sys-apps/systemd: remove unused patch

Signed-off-by: Michael Mair-Keimberger <mmk@levelnine.at>
Portage 3.0.32 / pkgdev 0.2.1 / pkgcheck 0.10.11
Closes: https://github.com/gentoo/gentoo/pull/26477
Signed-off-by: Conrad Kostecki <conikost@gentoo.org>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 74 deletions

diff --git a/sys-apps/systemd/files/250.4-random-seed-hash.patch b/sys-apps/systemd/files/250.4-random-seed-hash.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index efaa8cdfcaac..000000000000
--- a/sys-apps/systemd/files/250.4-random-seed-hash.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable/commit/ed46ff2bd6ca21d83cae4a94c3ed752ad1b64cce
-
-From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
-Date: Mon, 3 Jan 2022 18:11:32 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] random-seed: hash together old seed and new seed before
- writing out file
-
-If we're consuming an on-disk seed, we usually write out a new one after
-consuming it. In that case, we might be at early boot and the randomness
-could be rather poor, and the kernel doesn't guarantee that it'll use
-the new randomness right away for us. In order to prevent the new
-entropy from getting any worse, hash together the old seed and the new
-seed, and replace the final bytes of the new seed with the hash output.
-This way, entropy strictly increases and never regresses.
-
-(cherry picked from commit da2862ef06f22fc8d31dafced6d2d6dc14f2ee0b)
---- a/src/random-seed/random-seed.c
-+++ b/src/random-seed/random-seed.c
-@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
- #include "random-util.h"
- #include "string-util.h"
- #include "sync-util.h"
-+#include "sha256.h"
- #include "util.h"
- #include "xattr-util.h"
- 
-@@ -106,9 +107,11 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
-         _cleanup_close_ int seed_fd = -1, random_fd = -1;
-         bool read_seed_file, write_seed_file, synchronous;
-         _cleanup_free_ void* buf = NULL;
-+        struct sha256_ctx hash_state;
-+        uint8_t hash[32];
-         size_t buf_size;
-         struct stat st;
--        ssize_t k;
-+        ssize_t k, l;
-         int r;
- 
-         log_setup();
-@@ -242,6 +245,16 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
-                         if (r < 0)
-                                 log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write seed to /dev/urandom: %m");
-                 }
-+                /* If we're going to later write out a seed file, initialize a hash state with
-+                 * the contents of the seed file we just read, so that the new one can't regress
-+                 * in entropy. */
-+                if (write_seed_file) {
-+                        sha256_init_ctx(&hash_state);
-+                        if (k < 0)
-+                                k = 0;
-+                        sha256_process_bytes(&k, sizeof(k), &hash_state);
-+                        sha256_process_bytes(buf, k, &hash_state);
-+                }
-         }
- 
-         if (write_seed_file) {
-@@ -277,6 +290,17 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
-                                                        "Got EOF while reading from /dev/urandom.");
-                 }
- 
-+                /* If we previously read in a seed file, then hash the new seed into the old one,
-+                 * and replace the last 32 bytes of the seed with the hash output, so that the
-+                 * new seed file can't regress in entropy. */
-+                if (read_seed_file) {
-+                        sha256_process_bytes(&k, sizeof(k), &hash_state);
-+                        sha256_process_bytes(buf, k, &hash_state);
-+                        sha256_finish_ctx(&hash_state, hash);
-+                        l = MIN(k, 32);
-+                        memcpy((uint8_t *)buf + k - l, hash, l);
-+                }
-+
-                 r = loop_write(seed_fd, buf, (size_t) k, false);
-                 if (r < 0)
-                         return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write new random seed file: %m");