) +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/a.out.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/a.out.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/a.out.h 2004-04-03 22:36:57.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/a.out.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -19,7 +19,11 @@ + + #ifdef __KERNEL__ + +-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++#define __STACK_TOP ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)?TASK_SIZE/2:TASK_SIZE) ++#else ++#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE ++#endif + + #endif + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/desc.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/desc.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/desc.h 2004-04-03 22:36:12.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/desc.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -8,11 +8,19 @@ + + #include <linux/preempt.h> + #include <linux/smp.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> + + #include <asm/mmu.h> ++#include <asm/pgtable.h> ++#include <asm/tlbflush.h> + + extern struct desc_struct cpu_gdt_table[NR_CPUS][GDT_ENTRIES]; + ++static inline void pax_switch_segments(struct task_struct * tsk, int cpu) ++{ ++ cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS].b = tsk->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 0x60c9fb00U : 0x00cffb00U; ++} ++ + struct Xgt_desc_struct { + unsigned short size; + unsigned long address __attribute__((packed)); +@@ -28,7 +36,7 @@ + * This is the ldt that every process will get unless we need + * something other than this. + */ +-extern struct desc_struct default_ldt[]; ++extern const struct desc_struct default_ldt[]; + extern void set_intr_gate(unsigned int irq, void * addr); + + #define _set_tssldt_desc(n,addr,limit,type) \ +@@ -42,16 +50,50 @@ + "rorl $16,%%eax" \ + : "=m"(*(n)) : "a" (addr), "r"(n), "ir"(limit), "i"(type)) + +-static inline void __set_tss_desc(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int entry, void *addr) ++static inline void __set_tss_desc(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int entry, const void *addr) + { + _set_tssldt_desc(&cpu_gdt_table[cpu][entry], (int)addr, 235, 0x89); + } + + #define set_tss_desc(cpu,addr) __set_tss_desc(cpu, GDT_ENTRY_TSS, addr) + +-static inline void set_ldt_desc(unsigned int cpu, void *addr, unsigned int size) ++static inline void __set_ldt_desc(unsigned int cpu, const void *addr, unsigned int size) ++{ ++ _set_tssldt_desc(&cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_LDT], (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82); ++} ++ ++#define pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3) \ ++do { \ ++ typecheck(unsigned long,flags); \ ++ typecheck(unsigned long,cr3); \ ++ local_irq_save(flags); \ ++ asm("movl %%cr3,%0":"=r" (cr3)); \ ++ load_cr3(kernexec_pg_dir); \ ++} while(0) ++ ++#define pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3) \ ++do { \ ++ typecheck(unsigned long,flags); \ ++ typecheck(unsigned long,cr3); \ ++ asm("movl %0,%%cr3": :"r" (cr3)); \ ++ local_irq_restore(flags); \ ++} while(0) ++ ++static inline void set_ldt_desc(unsigned int cpu, const void *addr, unsigned int size) + { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ unsigned long flags, cr3; ++ ++ pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3); ++#endif ++ + _set_tssldt_desc(&cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_LDT], (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++ pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3); ++#endif ++ + } + + #define LDT_entry_a(info) \ +@@ -67,7 +109,7 @@ + ((info)->seg_32bit << 22) | \ + ((info)->limit_in_pages << 23) | \ + ((info)->useable << 20) | \ +- 0x7000) ++ 0x7100) + + #define LDT_empty(info) (\ + (info)->base_addr == 0 && \ +@@ -104,7 +146,7 @@ + */ + static inline void load_LDT_nolock(mm_context_t *pc, int cpu) + { +- void *segments = pc->ldt; ++ const void *segments = pc->ldt; + int count = pc->size; + + if (likely(!count)) { +@@ -123,6 +165,22 @@ + put_cpu(); + } + ++static inline void _load_LDT(mm_context_t *pc) ++{ ++ int cpu = get_cpu(); ++ const void *segments = pc->ldt; ++ int count = pc->size; ++ ++ if (likely(!count)) { ++ segments = &default_ldt[0]; ++ count = 5; ++ } ++ ++ __set_ldt_desc(cpu, segments, count); ++ load_LDT_desc(); ++ put_cpu(); ++} ++ + #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ + + #endif +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/elf.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/elf.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/elf.h 2004-04-03 22:37:36.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/elf.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -70,7 +70,22 @@ + the loader. We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program + that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk. */ + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)?SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE/3*2:TASK_SIZE/3*2) ++#else + #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2) ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x08048000UL ++ ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 16 ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 16 ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 15 : 16) ++#endif + + /* regs is struct pt_regs, pr_reg is elf_gregset_t (which is + now struct_user_regs, they are different) */ +@@ -113,8 +128,11 @@ + * Architecture-neutral AT_ values in 0-17, leave some room + * for more of them, start the x86-specific ones at 32. + */ ++ ++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL + #define AT_SYSINFO 32 + #define AT_SYSINFO_EHDR 33 ++#endif + + #ifdef __KERNEL__ + #define SET_PERSONALITY(ex, ibcs2) set_personality((ibcs2)?PER_SVR4:PER_LINUX) +@@ -129,7 +147,14 @@ + + #define VSYSCALL_BASE (__fix_to_virt(FIX_VSYSCALL)) + #define VSYSCALL_EHDR ((const struct elfhdr *) VSYSCALL_BASE) ++ ++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++#define VSYSCALL_ENTRY ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ? (unsigned long) &__kernel_vsyscall - SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE : (unsigned long) &__kernel_vsyscall) ++#else + #define VSYSCALL_ENTRY ((unsigned long) &__kernel_vsyscall) ++#endif ++ + extern void __kernel_vsyscall; + + #define ARCH_DLINFO \ +@@ -185,3 +210,5 @@ + #endif + + #endif ++ ++#endif +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h 2004-04-03 22:36:26.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ + __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS + "pushl %%edi\n\t" + "pushl %%ebp\n\t" +- "lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t" ++ "lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t" + "setc %%al\n\t" + "popl %%ebp\n\t" + "popl %%edi\n\t" +@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ + __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS + "pushl %%edi\n\t" + "pushl %%ebp\n\t" +- "lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t" ++ "lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t" + "setc %%bl\n\t" + "popl %%ebp\n\t" + "popl %%edi\n\t" +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/mach-pc9800/apm.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/mach-pc9800/apm.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/mach-pc9800/apm.h 2004-04-03 22:36:57.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/mach-pc9800/apm.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ + "pushl %%edi\n\t" + "pushl %%ebp\n\t" + "pushfl\n\t" +- "lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t" ++ "lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t" + "setc %%al\n\t" + "popl %%ebp\n\t" + "popl %%edi\n\t" +@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ + "pushl %%edi\n\t" + "pushl %%ebp\n\t" + "pushfl\n\t" +- "lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t" ++ "lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t" + "setc %%bl\n\t" + "popl %%ebp\n\t" + "popl %%edi\n\t" +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/mman.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/mman.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/mman.h 2004-04-03 22:36:24.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/mman.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ + #define MAP_POPULATE 0x8000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */ + #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x10000 /* do not block on IO */ + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++#define MAP_MIRROR 0x20000 ++#endif ++ + #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */ + #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */ + #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/module.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/module.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/module.h 2004-04-03 22:36:24.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/module.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ + #define MODULE_REGPARM "" + #endif + +-#define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC MODULE_PROC_FAMILY MODULE_REGPARM ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++#define MODULE_GRSEC "GRSECURITY " ++#else ++#define MODULE_GRSEC "" ++#endif ++ ++#define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC MODULE_PROC_FAMILY MODULE_REGPARM MODULE_GRSEC + + #endif /* _ASM_I386_MODULE_H */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/page.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/page.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/page.h 2004-04-03 22:36:25.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/page.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -120,6 +120,19 @@ + #define __PAGE_OFFSET (0xC0000000UL) + #endif + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ ++#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET (0xC0400000) ++#else ++#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET (0xC0400000UL) ++#endif ++#else ++#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ ++#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET (0) ++#else ++#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET (0x0UL) ++#endif ++#endif + + #define PAGE_OFFSET ((unsigned long)__PAGE_OFFSET) + #define VMALLOC_RESERVE ((unsigned long)__VMALLOC_RESERVE) +@@ -139,6 +152,15 @@ + #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ + VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ ++ ((current->flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC|PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#else ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC|PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#endif ++#endif ++ + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ + + #endif /* _I386_PAGE_H */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h 2004-04-03 22:36:16.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ + #include <linux/mm.h> /* for struct page */ + + #define pmd_populate_kernel(mm, pmd, pte) \ +- set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_PAGE_TABLE + __pa(pte))) ++ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE + __pa(pte))) + + static inline void pmd_populate(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd, struct page *pte) + { +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h 2004-04-03 22:37:38.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -32,6 +32,11 @@ + #define ZERO_PAGE(vaddr) (virt_to_page(empty_zero_page)) + extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[1024]; + extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[1024]; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC ++extern pgd_t kernexec_pg_dir[1024]; ++#endif ++ + extern kmem_cache_t *pgd_cache; + extern kmem_cache_t *pmd_cache; + extern spinlock_t pgd_lock; +@@ -130,6 +135,16 @@ + #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED) + #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED) ++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED) ++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED) ++#else ++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED ++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY ++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY ++#endif ++ + #define _PAGE_KERNEL \ + (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED) + +@@ -149,18 +164,18 @@ + * This is the closest we can get.. + */ + #define __P000 PAGE_NONE +-#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY +-#define __P010 PAGE_COPY +-#define __P011 PAGE_COPY ++#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC ++#define __P010 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC ++#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC + #define __P100 PAGE_READONLY + #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY + #define __P110 PAGE_COPY + #define __P111 PAGE_COPY + + #define __S000 PAGE_NONE +-#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY +-#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED +-#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED ++#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC ++#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC ++#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC + #define __S100 PAGE_READONLY + #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY + #define __S110 PAGE_SHARED +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/processor.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/processor.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/processor.h 2004-04-03 22:36:16.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/processor.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -296,10 +296,19 @@ + */ + #define TASK_SIZE (PAGE_OFFSET) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++#define SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE ((PAGE_OFFSET) / 2) ++#endif ++ + /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm + * space during mmap's. + */ ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (PAGE_ALIGN((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)?SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE/3:TASK_SIZE/3)) ++#else + #define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE / 3)) ++#endif + + /* + * Size of io_bitmap, covering ports 0 to 0x3ff. +@@ -624,7 +633,7 @@ + extern inline void prefetch(const void *x) + { + alternative_input(ASM_NOP4, +- "prefetchnta (%1)", ++ "prefetchnta (%2)", + X86_FEATURE_XMM, + "r" (x)); + } +@@ -638,7 +647,7 @@ + extern inline void prefetchw(const void *x) + { + alternative_input(ASM_NOP4, +- "prefetchw (%1)", ++ "prefetchw (%2)", + X86_FEATURE_3DNOW, + "r" (x)); + } +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/system.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/system.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/system.h 2004-04-03 22:36:13.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-i386/system.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ + #include <linux/kernel.h> + #include <asm/segment.h> + #include <asm/cpufeature.h> ++#include <asm/page.h> + #include <linux/bitops.h> /* for LOCK_PREFIX */ + + #ifdef __KERNEL__ +@@ -301,7 +302,7 @@ + asm volatile ("661:\n\t" oldinstr "\n662:\n" \ + ".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n" \ + " .align 4\n" \ +- " .long 661b\n" /* label */ \ ++ " .long 661b + %c1\n" /* label */ \ + " .long 663f\n" /* new instruction */ \ + " .byte %c0\n" /* feature bit */ \ + " .byte 662b-661b\n" /* sourcelen */ \ +@@ -309,7 +310,7 @@ + ".previous\n" \ + ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"ax\"\n" \ + "663:\n\t" newinstr "\n664:\n" /* replacement */ \ +- ".previous" :: "i" (feature) : "memory") ++ ".previous" :: "i" (feature), "i" (__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) : "memory") + + /* + * Alternative inline assembly with input. +@@ -325,7 +326,7 @@ + asm volatile ("661:\n\t" oldinstr "\n662:\n" \ + ".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n" \ + " .align 4\n" \ +- " .long 661b\n" /* label */ \ ++ " .long 661b + %c1\n" /* label */ \ + " .long 663f\n" /* new instruction */ \ + " .byte %c0\n" /* feature bit */ \ + " .byte 662b-661b\n" /* sourcelen */ \ +@@ -333,7 +334,7 @@ + ".previous\n" \ + ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"ax\"\n" \ + "663:\n\t" newinstr "\n664:\n" /* replacement */ \ +- ".previous" :: "i" (feature), input) ++ ".previous" :: "i" (feature), "i" (__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET), input) + + /* + * Force strict CPU ordering. +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/elf.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/elf.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/elf.h 2004-04-03 22:37:37.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/elf.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -162,6 +162,16 @@ + typedef struct ia64_fpreg elf_fpreg_t; + typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_NFPREG]; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 0x08048000UL : 0x4000000000000000UL) ++ ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - PAGE_SHIFT) ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - PAGE_SHIFT) ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - PAGE_SHIFT) ++#endif + + + struct pt_regs; /* forward declaration... */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/mman.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/mman.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/mman.h 2004-04-03 22:37:07.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/mman.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ + #define MAP_POPULATE 0x08000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */ + #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x10000 /* do not block on IO */ + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++#define MAP_MIRROR 0x40000 ++#endif ++ + #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */ + #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */ + #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/page.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/page.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/page.h 2004-04-03 22:36:19.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/page.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -187,4 +187,13 @@ + (((current->thread.flags & IA64_THREAD_XSTACK) != 0) \ + ? VM_EXEC : 0)) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ ++ ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#else ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#endif ++#endif ++ + #endif /* _ASM_IA64_PAGE_H */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h 2004-04-03 22:36:54.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -120,6 +120,17 @@ + #define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_RW) + #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R) + #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_RX) ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_RW) ++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R) ++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R) ++#else ++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED ++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY ++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY ++#endif ++ + #define PAGE_GATE __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_X_RX) + #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(__DIRTY_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_RWX) + #define PAGE_KERNELRX __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_RX) +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h 2004-04-03 22:38:21.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -11,6 +11,6 @@ + #define MAX_USER_STACK_SIZE (RGN_MAP_LIMIT/2) + /* Make a default stack size of 2GB */ + #define DEFAULT_USER_STACK_SIZE (1UL << 31) +-#define STACK_TOP (0x6000000000000000UL + RGN_MAP_LIMIT) ++#define __STACK_TOP (0x6000000000000000UL + RGN_MAP_LIMIT) + + #endif /* _ASM_IA64_USTACK_H */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-mips/a.out.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-mips/a.out.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-mips/a.out.h 2004-04-03 22:36:56.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-mips/a.out.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ + #ifdef __KERNEL__ + + #ifdef CONFIG_MIPS32 +-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE ++#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE + #endif + #ifdef CONFIG_MIPS64 +-#define STACK_TOP (current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR ? TASK_SIZE32 : TASK_SIZE) ++#define __STACK_TOP (current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR ? TASK_SIZE32 : TASK_SIZE) + #endif + + #endif +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-mips/elf.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-mips/elf.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-mips/elf.h 2004-04-03 22:36:57.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-mips/elf.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -273,4 +273,15 @@ + #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2) + #endif + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL) ++ ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) ++#endif ++ + #endif /* _ASM_ELF_H */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-mips/page.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-mips/page.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-mips/page.h 2004-04-03 22:36:56.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-mips/page.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -130,6 +130,15 @@ + #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ + VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ ++ ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#else ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#endif ++#endif ++ + #define UNCAC_ADDR(addr) ((addr) - PAGE_OFFSET + UNCAC_BASE) + #define CAC_ADDR(addr) ((addr) - UNCAC_BASE + PAGE_OFFSET) + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h 2004-04-03 22:38:18.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ + /* XXX: STACK_TOP actually should be STACK_BOTTOM for parisc. + * prumpf */ + +-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE ++#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE + + #endif + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/elf.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/elf.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/elf.h 2004-04-03 22:37:37.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/elf.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -337,6 +337,17 @@ + + #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + 0x01000000) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000UL ++ ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 16 ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 16 ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 16 ++#endif ++ + /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what + instruction set this CPU supports. This could be done in user space, + but it's not easy, and we've already done it here. */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/mman.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/mman.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/mman.h 2004-04-03 22:37:24.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/mman.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ + #define MAP_POPULATE 0x10000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */ + #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x20000 /* do not block on IO */ + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0400 ++#endif ++ + #define MS_SYNC 1 /* synchronous memory sync */ + #define MS_ASYNC 2 /* sync memory asynchronously */ + #define MS_INVALIDATE 4 /* invalidate the caches */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/page.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/page.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/page.h 2004-04-03 22:36:26.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/page.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -113,6 +113,15 @@ + #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ + VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ ++ ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#else ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#endif ++#endif ++ + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ + + #endif /* _PARISC_PAGE_H */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h 2004-04-03 22:38:13.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -179,6 +179,17 @@ + #define PAGE_EXECREAD __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC |_PAGE_ACCESSED) + #define PAGE_COPY PAGE_EXECREAD + #define PAGE_RWX __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_EXEC |_PAGE_ACCESSED) ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_ACCESSED) ++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_ACCESSED) ++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_ACCESSED) ++#else ++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED ++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY ++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY ++#endif ++ + #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL) + #define PAGE_KERNEL_RO __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED) + #define PAGE_KERNEL_UNC __pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_NO_CACHE) +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h 2004-04-03 22:37:07.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ + #define __PPC_A_OUT_H__ + + /* grabbed from the intel stuff */ +-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE ++#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE + + + struct exec +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/elf.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/elf.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/elf.h 2004-04-03 22:36:13.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/elf.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -87,6 +87,17 @@ + + #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (0x08000000) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000000UL ++ ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 15 ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 15 ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 15 ++#endif ++ + #define USE_ELF_CORE_DUMP + #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE 4096 + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/mman.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/mman.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/mman.h 2004-04-03 22:38:28.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/mman.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ + #define MAP_POPULATE 0x8000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */ + #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x10000 /* do not block on IO */ + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0200 ++#endif ++ + #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */ + #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */ + #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/page.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/page.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/page.h 2004-04-03 22:36:53.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/page.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -162,5 +162,14 @@ + #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ + VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ ++ ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#else ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#endif ++#endif ++ + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ + #endif /* _PPC_PAGE_H */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h 2004-04-03 22:36:26.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -349,11 +349,21 @@ + + #define PAGE_NONE __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE) + #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER) +-#define PAGE_READONLY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC) ++#define PAGE_READONLY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC) + #define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW) +-#define PAGE_SHARED_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC) ++#define PAGE_SHARED_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC) + #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER) +-#define PAGE_COPY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC) ++#define PAGE_COPY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC) ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_40x) && !defined(CONFIG_44x) ++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_GUARDED) ++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED) ++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED) ++#else ++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED ++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY ++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY ++#endif + + #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_RAM) + #define PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE __pgprot(_PAGE_IO) +@@ -365,21 +375,21 @@ + * This is the closest we can get.. + */ + #define __P000 PAGE_NONE +-#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_X +-#define __P010 PAGE_COPY +-#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_X +-#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY ++#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC ++#define __P010 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC ++#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC ++#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_X + #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_X +-#define __P110 PAGE_COPY ++#define __P110 PAGE_COPY_X + #define __P111 PAGE_COPY_X + + #define __S000 PAGE_NONE +-#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_X +-#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED +-#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_X +-#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY ++#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC ++#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC ++#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC ++#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_X + #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_X +-#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED ++#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_X + #define __S111 PAGE_SHARED_X + + #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h 2004-04-03 22:36:16.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ + + #include <asm/page.h> + +-#define STACK_TOP (PAGE_OFFSET - PAGE_SIZE) ++#define __STACK_TOP (PAGE_OFFSET - PAGE_SIZE) + + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/elf.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/elf.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/elf.h 2004-04-03 22:37:43.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/elf.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -145,6 +145,17 @@ + + #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (0x08000000) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000UL ++ ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 16 ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 16 ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 16 ++#endif ++ + /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what + instruction set this cpu supports. This can NOT be done in userspace + on Sparc. */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/mman.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/mman.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/mman.h 2004-04-03 22:38:20.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/mman.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ + #define MAP_DENYWRITE 0x0800 /* ETXTBSY */ + #define MAP_EXECUTABLE 0x1000 /* mark it as an executable */ + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0400 ++#endif ++ + #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */ + #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */ + #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/page.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/page.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/page.h 2004-04-03 22:36:53.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/page.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -176,6 +176,15 @@ + #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ + VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ ++ ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#else ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#endif ++#endif ++ + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ + + #endif /* _SPARC_PAGE_H */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h 2004-04-03 22:37:23.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -109,6 +109,13 @@ + BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_shared) + BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_copy) + BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_readonly) ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_shared_noexec) ++BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_copy_noexec) ++BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_readonly_noexec) ++#endif ++ + BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_kernel) + + #define PMD_SHIFT BTFIXUP_SIMM13(pmd_shift) +@@ -130,6 +137,16 @@ + #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_copy)) + #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_readonly)) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_shared_noexec)) ++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_copy_noexec)) ++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_readonly_noexec)) ++#else ++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED ++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY ++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY ++#endif ++ + extern unsigned long page_kernel; + + #ifdef MODULE +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h 2004-04-03 22:36:55.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -103,6 +103,16 @@ + SRMMU_EXEC | SRMMU_REF) + #define SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \ + SRMMU_EXEC | SRMMU_REF) ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++#define SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \ ++ SRMMU_WRITE | SRMMU_REF) ++#define SRMMU_PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \ ++ SRMMU_REF) ++#define SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \ ++ SRMMU_REF) ++#endif ++ + #define SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | SRMMU_PRIV | \ + SRMMU_DIRTY | SRMMU_REF) + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h 2004-04-03 22:38:14.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ + * No one can read/write anything from userland in the kernel space by setting + * large size and address near to PAGE_OFFSET - a fault will break his intentions. + */ +-#define __user_ok(addr,size) ((addr) < STACK_TOP) ++#define __user_ok(addr,size) ((addr) < __STACK_TOP) + #define __kernel_ok (segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)) + #define __access_ok(addr,size) (__user_ok((addr) & get_fs().seg,(size))) + #define access_ok(type,addr,size) __access_ok((unsigned long)(addr),(size)) +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h 2004-04-03 22:37:37.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ + + #ifdef __KERNEL__ + +-#define STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0xf0000000 : 0x80000000000L) ++#define __STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0xf0000000 : 0x80000000000L) + + #endif + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h 2004-04-03 22:36:55.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -140,6 +140,16 @@ + #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE 0x0000010000000000UL + #endif + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0x10000UL : 0x100000UL) ++ ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) (PAGE_SHIFT + 1) ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 14 : 28 ) ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) (PAGE_SHIFT + 1) ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 14 : 28 ) ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 15 : 29 ) ++#endif + + /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what + instruction set this cpu supports. */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h 2004-04-03 22:37:06.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ + #define MAP_DENYWRITE 0x0800 /* ETXTBSY */ + #define MAP_EXECUTABLE 0x1000 /* mark it as an executable */ + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0400 ++#endif ++ + #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */ + #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */ + #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/page.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/page.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/page.h 2004-04-03 22:36:57.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/page.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -174,6 +174,15 @@ + #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ + VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ ++ ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#else ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#endif ++#endif ++ + #endif /* !(__KERNEL__) */ + + #endif /* !(_SPARC64_PAGE_H) */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/pgtable.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/pgtable.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/pgtable.h 2004-04-03 22:36:14.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-sparc64/pgtable.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -124,7 +124,8 @@ + + /* Here are the SpitFire software bits we use in the TTE's. */ + #define _PAGE_FILE 0x0000000000001000 /* Pagecache page */ +-#define _PAGE_MODIFIED 0x0000000000000800 /* Modified Page (ie. dirty) */ ++#define _PAGE_MODIFIED 0x0000000000001000 /* Modified Page (ie. dirty) */ ++#define _PAGE_EXEC 0x0000000000000800 /* Executable SW Bit */ + #define _PAGE_ACCESSED 0x0000000000000400 /* Accessed Page (ie. referenced) */ + #define _PAGE_READ 0x0000000000000200 /* Readable SW Bit */ + #define _PAGE_WRITE 0x0000000000000100 /* Writable SW Bit */ +@@ -160,34 +161,48 @@ + + /* Don't set the TTE _PAGE_W bit here, else the dirty bit never gets set. */ + #define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \ +- __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_WRITE) ++ __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_EXEC) + + #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \ +- __ACCESS_BITS) ++ __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_EXEC) + + #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \ +- __ACCESS_BITS) ++ __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_EXEC) + + #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \ +- __PRIV_BITS | __ACCESS_BITS | __DIRTY_BITS) ++ __PRIV_BITS | __ACCESS_BITS | __DIRTY_BITS | \ ++ _PAGE_EXEC) ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \ ++ __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_WRITE) ++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \ ++ __ACCESS_BITS) ++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \ ++ __ACCESS_BITS) ++#else ++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED ++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY ++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY ++#endif + + #define _PFN_MASK _PAGE_PADDR + + #define pg_iobits (_PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_PRESENT | __DIRTY_BITS | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_E) + + #define __P000 PAGE_NONE +-#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY +-#define __P010 PAGE_COPY +-#define __P011 PAGE_COPY ++#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC ++#define __P010 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC ++#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC + #define __P100 PAGE_READONLY + #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY + #define __P110 PAGE_COPY + #define __P111 PAGE_COPY + + #define __S000 PAGE_NONE +-#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY +-#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED +-#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED ++#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC ++#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC ++#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC + #define __S100 PAGE_READONLY + #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY + #define __S110 PAGE_SHARED +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h 2004-04-03 22:36:57.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ + + #ifdef __KERNEL__ + #include <linux/thread_info.h> +-#define STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? IA32_PAGE_OFFSET : TASK_SIZE) ++#define __STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? IA32_PAGE_OFFSET : TASK_SIZE) + #endif + + #endif /* __A_OUT_GNU_H__ */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h 2004-04-03 22:37:44.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -89,6 +89,17 @@ + + #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (2 * TASK_SIZE / 3) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 0x08048000UL : 0x400000UL) ++ ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24) ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24) ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT ++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24) ++#endif ++ + /* regs is struct pt_regs, pr_reg is elf_gregset_t (which is + now struct_user_regs, they are different). Assumes current is the process + getting dumped. */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h 2004-04-03 22:37:37.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ + #define MAP_POPULATE 0x8000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */ + #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x10000 /* do not block on IO */ + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++#define MAP_MIRROR 0x8000 ++#endif ++ + #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */ + #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */ + #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/page.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/page.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/page.h 2004-04-03 22:36:16.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/page.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -127,6 +127,16 @@ + + #define __VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ + VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++#define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS __VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ ++ ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#else ++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) ++#endif ++#else + #define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_GROWSDOWN | VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ + VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) + +@@ -137,6 +147,8 @@ + #define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS \ + (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? vm_stack_flags32 : vm_stack_flags) + ++#endif ++ + #define CONFIG_ARCH_GATE_AREA 1 + + #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h 2004-04-03 22:37:07.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ + #include <linux/mm.h> + + #define pmd_populate_kernel(mm, pmd, pte) \ +- set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_PAGE_TABLE | __pa(pte))) ++ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(pte))) + #define pgd_populate(mm, pgd, pmd) \ + set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_PAGE_TABLE | __pa(pmd))) + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h 2004-04-03 22:37:37.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -170,6 +170,10 @@ + #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED) + #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX) + #define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED) ++ ++#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY ++#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED ++ + #define __PAGE_KERNEL \ + (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX) + #define __PAGE_KERNEL_EXECUTABLE \ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/a.out.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/a.out.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/a.out.h 2004-04-03 22:37:24.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/a.out.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -7,6 +7,16 @@ + + #include <asm/a.out.h> + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK ++#define __DELTA_STACK (current->mm->delta_stack) ++#else ++#define __DELTA_STACK 0UL ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef STACK_TOP ++#define STACK_TOP (__STACK_TOP - __DELTA_STACK) ++#endif ++ + #endif /* __STRUCT_EXEC_OVERRIDE__ */ + + /* these go in the N_MACHTYPE field */ +@@ -37,6 +47,14 @@ + M_MIPS2 = 152 /* MIPS R6000/R4000 binary */ + }; + ++/* Constants for the N_FLAGS field */ ++#define F_PAX_PAGEEXEC 1 /* Paging based non-executable pages */ ++#define F_PAX_EMUTRAMP 2 /* Emulate trampolines */ ++#define F_PAX_MPROTECT 4 /* Restrict mprotect() */ ++#define F_PAX_RANDMMAP 8 /* Randomize mmap() base */ ++#define F_PAX_RANDEXEC 16 /* Randomize ET_EXEC base */ ++#define F_PAX_SEGMEXEC 32 /* Segmentation based non-executable pages */ ++ + #if !defined (N_MAGIC) + #define N_MAGIC(exec) ((exec).a_info & 0xffff) + #endif +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/binfmts.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/binfmts.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/binfmts.h 2004-04-03 22:37:07.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/binfmts.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ + of the time same as filename, but could be + different for binfmt_{misc,script} */ + unsigned long loader, exec; ++ int misc; + }; + + /* +@@ -65,5 +66,8 @@ + extern int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs); + extern int set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new); + ++void pax_report_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void *pc, void *sp); ++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp); ++ + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ + #endif /* _LINUX_BINFMTS_H */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/elf.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/elf.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/elf.h 2004-04-03 22:36:25.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/elf.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -35,6 +35,17 @@ + #define PT_HIPROC 0x7fffffff + #define PT_GNU_EH_FRAME 0x6474e550 + ++#define PT_GNU_STACK (PT_LOOS + 0x474e551) ++#define PT_PAX_FLAGS (PT_LOOS + 0x5041580) ++ ++/* Constants for the e_flags field */ ++#define EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC 1 /* Paging based non-executable pages */ ++#define EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP 2 /* Emulate trampolines */ ++#define EF_PAX_MPROTECT 4 /* Restrict mprotect() */ ++#define EF_PAX_RANDMMAP 8 /* Randomize mmap() base */ ++#define EF_PAX_RANDEXEC 16 /* Randomize ET_EXEC base */ ++#define EF_PAX_SEGMEXEC 32 /* Segmentation based non-executable pages */ ++ + /* These constants define the different elf file types */ + #define ET_NONE 0 + #define ET_REL 1 +@@ -121,6 +132,8 @@ + #define DT_DEBUG 21 + #define DT_TEXTREL 22 + #define DT_JMPREL 23 ++#define DT_FLAGS 30 ++ #define DF_TEXTREL 0x00000004 + #define DT_LOPROC 0x70000000 + #define DT_HIPROC 0x7fffffff + +@@ -271,6 +284,19 @@ + #define PF_W 0x2 + #define PF_X 0x1 + ++#define PF_PAGEEXEC (1 << 4) /* Enable PAGEEXEC */ ++#define PF_NOPAGEEXEC (1 << 5) /* Disable PAGEEXEC */ ++#define PF_SEGMEXEC (1 << 6) /* Enable SEGMEXEC */ ++#define PF_NOSEGMEXEC (1 << 7) /* Disable SEGMEXEC */ ++#define PF_MPROTECT (1 << 8) /* Enable MPROTECT */ ++#define PF_NOMPROTECT (1 << 9) /* Disable MPROTECT */ ++#define PF_RANDEXEC (1 << 10) /* Enable RANDEXEC */ ++#define PF_NORANDEXEC (1 << 11) /* Disable RANDEXEC */ ++#define PF_EMUTRAMP (1 << 12) /* Enable EMUTRAMP */ ++#define PF_NOEMUTRAMP (1 << 13) /* Disable EMUTRAMP */ ++#define PF_RANDMMAP (1 << 14) /* Enable RANDMMAP */ ++#define PF_NORANDMMAP (1 << 15) /* Disable RANDMMAP */ ++ + typedef struct elf32_phdr{ + Elf32_Word p_type; + Elf32_Off p_offset; +@@ -363,6 +389,8 @@ + #define EI_OSABI 7 + #define EI_PAD 8 + ++#define EI_PAX 14 ++ + #define ELFMAG0 0x7f /* EI_MAG */ + #define ELFMAG1 'E' + #define ELFMAG2 'L' +@@ -419,6 +447,7 @@ + #define elfhdr elf32_hdr + #define elf_phdr elf32_phdr + #define elf_note elf32_note ++#define elf_dyn Elf32_Dyn + + #else + +@@ -426,6 +455,7 @@ + #define elfhdr elf64_hdr + #define elf_phdr elf64_phdr + #define elf_note elf64_note ++#define elf_dyn Elf64_Dyn + + #endif + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/fs.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/fs.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/fs.h 2004-04-03 22:36:52.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/fs.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@ + + /* fs/open.c */ + +-extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start); ++extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start, struct vfsmount *); + extern struct file *filp_open(const char *, int, int); + extern struct file * dentry_open(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, int); + extern int filp_close(struct file *, fl_owner_t id); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/gracl.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/gracl.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/gracl.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/gracl.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ ++#ifndef GR_ACL_H ++#define GR_ACL_H ++#endif ++#include <linux/grdefs.h> ++#include <linux/resource.h> ++#include <linux/dcache.h> ++#include <asm/resource.h> ++ ++/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ++ * grsecurity ACL System ++ * Main header file ++ * Purpose: define most gracl data structures ++ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */ ++ ++/* Major status information */ ++ ++#define GR_VERSION "grsecurity 2.0" ++ ++enum { ++ ++ SHUTDOWN = 0, ++ ENABLE = 1, ++ SPROLE = 2, ++ RELOAD = 3, ++ SEGVMOD = 4, ++ STATUS = 5, ++ UNSPROLE = 6 ++}; ++ ++/* Password setup definitions ++ * kernel/grhash.c */ ++enum { ++ GR_PW_LEN = 128, ++ GR_SALT_LEN = 16, ++ GR_SHA_LEN = 32, ++}; ++ ++enum { ++ GR_SPROLE_LEN = 64, ++}; ++ ++/* Begin Data Structures */ ++ ++struct sprole_pw { ++ unsigned char *rolename; ++ unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN]; ++ unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN]; /* 256-bit SHA hash of the password */ ++}; ++ ++struct name_entry { ++ ino_t inode; ++ dev_t device; ++ char *name; ++ __u16 len; ++}; ++ ++struct acl_role_db { ++ struct acl_role_label **r_hash; ++ __u32 r_size; ++}; ++ ++struct name_db { ++ struct name_entry **n_hash; ++ __u32 n_size; ++}; ++ ++struct crash_uid { ++ uid_t uid; ++ unsigned long expires; ++}; ++ ++struct gr_hash_struct { ++ void **table; ++ void **nametable; ++ void *first; ++ __u32 table_size; ++ __u32 used_size; ++ int type; ++}; ++ ++/* Userspace Grsecurity ACL data structures */ ++struct acl_subject_label { ++ char *filename; ++ ino_t inode; ++ dev_t device; ++ __u32 mode; ++ __u32 cap_mask; ++ __u32 cap_lower; ++ ++ struct rlimit res[RLIM_NLIMITS + 1]; ++ __u16 resmask; ++ ++ __u8 user_trans_type; ++ __u8 group_trans_type; ++ uid_t *user_transitions; ++ gid_t *group_transitions; ++ __u16 user_trans_num; ++ __u16 group_trans_num; ++ ++ __u32 ip_proto[8]; ++ __u32 ip_type; ++ struct acl_ip_label **ips; ++ __u32 ip_num; ++ ++ __u32 crashes; ++ unsigned long expires; ++ ++ struct acl_subject_label *parent_subject; ++ struct gr_hash_struct *hash; ++ struct acl_ip_label *ip_object; ++ struct acl_subject_label *prev; ++ struct acl_subject_label *next; ++ ++ struct acl_object_label **obj_hash; ++ __u32 obj_hash_size; ++}; ++ ++struct role_allowed_ip { ++ __u32 addr; ++ __u32 netmask; ++ ++ struct role_allowed_ip *prev; ++ struct role_allowed_ip *next; ++}; ++ ++struct role_transition { ++ char *rolename; ++ ++ struct role_transition *prev; ++ struct role_transition *next; ++}; ++ ++struct acl_role_label { ++ char *rolename; ++ uid_t uidgid; ++ __u16 roletype; ++ ++ __u16 auth_attempts; ++ unsigned long expires; ++ ++ struct acl_subject_label *root_label; ++ struct gr_hash_struct *hash; ++ ++ struct acl_role_label *prev; ++ struct acl_role_label *next; ++ ++ struct role_transition *transitions; ++ struct role_allowed_ip *allowed_ips; ++ struct acl_subject_label **subj_hash; ++ __u32 subj_hash_size; ++}; ++ ++struct user_acl_role_db { ++ struct acl_role_label **r_table; ++ __u32 r_entries; /* number of entries in table */ ++ __u32 s_entries; /* total number of subject acls */ ++ __u32 i_entries; /* total number of ip acls */ ++ __u32 o_entries; /* Total number of object acls */ ++ __u32 g_entries; /* total number of globbed objects */ ++ __u32 a_entries; /* total number of allowed ips */ ++ __u32 t_entries; /* total number of transitions */ ++}; ++ ++struct acl_object_label { ++ char *filename; ++ ino_t inode; ++ dev_t device; ++ __u32 mode; ++ ++ struct acl_subject_label *nested; ++ struct acl_object_label *globbed; ++ ++ /* next two structures not used */ ++ ++ struct acl_object_label *prev; ++ struct acl_object_label *next; ++}; ++ ++struct acl_ip_label { ++ __u32 addr; ++ __u32 netmask; ++ __u16 low, high; ++ __u8 mode; ++ __u32 type; ++ __u32 proto[8]; ++ ++ /* next two structures not used */ ++ ++ struct acl_ip_label *prev; ++ struct acl_ip_label *next; ++}; ++ ++struct gr_arg { ++ struct user_acl_role_db role_db; ++ unsigned char pw[GR_PW_LEN]; ++ unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN]; ++ unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN]; ++ unsigned char sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN]; ++ struct sprole_pw *sprole_pws; ++ dev_t segv_device; ++ ino_t segv_inode; ++ uid_t segv_uid; ++ __u16 num_sprole_pws; ++ __u16 mode; ++}; ++ ++struct subject_map { ++ struct acl_subject_label *user; ++ struct acl_subject_label *kernel; ++}; ++ ++struct acl_subj_map_db { ++ struct subject_map **s_hash; ++ __u32 s_size; ++}; ++ ++/* End Data Structures Section */ ++ ++/* Hash functions generated by empirical testing by Brad Spengler ++ Makes good use of the low bits of the inode. Generally 0-1 times ++ in loop for successful match. 0-3 for unsuccessful match. ++ Shift/add algorithm with modulus of table size and an XOR*/ ++ ++static __inline__ unsigned long ++rhash(const uid_t uid, const __u16 type, const unsigned long sz) ++{ ++ return (((uid << type) + (uid ^ type)) % sz); ++} ++ ++ static __inline__ unsigned long ++shash(const struct acl_subject_label *userp, const unsigned long sz) ++{ ++ return ((const unsigned long)userp % sz); ++} ++ ++static __inline__ unsigned long ++fhash(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev, const unsigned long sz) ++{ ++ return (((ino + dev) ^ ((ino << 13) + (ino << 23) + (dev << 9))) % sz); ++} ++ ++static __inline__ unsigned long ++nhash(const char *name, const __u16 len, const unsigned long sz) ++{ ++ return full_name_hash(name, len) % sz; ++} +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/gralloc.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/gralloc.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/gralloc.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/gralloc.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ ++#ifndef __GRALLOC_H ++#define __GRALLOC_H ++ ++void acl_free_all(void); ++int acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size); ++void *acl_alloc(unsigned long len); ++ ++#endif +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grdefs.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grdefs.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grdefs.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grdefs.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ ++#ifndef GRDEFS_H ++#define GRDEFS_H ++ ++/* Begin grsecurity status declarations */ ++ ++enum { ++ GR_READY = 0x01, ++ GR_STATUS_INIT = 0x00 // disabled state ++}; ++ ++/* Begin ACL declarations */ ++ ++/* Role flags */ ++ ++enum { ++ GR_ROLE_USER = 0x0001, ++ GR_ROLE_GROUP = 0x0002, ++ GR_ROLE_DEFAULT = 0x0004, ++ GR_ROLE_SPECIAL = 0x0008, ++ GR_ROLE_AUTH = 0x0010, ++ GR_ROLE_NOPW = 0x0020, ++ GR_ROLE_GOD = 0x0040, ++ GR_ROLE_LEARN = 0x0080, ++ GR_ROLE_TPE = 0x0100 ++}; ++ ++/* ACL Subject and Object mode flags */ ++enum { ++ GR_DELETED = 0x00000080 ++}; ++ ++/* ACL Object-only mode flags */ ++enum { ++ GR_READ = 0x00000001, ++ GR_APPEND = 0x00000002, ++ GR_WRITE = 0x00000004, ++ GR_EXEC = 0x00000008, ++ GR_FIND = 0x00000010, ++ GR_INHERIT = 0x00000040, ++ GR_PTRACERD = 0x00000100, ++ GR_SETID = 0x00000200, ++ GR_CREATE = 0x00000400, ++ GR_DELETE = 0x00000800, ++ GR_NOPTRACE = 0x00001000, ++ GR_AUDIT_READ = 0x00002000, ++ GR_AUDIT_APPEND = 0x00004000, ++ GR_AUDIT_WRITE = 0x00008000, ++ GR_AUDIT_EXEC = 0x00010000, ++ GR_AUDIT_FIND = 0x00020000, ++ GR_AUDIT_INHERIT= 0x00040000, ++ GR_AUDIT_SETID = 0x00080000, ++ GR_AUDIT_CREATE = 0x00100000, ++ GR_AUDIT_DELETE = 0x00200000, ++ GR_SUPPRESS = 0x00400000, ++ GR_NOLEARN = 0x00800000 ++}; ++ ++#define GR_AUDITS (GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_APPEND | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | \ ++ GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_SETID | \ ++ GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE) ++ ++/* ACL subject-only mode flags */ ++enum { ++ GR_KILL = 0x00000001, ++ GR_VIEW = 0x00000002, ++ GR_PROTECTED = 0x00000100, ++ GR_LEARN = 0x00000200, ++ GR_OVERRIDE = 0x00000400, ++ /* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */ ++ GR_DUMMY = 0x00000800, ++ GR_PAXPAGE = 0x00001000, ++ GR_PAXSEGM = 0x00002000, ++ GR_PAXGCC = 0x00004000, ++ GR_PAXRANDMMAP = 0x00008000, ++ GR_PAXRANDEXEC = 0x00010000, ++ GR_PAXMPROTECT = 0x00020000, ++ GR_PROTSHM = 0x00040000, ++ GR_KILLPROC = 0x00080000, ++ GR_KILLIPPROC = 0x00100000, ++ /* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */ ++ GR_NOTROJAN = 0x00200000, ++ GR_PROTPROCFD = 0x00400000, ++ GR_PROCACCT = 0x00800000, ++ GR_RELAXPTRACE = 0x01000000, ++ GR_NESTED = 0x02000000 ++}; ++ ++enum { ++ GR_ID_USER = 0x01, ++ GR_ID_GROUP = 0x02, ++}; ++ ++enum { ++ GR_ID_ALLOW = 0x01, ++ GR_ID_DENY = 0x02, ++}; ++ ++#define GR_CRASH_RES 11 ++#define GR_UIDTABLE_MAX 500 ++ ++/* begin resource learning section */ ++enum { ++ GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP = 60, ++ GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP = 50000, ++ GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP = 10000, ++ GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP = 1000, ++ GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP = 10000, ++ GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP = 500000, ++ GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP = 1, ++ GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP = 5, ++ GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP = 50000, ++ GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP = 500000, ++ GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP = 2 ++}; ++ ++#endif +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grinternal.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grinternal.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grinternal.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grinternal.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ ++#ifndef __GRINTERNAL_H ++#define __GRINTERNAL_H ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ ++#include <linux/fs.h> ++#include <linux/grdefs.h> ++#include <linux/grmsg.h> ++ ++extern void gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...); ++extern __u32 gr_search_file(const struct dentry *dentry, const __u32 mode, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern __u32 gr_check_create(const struct dentry *new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry *parent, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u32 mode); ++extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task); ++extern __u32 to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode); ++extern int gr_set_acls(const int type); ++ ++extern void gr_handle_alertkill(void); ++extern char *gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern char *gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern char *gr_to_filename2(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern char *gr_to_filename3(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++ ++extern int grsec_enable_link; ++extern int grsec_enable_fifo; ++extern int grsec_enable_execve; ++extern int grsec_enable_forkbomb; ++extern int grsec_forkbomb_gid; ++extern int grsec_forkbomb_sec; ++extern int grsec_forkbomb_max; ++extern int grsec_enable_execlog; ++extern int grsec_enable_signal; ++extern int grsec_enable_forkfail; ++extern int grsec_enable_time; ++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat; ++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask; ++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mount; ++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_double; ++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot; ++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir; ++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod; ++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod; ++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir; ++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_nice; ++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog; ++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_caps; ++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl; ++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_unix; ++extern int grsec_enable_tpe; ++extern int grsec_tpe_gid; ++extern int grsec_enable_tpe_all; ++extern int grsec_enable_sidcaps; ++extern int grsec_enable_randpid; ++extern int grsec_enable_socket_all; ++extern int grsec_socket_all_gid; ++extern int grsec_enable_socket_client; ++extern int grsec_socket_client_gid; ++extern int grsec_enable_socket_server; ++extern int grsec_socket_server_gid; ++extern int grsec_audit_gid; ++extern int grsec_enable_group; ++extern int grsec_enable_audit_ipc; ++extern int grsec_enable_audit_textrel; ++extern int grsec_enable_mount; ++extern int grsec_enable_chdir; ++extern int grsec_lock; ++ ++extern struct task_struct *child_reaper; ++ ++extern spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock; ++extern unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime; ++extern unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet; ++ ++extern spinlock_t grsec_alertgood_lock; ++extern unsigned long grsec_alertgood_wtime; ++extern unsigned long grsec_alertgood_fyet; ++ ++extern spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock; ++ ++#define gr_task_fullpath(tsk) (tsk->exec_file ? \ ++ gr_to_filename2(tsk->exec_file->f_dentry, \ ++ tsk->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/") ++ ++#define gr_parent_task_fullpath(tsk) (tsk->parent->exec_file ? \ ++ gr_to_filename3(tsk->parent->exec_file->f_dentry, \ ++ tsk->parent->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/") ++ ++#define gr_task_fullpath0(tsk) (tsk->exec_file ? \ ++ gr_to_filename(tsk->exec_file->f_dentry, \ ++ tsk->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/") ++ ++#define gr_parent_task_fullpath0(tsk) (tsk->parent->exec_file ? \ ++ gr_to_filename1(tsk->parent->exec_file->f_dentry, \ ++ tsk->parent->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/") ++ ++#define proc_is_chrooted(tsk_a) ((tsk_a->pid > 1) && \ ++ ((tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev != \ ++ child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) || \ ++ (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino != \ ++ child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino))) ++ ++#define have_same_root(tsk_a,tsk_b) ((tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev == \ ++ tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) && \ ++ (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino == \ ++ tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino)) ++ ++#define DEFAULTSECARGS gr_task_fullpath(current), current->comm, \ ++ current->pid, current->uid, \ ++ current->euid, current->gid, current->egid, \ ++ gr_parent_task_fullpath(current), \ ++ current->parent->comm, current->parent->pid, \ ++ current->parent->uid, current->parent->euid, \ ++ current->parent->gid, current->parent->egid ++ ++#define GR_CHROOT_CAPS ( \ ++ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) | \ ++ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_ADMIN) | \ ++ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_MODULE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) | \ ++ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_PACCT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) | \ ++ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_BOOT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TIME) | \ ++ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_RAW) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG) | \ ++ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_IPC_OWNER)) ++ ++#define security_alert_good(normal_msg,args...) \ ++({ \ ++ spin_lock(&grsec_alertgood_lock); \ ++ \ ++ if (!grsec_alertgood_wtime || get_seconds() - grsec_alertgood_wtime > CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME) { \ ++ grsec_alertgood_wtime = get_seconds(); grsec_alertgood_fyet = 0; \ ++ if (current->curr_ip) \ ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \ ++ else \ ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \ ++ } else if((get_seconds() - grsec_alertgood_wtime < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME) && (grsec_alertgood_fyet < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST)) { \ ++ grsec_alertgood_fyet++; \ ++ if (current->curr_ip) \ ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \ ++ else \ ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \ ++ } else if (grsec_alertgood_fyet == CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST) { \ ++ grsec_alertgood_wtime = get_seconds(); grsec_alertgood_fyet++; \ ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: more alerts, logging disabled for " \ ++ "%d seconds\n", CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME); \ ++ } \ ++ \ ++ spin_unlock(&grsec_alertgood_lock); \ ++}) ++ ++#define security_alert(normal_msg,args...) \ ++({ \ ++ spin_lock(&grsec_alert_lock); \ ++ \ ++ if (!grsec_alert_wtime || get_seconds() - grsec_alert_wtime > CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME) { \ ++ grsec_alert_wtime = get_seconds(); grsec_alert_fyet = 0; \ ++ if (current->curr_ip) \ ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \ ++ else \ ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \ ++ } else if((get_seconds() - grsec_alert_wtime < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME) && (grsec_alert_fyet < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST)) { \ ++ grsec_alert_fyet++; \ ++ if (current->curr_ip) \ ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \ ++ else \ ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \ ++ } else if (grsec_alert_fyet == CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST) { \ ++ grsec_alert_wtime = get_seconds(); grsec_alert_fyet++; \ ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: more alerts, logging disabled for " \ ++ "%d seconds\n", CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME); \ ++ } \ ++ \ ++ gr_handle_alertkill(); \ ++ spin_unlock(&grsec_alert_lock); \ ++}) ++ ++#define security_audit(normal_msg,args...) \ ++({ \ ++ spin_lock(&grsec_audit_lock); \ ++ if (current->curr_ip) \ ++ printk(KERN_INFO "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", \ ++ NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \ ++ else \ ++ printk(KERN_INFO "grsec: " normal_msg "\n", ## args); \ ++ spin_unlock(&grsec_audit_lock); \ ++}) ++ ++#define security_learn(normal_msg,args...) \ ++({ \ ++ preempt_disable(); \ ++ gr_add_learn_entry(normal_msg "\n", ## args); \ ++ preempt_enable(); \ ++}) ++ ++#endif ++ ++#endif +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grmsg.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grmsg.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grmsg.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grmsg.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ ++#define DEFAULTSECMSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d" ++#define GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d run time:[%ud %uh %um %us] cpu time:[%ud %uh %um %us] %s with exit code %ld, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d" ++#define GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s(%.16s:%d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_IOPERM_MSG "denied use of ioperm() by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_IOPL_MSG "denied use of iopl() by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG "denied attach of shared memory of UID %u, PID %d, ID %u by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG "denied connect to abstract AF_UNIX socket outside of chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attach of shared memory outside of chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_KMEM_MSG "attempted write to /dev/kmem by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG "attempted open of /dev/port by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG "attempted write of /dev/mem by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG "attempted mmap write of /dev/[k]mem by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SYMLINK_MSG "not following symlink %.950s owned by %d.%d by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%lu\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%u.%u.%u.%u" ++#define GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG "%s access to hidden file %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG "%s open of %.950s for%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG "%s create of %.950s for%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_FIFO_MSG "denied writing FIFO %.950s of %d.%d by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG "refused attempt to mknod %.950s from chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG "%s mknod of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG "%s connect to the unix domain socket %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG "%s mkdir of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG "%s rmdir of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG "%s unlink of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG "%s symlink from %.480s to %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_HARDLINK_MSG "denied hardlink of %.930s (owned by %d.%d) to %.30s for " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_LINK_ACL_MSG "%s link of %.480s to %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG "successful inherit of %.480s's ACL for %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG "%s rename of %.480s to %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_NPROC_MSG "attempt to overstep process limit by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG "%s execution of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG "denied untrusted exec of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " Banning uid %u from login for %lu seconds" ++#define GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " Banning execution for %lu seconds" ++#define GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to mount %.30s as %.930s from chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to pivot_root from chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG "%s truncate of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG "%s access time change of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG "%s access of %.950s for%s%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to double chroot to %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s fchmod of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to chmod +s %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s chmod of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG "attempted fchdir outside of chroot to %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG "%s chown of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG "denied load of writable library %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_INITF_ACL_MSG "init_variables() failed %s" ++#define GR_DISABLED_ACL_MSG "Error loading %s, trying to run kernel with acls disabled. To disable acls at startup use <kernel image name> gracl=off from your boot loader" ++#define GR_DEV_ACL_MSG "/dev/grsec: being fed garbage %d bytes sent %d required" ++#define GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth success for " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG "ignoring shutdown for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth success for " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG "ignoring segvmod for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG "Loaded %s" ++#define GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG "Unable to load %s for " DEFAULTSECMSG " RBAC system may already be enabled." ++#define GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG "Ignoring reload request for disabled RBAC system" ++#define GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG "Reloaded %s" ++#define GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG "Failed reload of %s for " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG "Ignoring change to special role for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful change to special role %s (id %d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG "special role %s (id %d) exited by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role %s failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_UNSPROLEI_ACL_MSG "Ignoring unauth of special role for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_UNSPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful unauth of special role %s (id %d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_UNSPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role unauth of %s failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG "Invalid mode %d by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_MAXPW_ACL_MSG "Maximum pw attempts reached (%d), locking password authentication" ++#define GR_MAXROLEPW_ACL_MSG "Maximum pw attempts reached (%d) trying to auth to special role %s, locking auth for role of " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG "attempted priority change of process (%.16s:%d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_CAPSET_CHROOT_MSG "denied capset of (%.16s:%d) within chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_FAILFORK_MSG "failed fork with errno %d by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG "attempted priority change by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to " DEFAULTSECMSG " by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SIG_ACL_MSG "Attempted send of signal %d to protected task " DEFAULTSECMSG " by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SYSCTL_MSG "attempt to modify grsecurity sysctl value : %.32s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG "%s sysctl of %.950s for%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_TIME_MSG "time set by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_DEFACL_MSG "Fatal: Unable to find ACL for (%.16s:%d)" ++#define GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG "%s executable mmap of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG "%s executable mprotect of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SOCK_MSG "attempted socket(%.16s,%.16s,%.16s) by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SOCK2_MSG "attempted socket(%d,%.16s,%.16s) by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_BIND_MSG "attempted bind() by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_CONNECT_MSG "attempted connect by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_BIND_ACL_MSG "attempted bind to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG "attempted connect to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_IP_LEARN_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%u.%u.%u.%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u.%u.%u.%u" ++#define GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG "exec of %.980s within chroot by process " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_CAP_ACL_MSG "use of %s denied for " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_USRCHANGE_ACL_MSG "change to uid %d denied for " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_GRPCHANGE_ACL_MSG "change to gid %d denied for " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "remount of %.30s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "unmount of %.30s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "mount %.30s to %.64s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG "chdir to %.980s by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG "exec of %.930s (%.63s) by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG "message queue created by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG "message queue of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore created by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of size %d created by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_RESOURCE_MSG "attempted resource overstep by requesting %lu for %.16s against limit %lu by " DEFAULTSECMSG ++#define GR_TEXTREL_AUDIT_MSG "text relocation in %s, VMA:0x%08lx 0x%08lx by " DEFAULTSECMSG +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grsecurity.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grsecurity.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grsecurity.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/grsecurity.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ ++#ifndef GR_SECURITY_H ++#define GR_SECURITY_H ++#include <linux/fs.h> ++#include <linux/binfmts.h> ++ ++extern int gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs); ++extern int gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs); ++ ++extern void gr_add_to_task_ip_table(struct task_struct *p); ++extern void gr_del_task_from_ip_table(struct task_struct *p); ++ ++extern int gr_pid_is_chrooted(const struct task_struct *p); ++extern int gr_handle_chroot_nice(void); ++extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op); ++extern int gr_handle_chroot_capset(const struct task_struct *target); ++extern int gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(struct task_struct *p, ++ const int niceval); ++extern int gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt); ++extern int gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern void gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task); ++extern void gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern int gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode); ++extern int gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode); ++extern int gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, ++ const char *dev_name); ++extern int gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void); ++extern int gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid); ++ ++extern int gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode); ++extern int gr_handle_nproc(void); ++ ++extern void gr_handle_ioperm(void); ++extern void gr_handle_iopl(void); ++ ++extern int gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file); ++ ++extern int gr_random_pid(void); ++ ++extern void gr_log_forkfail(const int retval); ++extern void gr_log_timechange(void); ++extern void gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t); ++extern void gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern void gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern void gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, char **argv); ++extern void gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval); ++extern void gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval); ++extern void gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval); ++extern void gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg); ++extern void gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid); ++extern void gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg); ++extern void gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid); ++extern void gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size); ++extern void gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid); ++extern void gr_log_textrel(struct vm_area_struct *vma); ++ ++extern int gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent, ++ const struct inode *inode, ++ const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern int gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, ++ const struct dentry *dir, const int flag, ++ const int acc_mode); ++extern int gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, ++ struct inode *inode, ++ const int mode, const char *to); ++ ++extern int gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap); ++extern int gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap); ++extern void gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task, const int limit, ++ const unsigned long wanted, const int gt); ++extern void gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk); ++extern void gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig); ++extern int gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig); ++extern int gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid); ++extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task); ++extern int gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, ++ const unsigned long prot); ++extern int gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, ++ const unsigned long prot); ++extern int gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern int gr_handle_ptrace_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern int gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request); ++extern int gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task); ++extern int gr_handle_mmap(const struct file *filp, const unsigned long prot); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern int gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp); ++extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void); ++extern void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task); ++extern void gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, ++ const gid_t gid); ++extern void gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct dentry *p_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *p_mnt, const int fmode, ++ const int imode); ++extern void gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry *new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry *parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, ++ const int mode); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry *parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern void gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry *new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry *parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, ++ const char *from); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry *parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, ++ const struct dentry *old_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *to); ++extern int gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry, ++ struct dentry *parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, ++ struct dentry *old_dentry, ++ struct inode *old_parent_inode, ++ struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname); ++extern void gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir, ++ struct dentry *old_dentry, ++ struct dentry *new_dentry, ++ struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace); ++extern __u32 gr_check_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry, ++ const struct dentry *parent_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, ++ const struct dentry *old_dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *old_mnt); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const ino_t ino); ++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt); ++extern void gr_acl_handle_exit(void); ++extern void gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code); ++extern int gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task); ++extern __u32 gr_cap_rtnetlink(void); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++extern void gr_handle_mem_write(void); ++extern void gr_handle_kmem_write(void); ++extern void gr_handle_open_port(void); ++extern int gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset, ++ struct vm_area_struct *vma); ++ ++extern __u16 ip_randomid(void); ++extern __u32 ip_randomisn(void); ++extern unsigned long get_random_long(void); ++ ++extern int grsec_enable_dmesg; ++extern int grsec_enable_randid; ++extern int grsec_enable_randisn; ++extern int grsec_enable_randsrc; ++extern int grsec_enable_randrpc; ++#endif ++ ++#endif +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/mm.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/mm.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/mm.h 2004-04-03 22:36:15.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/mm.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include <asm/pgtable.h> + #include <asm/processor.h> + #include <asm/atomic.h> ++#include <asm/mman.h> + + #ifndef MM_VM_SIZE + #define MM_VM_SIZE(mm) TASK_SIZE +@@ -115,6 +116,18 @@ + /* It makes sense to apply VM_ACCOUNT to this vma. */ + #define VM_MAYACCT(vma) (!!((vma)->vm_flags & VM_HUGETLB)) + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++#define VM_MIRROR 0x01000000 /* vma is mirroring another */ ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++#define VM_MAYNOTWRITE 0x02000000 /* vma cannot be granted VM_WRITE any more */ ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef __VM_STACK_FLAGS ++#define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS (0x00000033 | __VM_STACK_FLAGS) ++#endif ++ + #ifndef VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS /* arch can override this */ + #define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS + #endif +@@ -549,21 +562,48 @@ + unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flag, unsigned long pgoff); + ++extern int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t); ++ + static inline unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, + unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flag, unsigned long offset) + { + unsigned long ret = -EINVAL; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && ++ (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || (addr && addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len))) ++ goto out; ++#endif ++ + if ((offset + PAGE_ALIGN(len)) < offset) + goto out; + if (!(offset & ~PAGE_MASK)) + ret = do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, len, prot, flag, offset >> PAGE_SHIFT); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && ret < TASK_SIZE && ((flag & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_PRIVATE) ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++ && (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) || ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && file && !(prot & PROT_WRITE))) ++#endif ++ ++ ) ++ { ++ unsigned long ret_m; ++ prot = prot & PROT_EXEC ? prot : PROT_NONE; ++ ret_m = do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ret + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, 0UL, prot, flag | MAP_MIRROR | MAP_FIXED, ret); ++ if (ret_m >= TASK_SIZE) { ++ do_munmap(current->mm, ret, len); ++ ret = ret_m; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + out: + return ret; + } + +-extern int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t); +- + extern unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long, unsigned long); + + static inline void +@@ -579,6 +619,12 @@ + static inline int + can_vma_merge(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags) + { ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if ((vma->vm_flags | vm_flags) & VM_MIRROR) ++ return 0; ++#endif ++ + #ifdef CONFIG_MMU + if (!vma->vm_file && vma->vm_flags == vm_flags) + return 1; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/mman.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/mman.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/mman.h 2004-04-03 22:36:19.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/mman.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ + calc_vm_flag_bits(unsigned long flags) + { + return _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_GROWSDOWN, VM_GROWSDOWN ) | ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_MIRROR, VM_MIRROR) | ++#endif ++ + _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_DENYWRITE, VM_DENYWRITE ) | + _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_EXECUTABLE, VM_EXECUTABLE) | + _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_LOCKED, VM_LOCKED ); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/proc_fs.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/proc_fs.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/proc_fs.h 2004-04-03 22:38:28.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/proc_fs.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ + + #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ + +-#if !defined(CONFIG_PROC_FS) ++#if !defined(CONFIG_PROC_FS) || !defined(CONFIG_PROC_KCORE) + static inline void kclist_add(struct kcore_list *new, void *addr, size_t size) + { + } +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/random.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/random.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/random.h 2004-04-03 22:38:24.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/random.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ + + extern __u32 secure_ipv6_id(__u32 *daddr); + ++extern unsigned long pax_get_random_long(void); ++ + #ifndef MODULE + extern struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops; + #endif +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/sched.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/sched.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/sched.h 2004-04-03 22:36:18.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/sched.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ + #include <linux/percpu.h> + + struct exec_domain; ++struct linux_binprm; + + /* + * cloning flags: +@@ -228,6 +229,21 @@ + struct kioctx *ioctx_list; + + struct kioctx default_kioctx; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DLRESOLVE ++ unsigned long call_dl_resolve; ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT) ++ unsigned long call_syscall; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR ++ unsigned long delta_mmap; /* randomized offset */ ++ unsigned long delta_exec; /* randomized offset */ ++ unsigned long delta_stack; /* randomized offset */ ++#endif ++ + }; + + extern int mmlist_nr; +@@ -493,6 +509,22 @@ + + unsigned long ptrace_message; + siginfo_t *last_siginfo; /* For ptrace use. */ ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ /* grsecurity */ ++ struct acl_subject_label *acl; ++ struct acl_role_label *role; ++ struct file *exec_file; ++ u32 curr_ip; ++ u32 gr_saddr; ++ u32 gr_daddr; ++ u16 gr_sport; ++ u16 gr_dport; ++ u16 acl_role_id; ++ u8 acl_sp_role:1; ++ u8 used_accept:1; ++ u8 is_writable:1; ++#endif + }; + + static inline pid_t process_group(struct task_struct *tsk) +@@ -530,6 +562,29 @@ + #define PF_LESS_THROTTLE 0x00100000 /* Throttle me less: I clean memory */ + #define PF_SYNCWRITE 0x00200000 /* I am doing a sync write */ + ++#define PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC 0x01000000 /* Paging based non-executable pages */ ++#define PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP 0x02000000 /* Emulate trampolines */ ++#define PF_PAX_MPROTECT 0x04000000 /* Restrict mprotect() */ ++#define PF_PAX_RANDMMAP 0x08000000 /* Randomize mmap() base */ ++#define PF_PAX_RANDEXEC 0x10000000 /* Randomize ET_EXEC base */ ++#define PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC 0x20000000 /* Segmentation based non-executable pages */ ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK) ++extern unsigned int pax_aslr; ++#endif ++ ++extern unsigned int pax_softmode; ++#endif ++ ++extern int pax_check_flags(unsigned long *); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS ++extern void pax_set_flags(struct linux_binprm * bprm); ++#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS) ++extern void (*pax_set_flags_func)(struct linux_binprm * bprm); ++#endif ++ + #ifdef CONFIG_SMP + extern int set_cpus_allowed(task_t *p, cpumask_t new_mask); + #else +@@ -675,14 +730,29 @@ + : on_sig_stack(sp) ? SS_ONSTACK : 0); + } + ++extern int gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap); ++extern int gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap); + + #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + /* code is in security.c */ + extern int capable(int cap); ++static inline int capable_nolog(int cap) ++{ ++ return capable(cap); ++} + #else + static inline int capable(int cap) + { +- if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap)) { ++ if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap) && gr_task_is_capable(current, cap)) { ++ current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; ++ return 1; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static inline int capable_nolog(int cap) ++{ ++ if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap) && gr_is_capable_nolog(cap)) { + current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; + return 1; + } +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/shm.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/shm.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/shm.h 2004-04-03 22:37:37.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/shm.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -84,6 +84,10 @@ + time_t shm_ctim; + pid_t shm_cprid; + pid_t shm_lprid; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ time_t shm_createtime; ++ pid_t shm_lapid; ++#endif + }; + + /* shm_mode upper byte flags */ +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/linux/sysctl.h linux-2.6.5/include/linux/sysctl.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/linux/sysctl.h 2004-04-03 22:37:23.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/linux/sysctl.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -131,8 +131,21 @@ + KERN_PRINTK_RATELIMIT_BURST=61, /* int: tune printk ratelimiting */ + KERN_PTY=62, /* dir: pty driver */ + KERN_NGROUPS_MAX=63, /* int: NGROUPS_MAX */ ++ KERN_GRSECURITY=68, /* grsecurity */ ++ ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++ KERN_PAX=69, /* PaX control */ ++#endif ++ + }; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++enum { ++ PAX_ASLR=1, /* PaX: disable/enable all randomization features */ ++ PAX_SOFTMODE=2 /* PaX: disable/enable soft mode */ ++}; ++#endif + + /* CTL_VM names: */ + enum +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/include/net/ip.h linux-2.6.5/include/net/ip.h +--- linux-2.6.5/include/net/ip.h 2004-04-03 22:37:36.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/include/net/ip.h 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@ + #include <net/route.h> + #include <net/arp.h> + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID ++extern int grsec_enable_randid; ++extern __u16 ip_randomid(void); ++#endif ++ + #ifndef _SNMP_H + #include <net/snmp.h> + #endif +@@ -188,6 +193,13 @@ + + static inline void ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph, struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk) + { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID ++ if (grsec_enable_randid) ++ iph->id = htons(ip_randomid()); ++ else ++#endif ++ + if (iph->frag_off & htons(IP_DF)) { + /* This is only to work around buggy Windows95/2000 + * VJ compression implementations. If the ID field +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/init/Kconfig linux-2.6.5/init/Kconfig +--- linux-2.6.5/init/Kconfig 2004-04-03 22:37:44.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/init/Kconfig 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ + config KALLSYMS + bool "Load all symbols for debugging/kksymoops" if EMBEDDED + default y ++ depends on !GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM + help + Say Y here to let the kernel print out symbolic crash information and + symbolic stack backtraces. This increases the size of the kernel +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/init/do_mounts.c linux-2.6.5/init/do_mounts.c +--- linux-2.6.5/init/do_mounts.c 2004-04-03 22:36:56.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/init/do_mounts.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -287,6 +287,7 @@ + case -EINVAL: + continue; + } ++ + /* + * Allow the user to distinguish between failed sys_open + * and bad superblock on root device. +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/init/main.c linux-2.6.5/init/main.c +--- linux-2.6.5/init/main.c 2004-04-03 22:36:25.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/init/main.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ + extern void free_initmem(void); + extern void populate_rootfs(void); + extern void driver_init(void); ++extern void grsecurity_init(void); + + #ifdef CONFIG_TC + extern void tc_init(void); +@@ -605,7 +606,7 @@ + do_basic_setup(); + + prepare_namespace(); +- ++ grsecurity_init(); + /* + * Ok, we have completed the initial bootup, and + * we're essentially up and running. Get rid of the +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/ipc/msg.c linux-2.6.5/ipc/msg.c +--- linux-2.6.5/ipc/msg.c 2004-04-03 22:36:13.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/ipc/msg.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ + #include <linux/list.h> + #include <linux/security.h> + #include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + #include <asm/current.h> + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include "util.h" +@@ -331,6 +332,9 @@ + msg_unlock(msq); + } + up(&msg_ids.sem); ++ ++ gr_log_msgget(ret, msgflg); ++ + return ret; + } + +@@ -580,6 +584,8 @@ + break; + } + case IPC_RMID: ++ gr_log_msgrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid); ++ + freeque (msq, msqid); + break; + } +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/ipc/sem.c linux-2.6.5/ipc/sem.c +--- linux-2.6.5/ipc/sem.c 2004-04-03 22:36:56.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/ipc/sem.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ + #include <linux/time.h> + #include <linux/smp_lock.h> + #include <linux/security.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include "util.h" + +@@ -238,6 +239,9 @@ + } + + up(&sem_ids.sem); ++ ++ gr_log_semget(err, semflg); ++ + return err; + } + +@@ -804,6 +808,8 @@ + + switch(cmd){ + case IPC_RMID: ++ gr_log_semrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid); ++ + freeary(sma, semid); + err = 0; + break; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/ipc/shm.c linux-2.6.5/ipc/shm.c +--- linux-2.6.5/ipc/shm.c 2004-04-03 22:37:07.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/ipc/shm.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ + #include <linux/proc_fs.h> + #include <linux/shmem_fs.h> + #include <linux/security.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + + #include "util.h" +@@ -50,6 +51,14 @@ + static int sysvipc_shm_read_proc(char *buffer, char **start, off_t offset, int length, int *eof, void *data); + #endif + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++extern int gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid, ++ const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, ++ const int shmid); ++extern int gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid, ++ const time_t shm_createtime); ++#endif ++ + size_t shm_ctlmax = SHMMAX; + size_t shm_ctlall = SHMALL; + int shm_ctlmni = SHMMNI; +@@ -213,6 +222,9 @@ + shp->shm_lprid = 0; + shp->shm_atim = shp->shm_dtim = 0; + shp->shm_ctim = get_seconds(); ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ shp->shm_createtime = get_seconds(); ++#endif + shp->shm_segsz = size; + shp->shm_nattch = 0; + shp->id = shm_buildid(id,shp->shm_perm.seq); +@@ -267,6 +279,8 @@ + } + up(&shm_ids.sem); + ++ gr_log_shmget(err, shmflg, size); ++ + return err; + } + +@@ -567,6 +581,8 @@ + if (err) + goto out_unlock_up; + ++ gr_log_shmrm(shp->shm_perm.uid, shp->shm_perm.cuid); ++ + if (shp->shm_nattch){ + shp->shm_flags |= SHM_DEST; + /* Do not find it any more */ +@@ -705,9 +721,27 @@ + return err; + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ if (!gr_handle_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime, ++ shp->shm_perm.cuid, shmid)) { ++ shm_unlock(shp); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++ ++ if (!gr_chroot_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime)) { ++ shm_unlock(shp); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++#endif ++ + file = shp->shm_file; + size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode); + shp->shm_nattch++; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ shp->shm_lapid = current->pid; ++#endif ++ + shm_unlock(shp); + + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/kernel/capability.c linux-2.6.5/kernel/capability.c +--- linux-2.6.5/kernel/capability.c 2004-04-03 22:37:36.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/kernel/capability.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ + #include <linux/mm.h> + #include <linux/module.h> + #include <linux/security.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + + unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */ +@@ -168,6 +169,11 @@ + } else + target = current; + ++ if (gr_handle_chroot_capset(target)) { ++ ret = -ESRCH; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + ret = -EPERM; + + if (security_capset_check(target, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted)) +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/kernel/configs.c linux-2.6.5/kernel/configs.c +--- linux-2.6.5/kernel/configs.c 2004-04-03 22:36:55.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/kernel/configs.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -81,8 +81,16 @@ + IKCONFIG_VERSION); + + /* create the current config file */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER ++ entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR, &proc_root); ++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, &proc_root); ++#endif ++#else + entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUGO, + &proc_root); ++#endif + if (!entry) + return -ENOMEM; + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/kernel/exit.c linux-2.6.5/kernel/exit.c +--- linux-2.6.5/kernel/exit.c 2004-04-03 22:38:13.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/kernel/exit.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ + #include <linux/profile.h> + #include <linux/mount.h> + #include <linux/proc_fs.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/pgtable.h> +@@ -232,6 +233,13 @@ + { + write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ if (current->exec_file) { ++ fput(current->exec_file); ++ current->exec_file = NULL; ++ } ++#endif ++ + ptrace_unlink(current); + /* Reparent to init */ + REMOVE_LINKS(current); +@@ -239,6 +247,8 @@ + current->real_parent = child_reaper; + SET_LINKS(current); + ++ gr_set_kernel_label(current); ++ + /* Set the exit signal to SIGCHLD so we signal init on exit */ + current->exit_signal = SIGCHLD; + +@@ -333,6 +343,15 @@ + vsnprintf(current->comm, sizeof(current->comm), name, args); + va_end(args); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ if (current->exec_file) { ++ fput(current->exec_file); ++ current->exec_file = NULL; ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ gr_set_kernel_label(current); ++ + /* + * If we were started as result of loading a module, close all of the + * user space pages. We don't need them, and if we didn't close them +@@ -771,6 +790,11 @@ + } + + acct_process(code); ++ ++ gr_acl_handle_psacct(tsk, code); ++ gr_acl_handle_exit(); ++ gr_del_task_from_ip_table(tsk); ++ + __exit_mm(tsk); + + exit_sem(tsk); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/kernel/fork.c linux-2.6.5/kernel/fork.c +--- linux-2.6.5/kernel/fork.c 2004-04-03 22:36:18.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/kernel/fork.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ + #include <linux/futex.h> + #include <linux/ptrace.h> + #include <linux/mount.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/pgtable.h> + #include <asm/pgalloc.h> +@@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ + mm->locked_vm = 0; + mm->mmap = NULL; + mm->mmap_cache = NULL; +- mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; ++ mm->free_area_cache = oldmm->free_area_cache; + mm->map_count = 0; + mm->rss = 0; + cpus_clear(mm->cpu_vm_mask); +@@ -880,6 +881,9 @@ + goto fork_out; + + retval = -EAGAIN; ++ ++ gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&p->user->processes), 0); ++ + if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >= + p->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) { + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && +@@ -968,6 +972,8 @@ + if (retval) + goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespace; + ++ gr_copy_label(p); ++ + p->set_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL; + /* + * Clear TID on mm_release()? +@@ -1101,6 +1107,9 @@ + free_uid(p->user); + bad_fork_free: + free_task(p); ++ ++ gr_log_forkfail(retval); ++ + goto fork_out; + } + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/kernel/kallsyms.c linux-2.6.5/kernel/kallsyms.c +--- linux-2.6.5/kernel/kallsyms.c 2004-04-03 22:38:21.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/kernel/kallsyms.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -301,7 +301,15 @@ + { + struct proc_dir_entry *entry; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER ++ entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR, NULL); ++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL); ++#endif ++#else + entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", 0444, NULL); ++#endif + if (entry) + entry->proc_fops = &kallsyms_operations; + return 0; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/kernel/pid.c linux-2.6.5/kernel/pid.c +--- linux-2.6.5/kernel/pid.c 2004-04-03 22:37:23.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/kernel/pid.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include <linux/init.h> + #include <linux/bootmem.h> + #include <linux/hash.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #define pid_hashfn(nr) hash_long((unsigned long)nr, pidhash_shift) + static struct list_head *pid_hash[PIDTYPE_MAX]; +@@ -99,10 +100,12 @@ + + int alloc_pidmap(void) + { +- int pid, offset, max_steps = PIDMAP_ENTRIES + 1; ++ int pid = 0, offset, max_steps = PIDMAP_ENTRIES + 1; + pidmap_t *map; + +- pid = last_pid + 1; ++ pid = gr_random_pid(); ++ if (!pid) ++ pid = last_pid + 1; + if (pid >= pid_max) + pid = RESERVED_PIDS; + +@@ -225,10 +228,16 @@ + task_t *find_task_by_pid(int nr) + { + struct pid *pid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, nr); ++ struct task_struct *task = NULL; + + if (!pid) + return NULL; +- return pid_task(pid->task_list.next, PIDTYPE_PID); ++ task = pid_task(pid->task_list.next, PIDTYPE_PID); ++ ++ if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(task)) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ return task; + } + + EXPORT_SYMBOL(find_task_by_pid); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/kernel/printk.c linux-2.6.5/kernel/printk.c +--- linux-2.6.5/kernel/printk.c 2004-04-03 22:38:24.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/kernel/printk.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ + #include <linux/smp.h> + #include <linux/security.h> + #include <linux/bootmem.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + +@@ -248,6 +249,11 @@ + char c; + int error = 0; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && grsec_enable_dmesg) ++ return -EPERM; ++#endif ++ + error = security_syslog(type); + if (error) + return error; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/kernel/resource.c linux-2.6.5/kernel/resource.c +--- linux-2.6.5/kernel/resource.c 2004-04-03 22:37:36.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/kernel/resource.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -134,10 +134,27 @@ + { + struct proc_dir_entry *entry; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER ++ entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", S_IRUSR, NULL); ++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL); ++#endif ++#else + entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", 0, NULL); ++#endif + if (entry) + entry->proc_fops = &proc_ioports_operations; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER ++ entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", S_IRUSR, NULL); ++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP ++ entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL); ++#endif ++#else + entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", 0, NULL); ++#endif + if (entry) + entry->proc_fops = &proc_iomem_operations; + return 0; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/kernel/sched.c linux-2.6.5/kernel/sched.c +--- linux-2.6.5/kernel/sched.c 2004-04-03 22:37:42.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/kernel/sched.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ + #include <linux/cpu.h> + #include <linux/percpu.h> + #include <linux/kthread.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA + #define cpu_to_node_mask(cpu) node_to_cpumask(cpu_to_node(cpu)) +@@ -2038,6 +2039,8 @@ + return -EPERM; + if (increment < -40) + increment = -40; ++ if (gr_handle_chroot_nice()) ++ return -EPERM; + } + if (increment > 40) + increment = 40; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/kernel/signal.c linux-2.6.5/kernel/signal.c +--- linux-2.6.5/kernel/signal.c 2004-04-03 22:36:57.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/kernel/signal.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ + #include <linux/binfmts.h> + #include <linux/security.h> + #include <linux/ptrace.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + #include <asm/param.h> + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/siginfo.h> +@@ -750,11 +751,13 @@ + (((sig) < SIGRTMIN) && sigismember(&(sigptr)->signal, (sig))) + + +-static int ++int + specific_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t) + { + int ret = 0; + ++ gr_log_signal(sig, t); ++ + if (!irqs_disabled()) + BUG(); + #ifdef CONFIG_SMP +@@ -805,6 +808,8 @@ + ret = specific_send_sig_info(sig, info, t); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags); + ++ gr_handle_crash(t, sig); ++ + return ret; + } + +@@ -1063,9 +1068,14 @@ + int err; + + found = 1; +- err = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p); +- if (!retval) +- retval = err; ++ ++ if (gr_handle_signal(p, sig)) ++ retval = -EPERM; ++ else { ++ err = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p); ++ if (!retval) ++ retval = err; ++ } + } + return found ? retval : -ESRCH; + } +@@ -1123,8 +1133,12 @@ + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + p = find_task_by_pid(pid); + error = -ESRCH; +- if (p) +- error = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p); ++ if (p) { ++ if (gr_handle_signal(p, sig)) ++ error = -EPERM; ++ else ++ error = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p); ++ } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + return error; + } +@@ -1148,10 +1162,14 @@ + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + for_each_process(p) { + if (p->pid > 1 && p->tgid != current->tgid) { +- int err = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p); +- ++count; +- if (err != -EPERM) +- retval = err; ++ if (gr_handle_signal(p, sig)) ++ retval = -EPERM; ++ else { ++ int err = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p); ++ ++count; ++ if (err != -EPERM) ++ retval = err; ++ } + } + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/kernel/sys.c linux-2.6.5/kernel/sys.c +--- linux-2.6.5/kernel/sys.c 2004-04-03 22:36:18.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/kernel/sys.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + #include <linux/security.h> + #include <linux/dcookies.h> + #include <linux/suspend.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/io.h> +@@ -279,6 +280,12 @@ + error = -EACCES; + goto out; + } ++ ++ if (gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(p, niceval)) { ++ error = -ESRCH; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval); + if (no_nice) { + error = no_nice; +@@ -579,6 +586,9 @@ + if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || + (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid)) + current->sgid = new_egid; ++ ++ gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, new_rgid); ++ + current->fsgid = new_egid; + current->egid = new_egid; + current->gid = new_rgid; +@@ -606,6 +616,9 @@ + current->mm->dumpable=0; + wmb(); + } ++ ++ gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, gid); ++ + current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid; + } + else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid)) +@@ -644,6 +657,9 @@ + current->mm->dumpable = 0; + wmb(); + } ++ ++ gr_set_role_label(current, new_ruid, current->gid); ++ + current->uid = new_ruid; + return 0; + } +@@ -744,6 +760,9 @@ + } else if ((uid != current->uid) && (uid != new_suid)) + return -EPERM; + ++ if (gr_check_crash_uid(uid)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + if (old_euid != uid) + { + current->mm->dumpable = 0; +@@ -843,8 +862,10 @@ + current->egid = egid; + } + current->fsgid = current->egid; +- if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) ++ if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { ++ gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, rgid); + current->gid = rgid; ++ } + if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) + current->sgid = sgid; + return 0; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/kernel/sysctl.c linux-2.6.5/kernel/sysctl.c +--- linux-2.6.5/kernel/sysctl.c 2004-04-03 22:36:18.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/kernel/sysctl.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -46,6 +46,14 @@ + #endif + + #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++#include <linux/grinternal.h> ++ ++extern __u32 gr_handle_sysctl(const ctl_table *table, const void *oldval, ++ const void *newval); ++extern int gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name, ++ const int op); ++extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op); + + /* External variables not in a header file. */ + extern int panic_timeout; +@@ -139,6 +147,32 @@ + #ifdef CONFIG_UNIX98_PTYS + extern ctl_table pty_table[]; + #endif ++extern ctl_table grsecurity_table[]; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++static ctl_table pax_table[] = { ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK) ++ { ++ .ctl_name = PAX_ASLR, ++ .procname = "aslr", ++ .data = &pax_aslr, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif ++ ++ { ++ .ctl_name = PAX_SOFTMODE, ++ .procname = "softmode", ++ .data = &pax_softmode, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, ++ } ++}; ++#endif + + /* /proc declarations: */ + +@@ -615,6 +649,14 @@ + .mode = 0444, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL ++ { ++ .ctl_name = KERN_GRSECURITY, ++ .procname = "grsecurity", ++ .mode = 0500, ++ .child = grsecurity_table, ++ }, ++#endif + { .ctl_name = 0 } + }; + +@@ -854,6 +896,16 @@ + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE ++ { ++ .ctl_name = KERN_PAX, ++ .procname = "pax", ++ .mode = 0500, ++ .child = pax_table, ++ }, ++#endif ++ + { .ctl_name = 0 } + }; + +@@ -938,6 +990,10 @@ + static inline int ctl_perm(ctl_table *table, int op) + { + int error; ++ if (table->de && gr_handle_sysctl_mod(table->de->parent->name, table->de->name, op)) ++ return -EACCES; ++ if (gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(op)) ++ return -EACCES; + error = security_sysctl(table, op); + if (error) + return error; +@@ -974,6 +1030,10 @@ + table = table->child; + goto repeat; + } ++ ++ if (!gr_handle_sysctl(table, oldval, newval)) ++ return -EACCES; ++ + error = do_sysctl_strategy(table, name, nlen, + oldval, oldlenp, + newval, newlen, context); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/kernel/time.c linux-2.6.5/kernel/time.c +--- linux-2.6.5/kernel/time.c 2004-04-03 22:36:27.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/kernel/time.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ + #include <linux/timex.h> + #include <linux/errno.h> + #include <linux/smp_lock.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + + /* +@@ -80,6 +81,9 @@ + + tv.tv_nsec = 0; + do_settimeofday(&tv); ++ ++ gr_log_timechange(); ++ + return 0; + } + +@@ -181,6 +185,8 @@ + return -EFAULT; + } + ++ gr_log_timechange(); ++ + return do_sys_settimeofday(tv ? &new_ts : NULL, tz ? &new_tz : NULL); + } + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/kernel/timer.c linux-2.6.5/kernel/timer.c +--- linux-2.6.5/kernel/timer.c 2004-04-03 22:37:59.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/kernel/timer.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ + #include <linux/time.h> + #include <linux/jiffies.h> + #include <linux/cpu.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/div64.h> +@@ -688,6 +689,9 @@ + + psecs = (p->utime += user); + psecs += (p->stime += system); ++ ++ gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_CPU, psecs / HZ, 1); ++ + if (psecs / HZ > p->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur) { + /* Send SIGXCPU every second.. */ + if (!(psecs % HZ)) +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/mm/filemap.c linux-2.6.5/mm/filemap.c +--- linux-2.6.5/mm/filemap.c 2004-04-03 22:36:55.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/mm/filemap.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ + #include <linux/pagevec.h> + #include <linux/blkdev.h> + #include <linux/security.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++ + /* + * This is needed for the following functions: + * - try_to_release_page +@@ -1356,6 +1358,12 @@ + + if (!mapping->a_ops->readpage) + return -ENOEXEC; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) ++ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f]; ++#endif ++ + file_accessed(file); + vma->vm_ops = &generic_file_vm_ops; + return 0; +@@ -1654,6 +1662,7 @@ + *pos = i_size_read(inode); + + if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY) { ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE,*pos, 0); + if (*pos >= limit) { + send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0); + return -EFBIG; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/mm/madvise.c linux-2.6.5/mm/madvise.c +--- linux-2.6.5/mm/madvise.c 2004-04-03 22:36:52.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/mm/madvise.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -13,8 +13,42 @@ + * We can potentially split a vm area into separate + * areas, each area with its own behavior. + */ ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++static long __madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start, ++ unsigned long end, int behavior); ++ ++static long madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start, ++ unsigned long end, int behavior) ++{ ++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { ++ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m, * prev_m; ++ unsigned long start_m, end_m; ++ int error; ++ ++ start_m = vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ vma_m = find_vma_prev(vma->vm_mm, start_m, &prev_m); ++ if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == start_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) { ++ start_m = start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ end_m = end + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ error = __madvise_behavior(vma_m, start_m, end_m, behavior); ++ if (error) ++ return error; ++ } else { ++ printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: madvise bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start); ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return __madvise_behavior(vma, start, end, behavior); ++} ++ ++static long __madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start, ++ unsigned long end, int behavior) ++#else + static long madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start, + unsigned long end, int behavior) ++#endif + { + struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm; + int error; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/mm/memory.c linux-2.6.5/mm/memory.c +--- linux-2.6.5/mm/memory.c 2004-04-03 22:36:58.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/mm/memory.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ + #include <linux/rmap-locking.h> + #include <linux/module.h> + #include <linux/init.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/pgalloc.h> + #include <asm/rmap.h> +@@ -989,6 +990,69 @@ + update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry); + } + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++/* PaX: if vma is mirrored, synchronize the mirror's PTE ++ * ++ * mm->page_table_lock is held on entry and is not released on exit or inside ++ * to ensure atomic changes to the PTE states (swapout, mremap, munmap, etc) ++ */ ++struct pte_chain * pax_mirror_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct * vma, ++ unsigned long address, pte_t *pte, struct pte_chain *pte_chain) ++{ ++ unsigned long address_m; ++ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL; ++ pte_t * pte_m, entry_m; ++ struct page * page_m; ++ ++ address_m = vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ vma_m = find_vma(mm, address_m); ++ BUG_ON(!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != address_m); ++ ++ address_m = address + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ ++ { ++ pgd_t *pgd_m; ++ pmd_t *pmd_m; ++ ++ pgd_m = pgd_offset(mm, address_m); ++ pmd_m = pmd_offset(pgd_m, address_m); ++ pte_m = pte_offset_map_nested(pmd_m, address_m); ++ } ++ ++ if (pte_present(*pte_m)) { ++ flush_cache_page(vma_m, address_m); ++ flush_icache_page(vma_m, pte_page(*pte_m)); ++ } ++ entry_m = ptep_get_and_clear(pte_m); ++ if (pte_present(entry_m)) ++ flush_tlb_page(vma_m, address_m); ++ ++ if (pte_none(entry_m)) { ++ ++mm->rss; ++ } else if (pte_present(entry_m)) { ++ page_remove_rmap(pte_page(entry_m), pte_m); ++ page_cache_release(pte_page(entry_m)); ++ } else if (!pte_file(entry_m)) { ++ free_swap_and_cache(pte_to_swp_entry(entry_m)); ++ ++mm->rss; ++ } else { ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: bug in mirror_fault: %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n", ++ address, vma->vm_start, address_m, vma_m->vm_start); ++ } ++ ++ page_m = pte_page(*pte); ++ page_cache_get(page_m); ++ entry_m = mk_pte(page_m, vma_m->vm_page_prot); ++ if (pte_write(*pte)) ++ entry_m = pte_mkdirty(pte_mkwrite(entry_m)); ++ pte_chain = page_add_rmap(page_m, pte_m, pte_chain); ++ ptep_establish(vma_m, address_m, pte_m, entry_m); ++ update_mmu_cache(vma_m, address_m, entry_m); ++ pte_unmap_nested(pte_m); ++ return pte_chain; ++} ++#endif ++ + /* + * This routine handles present pages, when users try to write + * to a shared page. It is done by copying the page to a new address +@@ -1017,6 +1081,10 @@ + struct pte_chain *pte_chain; + pte_t entry; + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ struct pte_chain *pte_chain_m = NULL; ++#endif ++ + if (unlikely(!pfn_valid(pfn))) { + /* + * This should really halt the system so it can be debugged or +@@ -1056,6 +1124,13 @@ + pte_chain = pte_chain_alloc(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pte_chain) + goto no_pte_chain; ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ pte_chain_m = pte_chain_alloc(GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!pte_chain_m) ++ goto no_new_page; ++#endif ++ + new_page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER); + if (!new_page) + goto no_new_page; +@@ -1076,16 +1151,32 @@ + + /* Free the old page.. */ + new_page = old_page; ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ++ pte_chain_m = pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table, pte_chain_m); ++#endif ++ + } + pte_unmap(page_table); + page_cache_release(new_page); + page_cache_release(old_page); + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); + pte_chain_free(pte_chain); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ pte_chain_free(pte_chain_m); ++#endif ++ + return VM_FAULT_MINOR; + + no_new_page: + pte_chain_free(pte_chain); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ pte_chain_free(pte_chain_m); ++#endif ++ + no_pte_chain: + page_cache_release(old_page); + return VM_FAULT_OOM; +@@ -1187,6 +1278,7 @@ + + do_expand: + limit = current->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur; ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, offset, 1); + if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && offset > limit) + goto out_sig; + if (offset > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) +@@ -1246,6 +1338,10 @@ + int ret = VM_FAULT_MINOR; + struct pte_chain *pte_chain = NULL; + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ struct pte_chain *pte_chain_m = NULL; ++#endif ++ + pte_unmap(page_table); + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); + page = lookup_swap_cache(entry); +@@ -1279,6 +1375,15 @@ + ret = VM_FAULT_OOM; + goto out; + } ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ pte_chain_m = pte_chain_alloc(GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!pte_chain_m) { ++ ret = -ENOMEM; ++ goto out; ++ } ++#endif ++ + lock_page(page); + + /* +@@ -1314,10 +1419,21 @@ + + /* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */ + update_mmu_cache(vma, address, pte); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ++ pte_chain_m = pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table, pte_chain_m); ++#endif ++ + pte_unmap(page_table); + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); + out: + pte_chain_free(pte_chain); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ pte_chain_free(pte_chain_m); ++#endif ++ + return ret; + } + +@@ -1336,13 +1452,38 @@ + struct pte_chain *pte_chain; + int ret; + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ struct pte_chain *pte_chain_m = NULL; ++#endif ++ + pte_chain = pte_chain_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ pte_chain_m = pte_chain_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN); ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if (!pte_chain || !pte_chain_m) { ++#else + if (!pte_chain) { ++#endif ++ + pte_unmap(page_table); + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if (!pte_chain) ++ pte_chain = pte_chain_alloc(GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!pte_chain_m) ++ pte_chain_m = pte_chain_alloc(GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!pte_chain || !pte_chain_m) ++ goto no_mem; ++#else + pte_chain = pte_chain_alloc(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pte_chain) + goto no_mem; ++#endif ++ + spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock); + page_table = pte_offset_map(pmd, addr); + } +@@ -1382,10 +1523,16 @@ + set_pte(page_table, entry); + /* ignores ZERO_PAGE */ + pte_chain = page_add_rmap(page, page_table, pte_chain); +- pte_unmap(page_table); + + /* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */ + update_mmu_cache(vma, addr, entry); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ++ pte_chain_m = pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, addr, page_table, pte_chain_m); ++#endif ++ ++ pte_unmap(page_table); + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); + ret = VM_FAULT_MINOR; + goto out; +@@ -1394,6 +1541,11 @@ + ret = VM_FAULT_OOM; + out: + pte_chain_free(pte_chain); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ pte_chain_free(pte_chain_m); ++#endif ++ + return ret; + } + +@@ -1420,6 +1572,10 @@ + int sequence = 0; + int ret = VM_FAULT_MINOR; + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ struct pte_chain *pte_chain_m = NULL; ++#endif ++ + if (!vma->vm_ops || !vma->vm_ops->nopage) + return do_anonymous_page(mm, vma, page_table, + pmd, write_access, address); +@@ -1444,6 +1600,12 @@ + if (!pte_chain) + goto oom; + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ pte_chain_m = pte_chain_alloc(GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!pte_chain_m) ++ goto oom; ++#endif ++ + /* + * Should we do an early C-O-W break? + */ +@@ -1469,6 +1631,11 @@ + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); + page_cache_release(new_page); + pte_chain_free(pte_chain); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ pte_chain_free(pte_chain_m); ++#endif ++ + goto retry; + } + page_table = pte_offset_map(pmd, address); +@@ -1493,6 +1660,15 @@ + entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma); + set_pte(page_table, entry); + pte_chain = page_add_rmap(new_page, page_table, pte_chain); ++ ++ /* no need to invalidate: a not-present page shouldn't be cached */ ++ update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ++ pte_chain_m = pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table, pte_chain_m); ++#endif ++ + pte_unmap(page_table); + } else { + /* One of our sibling threads was faster, back out. */ +@@ -1502,8 +1678,6 @@ + goto out; + } + +- /* no need to invalidate: a not-present page shouldn't be cached */ +- update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry); + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); + goto out; + oom: +@@ -1511,6 +1685,11 @@ + ret = VM_FAULT_OOM; + out: + pte_chain_free(pte_chain); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ pte_chain_free(pte_chain_m); ++#endif ++ + return ret; + } + +@@ -1613,6 +1792,11 @@ + pgd_t *pgd; + pmd_t *pmd; + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ unsigned long address_m = 0UL; ++ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL; ++#endif ++ + __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); + pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address); + +@@ -1626,6 +1810,48 @@ + * and the SMP-safe atomic PTE updates. + */ + spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { ++ pgd_t *pgd_m; ++ pmd_t *pmd_m; ++ pte_t *pte_m; ++ ++ address_m = vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ vma_m = find_vma(mm, address_m); ++ ++ /* PaX: sanity checks */ ++ if (!vma_m) { ++ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: fault bug, %08lx, %p, %08lx, %p\n", ++ address, vma, address_m, vma_m); ++ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; ++ } else if (!(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) || ++ vma_m->vm_start != address_m || ++ vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start) ++ { ++ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: fault bug2, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n", ++ address, vma->vm_start, vma_m->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma_m->vm_end); ++ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; ++ } ++ ++ address_m = address + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ pgd_m = pgd_offset(mm, address_m); ++ pmd_m = pmd_alloc(mm, pgd_m, address_m); ++ if (!pmd_m) { ++ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); ++ return VM_FAULT_OOM; ++ } ++ pte_m = pte_alloc_map(mm, pmd_m, address_m); ++ if (!pte_m) { ++ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); ++ return VM_FAULT_OOM; ++ } ++ pte_unmap(pte_m); ++ } ++#endif ++ + pmd = pmd_alloc(mm, pgd, address); + + if (pmd) { +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/mm/mlock.c linux-2.6.5/mm/mlock.c +--- linux-2.6.5/mm/mlock.c 2004-04-03 22:36:16.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/mm/mlock.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -7,11 +7,43 @@ + + #include <linux/mman.h> + #include <linux/mm.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++static int __mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma, ++ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags); + + static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma, + unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags) + { ++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { ++ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m; ++ unsigned long start_m, end_m; ++ int error; ++ ++ start_m = vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, start_m); ++ if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == start_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) { ++ start_m = start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ end_m = end + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ error = __mlock_fixup(vma_m, start_m, end_m, newflags); ++ if (error) ++ return error; ++ } else { ++ printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: mlock bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start); ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ } ++ } ++ return __mlock_fixup(vma, start, end, newflags); ++} ++ ++static int __mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma, ++ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags) ++#else ++static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma, ++ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags) ++#endif ++{ + struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm; + int pages; + int ret = 0; +@@ -65,6 +97,17 @@ + return -EINVAL; + if (end == start) + return 0; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { ++ if (end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } else ++#endif ++ ++ if (end > TASK_SIZE) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ + vma = find_vma(current->mm, start); + if (!vma || vma->vm_start > start) + return -ENOMEM; +@@ -115,6 +158,7 @@ + lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT; + + /* check against resource limits */ ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked, 1); + if (locked <= lock_limit) + error = do_mlock(start, len, 1); + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); +@@ -151,6 +195,16 @@ + for (vma = current->mm->mmap; vma ; vma = vma->vm_next) { + unsigned int newflags; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { ++ if (vma->vm_end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE) ++ break; ++ } else ++#endif ++ ++ if (vma->vm_end > TASK_SIZE) ++ break; ++ + newflags = vma->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED; + if (!(flags & MCL_CURRENT)) + newflags &= ~VM_LOCKED; +@@ -174,6 +228,7 @@ + lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT; + + ret = -ENOMEM; ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, current->mm->total_vm, 1); + if (current->mm->total_vm <= lock_limit) + ret = do_mlockall(flags); + out: +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/mm/mmap.c linux-2.6.5/mm/mmap.c +--- linux-2.6.5/mm/mmap.c 2004-04-03 22:37:25.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/mm/mmap.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ + #include <linux/profile.h> + #include <linux/module.h> + #include <linux/mount.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/pgalloc.h> +@@ -121,6 +122,7 @@ + + /* Check against rlimit.. */ + rlim = current->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur; ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, brk - mm->start_data, 1); + if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY && brk - mm->start_data > rlim) + goto out; + +@@ -327,6 +329,12 @@ + static inline int is_mergeable_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + struct file *file, unsigned long vm_flags) + { ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if ((vma->vm_flags | vm_flags) & VM_MIRROR) ++ return 0; ++#endif ++ + if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->close) + return 0; + if (vma->vm_file != file) +@@ -494,6 +502,28 @@ + int accountable = 1; + unsigned long charged = 0; + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL; ++ ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) { ++ /* PaX: sanity checks, to be removed when proved to be stable */ ++ if (file || len || ((flags & MAP_TYPE) != MAP_PRIVATE)) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ vma_m = find_vma(mm, pgoff); ++ ++ if (!vma_m || is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma_m) || ++ vma_m->vm_start != pgoff || ++ (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) || ++ (!(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) && (prot & PROT_WRITE))) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ file = vma_m->vm_file; ++ pgoff = vma_m->vm_pgoff; ++ len = vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start; ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (file) { + if (is_file_hugepages(file)) + accountable = 0; +@@ -535,6 +565,30 @@ + vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) | + mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC; + ++ if (file && (file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) ++ vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC; ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ++ if (current->flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) { ++ if (!file || (prot & PROT_WRITE)) ++ vm_flags &= ~(VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC); ++ else ++ vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC ++ if (file && (flags & MAP_MIRROR) && (vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) ++ vma_m->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE; ++#endif ++ ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (flags & MAP_LOCKED) { + if (!capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) + return -EPERM; +@@ -544,6 +598,7 @@ + if (vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) { + unsigned long locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT; + locked += len; ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked, 1); + if (locked > current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur) + return -EAGAIN; + } +@@ -599,6 +654,9 @@ + if (error) + return error; + ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_mmap(file, prot)) ++ return -EACCES; ++ + /* Clear old maps */ + error = -ENOMEM; + munmap_back: +@@ -610,6 +668,7 @@ + } + + /* Check against address space limit. */ ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len, 1); + if ((mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len + > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur) + return -ENOMEM; +@@ -650,6 +709,13 @@ + vma->vm_start = addr; + vma->vm_end = addr + len; + vma->vm_flags = vm_flags; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if ((file || !(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) && (vm_flags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE))) ++ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(vm_flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x0f]; ++ else ++#endif ++ + vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vm_flags & 0x0f]; + vma->vm_ops = NULL; + vma->vm_pgoff = pgoff; +@@ -679,6 +745,14 @@ + goto free_vma; + } + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) { ++ vma_m->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR; ++ vma_m->vm_private_data = (void *)(vma->vm_start - vma_m->vm_start); ++ vma->vm_private_data = (void *)(vma_m->vm_start - vma->vm_start); ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* We set VM_ACCOUNT in a shared mapping's vm_flags, to inform + * shmem_zero_setup (perhaps called through /dev/zero's ->mmap) + * that memory reservation must be checked; but that reservation +@@ -759,12 +833,28 @@ + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + unsigned long start_addr; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ else ++#endif ++ + if (len > TASK_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp) ++#endif ++ + if (addr) { + addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr); + vma = find_vma(mm, addr); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len < addr) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++#endif ++ + if (TASK_SIZE - len >= addr && + (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start)) + return addr; +@@ -780,6 +870,13 @@ + * some holes. + */ + if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) ++ start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + mm->delta_mmap; ++ else ++#endif ++ + start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + goto full_search; + } +@@ -939,10 +1036,18 @@ + spin_unlock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock); + return -ENOMEM; + } +- ++ ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_STACK, address - vma->vm_start, 1); ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1); ++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, (vma->vm_mm->locked_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1); ++ + if (address - vma->vm_start > current->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur || + ((vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) > +- current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur) { ++ current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur || ++ ((vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) && ++ ((vma->vm_mm->locked_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) > ++ current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)) { + spin_unlock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock); + vm_unacct_memory(grow); + return -ENOMEM; +@@ -993,10 +1098,62 @@ + spin_unlock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock); + return -ENOMEM; + } +- ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { ++ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m; ++ unsigned long address_m; ++ ++ address_m = vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, address_m); ++ if (!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != address_m || ++ !(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) || ++ vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != ++ vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start) { ++ spin_unlock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock); ++ vm_unacct_memory(grow); ++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: expand bug, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n", ++ address, vma->vm_start, vma_m->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma_m->vm_end); ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ } ++ ++ address_m = address + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_STACK, vma_m->vm_end - address_m, 1); ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (vma_m->vm_mm->total_vm + 2*grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1); ++ if (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, (vma_m->vm_mm->locked_vm + 2*grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1); ++ ++ if (vma_m->vm_end - address_m > current->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur || ++ ((vma_m->vm_mm->total_vm + 2*grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) > ++ current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur || ++ ((vma_m->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) && ++ ((vma_m->vm_mm->locked_vm + 2*grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) > ++ current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)) { ++ spin_unlock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock); ++ vm_unacct_memory(grow); ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ } ++ ++ vma_m->vm_start = address_m; ++ vma_m->vm_pgoff -= grow; ++ vma_m->vm_mm->total_vm += grow; ++ if (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) ++ vma_m->vm_mm->locked_vm += grow; ++ } else ++#endif ++ ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_STACK, vma->vm_end - address, 1); ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1); ++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, (vma->vm_mm->locked_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1); ++ + if (vma->vm_end - address > current->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur || + ((vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) > +- current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur) { ++ current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur || ++ ((vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) && ++ ((vma->vm_mm->locked_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) > ++ current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)) { + spin_unlock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock); + vm_unacct_memory(grow); + return -ENOMEM; +@@ -1108,15 +1265,15 @@ + { + size_t len = area->vm_end - area->vm_start; + +- area->vm_mm->total_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT; ++ mm->total_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT; + if (area->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) +- area->vm_mm->locked_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT; ++ mm->locked_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT; + /* + * Is this a new hole at the lowest possible address? + */ + if (area->vm_start >= TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE && +- area->vm_start < area->vm_mm->free_area_cache) +- area->vm_mm->free_area_cache = area->vm_start; ++ area->vm_start < mm->free_area_cache) ++ mm->free_area_cache = area->vm_start; + + remove_shared_vm_struct(area); + +@@ -1178,21 +1335,73 @@ + */ + static void + detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, +- struct vm_area_struct *prev, unsigned long end) ++ struct vm_area_struct *prev, unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end) + { + struct vm_area_struct **insertion_point; + struct vm_area_struct *tail_vma = NULL; + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ unsigned long start_m; ++ struct vm_area_struct *vma_m, *head_vma = vma, *mirrors = NULL, *head_vma_m = NULL; ++#endif ++ + insertion_point = (prev ? &prev->vm_next : &mm->mmap); + do { + rb_erase(&vma->vm_rb, &mm->mm_rb); + mm->map_count--; ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) && ++ vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data >= *start && ++ vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data < *end) ++ { ++ mm->mmap_cache = NULL; /* Kill the cache. */ ++ start_m = vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ vma_m = find_vma(mm, start_m); ++ if (vma_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) && vma_m->vm_start == start_m) { ++ vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MIRROR; ++ vma_m->vm_flags &= ~VM_MIRROR; ++ } else ++ printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: munmap bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start); ++ } ++#endif ++ + tail_vma = vma; + vma = vma->vm_next; +- } while (vma && vma->vm_start < end); ++ } while (vma && vma->vm_start < *end); + *insertion_point = vma; + tail_vma->vm_next = NULL; + mm->mmap_cache = NULL; /* Kill the cache. */ ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ for (; head_vma; head_vma = head_vma->vm_next) { ++ struct vm_area_struct *prev_m; ++ ++ if (!(head_vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) ++ continue; ++ ++ start_m = head_vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)head_vma->vm_private_data; ++ vma_m = find_vma_prev(mm, start_m, &prev_m); ++ rb_erase(&vma_m->vm_rb, &mm->mm_rb); ++ mm->map_count--; ++ insertion_point = prev_m ? &prev_m->vm_next : &mm->mmap; ++ *insertion_point = vma_m->vm_next; ++ if (head_vma_m) { ++ mirrors->vm_next = vma_m; ++ mirrors = vma_m; ++ } else ++ head_vma_m = mirrors = vma_m; ++ mirrors->vm_next = NULL; ++ if (vma_m->vm_start < *start) ++ *start = vma_m->vm_start; ++ if (vma_m->vm_end > *end) ++ *end = vma_m->vm_end; ++ mm->mmap_cache = NULL; /* Kill the cache. */ ++ } ++ if (head_vma_m) ++ tail_vma->vm_next = head_vma_m; ++#endif ++ + } + + /* +@@ -1262,6 +1471,10 @@ + unsigned long end; + struct vm_area_struct *mpnt, *prev, *last; + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ struct vm_area_struct *mpnt_m = NULL, *last_m; ++#endif ++ + if ((start & ~PAGE_MASK) || start > TASK_SIZE || len > TASK_SIZE-start) + return -EINVAL; + +@@ -1298,6 +1511,20 @@ + * places tmp vma above, and higher split_vma places tmp vma below. + */ + if (start > mpnt->vm_start) { ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if (mpnt->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { ++ unsigned long start_m = mpnt->vm_start + (unsigned long)mpnt->vm_private_data; ++ ++ mpnt_m = find_vma(mm, start_m); ++ if (!mpnt_m || (!mpnt_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) || mpnt_m->vm_start != start_m) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ start_m = start + (unsigned long)mpnt->vm_private_data; ++ if (split_vma(mm, mpnt_m, start_m, 0)) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (split_vma(mm, mpnt, start, 0)) + return -ENOMEM; + prev = mpnt; +@@ -1306,6 +1533,20 @@ + /* Does it split the last one? */ + last = find_vma(mm, end); + if (last && end > last->vm_start) { ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if (last->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { ++ unsigned long end_m = last->vm_start + (unsigned long)last->vm_private_data; ++ ++ last_m = find_vma(mm, end_m); ++ if (!last_m || (!last_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) || last_m->vm_start != end_m) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ end_m = end + (unsigned long)last->vm_private_data; ++ if (split_vma(mm, last_m, end_m, 1)) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (split_vma(mm, last, end, 1)) + return -ENOMEM; + } +@@ -1315,7 +1556,7 @@ + * Remove the vma's, and unmap the actual pages + */ + spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock); +- detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(mm, mpnt, prev, end); ++ detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(mm, mpnt, prev, &start, &end); + unmap_region(mm, mpnt, prev, start, end); + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); + +@@ -1332,6 +1573,12 @@ + int ret; + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && ++ (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len)) ++ return -EINVAL; ++#endif ++ + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + ret = do_munmap(mm, addr, len); + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); +@@ -1343,7 +1590,31 @@ + * anonymous maps. eventually we may be able to do some + * brk-specific accounting here. + */ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT) ++unsigned long __do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len); ++ ++unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) ++{ ++ unsigned long ret; ++ ++ ret = __do_brk(addr, len); ++ if (ret == addr && (current->flags & (PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC | PF_PAX_MPROTECT)) == PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { ++ unsigned long ret_m; ++ ++ ret_m = do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, addr + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, 0UL, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_MIRROR, addr); ++ if (ret_m > TASK_SIZE) { ++ do_munmap(current->mm, addr, len); ++ ret = ret_m; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++unsigned long __do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) ++#else + unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) ++#endif + { + struct mm_struct * mm = current->mm; + struct vm_area_struct * vma, * prev; +@@ -1354,6 +1625,13 @@ + if (!len) + return addr; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { ++ if ((addr + len) > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || (addr + len) < addr) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } else ++#endif ++ + if ((addr + len) > TASK_SIZE || (addr + len) < addr) + return -EINVAL; + +@@ -1363,6 +1641,7 @@ + if (mm->def_flags & VM_LOCKED) { + unsigned long locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT; + locked += len; ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked, 1); + if (locked > current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur) + return -EAGAIN; + } +@@ -1379,6 +1658,7 @@ + } + + /* Check against address space limits *after* clearing old maps... */ ++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len, 1); + if ((mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len + > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur) + return -ENOMEM; +@@ -1391,6 +1671,18 @@ + + flags = VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT | mm->def_flags; + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ++ if (current->flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) { ++ flags &= ~VM_EXEC; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) ++ flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC; ++#endif ++ ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* Can we just expand an old anonymous mapping? */ + if (rb_parent && vma_merge(mm, prev, rb_parent, addr, addr + len, + flags, NULL, 0)) +@@ -1409,6 +1701,13 @@ + vma->vm_start = addr; + vma->vm_end = addr + len; + vma->vm_flags = flags; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (flags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE))) ++ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x0f]; ++ else ++#endif ++ + vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[flags & 0x0f]; + vma->vm_ops = NULL; + vma->vm_pgoff = 0; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/mm/mprotect.c linux-2.6.5/mm/mprotect.c +--- linux-2.6.5/mm/mprotect.c 2004-04-03 22:38:28.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/mm/mprotect.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ + #include <linux/fs.h> + #include <linux/highmem.h> + #include <linux/security.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++#include <linux/elf.h> ++#include <linux/fs.h> ++#endif + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/pgalloc.h> +@@ -150,6 +156,46 @@ + return 1; + } + ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++static int __mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, ++ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags); ++ ++static int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, ++ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags) ++{ ++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { ++ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m, * prev_m; ++ unsigned long start_m, end_m; ++ int error; ++ ++ start_m = vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ vma_m = find_vma_prev(vma->vm_mm, start_m, &prev_m); ++ if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == start_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) { ++ start_m = start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ end_m = end + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data; ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && !(newflags & VM_EXEC)) ++ error = __mprotect_fixup(vma_m, &prev_m, start_m, end_m, vma_m->vm_flags & ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC)); ++ else ++ error = __mprotect_fixup(vma_m, &prev_m, start_m, end_m, newflags); ++ if (error) ++ return error; ++ } else { ++ printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: mprotect bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start); ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return __mprotect_fixup(vma, pprev, start, end, newflags); ++} ++ ++static int __mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, ++ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags) ++{ ++ struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm; ++ unsigned long charged = 0; ++ pgprot_t newprot; ++ int error; ++#else + static int + mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, + unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags) +@@ -163,6 +209,7 @@ + *pprev = vma; + return 0; + } ++#endif + + /* + * If we make a private mapping writable we increase our commit; +@@ -182,6 +229,12 @@ + } + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (newflags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE))) ++ newprot = protection_map[(newflags | VM_EXEC) & 0xf]; ++ else ++#endif ++ + newprot = protection_map[newflags & 0xf]; + + if (start == vma->vm_start) { +@@ -222,6 +275,69 @@ + return error; + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++/* PaX: non-PIC ELF libraries need relocations on their executable segments ++ * therefore we'll grant them VM_MAYWRITE once during their life. ++ * ++ * The checks favour ld-linux.so behaviour which operates on a per ELF segment ++ * basis because we want to allow the common case and not the special ones. ++ */ ++static inline void pax_handle_maywrite(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start) ++{ ++ struct elfhdr elf_h; ++ struct elf_phdr elf_p, p_dyn; ++ elf_dyn dyn; ++ unsigned long i, j = 65536UL / sizeof(struct elf_phdr); ++ ++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOELFRELOCS ++ if ((vma->vm_start != start) || ++ !vma->vm_file || ++ !(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC) || ++ (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYNOTWRITE)) ++#endif ++ ++ return; ++ ++ if (0 > kernel_read(vma->vm_file, 0UL, (char*)&elf_h, sizeof(elf_h)) || ++ memcmp(elf_h.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) || ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ETEXECRELOCS ++ (elf_h.e_type != ET_DYN && elf_h.e_type != ET_EXEC) || ++#else ++ elf_h.e_type != ET_DYN || ++#endif ++ ++ !elf_check_arch(&elf_h) || ++ elf_h.e_phentsize != sizeof(struct elf_phdr) || ++ elf_h.e_phnum > j) ++ return; ++ ++ for (i = 0UL; i < elf_h.e_phnum; i++) { ++ if (0 > kernel_read(vma->vm_file, elf_h.e_phoff + i*sizeof(elf_p), (char*)&elf_p, sizeof(elf_p))) ++ return; ++ if (elf_p.p_type == PT_DYNAMIC) { ++ p_dyn = elf_p; ++ j = i; ++ } ++ } ++ if (elf_h.e_phnum <= j) ++ return; ++ ++ i = 0UL; ++ do { ++ if (0 > kernel_read(vma->vm_file, p_dyn.p_offset + i*sizeof(dyn), (char*)&dyn, sizeof(dyn))) ++ return; ++ if (dyn.d_tag == DT_TEXTREL || (dyn.d_tag == DT_FLAGS && (dyn.d_un.d_val & DF_TEXTREL))) { ++ vma->vm_flags |= VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYNOTWRITE; ++ gr_log_textrel(vma); ++ return; ++ } ++ i++; ++ } while (dyn.d_tag != DT_NULL); ++ return; ++} ++#endif ++ + asmlinkage long + sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t len, unsigned long prot) + { +@@ -239,6 +355,17 @@ + end = start + len; + if (end < start) + return -ENOMEM; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { ++ if (end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } else ++#endif ++ ++ if (end > TASK_SIZE) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ + if (prot & ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM)) + return -EINVAL; + if (end == start) +@@ -271,6 +398,16 @@ + } + } + ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_mprotect(vma->vm_file, prot)) { ++ error = -EACCES; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) ++ pax_handle_maywrite(vma, start); ++#endif ++ + for (nstart = start ; ; ) { + unsigned int newflags; + int last = 0; +@@ -289,6 +426,12 @@ + goto out; + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT ++ /* PaX: disallow write access after relocs are done, hopefully noone else needs it... */ ++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) && (prot & PROT_WRITE) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYNOTWRITE)) ++ newflags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE; ++#endif ++ + error = security_file_mprotect(vma, prot); + if (error) + goto out; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/mm/mremap.c linux-2.6.5/mm/mremap.c +--- linux-2.6.5/mm/mremap.c 2004-04-03 22:37:23.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/mm/mremap.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -329,6 +329,18 @@ + if (!new_len) + goto out; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { ++ if (new_len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-new_len || ++ old_len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-old_len) ++ goto out; ++ } else ++#endif ++ ++ if (new_len > TASK_SIZE || addr > TASK_SIZE-new_len || ++ old_len > TASK_SIZE || addr > TASK_SIZE-old_len) ++ goto out; ++ + /* new_addr is only valid if MREMAP_FIXED is specified */ + if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) { + if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK) +@@ -336,6 +348,13 @@ + if (!(flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE)) + goto out; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { ++ if (new_len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || new_addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-new_len) ++ goto out; ++ } else ++#endif ++ + if (new_len > TASK_SIZE || new_addr > TASK_SIZE - new_len) + goto out; + +@@ -379,6 +398,16 @@ + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) ++ if ((current->flags & (PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC | PF_PAX_RANDEXEC)) && ++ (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) ++ { ++ ret = -EINVAL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* We can't remap across vm area boundaries */ + if (old_len > vma->vm_end - addr) + goto out; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/af_inet.c linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/af_inet.c +--- linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/af_inet.c 2004-04-03 22:36:24.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/af_inet.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ + #include <linux/init.h> + #include <linux/poll.h> + #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/system.h> +@@ -387,7 +388,12 @@ + else + inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT; + +- inet->id = 0; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID ++ if (grsec_enable_randid) ++ inet->id = htons(ip_randomid()); ++ else ++#endif ++ inet->id = 0; + + sock_init_data(sock, sk); + sk_set_owner(sk, THIS_MODULE); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/ip_output.c linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/ip_output.c +--- linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/ip_output.c 2004-04-03 22:38:22.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/ip_output.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ + #include <linux/proc_fs.h> + #include <linux/stat.h> + #include <linux/init.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <net/snmp.h> + #include <net/ip.h> +@@ -1161,6 +1162,12 @@ + iph->tos = inet->tos; + iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len); + iph->frag_off = df; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID ++ if (grsec_enable_randid) ++ iph->id = htons(ip_randomid()); ++ else ++#endif + if (!df) { + __ip_select_ident(iph, &rt->u.dst, 0); + } else { +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig +--- linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig 2004-04-03 22:37:45.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -225,6 +225,21 @@ + + To compile it as a module, choose M here. If unsure, say N. + ++config IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH ++ tristate "stealth match support" ++ depends on IP_NF_IPTABLES ++ help ++ Enabling this option will drop all syn packets coming to unserved tcp ++ ports as well as all packets coming to unserved udp ports. If you ++ are using your system to route any type of packets (ie. via NAT) ++ you should put this module at the end of your ruleset, since it will ++ drop packets that aren't going to ports that are listening on your ++ machine itself, it doesn't take into account that the packet might be ++ destined for someone on your internal network if you're using NAT for ++ instance. ++ ++ To compile it as a module, choose M here. If unsure, say N. ++ + config IP_NF_MATCH_HELPER + tristate "Helper match support" + depends on IP_NF_CONNTRACK && IP_NF_IPTABLES +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile +--- linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile 2004-04-03 22:36:27.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ + obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_CONNTRACK) += ipt_conntrack.o + obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_TCPMSS) += ipt_tcpmss.o + ++obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH) += ipt_stealth.o ++ + obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_PHYSDEV) += ipt_physdev.o + + # targets +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c +--- linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ ++/* Kernel module to add stealth support. ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2002 Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> ++ * ++ */ ++ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/skbuff.h> ++#include <linux/net.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/inet.h> ++#include <linux/stddef.h> ++ ++#include <net/ip.h> ++#include <net/sock.h> ++#include <net/tcp.h> ++#include <net/udp.h> ++#include <net/route.h> ++#include <net/inet_common.h> ++ ++#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h> ++ ++MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); ++ ++extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif); ++ ++static int ++match(const struct sk_buff *skb, ++ const struct net_device *in, ++ const struct net_device *out, ++ const void *matchinfo, ++ int offset, ++ int *hotdrop) ++{ ++ struct iphdr *ip = skb->nh.iph; ++ struct tcphdr th; ++ struct udphdr uh; ++ struct sock *sk = NULL; ++ ++ if (!ip || offset) return 0; ++ ++ switch(ip->protocol) { ++ case IPPROTO_TCP: ++ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->nh.iph->ihl*4, &th, sizeof(th)) < 0) { ++ *hotdrop = 1; ++ return 0; ++ } ++ if (!(th.syn && !th.ack)) return 0; ++ sk = tcp_v4_lookup_listener(ip->daddr, ntohs(th.dest), ((struct rtable*)skb->dst)->rt_iif); ++ break; ++ case IPPROTO_UDP: ++ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->nh.iph->ihl*4, &uh, sizeof(uh)) < 0) { ++ *hotdrop = 1; ++ return 0; ++ } ++ sk = udp_v4_lookup(ip->saddr, uh.source, ip->daddr, uh.dest, skb->dev->ifindex); ++ break; ++ default: ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if(!sk) // port is being listened on, match this ++ return 1; ++ else { ++ sock_put(sk); ++ return 0; ++ } ++} ++ ++/* Called when user tries to insert an entry of this type. */ ++static int ++checkentry(const char *tablename, ++ const struct ipt_ip *ip, ++ void *matchinfo, ++ unsigned int matchsize, ++ unsigned int hook_mask) ++{ ++ if (matchsize != IPT_ALIGN(0)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if(((ip->proto == IPPROTO_TCP && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO)) || ++ ((ip->proto == IPPROTO_UDP) && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO))) ++ && (hook_mask & (1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_IN))) ++ return 1; ++ ++ printk("stealth: Only works on TCP and UDP for the INPUT chain.\n"); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ ++static struct ipt_match stealth_match = { ++ .name = "stealth", ++ .match = &match, ++ .checkentry = &checkentry, ++ .destroy = NULL, ++ .me = THIS_MODULE ++}; ++ ++static int __init init(void) ++{ ++ return ipt_register_match(&stealth_match); ++} ++ ++static void __exit fini(void) ++{ ++ ipt_unregister_match(&stealth_match); ++} ++ ++module_init(init); ++module_exit(fini); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +--- linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c 2004-04-03 22:36:55.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ + #include <linux/jhash.h> + #include <linux/init.h> + #include <linux/times.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <net/icmp.h> + #include <net/tcp.h> +@@ -224,9 +225,16 @@ + spin_lock(&tcp_portalloc_lock); + rover = tcp_port_rover; + do { +- rover++; +- if (rover < low || rover > high) +- rover = low; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC ++ if (grsec_enable_randsrc && (high > low)) { ++ rover = low + (get_random_long() % (high - low)); ++ } else ++#endif ++ { ++ rover++; ++ if (rover < low || rover > high) ++ rover = low; ++ } + head = &tcp_bhash[tcp_bhashfn(rover)]; + spin_lock(&head->lock); + tb_for_each(tb, node, &head->chain) +@@ -537,6 +545,11 @@ + + static inline __u32 tcp_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) + { ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN ++ if (likely(grsec_enable_randisn)) ++ return ip_randomisn(); ++ else ++#endif + return secure_tcp_sequence_number(skb->nh.iph->daddr, + skb->nh.iph->saddr, + skb->h.th->dest, +@@ -671,10 +684,17 @@ + rover = tcp_port_rover; + + do { +- rover++; +- if ((rover < low) || (rover > high)) +- rover = low; +- head = &tcp_bhash[tcp_bhashfn(rover)]; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC ++ if (grsec_enable_randsrc && (high > low)) { ++ rover = low + (get_random_long() % (high - low)); ++ } else ++#endif ++ { ++ rover++; ++ if ((rover < low) || (rover > high)) ++ rover = low; ++ } ++ head = &tcp_bhash[tcp_bhashfn(rover)]; + spin_lock(&head->lock); + + /* Does not bother with rcv_saddr checks, +@@ -724,6 +744,15 @@ + } + spin_unlock(&head->lock); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC ++ gr_del_task_from_ip_table(current); ++ current->gr_saddr = inet_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr; ++ current->gr_daddr = inet_sk(sk)->daddr; ++ current->gr_sport = inet_sk(sk)->sport; ++ current->gr_dport = inet_sk(sk)->dport; ++ gr_add_to_task_ip_table(current); ++#endif ++ + if (tw) { + tcp_tw_deschedule(tw); + tcp_tw_put(tw); +@@ -843,13 +872,24 @@ + tcp_v4_setup_caps(sk, &rt->u.dst); + tp->ext2_header_len = rt->u.dst.header_len; + +- if (!tp->write_seq) ++ if (!tp->write_seq) { ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN ++ if (likely(grsec_enable_randisn)) ++ tp->write_seq = ip_randomisn(); ++ else ++#endif + tp->write_seq = secure_tcp_sequence_number(inet->saddr, + inet->daddr, + inet->sport, + usin->sin_port); ++ } + +- inet->id = tp->write_seq ^ jiffies; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID ++ if (grsec_enable_randid) ++ inet->id = htons(ip_randomid()); ++ else ++#endif ++ inet->id = tp->write_seq ^ jiffies; + + err = tcp_connect(sk); + rt = NULL; +@@ -1593,7 +1633,13 @@ + if (newinet->opt) + newtp->ext_header_len = newinet->opt->optlen; + newtp->ext2_header_len = dst->header_len; +- newinet->id = newtp->write_seq ^ jiffies; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID ++ if (grsec_enable_randid) ++ newinet->id = htons(ip_randomid()); ++ else ++#endif ++ newinet->id = newtp->write_seq ^ jiffies; + + tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_pmtu(dst)); + newtp->advmss = dst_metric(dst, RTAX_ADVMSS); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/udp.c linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/udp.c +--- linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/udp.c 2004-04-03 22:36:25.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/net/ipv4/udp.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ + #include <linux/skbuff.h> + #include <linux/proc_fs.h> + #include <linux/seq_file.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + #include <net/sock.h> + #include <net/udp.h> + #include <net/icmp.h> +@@ -108,6 +109,12 @@ + #include <net/checksum.h> + #include <net/xfrm.h> + ++extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, ++ const struct sk_buff *skb); ++extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, ++ const struct sockaddr_in *addr); ++ ++ + /* + * Snmp MIB for the UDP layer + */ +@@ -538,9 +545,16 @@ + dport = usin->sin_port; + if (dport == 0) + return -EINVAL; ++ ++ if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, usin)) ++ return -EPERM; + } else { + if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) + return -EDESTADDRREQ; ++ ++ if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, NULL)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + daddr = inet->daddr; + dport = inet->dport; + /* Open fast path for connected socket. +@@ -792,7 +806,12 @@ + if (!skb) + goto out; + +- copied = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr); ++ if (!gr_search_udp_recvmsg(sk, skb)) { ++ err = -EPERM; ++ goto out_free; ++ } ++ ++ copied = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr); + if (copied > len) { + copied = len; + msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; +@@ -901,7 +920,12 @@ + inet->daddr = rt->rt_dst; + inet->dport = usin->sin_port; + sk->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED; +- inet->id = jiffies; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID ++ if (grsec_enable_randid) ++ inet->id = htons(ip_randomid()); ++ else ++#endif ++ inet->id = jiffies; + + sk_dst_set(sk, &rt->u.dst); + return(0); +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/net/socket.c linux-2.6.5/net/socket.c +--- linux-2.6.5/net/socket.c 2004-04-03 22:36:56.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/net/socket.c 2004-04-16 12:58:34.000000000 -0400 +@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ + #include <linux/syscalls.h> + #include <linux/compat.h> + #include <linux/kmod.h> ++#include <linux/in.h> + + #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RADIO + #include <linux/wireless.h> /* Note : will define WIRELESS_EXT */ +@@ -92,6 +93,18 @@ + #include <net/sock.h> + #include <linux/netfilter.h> + ++extern void gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk); ++extern int gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type, ++ const int protocol); ++extern int gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck); ++extern int gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck); ++extern int gr_search_connect(const struct socket * sock, ++ const struct sockaddr_in * addr); ++extern int gr_search_bind(const struct socket * sock, ++ const struct sockaddr_in * addr); ++extern int gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type, ++ const int protocol); ++ + static int sock_no_open(struct inode *irrelevant, struct file *dontcare); + static ssize_t sock_aio_read(struct kiocb *iocb, char __user *buf, + size_t size, loff_t pos); +@@ -872,6 +885,7 @@ + printk(KERN_DEBUG "sock_close: NULL inode\n"); + return 0; + } ++ + sock_fasync(-1, filp, 0); + sock_release(SOCKET_I(inode)); + return 0; +@@ -1092,6 +1106,16 @@ + int retval; + struct socket *sock; + ++ if(!gr_search_socket(family, type, protocol)) { ++ retval = -EACCES; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if (gr_handle_sock_all(family, type, protocol)) { ++ retval = -EACCES; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + retval = sock_create(family, type, protocol, &sock); + if (retval < 0) + goto out; +@@ -1187,11 +1211,23 @@ + { + struct socket *sock; + char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR]; ++ struct sockaddr *sck; + int err; + + if((sock = sockfd_lookup(fd,&err))!=NULL) + { + if((err=move_addr_to_kernel(umyaddr,addrlen,address))>=0) { ++ sck = (struct sockaddr *)address; ++ if (!gr_search_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *)sck)) { ++ sockfd_put(sock); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++ ++ if (gr_handle_sock_server(sck)) { ++ sockfd_put(sock); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++ + err = security_socket_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)address, addrlen); + if (err) { + sockfd_put(sock); +@@ -1294,6 +1330,7 @@ + goto out_release; + + security_socket_post_accept(sock, newsock); ++ gr_attach_curr_ip(newsock->sk); + + out_put: + sockfd_put(sock); +@@ -1321,6 +1358,7 @@ + { + struct socket *sock; + char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR]; ++ struct sockaddr *sck; + int err; + + sock = sockfd_lookup(fd, &err); +@@ -1330,6 +1368,18 @@ + if (err < 0) + goto out_put; + ++ sck = (struct sockaddr *)address; ++ ++ if (!gr_search_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *)sck)) { ++ err = -EACCES; ++ goto out_put; ++ } ++ ++ if (gr_handle_sock_client(sck)) { ++ err = -EACCES; ++ goto out_put; ++ } ++ + err = security_socket_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)address, addrlen); + if (err) + goto out_put; +@@ -1583,6 +1633,7 @@ + err=sock->ops->shutdown(sock, how); + sockfd_put(sock); + } ++ + return err; + } + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/net/sunrpc/xprt.c linux-2.6.5/net/sunrpc/xprt.c +--- linux-2.6.5/net/sunrpc/xprt.c 2004-04-03 22:37:36.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/net/sunrpc/xprt.c 2004-04-16 12:58:35.000000000 -0400 +@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ + #include <linux/file.h> + #include <linux/workqueue.h> + #include <linux/random.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + #include <net/sock.h> + #include <net/checksum.h> +@@ -1322,6 +1323,12 @@ + */ + static inline u32 xprt_alloc_xid(struct rpc_xprt *xprt) + { ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC ++ if (grsec_enable_randrpc) ++ return (u32) get_random_long(); ++#endif ++ + return xprt->xid++; + } + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/net/unix/af_unix.c linux-2.6.5/net/unix/af_unix.c +--- linux-2.6.5/net/unix/af_unix.c 2004-04-03 22:37:36.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/net/unix/af_unix.c 2004-04-16 12:58:35.000000000 -0400 +@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ + #include <linux/mount.h> + #include <net/checksum.h> + #include <linux/security.h> ++#include <linux/grsecurity.h> + + int sysctl_unix_max_dgram_qlen = 10; + +@@ -683,6 +684,11 @@ + if (err) + goto put_fail; + ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_unix(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) { ++ err = -EACCES; ++ goto put_fail; ++ } ++ + err = -ECONNREFUSED; + if (!S_ISSOCK(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) + goto put_fail; +@@ -706,6 +712,13 @@ + if (u) { + struct dentry *dentry; + dentry = unix_sk(u)->dentry; ++ ++ if (!gr_handle_chroot_unix(u->sk_peercred.pid)) { ++ err = -EPERM; ++ sock_put(u); ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ + if (dentry) + touch_atime(unix_sk(u)->mnt, dentry); + } else +@@ -805,9 +818,18 @@ + */ + mode = S_IFSOCK | + (SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_mode & ~current->fs->umask); ++ ++ if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) { ++ err = -EACCES; ++ goto out_mknod_dput; ++ } ++ + err = vfs_mknod(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode, 0); + if (err) + goto out_mknod_dput; ++ ++ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt); ++ + up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); + dput(nd.dentry); + nd.dentry = dentry; +@@ -825,6 +847,10 @@ + goto out_unlock; + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX ++ sk->sk_peercred.pid = current->pid; ++#endif ++ + list = &unix_socket_table[addr->hash]; + } else { + list = &unix_socket_table[dentry->d_inode->i_ino & (UNIX_HASH_SIZE-1)]; +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/security/Kconfig linux-2.6.5/security/Kconfig +--- linux-2.6.5/security/Kconfig 2004-04-03 22:37:37.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/security/Kconfig 2004-04-16 12:58:35.000000000 -0400 +@@ -4,6 +4,407 @@ + + menu "Security options" + ++source grsecurity/Kconfig ++ ++menu "PaX" ++ ++config PAX ++ bool "Enable various PaX features" ++ depends on ALPHA || IA64 || MIPS32 || MIPS64 || PARISC || PPC32 || SPARC32 || SPARC64 || X86 || X86_64 ++ help ++ This allows you to enable various PaX features. PaX adds ++ intrusion prevention mechanisms to the kernel that reduce ++ the risks posed by exploitable memory corruption bugs. ++ ++menu "PaX Control" ++ depends on PAX ++ ++config PAX_SOFTMODE ++ bool 'Support soft mode' ++ help ++ Enabling this option will allow you to run PaX in soft mode, that ++ is, PaX features will not be enforced by default, only on executables ++ marked explicitly. You must also enable PT_PAX_FLAGS support as it ++ is the only way to mark executables for soft mode use. ++ ++ Soft mode can be activated by using the "pax_softmode=1" kernel command ++ line option on boot. Furthermore you can control various PaX features ++ at runtime via the entries in /proc/sys/kernel/pax. ++ ++config PAX_EI_PAX ++ bool 'Use legacy ELF header marking' ++ help ++ Enabling this option will allow you to control PaX features on ++ a per executable basis via the 'chpax' utility available at ++ http://pax.grsecurity.net/. The control flags will be read from ++ an otherwise reserved part of the ELF header. This marking has ++ numerous drawbacks (no support for soft-mode, toolchain does not ++ know about the non-standard use of the ELF header) therefore it ++ has been deprecated in favour of PT_PAX_FLAGS support. ++ ++ You should enable this option only if your toolchain does not yet ++ support the new control flag location (PT_PAX_FLAGS) or you still ++ have applications not marked by PT_PAX_FLAGS. ++ ++ Note that if you enable PT_PAX_FLAGS marking support as well, ++ it will override the legacy EI_PAX marks. ++ ++config PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS ++ bool 'Use ELF program header marking' ++ help ++ Enabling this option will allow you to control PaX features on ++ a per executable basis via the 'paxctl' utility available at ++ http://pax.grsecurity.net/. The control flags will be read from ++ a PaX specific ELF program header (PT_PAX_FLAGS). This marking ++ has the benefits of supporting both soft mode and being fully ++ integrated into the toolchain (the binutils patch is available ++ from http://pax.grsecurity.net). ++ ++ Note that if you enable the legacy EI_PAX marking support as well, ++ it will be overridden by the PT_PAX_FLAGS marking. ++ ++choice ++ prompt 'MAC system integration' ++ default PAX_NO_ACL_FLAGS ++ help ++ Mandatory Access Control systems have the option of controlling ++ PaX flags on a per executable basis, choose the method supported ++ by your particular system. ++ ++ - "none": if your MAC system does not interact with PaX, ++ - "direct": if your MAC system defines pax_set_flags() itself, ++ - "hook": if your MAC system uses the pax_set_flags_func callback. ++ ++ NOTE: this option is for developers/integrators only. ++ ++config PAX_NO_ACL_FLAGS ++ bool 'none' ++ ++config PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS ++ bool 'direct' ++ ++config PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS ++ bool 'hook' ++endchoice ++ ++endmenu ++ ++menu "Non-executable pages" ++ depends on PAX ++ ++config PAX_NOEXEC ++ bool "Enforce non-executable pages" ++ depends on (PAX_EI_PAX || PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS || PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS || PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS) && (ALPHA || IA64 || MIPS32 || MIPS64 || PARISC || PPC32 || SPARC32 || SPARC64 || X86 || X86_64) ++ help ++ By design some architectures do not allow for protecting memory ++ pages against execution or even if they do, Linux does not make ++ use of this feature. In practice this means that if a page is ++ readable (such as the stack or heap) it is also executable. ++ ++ There is a well known exploit technique that makes use of this ++ fact and a common programming mistake where an attacker can ++ introduce code of his choice somewhere in the attacked program's ++ memory (typically the stack or the heap) and then execute it. ++ ++ If the attacked program was running with different (typically ++ higher) privileges than that of the attacker, then he can elevate ++ his own privilege level (e.g. get a root shell, write to files for ++ which he does not have write access to, etc). ++ ++ Enabling this option will let you choose from various features ++ that prevent the injection and execution of 'foreign' code in ++ a program. ++ ++ This will also break programs that rely on the old behaviour and ++ expect that dynamically allocated memory via the malloc() family ++ of functions is executable (which it is not). Notable examples ++ are the XFree86 4.x server, the java runtime and wine. ++ ++config PAX_PAGEEXEC ++ bool "Paging based non-executable pages" ++ depends on PAX_NOEXEC && !HIGHPTE && (!X86 || X86_64 || M586 || M586TSC || M586MMX || M686 || MPENTIUMII || MPENTIUMIII || MPENTIUM4 || MK7 || MK8) ++ help ++ This implementation is based on the paging feature of the CPU. ++ On i386 it has a variable performance impact on applications ++ depending on their memory usage pattern. You should carefully ++ test your applications before using this feature in production. ++ On alpha, ia64, parisc, sparc, sparc64 and x86_64 there is no ++ performance impact. On ppc there is a slight performance impact. ++ ++config PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ bool "Segmentation based non-executable pages" ++ depends on PAX_NOEXEC && X86 && !X86_64 ++ help ++ This implementation is based on the segmentation feature of the ++ CPU and has little performance impact, however applications will ++ be limited to a 1.5 GB address space instead of the normal 3 GB. ++ ++config PAX_EMUTRAMP ++ bool "Emulate trampolines" if (PAX_PAGEEXEC || PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (PARISC || PPC || X86) && !X86_64 ++ default y if PARISC || PPC ++ help ++ There are some programs and libraries that for one reason or ++ another attempt to execute special small code snippets from ++ non-executable memory pages. Most notable examples are the ++ signal handler return code generated by the kernel itself and ++ the GCC trampolines. ++ ++ If you enabled CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC or CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC then ++ such programs will no longer work under your kernel. ++ ++ As a remedy you can say Y here and use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' ++ utilities to enable trampoline emulation for the affected programs ++ yet still have the protection provided by the non-executable pages. ++ ++ On parisc and ppc you MUST enable this option and EMUSIGRT as ++ well, otherwise your system will not even boot. ++ ++ Alternatively you can say N here and use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' ++ utilities to disable CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC and CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ for the affected files. ++ ++ NOTE: enabling this feature *may* open up a loophole in the ++ protection provided by non-executable pages that an attacker ++ could abuse. Therefore the best solution is to not have any ++ files on your system that would require this option. This can ++ be achieved by not using libc5 (which relies on the kernel ++ signal handler return code) and not using or rewriting programs ++ that make use of the nested function implementation of GCC. ++ Skilled users can just fix GCC itself so that it implements ++ nested function calls in a way that does not interfere with PaX. ++ ++config PAX_EMUSIGRT ++ bool "Automatically emulate sigreturn trampolines" ++ depends on PAX_EMUTRAMP && (PARISC || PPC) ++ default y ++ help ++ Enabling this option will have the kernel automatically detect ++ and emulate signal return trampolines executing on the stack ++ that would otherwise lead to task termination. ++ ++ This solution is intended as a temporary one for users with ++ legacy versions of libc (libc5, glibc 2.0, uClibc before 0.9.17, ++ Modula-3 runtime, etc) or executables linked to such, basically ++ everything that does not specify its own SA_RESTORER function in ++ normal executable memory like glibc 2.1+ does. ++ ++ On parisc and ppc you MUST enable this option, otherwise your ++ system will not even boot. ++ ++ NOTE: this feature cannot be disabled on a per executable basis ++ and since it *does* open up a loophole in the protection provided ++ by non-executable pages, the best solution is to not have any ++ files on your system that would require this option. ++ ++config PAX_MPROTECT ++ bool "Restrict mprotect()" ++ depends on PAX_PAGEEXEC || PAX_SEGMEXEC ++ help ++ Enabling this option will prevent programs from ++ - changing the executable status of memory pages that were ++ not originally created as executable, ++ - making read-only executable pages writable again, ++ - creating executable pages from anonymous memory. ++ ++ You should say Y here to complete the protection provided by ++ the enforcement of non-executable pages. ++ ++ NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control ++ this feature on a per file basis. ++ ++config PAX_NOELFRELOCS ++ bool "Disallow ELF text relocations" ++ depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (IA64 || X86 || X86_64) ++ help ++ Non-executable pages and mprotect() restrictions are effective ++ in preventing the introduction of new executable code into an ++ attacked task's address space. There remain only two venues ++ for this kind of attack: if the attacker can execute already ++ existing code in the attacked task then he can either have it ++ create and mmap() a file containing his code or have it mmap() ++ an already existing ELF library that does not have position ++ independent code in it and use mprotect() on it to make it ++ writable and copy his code there. While protecting against ++ the former approach is beyond PaX, the latter can be prevented ++ by having only PIC ELF libraries on one's system (which do not ++ need to relocate their code). If you are sure this is your case, ++ then enable this option otherwise be careful as you may not even ++ be able to boot or log on your system (for example, some PAM ++ modules are erroneously compiled as non-PIC by default). ++ ++ NOTE: if you are using dynamic ELF executables (as suggested ++ when using ASLR) then you must have made sure that you linked ++ your files using the PIC version of crt1 (the et_dyn.tar.gz package ++ referenced there has already been updated to support this). ++ ++config PAX_ETEXECRELOCS ++ bool "Allow ELF ET_EXEC text relocations" ++ depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (ALPHA || IA64 || PARISC) ++ default y ++ help ++ On some architectures there are incorrectly created applications ++ that require text relocations and would not work without enabling ++ this option. If you are an alpha, ia64 or parisc user, you should ++ enable this option and disable it once you have made sure that ++ none of your applications need it. ++ ++config PAX_EMUPLT ++ bool "Automatically emulate ELF PLT" ++ depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (ALPHA || PARISC || PPC || SPARC32 || SPARC64) ++ default y ++ help ++ Enabling this option will have the kernel automatically detect ++ and emulate the Procedure Linkage Table entries in ELF files. ++ On some architectures such entries are in writable memory, and ++ become non-executable leading to task termination. Therefore ++ it is mandatory that you enable this option on alpha, parisc, ppc, ++ sparc and sparc64, otherwise your system would not even boot. ++ ++ NOTE: this feature *does* open up a loophole in the protection ++ provided by the non-executable pages, therefore the proper ++ solution is to modify the toolchain to produce a PLT that does ++ not need to be writable. ++ ++config PAX_DLRESOLVE ++ bool ++ depends on PAX_EMUPLT && (SPARC32 || SPARC64) ++ default y ++ ++config PAX_SYSCALL ++ bool ++ depends on PAX_PAGEEXEC && PPC ++ default y ++ ++config PAX_KERNEXEC ++ bool "Enforce non-executable kernel pages" ++ depends on PAX_NOEXEC && X86 && !X86_64 && !MODULES && !HOTPLUG_PCI_COMPAQ_NVRAM ++ help ++ This is the kernel land equivalent of PAGEEXEC and MPROTECT, ++ that is, enabling this option will make it harder to inject ++ and execute 'foreign' code in kernel memory itself. ++ ++endmenu ++ ++menu "Address Space Layout Randomization" ++ depends on PAX ++ ++config PAX_ASLR ++ bool "Address Space Layout Randomization" ++ depends on PAX_EI_PAX || PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS || PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS || PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS ++ help ++ Many if not most exploit techniques rely on the knowledge of ++ certain addresses in the attacked program. The following options ++ will allow the kernel to apply a certain amount of randomization ++ to specific parts of the program thereby forcing an attacker to ++ guess them in most cases. Any failed guess will most likely crash ++ the attacked program which allows the kernel to detect such attempts ++ and react on them. PaX itself provides no reaction mechanisms, ++ instead it is strongly encouraged that you make use of Nergal's ++ segvguard (ftp://ftp.pl.openwall.com/misc/segvguard/) or grsecurity's ++ (http://www.grsecurity.net/) built-in crash detection features or ++ develop one yourself. ++ ++ By saying Y here you can choose to randomize the following areas: ++ - top of the task's kernel stack ++ - top of the task's userland stack ++ - base address for mmap() requests that do not specify one ++ (this includes all libraries) ++ - base address of the main executable ++ ++ It is strongly recommended to say Y here as address space layout ++ randomization has negligible impact on performance yet it provides ++ a very effective protection. ++ ++ NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control ++ this feature on a per file basis. ++ ++config PAX_RANDKSTACK ++ bool "Randomize kernel stack base" ++ depends on PAX_ASLR && X86_TSC && !X86_64 ++ help ++ By saying Y here the kernel will randomize every task's kernel ++ stack on every system call. This will not only force an attacker ++ to guess it but also prevent him from making use of possible ++ leaked information about it. ++ ++ Since the kernel stack is a rather scarce resource, randomization ++ may cause unexpected stack overflows, therefore you should very ++ carefully test your system. Note that once enabled in the kernel ++ configuration, this feature cannot be disabled on a per file basis. ++ ++config PAX_RANDUSTACK ++ bool "Randomize user stack base" ++ depends on PAX_ASLR ++ help ++ By saying Y here the kernel will randomize every task's userland ++ stack. The randomization is done in two steps where the second ++ one may apply a big amount of shift to the top of the stack and ++ cause problems for programs that want to use lots of memory (more ++ than 2.5 GB if SEGMEXEC is not active, or 1.25 GB when it is). ++ For this reason the second step can be controlled by 'chpax' or ++ 'paxctl' on a per file basis. ++ ++config PAX_RANDMMAP ++ bool "Randomize mmap() base" ++ depends on PAX_ASLR ++ help ++ By saying Y here the kernel will use a randomized base address for ++ mmap() requests that do not specify one themselves. As a result ++ all dynamically loaded libraries will appear at random addresses ++ and therefore be harder to exploit by a technique where an attacker ++ attempts to execute library code for his purposes (e.g. spawn a ++ shell from an exploited program that is running at an elevated ++ privilege level). ++ ++ Furthermore, if a program is relinked as a dynamic ELF file, its ++ base address will be randomized as well, completing the full ++ randomization of the address space layout. Attacking such programs ++ becomes a guess game. You can find an example of doing this at ++ http://pax.grsecurity.net/et_dyn.tar.gz and practical samples at ++ http://www.grsecurity.net/grsec-gcc-specs.tar.gz . ++ ++ NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control this ++ feature on a per file basis. ++ ++config PAX_RANDEXEC ++ bool "Randomize ET_EXEC base" ++ depends on PAX_MPROTECT && PAX_RANDMMAP ++ help ++ By saying Y here the kernel will randomize the base address of normal ++ ET_EXEC ELF executables as well. This is accomplished by mapping the ++ executable in memory in a special way which also allows for detecting ++ attackers who attempt to execute its code for their purposes. Since ++ this special mapping causes performance degradation and the attack ++ detection may create false alarms as well, you should carefully test ++ your executables when this feature is enabled. ++ ++ This solution is intended only as a temporary one until you relink ++ your programs as a dynamic ELF file. ++ ++ NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control this ++ feature on a per file basis. ++ ++config PAX_NOVSYSCALL ++ bool "Disable the vsyscall page" ++ depends on PAX_ASLR && X86 && !X86_64 ++ help ++ The Linux 2.6 kernel introduced a new feature that speeds up or ++ simplifies certain operations, such as system calls or returns ++ from signal handlers. ++ ++ Unfortunately the implementation also gives a powerful instrument ++ into the hands of exploit writers: the so-called vsyscall page exists ++ in every task at the same fixed address and it contains machine code ++ that is very useful in performing the return-to-libc style attack. ++ ++ Since this exploit technique cannot in general be protected against ++ via kernel solutions, this option will allow you to disable the use ++ of the vsyscall page and revert back to the old behaviour. ++ ++endmenu ++ ++endmenu ++ + config SECURITY + bool "Enable different security models" + help +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/security/commoncap.c linux-2.6.5/security/commoncap.c +--- linux-2.6.5/security/commoncap.c 2004-04-03 22:36:56.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/security/commoncap.c 2004-04-16 12:58:35.000000000 -0400 +@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ + int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) + { + /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */ +- if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap)) ++ if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap) && gr_task_is_capable(tsk, cap)) + return 0; + else + return -EPERM; +@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ + { + /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */ + if (!cap_issubset (child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) && +- !capable (CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) ++ !capable_nolog (CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + return -EPERM; + else + return 0; +@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ + /* + * Leave the last 3% for root + */ +- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) ++ if (!capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + free -= free / 32; + + if (free > pages) +@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ + * only call if we're about to fail. + */ + n = nr_free_pages(); +- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) ++ if (!capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + n -= n / 32; + free += n; + +diff -urN linux-2.6.5/security/security.c linux-2.6.5/security/security.c +--- linux-2.6.5/security/security.c 2004-04-03 22:36:13.000000000 -0500 ++++ linux-2.6.5/security/security.c 2004-04-16 12:58:35.000000000 -0400 +@@ -206,4 +206,5 @@ + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mod_reg_security); + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mod_unreg_security); + EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_nolog); + EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ops); |