Sync patches (and other files) provided by Gentoo with local overlay.

author: Mike Hammill <mike@kth.se> 2011-02-15 21:56:41 +0100
committer: Mike Hammill <mike@kth.se> 2011-02-15 21:56:41 +0100
commit: 0eba14190c0d1a4050632302e07f6fc4c767e404 (patch)
tree: 98594b73bd3cab8ad2f24e84356cf79687b3dba5
parent: Add Roy Marples's patch. (diff)
download: mhammill-0eba14190c0d1a4050632302e07f6fc4c767e404.tar.gz
mhammill-0eba14190c0d1a4050632302e07f6fc4c767e404.tar.bz2
mhammill-0eba14190c0d1a4050632302e07f6fc4c767e404.zip
11 files changed, 6285 insertions, 242 deletions
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-3.9_p1-opensc.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-3.9_p1-opensc.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c81dcc9..0000000
--- a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-3.9_p1-opensc.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-http://bugs.gentoo.org/43593
-http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=608
-
-Index: scard-opensc.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/scard-opensc.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.12
---- scard-opensc.c
-+++ scard-opensc.c
-@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
- #include "readpass.h"
- #include "scard.h"
- 
-+int ask_for_pin=0;
-+
- #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L && defined(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE)
- #define USE_ENGINE
- #define RSA_get_default_method RSA_get_default_openssl_method
-@@ -119,6 +121,7 @@
- 	struct sc_pkcs15_prkey_info *key;
- 	struct sc_pkcs15_object *pin_obj;
- 	struct sc_pkcs15_pin_info *pin;
-+	char *passphrase = NULL;
- 
- 	priv = (struct sc_priv_data *) RSA_get_app_data(rsa);
- 	if (priv == NULL)
-@@ -156,24 +159,47 @@
- 		goto err;
- 	}
- 	pin = pin_obj->data;
-+
-+	if (sc_pin)
-+		passphrase = sc_pin;
-+	else if (ask_for_pin) {
-+		/* we need a pin but don't have one => ask for the pin */
-+		char prompt[64];
-+
-+		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for %s: ",
-+			key_obj->label ? key_obj->label : "smartcard key");
-+		passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
-+		if (!passphrase || !strcmp(passphrase, ""))
-+			goto err;
-+	} else 
-+		/* no pin => error */
-+		goto err;
-+
- 	r = sc_lock(card);
- 	if (r) {
- 		error("Unable to lock smartcard: %s", sc_strerror(r));
- 		goto err;
- 	}
--	if (sc_pin != NULL) {
--		r = sc_pkcs15_verify_pin(p15card, pin, sc_pin,
--					 strlen(sc_pin));
--		if (r) {
--			sc_unlock(card);
--			error("PIN code verification failed: %s",
--			      sc_strerror(r));
--			goto err;
--		}
-+	r = sc_pkcs15_verify_pin(p15card, pin, passphrase,
-+				 strlen(passphrase));
-+	if (r) {
-+		sc_unlock(card);
-+		error("PIN code verification failed: %s",
-+		      sc_strerror(r));
-+		goto err;
- 	}
-+
- 	*key_obj_out = key_obj;
-+	if (!sc_pin) {
-+		memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
-+		xfree(passphrase);
-+	}
- 	return 0;
- err:
-+	if (!sc_pin && passphrase) {
-+		memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
-+		xfree(passphrase);
-+	}
- 	sc_close();
- 	return -1;
- }
-Index: scard.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/scard.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.27
---- scard.c
-+++ scard.c
-@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@
- #include "readpass.h"
- #include "scard.h"
- 
-+/* currently unused */
-+int ask_for_pin = 0;
-+
- #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
- #define USE_ENGINE
- #define RSA_get_default_method RSA_get_default_openssl_method
-Index: scard.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/scard.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.10
---- scard.h
-+++ scard.h
-@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
- #define SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD	-2
- #define SCARD_ERROR_APPLET	-3
- 
-+extern int ask_for_pin;
-+
- Key	**sc_get_keys(const char *, const char *);
- void	 sc_close(void);
- int	 sc_put_key(Key *, const char *);
-Index: ssh.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/ssh.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.180
---- ssh.c
-+++ ssh.c
-@@ -1155,6 +1155,9 @@
- #ifdef SMARTCARD
- 	Key **keys;
- 
-+	if (!options.batch_mode)
-+		ask_for_pin = 1;
-+
- 	if (options.smartcard_device != NULL &&
- 	    options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
- 	    (keys = sc_get_keys(options.smartcard_device, NULL)) != NULL ) {
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-4.7p1-selinux.diff b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-4.7p1-selinux.diff
deleted file mode 100644
index f1c5c87..0000000
--- a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-4.7p1-selinux.diff
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-diff -purN openssh-4.7p1.orig/configure.ac openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac
---- openssh-4.7p1.orig/configure.ac	2007-08-10 00:36:12.000000000 -0400
-+++ openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac	2008-03-31 19:38:54.548935620 -0400
-@@ -3211,6 +3211,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
- 		AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, setexeccon, [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux" ],
- 		    AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires libselinux library))
- 		SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
-+		LIBS="$LIBS $LIBSELINUX"
- 		AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level)
- 		LIBS="$save_LIBS"
- 	fi ]
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.3_p1-pkcs11-hpn-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.3_p1-pkcs11-hpn-glue.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0aee2e8..0000000
--- a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.3_p1-pkcs11-hpn-glue.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-diff -Nuar openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in openssh-5.3p1.pkcs-hpn-glue/Makefile.in
---- openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in	2009-10-10 22:52:10.081356354 -0700
-+++ openssh-5.3p1.pkcs-hpn-glue/Makefile.in	2009-10-10 22:55:47.158418049 -0700
-@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@
- 
- LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
- 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-acss.o cipher-aes.o \
--	pkcs11.o \
- 	cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \
- 	compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
- 	log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
-+	pkcs11.o \
- 	readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
- 	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
- 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.4_p1-pkcs11.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.4_p1-pkcs11.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 08fad07..0000000
--- a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.4_p1-pkcs11.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-fixes from upstream
-
-https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1737
-https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1738
-
-http://bugs.gentoo.org/310929
-
---- ssh-pkcs11-helper.c
-+++ ssh-pkcs11-helper.c
-@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@
- 
- #include "includes.h"
- 
--#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
--
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
- # include <sys/time.h>
-@@ -39,6 +37,8 @@
- #include "authfd.h"
- #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
- 
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+
- /* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */
- 
- struct pkcs11_keyinfo {
---- Makefile.in
-+++ Makefile.in
-@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
--	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.4_p1-relative-AuthorizedKeysFile.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.4_p1-relative-AuthorizedKeysFile.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cc992ab..0000000
--- a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.4_p1-relative-AuthorizedKeysFile.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-grab fixes from upstream for relative AuthorizedKeysFile handling
-
-https://bugs.gentoo.org/308939
-
-Author: djm <djm>
-Date:   Sun Mar 21 18:53:04 2010 +0000
-
-       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/12 11:37:40
-         [servconf.c]
-         do not prepend AuthorizedKeysFile with getcwd(), unbreaks relative paths
-
-Author: djm <djm>
-Date:   Sun Mar 21 18:52:26 2010 +0000
-
-       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/12 01:06:25
-         [servconf.c]
-         unbreak AuthorizedKeys option with a $HOME-relative path; reported by
-         vinschen AT redhat.com, ok dtucker@
-
-
-Index: servconf.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/src/usr.bin/ssh/servconf.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.204
-retrieving revision 1.206
-diff -N -u -p -r1.204 -r1.206
---- servconf.c	4 Mar 2010 10:36:03 -0000	1.204
-+++ servconf.c	12 Mar 2010 11:37:40 -0000	1.206
-@@ -1180,7 +1180,17 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, cha
- 		charptr = (opcode == sAuthorizedKeysFile) ?
- 		    &options->authorized_keys_file :
- 		    &options->authorized_keys_file2;
--		goto parse_filename;
-+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
-+			fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
-+			    filename, linenum);
-+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
-+			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
-+			/* increase optional counter */
-+			if (intptr != NULL)
-+				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
-+		}
-+		break;
- 
- 	case sClientAliveInterval:
- 		intptr = &options->client_alive_interval;
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.6p1-gsskex-all-20110101.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.6p1-gsskex-all-20110101.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41d9141
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.6p1-gsskex-all-20110101.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,3031 @@
+diff --git a/ChangeLog.gssapi b/ChangeLog.gssapi
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f117a33
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
+@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
++20110101
++  - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
++  - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
++ 
++20100308
++  - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
++    Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
++  - [ servconf.c ]
++    Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
++    some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin 
++    Watson.
++  -
++
++20100124
++  - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++    Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
++    Colin Watson
++
++20090615
++  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
++      sshd.c ]
++    Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
++	Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
++	Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
++	Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
++	Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
++	Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
++	Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
++	Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
++	Cast data.length before printing
++	If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
++
++20090201
++  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
++      ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
++    Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
++    to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
++
++20080404
++  - [ gss-serv.c ]
++    Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
++    been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
++    Stoichkov
++
++20070317
++  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++    Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a 
++    function
++
++20061220
++  - [ servconf.c ]
++    Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and 
++    documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
++
++20060910
++  - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
++      ssh-gss.h ]
++    add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
++  - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
++    Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
++    acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
++    <Bugzilla #928>
++  - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
++    Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
++    configuration files
++  - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
++    Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
++    Limit length of error messages displayed by client
++
++20060909
++  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
++    move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
++    only, where they belong 
++    <Bugzilla #1225>
++
++20060829
++  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++    Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment 
++    variable
++
++20060828
++  - [ gss-genr.c ]
++    Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
++    <Fixed upstream 20060829>
++
++20060818
++  - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
++    Make sure that SPENGO is disabled 
++    <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
++
++20060421
++  - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++    a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
++    fix compiler errors/warnings 
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++  - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++    fix uninitialized variable warnings
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++  - [ gssgenr.c ]
++    pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++    <Bugzilla #1220 >
++  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++    #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++    <Fixed upstream 20060304>
++  - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c 
++    add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++  - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++    add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++    <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 5654d43..eaf3626 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
+ 	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
+ 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
+ 	kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \
+-	entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o \
++	entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o kexgssc.o \
+ 	ssh-pkcs11.o
+ 
+ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
+ 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \
+ 	monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \
+ 	auth-krb5.o \
+-	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
++	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
+ 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+ 	audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ 	roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index d019fe2..8219133 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -170,8 +170,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ 
+ 	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+ 	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
++	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#else
+ 	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+ 	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -226,15 +231,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ #ifndef HEIMDAL
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-	int tmpfd, ret;
++	int ret;
+ 	char ccname[40];
+ 	mode_t old_umask;
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++	char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
++#else
++	char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
++	int tmpfd;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
++	    cctemplate, geteuid());
+ 	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+ 		return ENOMEM;
+ 
++#ifndef USE_CCAPI
+ 	old_umask = umask(0177);
+ 	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ 	umask(old_umask);
+@@ -249,6 +261,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+ 		return errno;
+ 	}
+ 	close(tmpfd);
++#endif
+ 
+ 	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ }
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 77317ae..a66b925 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	int		 valid;		/* user exists and is allowed to login */
+ 	int		 attempt;
+ 	int		 failures;
++	int		 server_caused_failure; 
+ 	int		 force_pwchange;
+ 	char		*user;		/* username sent by the client */
+ 	char		*service;
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index 0e08d88..a192d28 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
++++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.16 2007/10/29 00:52:45 dtucker Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@ static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+ static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+ static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ 
++/* 
++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
++ */
++static int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++	int authenticated = 0;
++	Buffer b;
++	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
++	u_int len;
++
++	mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
++	mic.length = len;
++
++	packet_check_eom();
++
++	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++	    "gssapi-keyex");
++
++	gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++	gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++	/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
++	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, 
++	    &gssbuf, &mic))))
++		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++		    authctxt->pw));
++	
++	buffer_free(&b);
++	xfree(mic.value);
++
++	return (authenticated);
++}
++
+ /*
+  * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+  * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+@@ -102,6 +136,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 	if (!present) {
+ 		xfree(doid);
++		authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+ 		return (0);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -109,6 +144,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		if (ctxt != NULL)
+ 			ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+ 		xfree(doid);
++		authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+ 		return (0);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -242,7 +278,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ 
+ 	packet_check_eom();
+ 
+-	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++	    authctxt->pw));
+ 
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+@@ -277,7 +314,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ 	gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+ 
+ 	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+-		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++		authenticated = 
++		    PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
+ 	else
+ 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+ 
+@@ -292,6 +330,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ 	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
+ }
+ 
++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
++	"gssapi-keyex",
++	userauth_gsskeyex,
++	&options.gss_authentication
++};
++
+ Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+ 	"gssapi-with-mic",
+ 	userauth_gssapi,
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index 5d54685..61b5c01 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
++++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+ extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+ 	&method_none,
+ 	&method_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++	&method_gsskeyex,
+ 	&method_gssapi,
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+@@ -274,6 +276,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
++	authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* try to authenticate user */
+ 	m = authmethod_lookup(method);
+@@ -346,7 +349,8 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
+ 	} else {
+ 
+ 		/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
+-		if (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
++		if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
++		    (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
+ 			authctxt->failures++;
+ 		if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index de79793..ef97859 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@
+ #include "msg.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ /* import options */
+ extern Options options;
+ 
+@@ -1483,6 +1487,15 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
+ 		/* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
+ 		if (!rekeying) {
+ 			channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++			if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
++			    ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
++				debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
++				need_rekeying = 1;
++			}
++#endif
++
+ 			if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
+ 				debug("need rekeying");
+ 				xxx_kex->done = 0;
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 637e7b5..510b803 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -477,6 +477,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
+ 	    [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+ 	AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF, 1,
+ 	    [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
++	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
++	AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
++		[SessionCreate(0, 0);],
++		[ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
++		 AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1, 
++			[platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
++		 LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++		 AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
++		[ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
++		 AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
++	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
++	AC_TRY_COMPILE(
++		[#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
++		[cc_context_t c;
++		 (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
++		[AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1, 
++			[platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
++		 LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++		 AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
++		 if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
++			AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
++		fi],
++		[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
++	)
+ 	m4_pattern_allow(AU_IPv)
+ 	AC_CHECK_DECL(AU_IPv4, [], 
+ 	    AC_DEFINE(AU_IPv4, 0, [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
+diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
+index 842f385..f9b39cf 100644
+--- a/gss-genr.c
++++ b/gss-genr.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.20 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+ extern u_char *session_id2;
+ extern u_int session_id2_len;
+ 
++typedef struct {
++	char *encoded;
++	gss_OID oid;
++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
++
++/*
++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
++ * XXX   passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
++ */
++
++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
++
++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
++
++int 
++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
++	return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
++ *
++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
++ */
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
++	gss_OID_set gss_supported;
++	OM_uint32 min_status;
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
++		return NULL;
++
++	return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
++	    host, client));
++}
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
++    const char *host, const char *client) {
++	Buffer buf;
++	size_t i;
++	int oidpos, enclen;
++	char *mechs, *encoded;
++	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++	char deroid[2];
++	const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
++	EVP_MD_CTX md;
++
++	if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
++		for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
++			xfree(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
++		xfree(gss_enc2oid);
++	}
++
++	gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
++	    (gss_supported->count + 1));
++
++	buffer_init(&buf);
++
++	oidpos = 0;
++	for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
++		if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
++		    (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
++
++			deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
++			deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
++
++			EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
++			EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
++			EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
++			    gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
++			    gss_supported->elements[i].length);
++			EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
++
++			encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
++			    encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++
++			if (oidpos != 0)
++				buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++
++			buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
++			    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++			buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++			buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++			buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, 
++			    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++			buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++			buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++			buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
++			    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++			buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++
++			gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
++			gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
++			oidpos++;
++		}
++	}
++	gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
++	gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
++
++	buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
++
++	mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
++	buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
++	buffer_free(&buf);
++
++	if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
++		xfree(mechs);
++		mechs = NULL;
++	}
++	
++	return (mechs);
++}
++
++gss_OID
++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
++	int i = 0;
++	
++	switch (kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++		if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
++			return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++		name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++		if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
++			return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++		name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++		if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
++			return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++		name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++		break;
++	default:
++		return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++	}
++
++	while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
++	    strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
++		i++;
++
++	if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
++		ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
++
++	return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
++}
++
+ /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+-	    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
++	    ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+ 	    GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
+ 	    0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
+ 
+@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
+ }
+ 
+ OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
++{
++	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++	gss_name_t gssname;
++	OM_uint32 status;
++	gss_OID_set oidset;
++
++	gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
++	gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
++
++	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++	gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++
++	ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
++	    GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
++
++	if (!ctx->major)
++		ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, 
++		    gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, 
++		    &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
++
++	gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
++	gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++
++	if (ctx->major)
++		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++
++	return(ctx->major);
++}
++
++OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+ {
++	if (ctx == NULL) 
++		return -1;
++
+ 	if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+ 	    GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
+ 		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+ 	return (ctx->major);
+ }
+ 
++/* Priviledged when used by server */
++OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++{
++	if (ctx == NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
++	    gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++
++	return (ctx->major);
++}
++
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+     const char *context)
+@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
++ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, 
++    const char *client)
+ {
+ 	gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ 	OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ 	gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
++	Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
++
++	if (ctx == NULL)
++		ctx = &intctx;
+ 
+ 	/* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+ 	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && 
+@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+ 	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+ 	ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+ 	major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
++
++	if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
++		major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
++
+ 	if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ 		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, 
+ 		    NULL);
+@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+ 			    GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) 
++	if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) 
+ 		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+ 
+ 	return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+ }
+ 
++int
++ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
++	static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++	static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
++	static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
++	static gss_name_t name;
++	static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
++	OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
++	int equal;
++	gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE;
++	
++	now = time(NULL);
++
++	if (ctxt) {
++		debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
++
++		if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
++			gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
++
++		major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++		    &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++
++		if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++			saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
++		        saved_lifetime+= now;
++		} else {
++			/* Handle the error */
++		}
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	if (now - last_call < 10)
++		return 0;
++
++	last_call = now;
++
++	if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++		return 0;
++	
++	major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, 
++	    &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++	if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
++		return 0;
++	else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++		return 0;
++
++	major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
++	gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
++	if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
++		return 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 5a625ac..e7170ee 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 	krb5_principal princ;
+ 	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+ 	int len;
++	const char *new_ccname;
+ 
+ 	if (client->creds == NULL) {
+ 		debug("No credentials stored");
+@@ -168,11 +169,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
++	new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
++
+ 	client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+-	len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
+-	client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
+-	snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
++	client->store.filename = NULL;
++#else
++	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
++	client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
++#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -184,6 +190,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 	return;
+ }
+ 
++int
++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, 
++    ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
++	krb5_principal principal = NULL;
++	char *name = NULL;
++	krb5_error_code problem;
++	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++
++   	if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
++                logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
++                    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++                return 0;
++       	}
++	
++	/* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
++	if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, 
++	    &principal))) {
++		logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
++		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++		krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
++		logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
++		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++		krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++
++	if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
++		debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
++		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++		krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++		krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++
++	/* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
++
++	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
++		logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
++		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++		krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++
++	if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
++	    ccache))) {
++		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
++		krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+ 	"toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+ 	"Kerberos",
+@@ -191,7 +262,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+ 	NULL,
+ 	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+ 	NULL,
+-	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
++	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
++	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
+ };
+ 
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index 2ec7ea1..365e48d 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.22 2008/05/08 12:02:23 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@
+ #include "channels.h"
+ #include "session.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "uidswap.h"
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+-    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}};
++    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME,  NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
+ 
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+-    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
++    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+ 
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+@@ -81,25 +86,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
+ 	char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+ 	gss_OID_set oidset;
+ 
+-	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+-	gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++	if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
++		gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++		gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+ 
+-	if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
+-		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+-		return (-1);
+-	}
++		if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
++			gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++			return (-1);
++		}
++
++		if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
++			gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++			return (ctx->major);
++		}
++
++		if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++		    ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, 
++		    NULL, NULL)))
++			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ 
+-	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+ 		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ 		return (ctx->major);
++	} else {
++		ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++		ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ 	}
+-
+-	if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+-	    ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
+-		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+-
+-	gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+-	return (ctx->major);
++	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Privileged */
+@@ -114,6 +126,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
+ }
+ 
+ /* Unprivileged */
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
++	gss_OID_set	supported;
++
++	ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
++	return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
++	    NULL, NULL));
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
++int
++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
++    const char *dummy) {
++	Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
++	int res;
++ 
++	res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
++	ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
++
++	return (res);
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+ {
+@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+ 	gss_OID_set supported;
+ 
+ 	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
+-	gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
++		return;
+ 
+ 	while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+ 		if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+@@ -247,8 +284,48 @@ OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+ 	int i = 0;
++	int equal = 0;
++	gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++	gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++
++	if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
++		if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
++		    (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
++		     ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
++			debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
++			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++		}
++
++		if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, 
++		    ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, 
++		    NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++			return (ctx->major);
++		}
++
++		ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, 
++		    new_name, &equal);
+ 
+-	gss_buffer_desc ename;
++		if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
++			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++			return (ctx->major);
++		}
++ 
++		if (!equal) {
++			debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
++			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++		}
++
++		debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
++
++		gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
++		gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
++		client->name = new_name;
++		client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
++        	ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++		client->updated = 1;
++		return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++	}
+ 
+ 	client->mech = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -263,6 +340,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 	if (client->mech == NULL)
+ 		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ 
++	if (ctx->client_creds &&
++	    (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++	     ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++		return (ctx->major);
++	}
++
+ 	if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+ 	    &client->displayname, NULL))) {
+ 		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -280,6 +364,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 		return (ctx->major);
+ 	}
+ 
++	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
++
+ 	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+ 	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+ 	ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+@@ -327,7 +413,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
+ 
+ /* Privileged */
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ 	OM_uint32 lmin;
+ 
+@@ -337,9 +423,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+-		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
++		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
++			gssapi_client.used = 1;
++			gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
+ 			return 1;
+-		else {
++		} else {
+ 			/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+@@ -352,14 +440,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+ 
+-/* Privileged */
+-OM_uint32
+-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running 
++ * as the user, the monitor is root.
++ *
++ * In the child, we want to :
++ *    *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
++ *    *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
++ */
++
++/* Stuff for PAM */
++
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, 
++    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+ {
+-	ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+-	    gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
++}
++#endif
+ 
+-	return (ctx->major);
++void
++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
++	int ok;
++	int ret;
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++	pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
++	struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
++	char *envstr;
++#endif
++
++	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && 
++	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
++	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++		return;
++ 
++	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
++
++	if (!ok)
++		return;
++
++	debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
++
++	/* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
++	 * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
++	 * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
++	 */
++#ifdef USE_PAM	
++	if (!use_privsep) {
++		debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
++		return;
++	}
++
++	ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
++ 	    &pamconv, &pamh);
++	if (ret)
++		return;
++
++	xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, 
++	    gssapi_client.store.envval);
++
++	ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
++	if (!ret)
++		pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
++	pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
++#endif
++}
++
++int 
++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
++	int ok = 0;
++
++	/* Check we've got credentials to store */
++	if (!gssapi_client.updated)
++		return 0;
++
++	gssapi_client.updated = 0;
++
++	temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
++	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
++		ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
++	else
++		debug("No update function for this mechanism");
++
++	restore_uid();
++
++	return ok;
+ }
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 148cfee..a09e252 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
+ #include "monitor.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+ # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
+ # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
+@@ -326,6 +330,20 @@ choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
+ 		k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256;
+ 		k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256();
+ #endif
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	} else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
++	    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
++		k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1;
++		k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
++	} else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
++	    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
++		k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1;
++		k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
++	} else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
++	    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
++		k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1;
++		k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
++#endif
+ 	} else
+ 		fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
+ }
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 62fa2ea..d2668b1 100644
+--- a/kex.h
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ enum kex_exchange {
+ 	KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1,
+ 	KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
+ 	KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
++	KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
++	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
++	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
+ 	KEX_MAX
+ };
+ 
+@@ -123,6 +126,12 @@ struct Kex {
+ 	sig_atomic_t done;
+ 	int	flags;
+ 	const EVP_MD *evp_md;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	int	gss_deleg_creds;
++	int	gss_trust_dns;
++	char    *gss_host;
++	char	*gss_client;
++#endif
+ 	char	*client_version_string;
+ 	char	*server_version_string;
+ 	int	(*verify_host_key)(Key *);
+@@ -146,6 +155,11 @@ void	 kexdh_server(Kex *);
+ void	 kexgex_client(Kex *);
+ void	 kexgex_server(Kex *);
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++void	kexgss_client(Kex *);
++void	kexgss_server(Kex *);
++#endif
++
+ void
+ kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
+     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
+diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..39be405
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/kexgssc.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++
++void
++kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
++	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
++	Gssctxt *ctxt;
++	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
++	u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
++	DH *dh; 
++	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *p = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *g = NULL;	
++	u_char *kbuf, *hash;
++	u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
++	u_char *empty = "";
++	char *msg;
++	char *lang;
++	int type = 0;
++	int first = 1;
++	int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
++
++	/* Initialise our GSSAPI world */	
++	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
++	if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) 
++	    == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++		fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
++
++	if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
++		fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
++
++	if (kex->gss_client && 
++	    ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
++		fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
++
++	switch (kex->kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++		dh = dh_new_group1();
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++		dh = dh_new_group14();
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++		debug("Doing group exchange\n");
++		nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
++		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++		packet_put_int(min);
++		packet_put_int(nbits);
++		packet_put_int(max);
++
++		packet_send();
++
++		packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++
++		if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
++			fatal("BN_new() failed");
++		packet_get_bignum2(p);
++		if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
++			fatal("BN_new() failed");
++		packet_get_bignum2(g);
++		packet_check_eom();
++
++		if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
++			fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
++			    min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
++
++		dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
++		break;
++	default:
++		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++	}
++	
++	/* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
++	dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++	/* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
++	dh_server_pub = BN_new();
++	if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
++		fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
++
++	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
++			 
++	do {
++		debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++		
++		maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
++		    kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
++		    &ret_flags);
++
++		if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++			if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++				packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++				packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++				    send_tok.length);
++			}
++			fatal("gss_init_context failed");
++		}
++
++		/* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
++		if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
++			xfree(recv_tok.value);
++
++		if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++			/* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
++			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++				fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
++
++			/* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
++			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++				fatal("Integrity check failed");
++		}
++
++		/* 
++		 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
++		 * received cannot have been a 'complete'. 
++		 */
++		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++			if (first) {
++				packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
++				packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++				    send_tok.length);
++				packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++				first = 0;
++			} else {
++				packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++				packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++				    send_tok.length);
++			}
++			packet_send();
++			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++
++			/* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
++			do {	
++				type = packet_read();
++				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
++					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
++					if (serverhostkey)
++						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
++					serverhostkey = 
++					    packet_get_string(&slen);
++				}
++			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
++
++			switch (type) {
++			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++				debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++				if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) 
++					fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
++				recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++				recv_tok.length = strlen; 
++				break;
++			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
++				debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
++				packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
++				msg_tok.value =  packet_get_string(&strlen);
++				msg_tok.length = strlen; 
++
++				/* Is there a token included? */
++				if (packet_get_char()) {
++					recv_tok.value=
++					    packet_get_string(&strlen);
++					recv_tok.length = strlen;
++					/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
++					if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++						packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
++					} else {
++						/* No token included */
++						if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++							packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++				}
++				break;
++			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
++				debug("Received Error");
++				maj_status = packet_get_int();
++				min_status = packet_get_int();
++				msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
++				lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
++				fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
++			default:
++				packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++		    		type);
++			}
++			token_ptr = &recv_tok;
++		} else {
++			/* No data, and not complete */
++			if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++				fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
++		}
++	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++	/* 
++	 * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the 
++	 * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok 
++	 */
++
++	if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
++		fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
++
++	/* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
++	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
++		packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
++
++	/* compute K=f^x mod p */
++	klen = DH_size(dh);
++	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++	kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
++	if (kout < 0)
++		fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++	shared_secret = BN_new();
++	if (shared_secret == NULL)
++		fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
++
++	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++		fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++	xfree(kbuf);
++
++	switch (kex->kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++		kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string, 
++		    kex->server_version_string,
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++		    (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++		    dh->pub_key,	/* e */
++		    dh_server_pub,	/* f */
++		    shared_secret,	/* K */
++		    &hash, &hashlen
++		);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++		kexgex_hash(
++		    kex->evp_md,
++		    kex->client_version_string,
++		    kex->server_version_string,
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++		    (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++ 		    min, nbits, max,
++		    dh->p, dh->g,
++		    dh->pub_key,
++		    dh_server_pub,
++		    shared_secret,
++		    &hash, &hashlen
++		);
++		break;
++	default:
++		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++	}
++
++	gssbuf.value = hash;
++	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++	/* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
++	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
++		packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
++
++	xfree(msg_tok.value);
++
++	DH_free(dh);
++	if (serverhostkey)
++		xfree(serverhostkey);
++	BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
++
++	/* save session id */
++	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++	}
++
++	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
++		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
++
++	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++	else
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++	kex_finish(kex);
++}
++
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0c3eeaa
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/kexgsss.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++
++void
++kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
++{
++	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++	
++	/* 
++	 * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
++ 	 * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific 
++ 	 * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently 
++ 	 * activating this non-standard behaviour.
++	 */
++
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
++	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
++	u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
++	u_char *kbuf, *hash;
++	DH *dh;
++	int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
++	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
++	int type = 0;
++	gss_OID oid;
++	char *mechs;
++
++	/* Initialise GSSAPI */
++
++	/* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
++	 * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
++	 * into life
++	 */
++	if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) 
++		if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
++			xfree(mechs);
++
++	debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
++	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
++	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
++
++	debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
++
++	switch (kex->kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++		dh = dh_new_group1();
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++		dh = dh_new_group14();
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++		debug("Doing group exchange");
++		packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++		min = packet_get_int();
++		nbits = packet_get_int();
++		max = packet_get_int();
++		min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
++		max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
++		packet_check_eom();
++		if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
++			fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
++			    min, nbits, max);
++		dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
++		if (dh == NULL)
++			packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
++
++		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++		packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
++		packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
++		packet_send();
++
++		packet_write_wait();
++		break;
++	default:
++		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++	}
++
++	dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++	do {
++		debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
++		type = packet_read();
++		switch(type) {
++		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
++			if (dh_client_pub != NULL) 
++				fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
++			recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++			recv_tok.length = slen; 
++
++			if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
++				fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
++
++			packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
++
++			/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++			break;
++		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++			recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++			recv_tok.length = slen; 
++			break;
++		default:
++			packet_disconnect(
++			    "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++			    type);
++		}
++
++		maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, 
++		    &send_tok, &ret_flags));
++
++		xfree(recv_tok.value);
++
++		if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
++			fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
++
++		if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
++			fatal("No client public key");
++		
++		if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++			debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++			packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++			packet_send();
++			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++		}
++	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++		if (send_tok.length > 0) {
++			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++			packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++			packet_send();
++		}
++		fatal("accept_ctx died");
++	}
++
++	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++		fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
++
++	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
++	
++	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
++		packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
++
++	klen = DH_size(dh);
++	kbuf = xmalloc(klen); 
++	kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
++	if (kout < 0)
++		fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++	shared_secret = BN_new();
++	if (shared_secret == NULL)
++		fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
++
++	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++		fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++	xfree(kbuf);
++
++	switch (kex->kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++		kex_dh_hash(
++		    kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++		    NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
++		    dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
++		    &hash, &hashlen
++		);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++		kexgex_hash(
++		    kex->evp_md,
++		    kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++		    NULL, 0,
++		    min, nbits, max,
++		    dh->p, dh->g,
++		    dh_client_pub,
++		    dh->pub_key,
++		    shared_secret,
++		    &hash, &hashlen
++		);
++		break;
++	default:
++		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++	}
++
++	BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
++
++	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++	}
++
++	gssbuf.value = hash;
++	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
++		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
++
++	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
++	packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++	packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
++
++	if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++		packet_put_char(1); /* true */
++		packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++	} else {
++		packet_put_char(0); /* false */
++	}
++	packet_send();
++
++	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
++
++	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++	else 
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++	DH_free(dh);
++
++	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++	kex_finish(kex);
++
++	/* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
++	 * just exchanged.  */
++	if (options.gss_store_rekey)
++		ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
++}
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
+index e4aa25c..020f503 100644
+--- a/key.c
++++ b/key.c
+@@ -851,6 +851,8 @@ key_ssh_name(const Key *k)
+ 		return "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com";
+ 	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ 		return "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com";
++	case KEY_NULL:
++		return "null";
+ 	}
+ 	return "ssh-unknown";
+ }
+@@ -1020,6 +1022,8 @@ key_type_from_name(char *name)
+ 		return KEY_RSA_CERT;
+ 	} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ 		return KEY_DSA_CERT;
++	} else if (strcmp(name, "null") == 0) {
++		return KEY_NULL;
+ 	}
+ 	debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);
+ 	return KEY_UNSPEC;
+diff --git a/key.h b/key.h
+index 11d30ea..810f2aa 100644
+--- a/key.h
++++ b/key.h
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ enum types {
+ 	KEY_DSA_CERT,
+ 	KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
+ 	KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
++	KEY_NULL,
+ 	KEY_UNSPEC
+ };
+ enum fp_type {
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 9eb4e35..517acf3 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+@@ -241,6 +243,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+     {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
+@@ -253,6 +256,12 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
++#endif
+     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
+@@ -357,6 +366,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++		/* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif
+ 	} else {
+ 		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+ 
+@@ -443,6 +456,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++		/* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif		
+ 	} else {
+ 		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+@@ -1691,6 +1708,13 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++	}
++#endif
+ 	kex->server = 1;
+ 	kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ 	kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+@@ -1897,6 +1921,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	OM_uint32 major;
+ 	u_int len;
+ 
++	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++		fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ 	goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ 	goid.length = len;
+ 
+@@ -1924,6 +1951,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+ 	u_int len;
+ 
++	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++		fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ 	in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ 	in.length = len;
+ 	major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
+@@ -1941,6 +1971,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
++		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
+ 	}
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+@@ -1952,6 +1983,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	OM_uint32 ret;
+ 	u_int len;
+ 
++	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++		fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ 	gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ 	gssbuf.length = len;
+ 	mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+@@ -1978,7 +2012,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ {
+ 	int authenticated;
+ 
+-	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++		fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
++	authenticated = authctxt->valid && 
++	    ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
+ 
+ 	buffer_clear(m);
+ 	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+@@ -1991,6 +2029,74 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+ 	return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++int 
++mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
++{
++	gss_buffer_desc data;
++	gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 major, minor;
++	u_int len;
++
++	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++		fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
++	data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++	data.length = len;
++	if (data.length != 20) 
++		fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, 
++		    (int) data.length);
++
++	/* Save the session ID on the first time around */
++	if (session_id2_len == 0) {
++		session_id2_len = data.length;
++		session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
++		memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
++	}
++	major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
++
++	xfree(data.value);
++
++	buffer_clear(m);
++	buffer_put_int(m, major);
++	buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
++
++	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
++
++	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
++
++	/* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
++	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
++	
++	/* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
++	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
++
++	return (0);
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
++	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++	int ok;
++
++	store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++	store.envvar   = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++	store.envval   = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++
++	ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
++
++	xfree(store.filename);
++	xfree(store.envvar);
++	xfree(store.envval);
++
++	buffer_clear(m);
++	buffer_put_int(m, ok);
++
++	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
++
++	return(0);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index a8a2c0c..aa38b16 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
++++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
++	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN,
++	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX,
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index faeb02c..a01500c 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ 	Buffer m;
+ 	int authenticated = 0;
+@@ -1248,6 +1248,51 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ 	debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ 	return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++OM_uint32
++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++	OM_uint32 major;
++	u_int len;
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
++
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
++
++	major = buffer_get_int(&m);
++	hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
++	hash->length = len;
++
++	buffer_free(&m);
++
++	return(major);
++}
++
++int
++mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++	int ok;
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
++	
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++
++	ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
++
++	buffer_free(&m);
++	
++	return (ok);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index de2d16f..432953f 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -57,8 +57,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+    gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 0296590..0d551b9 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++	oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
++	oGssServerIdentity, 
+ 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ 	oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -166,10 +168,19 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
++	{ "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
++	{ "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
++	{ "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
++	{ "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+ 	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
+@@ -474,10 +485,30 @@ parse_flag:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case oGssKeyEx:
++		intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case oGssDelegateCreds:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case oGssTrustDns:
++		intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case oGssClientIdentity:
++		charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
++		goto parse_string;
++
++	case oGssServerIdentity:
++		charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
++		goto parse_string;
++
++	case oGssRenewalRekey:
++		intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case oBatchMode:
+ 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1058,7 +1089,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication = -1;
++	options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ 	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++	options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
++	options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
++	options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
++	options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1156,8 +1192,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 		options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
++	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++		options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++	if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++		options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
++	if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
++		options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
+index 95d1046..bb3ff04 100644
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -46,7 +46,12 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     challenge_response_authentication;
+ 					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
++	int     gss_keyex;		/* Try GSS key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
++	int	gss_trust_dns;		/* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
++	int	gss_renewal_rekey;	/* Credential renewal forces rekey */
++	char    *gss_client_identity;   /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
++	char    *gss_server_identity;   /* GSSAPI target principal */
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 986a5b9..3ce2397 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -93,7 +93,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+ 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
++	options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
++	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
++	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -215,8 +218,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
++	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++		options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
++	if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
++		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
++	if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
++		options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -307,7 +316,9 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
+ 	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
+-	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
++	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
++	sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
++	sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+ 	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
+@@ -370,10 +381,20 @@ static struct {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
++	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -926,10 +947,22 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sGssKeyEx:
++		intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sGssCleanupCreds:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sGssStrictAcceptor:
++		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case sGssStoreRekey:
++		intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1655,7 +1688,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 45d2a2a..ef7cc21 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -94,7 +94,10 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
+ 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
++	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
++	int 	gss_strict_acceptor;	/* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
++	int 	gss_store_rekey;
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index c29a1b7..31d5a08 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -60,10 +60,22 @@
+ 
+ #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+ 
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT                            30
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE                        31
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE                        32
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY                         33
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR                           34
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ			40
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP				41
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID				"gss-group1-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID				"gss-group14-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID				"gss-gex-sha1-"
++
+ typedef struct {
+ 	char *filename;
+ 	char *envvar;
+ 	char *envval;
++	struct passwd *owner;
+ 	void *data;
+ } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
+ 
+@@ -71,8 +83,11 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	gss_buffer_desc displayname;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
+ 	gss_cred_id_t creds;
++	gss_name_t name;
+ 	struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
+ 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++	int used;
++	int updated;
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+ 
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+@@ -83,6 +98,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+ 	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -93,10 +109,11 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	gss_OID		oid; /* client */
+ 	gss_cred_id_t	creds; /* server */
+ 	gss_name_t	client; /* server */
+-	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* server */
++	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* both */
+ } Gssctxt;
+ 
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
+ 
+ int  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+@@ -116,16 +133,30 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
+ 
+ /* In the server */
++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, 
++    const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
++    const char *);
++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, 
++    const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ 
++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
++
++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
+diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
+index 1893674..2c06ba7 100644
+--- a/ssh_config
++++ b/ssh_config
+@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
+ #   HostbasedAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
++#   GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++#   GSSAPITrustDNS no
+ #   BatchMode no
+ #   CheckHostIP yes
+ #   AddressFamily any
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index ddb806e..321a94d 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -509,11 +509,43 @@ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
++If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when 
++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default 
++identity will be used.
++.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
++If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when 
++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
++expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
++hostname.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
++If set to 
++.Dq yes
++then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
++ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed 
++credentials to a session on the server.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to 
++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If 
++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 4c379ae..1a03c6b 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -106,9 +106,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+ {
+ 	Kex *kex;
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
++	char *gss_host = NULL;
++#endif
++
+ 	xxx_host = host;
+ 	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this 
++		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++		if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++			gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
++		else
++			gss_host = host;
++
++		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
++		if (gss) {
++			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
++			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
+ 		logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
+ 		options.ciphers = NULL;
+@@ -136,6 +161,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+ 		    options.hostkeyalgorithms;
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
++	 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
++	if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
++		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
++		xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], 
++		    "%s,null", orig);
++		xfree(gss);
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	if (options.rekey_limit)
+ 		packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit);
+ 
+@@ -145,10 +181,30 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++	}
++#endif
+ 	kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ 	kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ 	kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
++		kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
++		kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
++		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
++			kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
++		} else {
++			kex->gss_host = gss_host;
++        }
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	xxx_kex = kex;
+ 
+ 	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
+@@ -243,6 +299,7 @@ void	input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void	input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void	input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void	input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
++int	userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ #endif
+ 
+ void	userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
+@@ -258,6 +315,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
+ 
+ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++	{"gssapi-keyex",
++		userauth_gsskeyex,
++		NULL,
++		&options.gss_authentication,
++		NULL},
+ 	{"gssapi-with-mic",
+ 		userauth_gssapi,
+ 		NULL,
+@@ -564,19 +626,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	static u_int mech = 0;
+ 	OM_uint32 min;
+ 	int ok = 0;
++	const char *gss_host;
++
++	if (options.gss_server_identity)
++		gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
++	else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++		gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
++	else
++		gss_host = authctxt->host;
+ 
+ 	/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ 	 * once. */
+ 
+ 	if (gss_supported == NULL)
+-		gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
++		if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
++			gss_supported = NULL;
++			return 0;
++		}
+ 
+ 	/* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+ 	while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
+ 		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ 		if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ 		    ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, 
+-		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
++		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, 
++                    options.gss_client_identity)) {
+ 			ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ 		} else {
+ 			mech++;
+@@ -673,8 +747,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ {
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ 	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+-	int oidlen;
+-	char *oidv;
++	u_int oidlen;
++	u_char *oidv;
+ 
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL)
+ 		fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+@@ -784,6 +858,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ 	xfree(msg);
+ 	xfree(lang);
+ }
++
++int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++	Buffer b;
++	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++	gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ms;
++
++	static int attempt = 0;
++	if (attempt++ >= 1)
++		return (0);
++
++	if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
++		debug("No valid Key exchange context"); 
++		return (0);
++	}
++
++	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
++	    "gssapi-keyex");
++
++	gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++	gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
++		buffer_free(&b);
++		return (0);
++	}
++
++	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
++	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
++	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
++	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
++	packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
++	packet_send();
++
++	buffer_free(&b);
++	gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
++
++	return (1);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ int
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index a7d3ee5..06a2e1e 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@
+ #include "roaming.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+ 
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef LIBWRAP
+ #include <tcpd.h>
+ #include <syslog.h>
+@@ -1586,10 +1590,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+ 		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+ 	}
++#ifndef GSSAPI
++	/* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
+ 	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+ 		logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
+ 		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
+ 	}
++#endif
+ 	if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+ 		logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+ 		exit(1);
+@@ -1918,6 +1925,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	/* Log the connection. */
+ 	verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+ 
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++	/*
++	 * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
++	 * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
++	 * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode).  We do not
++	 * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
++	 * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
++	 *
++	 * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
++	 * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
++	 * new sessions for us.  Then all the users will end up in the
++	 * same session (bad).
++	 *
++	 * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
++	 * automatically.
++	 *
++	 * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
++	 * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
++	 */
++	{
++		OSStatus err = 0;
++		SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
++		SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
++
++		err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
++		if (err)
++			error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++			    (unsigned) err);
++		else
++			debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++			    (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++
++		if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
++			debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
++			    "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
++		else {
++			debug("Creating new security session...");
++			err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
++			if (err)
++				error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
++				    (unsigned) err);
++
++			err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, 
++			    &sattrs);
++			if (err)
++				error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++				    (unsigned) err);
++			else
++				debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++				    (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+ 	 * successfully authenticates itself.  So we set up an alarm which is
+@@ -2296,12 +2357,61 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ 
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	{
++	char *orig;
++	char *gss = NULL;
++	char *newstr = NULL;
++	orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++	/* 
++	 * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
++	 * the other key exchange algorithms
++	 */
++
++	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
++		orig = NULL;
++
++	if (options.gss_keyex)
++		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++	else
++		gss = NULL;
++
++	if (gss && orig)
++		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++	else if (gss)
++		newstr = gss;
++	else if (orig)
++		newstr = orig;
++
++	/* 
++	 * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
++	 * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
++  	 * host key algorithm we support
++	 */
++	if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
++
++	if (newstr)
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
++	else
++		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/* start key exchange */
+ 	kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++	}
++#endif
+ 	kex->server = 1;
+ 	kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ 	kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 72fbae3..69ff6b6 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, 
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will 
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 596a728..55e8d85 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -424,12 +424,40 @@ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+ on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
++Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor 
++a client authenticates against. If
++.Dq yes
++then the client must authenticate against the
++.Pa host
++service on the current hostname. If 
++.Dq no
++then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the 
++machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation 
++on multi homed machines. 
++The default is
++.Dq yes .
++Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
++and setting it to 
++.Dq no
++may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
++.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
++Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a 
++successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed 
++or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
++.Dq no .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+ Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
+ with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.7_p1-x509-hpn-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.7_p1-x509-hpn-glue.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee3e757
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.7_p1-x509-hpn-glue.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+Move things around so hpn applies cleanly when using X509.
+
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -46,11 +46,12 @@
+ CC=@CC@
+ LD=@LD@
+ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ @LDAP_CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
++CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+ LIBS=@LIBS@
+ SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
+ LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
+ LIBLDAP=@LDAP_LDFLAGS@ @LDAP_LIBS@
++CPPFLAGS+=@LDAP_CPPFLAGS@
+ AR=@AR@
+ AWK=@AWK@
+ RANLIB=@RANLIB@
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -153,9 +153,6 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
+ 	options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
+-	options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
+-	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+-	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ 
+ 	options->hostbased_algorithms = NULL;
+ 	options->pubkey_algorithms = NULL;
+@@ -168,6 +165,9 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->va.certificate_file = NULL;
+ 	options->va.responder_url = NULL;
+ #endif /*def SSH_OCSP_ENABLED*/
++	options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
++	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
++	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -367,9 +367,6 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+-	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
+-	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+-	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS,
+ 	sHostbasedAlgorithms,
+ 	sPubkeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sX509KeyAlgorithm,
+@@ -380,6 +377,9 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sCAldapVersion, sCAldapURL,
+ 	sVAType, sVACertificateFile,
+ 	sVAOCSPResponderURL,
++	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
++	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
++	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS,
+ 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+ 
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.7p1-gsskex-all-20110125.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.7p1-gsskex-all-20110125.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e9f296
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.7p1-gsskex-all-20110125.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,3031 @@
+diff --git a/ChangeLog.gssapi b/ChangeLog.gssapi
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f117a33
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
+@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
++20110101
++  - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
++  - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
++ 
++20100308
++  - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
++    Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
++  - [ servconf.c ]
++    Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
++    some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin 
++    Watson.
++  -
++
++20100124
++  - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++    Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
++    Colin Watson
++
++20090615
++  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
++      sshd.c ]
++    Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
++	Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
++	Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
++	Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
++	Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
++	Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
++	Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
++	Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
++	Cast data.length before printing
++	If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
++
++20090201
++  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
++      ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
++    Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
++    to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
++
++20080404
++  - [ gss-serv.c ]
++    Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
++    been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
++    Stoichkov
++
++20070317
++  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++    Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a 
++    function
++
++20061220
++  - [ servconf.c ]
++    Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and 
++    documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
++
++20060910
++  - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
++      ssh-gss.h ]
++    add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
++  - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
++    Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
++    acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
++    <Bugzilla #928>
++  - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
++    Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
++    configuration files
++  - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
++    Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
++    Limit length of error messages displayed by client
++
++20060909
++  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
++    move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
++    only, where they belong 
++    <Bugzilla #1225>
++
++20060829
++  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++    Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment 
++    variable
++
++20060828
++  - [ gss-genr.c ]
++    Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
++    <Fixed upstream 20060829>
++
++20060818
++  - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
++    Make sure that SPENGO is disabled 
++    <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
++
++20060421
++  - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++    a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
++    fix compiler errors/warnings 
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++  - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++    fix uninitialized variable warnings
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++  - [ gssgenr.c ]
++    pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++    <Bugzilla #1220 >
++  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++    #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++    <Fixed upstream 20060304>
++  - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c 
++    add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++  - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++    add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++    <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 77a78aa..947eec0 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
+ 	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
+ 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
+ 	kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
++	kexgssc.o \
+ 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o \
+ 	schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o
+ 
+@@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
+ 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \
+ 	monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \
+ 	auth-krb5.o \
+-	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
++	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
+ 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+ 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ 	roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index d019fe2..8219133 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -170,8 +170,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ 
+ 	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+ 	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
++	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#else
+ 	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+ 	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -226,15 +231,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ #ifndef HEIMDAL
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-	int tmpfd, ret;
++	int ret;
+ 	char ccname[40];
+ 	mode_t old_umask;
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++	char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
++#else
++	char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
++	int tmpfd;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
++	    cctemplate, geteuid());
+ 	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+ 		return ENOMEM;
+ 
++#ifndef USE_CCAPI
+ 	old_umask = umask(0177);
+ 	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ 	umask(old_umask);
+@@ -249,6 +261,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+ 		return errno;
+ 	}
+ 	close(tmpfd);
++#endif
+ 
+ 	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ }
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 77317ae..a66b925 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	int		 valid;		/* user exists and is allowed to login */
+ 	int		 attempt;
+ 	int		 failures;
++	int		 server_caused_failure; 
+ 	int		 force_pwchange;
+ 	char		*user;		/* username sent by the client */
+ 	char		*service;
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index 0e08d88..a192d28 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
++++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.16 2007/10/29 00:52:45 dtucker Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@ static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+ static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+ static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ 
++/* 
++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
++ */
++static int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++	int authenticated = 0;
++	Buffer b;
++	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
++	u_int len;
++
++	mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
++	mic.length = len;
++
++	packet_check_eom();
++
++	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++	    "gssapi-keyex");
++
++	gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++	gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++	/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
++	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, 
++	    &gssbuf, &mic))))
++		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++		    authctxt->pw));
++	
++	buffer_free(&b);
++	xfree(mic.value);
++
++	return (authenticated);
++}
++
+ /*
+  * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+  * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+@@ -102,6 +136,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 	if (!present) {
+ 		xfree(doid);
++		authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+ 		return (0);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -109,6 +144,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		if (ctxt != NULL)
+ 			ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+ 		xfree(doid);
++		authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+ 		return (0);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -242,7 +278,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ 
+ 	packet_check_eom();
+ 
+-	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++	    authctxt->pw));
+ 
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+@@ -277,7 +314,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ 	gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+ 
+ 	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+-		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++		authenticated = 
++		    PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
+ 	else
+ 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+ 
+@@ -292,6 +330,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ 	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
+ }
+ 
++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
++	"gssapi-keyex",
++	userauth_gsskeyex,
++	&options.gss_authentication
++};
++
+ Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+ 	"gssapi-with-mic",
+ 	userauth_gssapi,
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index 95820f9..3c38cdd 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
++++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+ extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+ 	&method_none,
+ 	&method_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++	&method_gsskeyex,
+ 	&method_gssapi,
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+@@ -274,6 +276,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
++	authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* try to authenticate user */
+ 	m = authmethod_lookup(method);
+@@ -346,7 +349,8 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
+ 	} else {
+ 
+ 		/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
+-		if (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
++		if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
++		    (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
+ 			authctxt->failures++;
+ 		if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index f6c1444..ed19023 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@
+ #include "msg.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ /* import options */
+ extern Options options;
+ 
+@@ -1483,6 +1487,15 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
+ 		/* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
+ 		if (!rekeying) {
+ 			channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++			if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
++			    ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
++				debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
++				need_rekeying = 1;
++			}
++#endif
++
+ 			if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
+ 				debug("need rekeying");
+ 				xxx_kex->done = 0;
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 769e835..d7d1a98 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -514,6 +514,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
+ 	    [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+ 	AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF, 1,
+ 	    [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
++	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
++	AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
++		[SessionCreate(0, 0);],
++		[ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
++		 AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1, 
++			[platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
++		 LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++		 AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
++		[ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
++		 AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
++	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
++	AC_TRY_COMPILE(
++		[#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
++		[cc_context_t c;
++		 (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
++		[AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1, 
++			[platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
++		 LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++		 AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
++		 if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
++			AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
++		fi],
++		[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
++	)
+ 	m4_pattern_allow(AU_IPv)
+ 	AC_CHECK_DECL(AU_IPv4, [], 
+ 	    AC_DEFINE(AU_IPv4, 0, [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
+diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
+index 842f385..f9b39cf 100644
+--- a/gss-genr.c
++++ b/gss-genr.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.20 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+ extern u_char *session_id2;
+ extern u_int session_id2_len;
+ 
++typedef struct {
++	char *encoded;
++	gss_OID oid;
++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
++
++/*
++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
++ * XXX   passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
++ */
++
++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
++
++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
++
++int 
++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
++	return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
++ *
++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
++ */
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
++	gss_OID_set gss_supported;
++	OM_uint32 min_status;
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
++		return NULL;
++
++	return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
++	    host, client));
++}
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
++    const char *host, const char *client) {
++	Buffer buf;
++	size_t i;
++	int oidpos, enclen;
++	char *mechs, *encoded;
++	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++	char deroid[2];
++	const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
++	EVP_MD_CTX md;
++
++	if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
++		for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
++			xfree(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
++		xfree(gss_enc2oid);
++	}
++
++	gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
++	    (gss_supported->count + 1));
++
++	buffer_init(&buf);
++
++	oidpos = 0;
++	for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
++		if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
++		    (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
++
++			deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
++			deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
++
++			EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
++			EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
++			EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
++			    gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
++			    gss_supported->elements[i].length);
++			EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
++
++			encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
++			    encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++
++			if (oidpos != 0)
++				buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++
++			buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
++			    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++			buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++			buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++			buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, 
++			    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++			buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++			buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++			buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
++			    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++			buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++
++			gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
++			gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
++			oidpos++;
++		}
++	}
++	gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
++	gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
++
++	buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
++
++	mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
++	buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
++	buffer_free(&buf);
++
++	if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
++		xfree(mechs);
++		mechs = NULL;
++	}
++	
++	return (mechs);
++}
++
++gss_OID
++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
++	int i = 0;
++	
++	switch (kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++		if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
++			return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++		name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++		if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
++			return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++		name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++		if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
++			return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++		name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++		break;
++	default:
++		return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++	}
++
++	while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
++	    strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
++		i++;
++
++	if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
++		ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
++
++	return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
++}
++
+ /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+-	    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
++	    ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+ 	    GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
+ 	    0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
+ 
+@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
+ }
+ 
+ OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
++{
++	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++	gss_name_t gssname;
++	OM_uint32 status;
++	gss_OID_set oidset;
++
++	gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
++	gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
++
++	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++	gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++
++	ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
++	    GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
++
++	if (!ctx->major)
++		ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, 
++		    gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, 
++		    &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
++
++	gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
++	gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++
++	if (ctx->major)
++		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++
++	return(ctx->major);
++}
++
++OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+ {
++	if (ctx == NULL) 
++		return -1;
++
+ 	if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+ 	    GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
+ 		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+ 	return (ctx->major);
+ }
+ 
++/* Priviledged when used by server */
++OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++{
++	if (ctx == NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
++	    gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++
++	return (ctx->major);
++}
++
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+     const char *context)
+@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
++ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, 
++    const char *client)
+ {
+ 	gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ 	OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ 	gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
++	Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
++
++	if (ctx == NULL)
++		ctx = &intctx;
+ 
+ 	/* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+ 	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && 
+@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+ 	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+ 	ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+ 	major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
++
++	if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
++		major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
++
+ 	if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ 		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, 
+ 		    NULL);
+@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+ 			    GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) 
++	if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) 
+ 		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+ 
+ 	return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+ }
+ 
++int
++ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
++	static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++	static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
++	static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
++	static gss_name_t name;
++	static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
++	OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
++	int equal;
++	gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE;
++	
++	now = time(NULL);
++
++	if (ctxt) {
++		debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
++
++		if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
++			gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
++
++		major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++		    &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++
++		if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++			saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
++		        saved_lifetime+= now;
++		} else {
++			/* Handle the error */
++		}
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	if (now - last_call < 10)
++		return 0;
++
++	last_call = now;
++
++	if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++		return 0;
++	
++	major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, 
++	    &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++	if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
++		return 0;
++	else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++		return 0;
++
++	major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
++	gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
++	if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
++		return 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 5a625ac..e7170ee 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 	krb5_principal princ;
+ 	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+ 	int len;
++	const char *new_ccname;
+ 
+ 	if (client->creds == NULL) {
+ 		debug("No credentials stored");
+@@ -168,11 +169,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
++	new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
++
+ 	client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+-	len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
+-	client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
+-	snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
++	client->store.filename = NULL;
++#else
++	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
++	client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
++#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -184,6 +190,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 	return;
+ }
+ 
++int
++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, 
++    ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
++	krb5_principal principal = NULL;
++	char *name = NULL;
++	krb5_error_code problem;
++	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++
++   	if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
++                logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
++                    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++                return 0;
++       	}
++	
++	/* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
++	if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, 
++	    &principal))) {
++		logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
++		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++		krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
++		logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
++		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++		krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++
++	if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
++		debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
++		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++		krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++		krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++
++	/* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
++
++	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
++		logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
++		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++		krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++
++	if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
++	    ccache))) {
++		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
++		krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+ 	"toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+ 	"Kerberos",
+@@ -191,7 +262,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+ 	NULL,
+ 	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+ 	NULL,
+-	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
++	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
++	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
+ };
+ 
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index 2ec7ea1..365e48d 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.22 2008/05/08 12:02:23 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@
+ #include "channels.h"
+ #include "session.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "uidswap.h"
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+-    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}};
++    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME,  NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
+ 
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+-    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
++    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+ 
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+@@ -81,25 +86,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
+ 	char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+ 	gss_OID_set oidset;
+ 
+-	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+-	gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++	if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
++		gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++		gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+ 
+-	if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
+-		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+-		return (-1);
+-	}
++		if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
++			gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++			return (-1);
++		}
++
++		if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
++			gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++			return (ctx->major);
++		}
++
++		if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++		    ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, 
++		    NULL, NULL)))
++			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ 
+-	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+ 		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ 		return (ctx->major);
++	} else {
++		ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++		ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ 	}
+-
+-	if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+-	    ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
+-		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+-
+-	gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+-	return (ctx->major);
++	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Privileged */
+@@ -114,6 +126,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
+ }
+ 
+ /* Unprivileged */
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
++	gss_OID_set	supported;
++
++	ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
++	return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
++	    NULL, NULL));
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
++int
++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
++    const char *dummy) {
++	Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
++	int res;
++ 
++	res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
++	ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
++
++	return (res);
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+ {
+@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+ 	gss_OID_set supported;
+ 
+ 	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
+-	gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
++		return;
+ 
+ 	while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+ 		if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+@@ -247,8 +284,48 @@ OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+ 	int i = 0;
++	int equal = 0;
++	gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++	gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++
++	if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
++		if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
++		    (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
++		     ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
++			debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
++			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++		}
++
++		if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, 
++		    ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, 
++		    NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++			return (ctx->major);
++		}
++
++		ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, 
++		    new_name, &equal);
+ 
+-	gss_buffer_desc ename;
++		if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
++			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++			return (ctx->major);
++		}
++ 
++		if (!equal) {
++			debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
++			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++		}
++
++		debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
++
++		gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
++		gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
++		client->name = new_name;
++		client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
++        	ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++		client->updated = 1;
++		return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++	}
+ 
+ 	client->mech = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -263,6 +340,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 	if (client->mech == NULL)
+ 		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ 
++	if (ctx->client_creds &&
++	    (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++	     ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++		return (ctx->major);
++	}
++
+ 	if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+ 	    &client->displayname, NULL))) {
+ 		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -280,6 +364,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 		return (ctx->major);
+ 	}
+ 
++	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
++
+ 	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+ 	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+ 	ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+@@ -327,7 +413,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
+ 
+ /* Privileged */
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ 	OM_uint32 lmin;
+ 
+@@ -337,9 +423,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+-		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
++		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
++			gssapi_client.used = 1;
++			gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
+ 			return 1;
+-		else {
++		} else {
+ 			/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+@@ -352,14 +440,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+ 
+-/* Privileged */
+-OM_uint32
+-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running 
++ * as the user, the monitor is root.
++ *
++ * In the child, we want to :
++ *    *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
++ *    *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
++ */
++
++/* Stuff for PAM */
++
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, 
++    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+ {
+-	ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+-	    gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
++}
++#endif
+ 
+-	return (ctx->major);
++void
++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
++	int ok;
++	int ret;
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++	pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
++	struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
++	char *envstr;
++#endif
++
++	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && 
++	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
++	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++		return;
++ 
++	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
++
++	if (!ok)
++		return;
++
++	debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
++
++	/* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
++	 * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
++	 * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
++	 */
++#ifdef USE_PAM	
++	if (!use_privsep) {
++		debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
++		return;
++	}
++
++	ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
++ 	    &pamconv, &pamh);
++	if (ret)
++		return;
++
++	xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, 
++	    gssapi_client.store.envval);
++
++	ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
++	if (!ret)
++		pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
++	pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
++#endif
++}
++
++int 
++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
++	int ok = 0;
++
++	/* Check we've got credentials to store */
++	if (!gssapi_client.updated)
++		return 0;
++
++	gssapi_client.updated = 0;
++
++	temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
++	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
++		ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
++	else
++		debug("No update function for this mechanism");
++
++	restore_uid();
++
++	return ok;
+ }
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index c65e28f..58349fc 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
+ #include "monitor.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+ # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
+ # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
+@@ -358,6 +362,20 @@ choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
+  		k->kex_type = KEX_ECDH_SHA2;
+ 		k->evp_md = kex_ecdh_name_to_evpmd(k->name);
+ #endif
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	} else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
++	    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
++		k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1;
++		k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
++	} else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
++	    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
++		k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1;
++		k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
++	} else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
++	    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
++		k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1;
++		k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
++#endif
+ 	} else
+ 		fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
+ }
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 7373d3c..fa50b2c 100644
+--- a/kex.h
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ enum kex_exchange {
+ 	KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
+ 	KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
+ 	KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
++	KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
++	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
++	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
+ 	KEX_MAX
+ };
+ 
+@@ -129,6 +132,12 @@ struct Kex {
+ 	sig_atomic_t done;
+ 	int	flags;
+ 	const EVP_MD *evp_md;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	int	gss_deleg_creds;
++	int	gss_trust_dns;
++	char    *gss_host;
++	char	*gss_client;
++#endif
+ 	char	*client_version_string;
+ 	char	*server_version_string;
+ 	int	(*verify_host_key)(Key *);
+@@ -156,6 +165,11 @@ void	 kexgex_server(Kex *);
+ void	 kexecdh_client(Kex *);
+ void	 kexecdh_server(Kex *);
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++void	kexgss_client(Kex *);
++void	kexgss_server(Kex *);
++#endif
++
+ void
+ kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
+     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
+diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..39be405
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/kexgssc.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++
++void
++kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
++	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
++	Gssctxt *ctxt;
++	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
++	u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
++	DH *dh; 
++	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *p = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *g = NULL;	
++	u_char *kbuf, *hash;
++	u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
++	u_char *empty = "";
++	char *msg;
++	char *lang;
++	int type = 0;
++	int first = 1;
++	int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
++
++	/* Initialise our GSSAPI world */	
++	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
++	if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) 
++	    == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++		fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
++
++	if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
++		fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
++
++	if (kex->gss_client && 
++	    ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
++		fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
++
++	switch (kex->kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++		dh = dh_new_group1();
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++		dh = dh_new_group14();
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++		debug("Doing group exchange\n");
++		nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
++		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++		packet_put_int(min);
++		packet_put_int(nbits);
++		packet_put_int(max);
++
++		packet_send();
++
++		packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++
++		if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
++			fatal("BN_new() failed");
++		packet_get_bignum2(p);
++		if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
++			fatal("BN_new() failed");
++		packet_get_bignum2(g);
++		packet_check_eom();
++
++		if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
++			fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
++			    min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
++
++		dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
++		break;
++	default:
++		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++	}
++	
++	/* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
++	dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++	/* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
++	dh_server_pub = BN_new();
++	if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
++		fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
++
++	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
++			 
++	do {
++		debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++		
++		maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
++		    kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
++		    &ret_flags);
++
++		if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++			if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++				packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++				packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++				    send_tok.length);
++			}
++			fatal("gss_init_context failed");
++		}
++
++		/* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
++		if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
++			xfree(recv_tok.value);
++
++		if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++			/* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
++			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++				fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
++
++			/* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
++			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++				fatal("Integrity check failed");
++		}
++
++		/* 
++		 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
++		 * received cannot have been a 'complete'. 
++		 */
++		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++			if (first) {
++				packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
++				packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++				    send_tok.length);
++				packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++				first = 0;
++			} else {
++				packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++				packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++				    send_tok.length);
++			}
++			packet_send();
++			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++
++			/* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
++			do {	
++				type = packet_read();
++				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
++					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
++					if (serverhostkey)
++						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
++					serverhostkey = 
++					    packet_get_string(&slen);
++				}
++			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
++
++			switch (type) {
++			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++				debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++				if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) 
++					fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
++				recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++				recv_tok.length = strlen; 
++				break;
++			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
++				debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
++				packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
++				msg_tok.value =  packet_get_string(&strlen);
++				msg_tok.length = strlen; 
++
++				/* Is there a token included? */
++				if (packet_get_char()) {
++					recv_tok.value=
++					    packet_get_string(&strlen);
++					recv_tok.length = strlen;
++					/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
++					if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++						packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
++					} else {
++						/* No token included */
++						if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++							packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++				}
++				break;
++			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
++				debug("Received Error");
++				maj_status = packet_get_int();
++				min_status = packet_get_int();
++				msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
++				lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
++				fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
++			default:
++				packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++		    		type);
++			}
++			token_ptr = &recv_tok;
++		} else {
++			/* No data, and not complete */
++			if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++				fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
++		}
++	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++	/* 
++	 * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the 
++	 * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok 
++	 */
++
++	if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
++		fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
++
++	/* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
++	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
++		packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
++
++	/* compute K=f^x mod p */
++	klen = DH_size(dh);
++	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++	kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
++	if (kout < 0)
++		fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++	shared_secret = BN_new();
++	if (shared_secret == NULL)
++		fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
++
++	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++		fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++	xfree(kbuf);
++
++	switch (kex->kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++		kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string, 
++		    kex->server_version_string,
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++		    (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++		    dh->pub_key,	/* e */
++		    dh_server_pub,	/* f */
++		    shared_secret,	/* K */
++		    &hash, &hashlen
++		);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++		kexgex_hash(
++		    kex->evp_md,
++		    kex->client_version_string,
++		    kex->server_version_string,
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++		    (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++ 		    min, nbits, max,
++		    dh->p, dh->g,
++		    dh->pub_key,
++		    dh_server_pub,
++		    shared_secret,
++		    &hash, &hashlen
++		);
++		break;
++	default:
++		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++	}
++
++	gssbuf.value = hash;
++	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++	/* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
++	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
++		packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
++
++	xfree(msg_tok.value);
++
++	DH_free(dh);
++	if (serverhostkey)
++		xfree(serverhostkey);
++	BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
++
++	/* save session id */
++	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++	}
++
++	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
++		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
++
++	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++	else
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++	kex_finish(kex);
++}
++
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0c3eeaa
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/kexgsss.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++
++void
++kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
++{
++	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++	
++	/* 
++	 * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
++ 	 * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific 
++ 	 * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently 
++ 	 * activating this non-standard behaviour.
++	 */
++
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
++	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
++	u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
++	u_char *kbuf, *hash;
++	DH *dh;
++	int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
++	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
++	int type = 0;
++	gss_OID oid;
++	char *mechs;
++
++	/* Initialise GSSAPI */
++
++	/* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
++	 * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
++	 * into life
++	 */
++	if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) 
++		if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
++			xfree(mechs);
++
++	debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
++	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
++	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
++
++	debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
++
++	switch (kex->kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++		dh = dh_new_group1();
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++		dh = dh_new_group14();
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++		debug("Doing group exchange");
++		packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++		min = packet_get_int();
++		nbits = packet_get_int();
++		max = packet_get_int();
++		min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
++		max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
++		packet_check_eom();
++		if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
++			fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
++			    min, nbits, max);
++		dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
++		if (dh == NULL)
++			packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
++
++		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++		packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
++		packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
++		packet_send();
++
++		packet_write_wait();
++		break;
++	default:
++		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++	}
++
++	dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++	do {
++		debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
++		type = packet_read();
++		switch(type) {
++		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
++			if (dh_client_pub != NULL) 
++				fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
++			recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++			recv_tok.length = slen; 
++
++			if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
++				fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
++
++			packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
++
++			/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++			break;
++		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++			recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++			recv_tok.length = slen; 
++			break;
++		default:
++			packet_disconnect(
++			    "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++			    type);
++		}
++
++		maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, 
++		    &send_tok, &ret_flags));
++
++		xfree(recv_tok.value);
++
++		if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
++			fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
++
++		if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
++			fatal("No client public key");
++		
++		if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++			debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++			packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++			packet_send();
++			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++		}
++	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++		if (send_tok.length > 0) {
++			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++			packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++			packet_send();
++		}
++		fatal("accept_ctx died");
++	}
++
++	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++		fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
++
++	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
++	
++	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
++		packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
++
++	klen = DH_size(dh);
++	kbuf = xmalloc(klen); 
++	kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
++	if (kout < 0)
++		fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++	shared_secret = BN_new();
++	if (shared_secret == NULL)
++		fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
++
++	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++		fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++	xfree(kbuf);
++
++	switch (kex->kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++		kex_dh_hash(
++		    kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++		    NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
++		    dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
++		    &hash, &hashlen
++		);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++		kexgex_hash(
++		    kex->evp_md,
++		    kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++		    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++		    NULL, 0,
++		    min, nbits, max,
++		    dh->p, dh->g,
++		    dh_client_pub,
++		    dh->pub_key,
++		    shared_secret,
++		    &hash, &hashlen
++		);
++		break;
++	default:
++		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++	}
++
++	BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
++
++	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++	}
++
++	gssbuf.value = hash;
++	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
++		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
++
++	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
++	packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++	packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
++
++	if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++		packet_put_char(1); /* true */
++		packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++	} else {
++		packet_put_char(0); /* false */
++	}
++	packet_send();
++
++	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
++
++	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++	else 
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++	DH_free(dh);
++
++	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++	kex_finish(kex);
++
++	/* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
++	 * just exchanged.  */
++	if (options.gss_store_rekey)
++		ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
++}
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
+index 1defb11..6ccfd8d 100644
+--- a/key.c
++++ b/key.c
+@@ -971,6 +971,8 @@ key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid)
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
++	case KEY_NULL:
++		return "null";
+ 	}
+ 	return "ssh-unknown";
+ }
+@@ -1276,6 +1278,8 @@ key_type_from_name(char *name)
+ 	    strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ 		return KEY_ECDSA_CERT;
+ #endif
++	} else if (strcmp(name, "null") == 0) {
++		return KEY_NULL;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);
+diff --git a/key.h b/key.h
+index ec5ac5e..8b5c565 100644
+--- a/key.h
++++ b/key.h
+@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ enum types {
+ 	KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
+ 	KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
+ 	KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
++	KEY_NULL,
+ 	KEY_UNSPEC
+ };
+ enum fp_type {
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 29d987c..73702d1 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+@@ -241,6 +243,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+     {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
+@@ -253,6 +256,12 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
++#endif
+     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
+@@ -357,6 +366,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++		/* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif
+ 	} else {
+ 		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+ 
+@@ -443,6 +456,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++		/* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif		
+ 	} else {
+ 		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+@@ -1692,6 +1709,13 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++	}
++#endif
+ 	kex->server = 1;
+ 	kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ 	kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+@@ -1898,6 +1922,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	OM_uint32 major;
+ 	u_int len;
+ 
++	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++		fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ 	goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ 	goid.length = len;
+ 
+@@ -1925,6 +1952,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+ 	u_int len;
+ 
++	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++		fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ 	in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ 	in.length = len;
+ 	major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
+@@ -1942,6 +1972,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
++		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
+ 	}
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+@@ -1953,6 +1984,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	OM_uint32 ret;
+ 	u_int len;
+ 
++	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++		fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ 	gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ 	gssbuf.length = len;
+ 	mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+@@ -1979,7 +2013,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ {
+ 	int authenticated;
+ 
+-	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++		fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
++	authenticated = authctxt->valid && 
++	    ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
+ 
+ 	buffer_clear(m);
+ 	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+@@ -1992,6 +2030,74 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+ 	return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++int 
++mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
++{
++	gss_buffer_desc data;
++	gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 major, minor;
++	u_int len;
++
++	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++		fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
++	data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++	data.length = len;
++	if (data.length != 20) 
++		fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, 
++		    (int) data.length);
++
++	/* Save the session ID on the first time around */
++	if (session_id2_len == 0) {
++		session_id2_len = data.length;
++		session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
++		memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
++	}
++	major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
++
++	xfree(data.value);
++
++	buffer_clear(m);
++	buffer_put_int(m, major);
++	buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
++
++	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
++
++	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
++
++	/* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
++	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
++	
++	/* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
++	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
++
++	return (0);
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
++	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++	int ok;
++
++	store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++	store.envvar   = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++	store.envval   = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++
++	ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
++
++	xfree(store.filename);
++	xfree(store.envvar);
++	xfree(store.envval);
++
++	buffer_clear(m);
++	buffer_put_int(m, ok);
++
++	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
++
++	return(0);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index a8a2c0c..aa38b16 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
++++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
++	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN,
++	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX,
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index 1a5dda5..20c37eb 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -1232,7 +1232,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ 	Buffer m;
+ 	int authenticated = 0;
+@@ -1249,6 +1249,51 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ 	debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ 	return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++OM_uint32
++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++	OM_uint32 major;
++	u_int len;
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
++
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
++
++	major = buffer_get_int(&m);
++	hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
++	hash->length = len;
++
++	buffer_free(&m);
++
++	return(major);
++}
++
++int
++mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++	int ok;
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
++	
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++
++	ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
++
++	buffer_free(&m);
++	
++	return (ok);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index de2d16f..432953f 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -57,8 +57,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+    gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index eb4a8b9..091029a 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -129,6 +129,8 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++	oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
++	oGssServerIdentity, 
+ 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ 	oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -169,10 +171,19 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
++	{ "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
++	{ "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
++	{ "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
++	{ "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+ 	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
+@@ -479,10 +490,30 @@ parse_flag:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case oGssKeyEx:
++		intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case oGssDelegateCreds:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case oGssTrustDns:
++		intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case oGssClientIdentity:
++		charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
++		goto parse_string;
++
++	case oGssServerIdentity:
++		charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
++		goto parse_string;
++
++	case oGssRenewalRekey:
++		intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case oBatchMode:
+ 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1092,7 +1123,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication = -1;
++	options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ 	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++	options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
++	options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
++	options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
++	options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1193,8 +1229,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 		options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
++	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++		options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++	if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++		options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
++	if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
++		options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
+index ee160df..3e54355 100644
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -46,7 +46,12 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     challenge_response_authentication;
+ 					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
++	int     gss_keyex;		/* Try GSS key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
++	int	gss_trust_dns;		/* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
++	int	gss_renewal_rekey;	/* Credential renewal forces rekey */
++	char    *gss_client_identity;   /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
++	char    *gss_server_identity;   /* GSSAPI target principal */
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index e2f20a3..b087726 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -97,7 +97,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+ 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
++	options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
++	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
++	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -226,8 +229,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
++	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++		options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
++	if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
++		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
++	if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
++		options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -322,7 +331,9 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
+ 	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
+-	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
++	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
++	sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
++	sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+ 	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
+@@ -386,10 +397,20 @@ static struct {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
++	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -944,10 +965,22 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sGssKeyEx:
++		intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sGssCleanupCreds:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sGssStrictAcceptor:
++		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case sGssStoreRekey:
++		intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1704,7 +1737,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 5a058a4..38de135 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -97,7 +97,10 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
+ 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
++	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
++	int 	gss_strict_acceptor;	/* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
++	int 	gss_store_rekey;
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index c29a1b7..31d5a08 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -60,10 +60,22 @@
+ 
+ #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+ 
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT                            30
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE                        31
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE                        32
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY                         33
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR                           34
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ			40
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP				41
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID				"gss-group1-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID				"gss-group14-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID				"gss-gex-sha1-"
++
+ typedef struct {
+ 	char *filename;
+ 	char *envvar;
+ 	char *envval;
++	struct passwd *owner;
+ 	void *data;
+ } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
+ 
+@@ -71,8 +83,11 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	gss_buffer_desc displayname;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
+ 	gss_cred_id_t creds;
++	gss_name_t name;
+ 	struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
+ 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++	int used;
++	int updated;
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+ 
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+@@ -83,6 +98,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+ 	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -93,10 +109,11 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	gss_OID		oid; /* client */
+ 	gss_cred_id_t	creds; /* server */
+ 	gss_name_t	client; /* server */
+-	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* server */
++	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* both */
+ } Gssctxt;
+ 
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
+ 
+ int  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+@@ -116,16 +133,30 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
+ 
+ /* In the server */
++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, 
++    const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
++    const char *);
++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, 
++    const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ 
++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
++
++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
+diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
+index 1893674..2c06ba7 100644
+--- a/ssh_config
++++ b/ssh_config
+@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
+ #   HostbasedAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
++#   GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++#   GSSAPITrustDNS no
+ #   BatchMode no
+ #   CheckHostIP yes
+ #   AddressFamily any
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 50bcae8..269d394 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -508,11 +508,43 @@ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
++If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when 
++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default 
++identity will be used.
++.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
++If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when 
++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
++expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
++hostname.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
++If set to 
++.Dq yes
++then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
++ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed 
++credentials to a session on the server.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to 
++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If 
++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 3cb9b10..aaf02ec 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -159,9 +159,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ {
+ 	Kex *kex;
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
++	char *gss_host = NULL;
++#endif
++
+ 	xxx_host = host;
+ 	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this 
++		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++		if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++			gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
++		else
++			gss_host = host;
++
++		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
++		if (gss) {
++			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
++			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
+ 		logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
+ 		options.ciphers = NULL;
+@@ -196,6 +221,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ 	if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
++	 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
++	if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
++		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
++		xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], 
++		    "%s,null", orig);
++		xfree(gss);
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	if (options.rekey_limit)
+ 		packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit);
+ 
+@@ -206,10 +242,30 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++	}
++#endif
+ 	kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ 	kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ 	kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
++		kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
++		kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
++		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
++			kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
++		} else {
++			kex->gss_host = gss_host;
++        }
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	xxx_kex = kex;
+ 
+ 	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
+@@ -304,6 +360,7 @@ void	input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void	input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void	input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void	input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
++int	userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ #endif
+ 
+ void	userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
+@@ -319,6 +376,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
+ 
+ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++	{"gssapi-keyex",
++		userauth_gsskeyex,
++		NULL,
++		&options.gss_authentication,
++		NULL},
+ 	{"gssapi-with-mic",
+ 		userauth_gssapi,
+ 		NULL,
+@@ -625,19 +687,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	static u_int mech = 0;
+ 	OM_uint32 min;
+ 	int ok = 0;
++	const char *gss_host;
++
++	if (options.gss_server_identity)
++		gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
++	else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++		gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
++	else
++		gss_host = authctxt->host;
+ 
+ 	/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ 	 * once. */
+ 
+ 	if (gss_supported == NULL)
+-		gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
++		if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
++			gss_supported = NULL;
++			return 0;
++		}
+ 
+ 	/* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+ 	while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
+ 		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ 		if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ 		    ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, 
+-		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
++		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, 
++                    options.gss_client_identity)) {
+ 			ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ 		} else {
+ 			mech++;
+@@ -734,8 +808,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ {
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ 	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+-	int oidlen;
+-	char *oidv;
++	u_int oidlen;
++	u_char *oidv;
+ 
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL)
+ 		fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+@@ -845,6 +919,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ 	xfree(msg);
+ 	xfree(lang);
+ }
++
++int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++	Buffer b;
++	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++	gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ms;
++
++	static int attempt = 0;
++	if (attempt++ >= 1)
++		return (0);
++
++	if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
++		debug("No valid Key exchange context"); 
++		return (0);
++	}
++
++	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
++	    "gssapi-keyex");
++
++	gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++	gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
++		buffer_free(&b);
++		return (0);
++	}
++
++	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
++	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
++	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
++	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
++	packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
++	packet_send();
++
++	buffer_free(&b);
++	gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
++
++	return (1);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ int
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index cb45cec..1136c63 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@
+ #include "roaming.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+ 
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef LIBWRAP
+ #include <tcpd.h>
+ #include <syslog.h>
+@@ -1590,10 +1594,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+ 		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+ 	}
++#ifndef GSSAPI
++	/* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
+ 	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+ 		logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
+ 		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
+ 	}
++#endif
+ 	if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+ 		logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+ 		exit(1);
+@@ -1922,6 +1929,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	/* Log the connection. */
+ 	verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+ 
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++	/*
++	 * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
++	 * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
++	 * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode).  We do not
++	 * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
++	 * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
++	 *
++	 * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
++	 * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
++	 * new sessions for us.  Then all the users will end up in the
++	 * same session (bad).
++	 *
++	 * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
++	 * automatically.
++	 *
++	 * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
++	 * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
++	 */
++	{
++		OSStatus err = 0;
++		SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
++		SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
++
++		err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
++		if (err)
++			error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++			    (unsigned) err);
++		else
++			debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++			    (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++
++		if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
++			debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
++			    "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
++		else {
++			debug("Creating new security session...");
++			err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
++			if (err)
++				error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
++				    (unsigned) err);
++
++			err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, 
++			    &sattrs);
++			if (err)
++				error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++				    (unsigned) err);
++			else
++				debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++				    (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+ 	 * successfully authenticates itself.  So we set up an alarm which is
+@@ -2303,6 +2364,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ 
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	{
++	char *orig;
++	char *gss = NULL;
++	char *newstr = NULL;
++	orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++	/* 
++	 * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
++	 * the other key exchange algorithms
++	 */
++
++	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
++		orig = NULL;
++
++	if (options.gss_keyex)
++		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++	else
++		gss = NULL;
++
++	if (gss && orig)
++		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++	else if (gss)
++		newstr = gss;
++	else if (orig)
++		newstr = orig;
++
++	/* 
++	 * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
++	 * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
++  	 * host key algorithm we support
++	 */
++	if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
++
++	if (newstr)
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
++	else
++		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/* start key exchange */
+ 	kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+@@ -2310,6 +2413,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++	}
++#endif
+ 	kex->server = 1;
+ 	kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ 	kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 4534841..3576260 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, 
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will 
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index c3d6df3..449afb3 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -423,12 +423,40 @@ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+ on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
++Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor 
++a client authenticates against. If
++.Dq yes
++then the client must authenticate against the
++.Pa host
++service on the current hostname. If 
++.Dq no
++then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the 
++machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation 
++on multi homed machines. 
++The default is
++.Dq yes .
++Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
++and setting it to 
++.Dq no
++may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
++.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
++Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a 
++successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed 
++or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
++.Dq no .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+ Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
+ with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.8_p1-selinux.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.8_p1-selinux.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7be2879
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.8_p1-selinux.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+http://bugs.gentoo.org/354247
+
+[openbsd-compat/port-linux.c] Bug #1851: fix syntax error in
+	selinux code.  Patch from Leonardo Chiquitto.
+
+/* $Id: openssh-5.8_p1-selinux.patch,v 1.1 2011/02/10 02:44:53 vapier Exp $ */
+
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@
+ 
+ 	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+-	if (path == NULL)
++	if (path == NULL) {
+ 		setfscreatecon(NULL);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.8_p1-x509-hpn-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.8_p1-x509-hpn-glue.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74d06c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.8_p1-x509-hpn-glue.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+Move things around so hpn applies cleanly when using X509.
+
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -46,12 +46,13 @@
+ CC=@CC@
+ LD=@LD@
+ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ @LDAP_CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
++CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+ LIBS=@LIBS@
+ SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
+ SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
+ LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
+ LIBLDAP=@LDAP_LDFLAGS@ @LDAP_LIBS@
++CPPFLAGS+=@LDAP_CPPFLAGS@
+ AR=@AR@
+ AWK=@AWK@
+ RANLIB=@RANLIB@
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -153,9 +153,6 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
+ 	options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
+-	options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
+-	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+-	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ 
+ 	options->hostbased_algorithms = NULL;
+ 	options->pubkey_algorithms = NULL;
+@@ -168,6 +165,9 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->va.certificate_file = NULL;
+ 	options->va.responder_url = NULL;
+ #endif /*def SSH_OCSP_ENABLED*/
++	options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
++	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
++	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -367,9 +367,6 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+-	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
+-	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+-	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS,
+ 	sHostbasedAlgorithms,
+ 	sPubkeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sX509KeyAlgorithm,
+@@ -380,6 +377,9 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sCAldapVersion, sCAldapURL,
+ 	sVAType, sVACertificateFile,
+ 	sVAOCSPResponderURL,
++	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
++	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
++	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS,
+ 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+ 
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.rc6.2 b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.rc6.2
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86f87ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.rc6.2
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+#!/sbin/runscript
+# Copyright 1999-2011 Gentoo Foundation
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.rc6.2,v 1.1 2011/01/24 02:55:47 vapier Exp $
+
+opts="${opts} reload checkconfig gen_keys"
+
+depend() {
+	use logger dns
+	need net
+}
+
+SSHD_CONFDIR=${SSHD_CONFDIR:-/etc/ssh}
+SSHD_PIDFILE=${SSHD_PIDFILE:-/var/run/${SVCNAME}.pid}
+SSHD_BINARY=${SSHD_BINARY:-/usr/sbin/sshd}
+
+checkconfig() {
+	if [ ! -d /var/empty ] ; then
+		mkdir -p /var/empty || return 1
+	fi
+
+	if [ ! -e "${SSHD_CONFDIR}"/sshd_config ] ; then
+		eerror "You need an ${SSHD_CONFDIR}/sshd_config file to run sshd"
+		eerror "There is a sample file in /usr/share/doc/openssh"
+		return 1
+	fi
+
+	gen_keys || return 1
+
+	"${SSHD_BINARY}" -t ${myopts} || return 1
+}
+
+gen_key() {
+	local type=$1 key ks
+	[ $# -eq 1 ] && ks="${type}_"
+	key="${SSHD_CONFDIR}/ssh_host_${ks}key"
+	if [ ! -e "${key}" ] ; then
+		ebegin "Generating ${type} host key"
+		ssh-keygen -t ${type} -f "${key}" -N ''
+		eend $? || return $?
+	fi
+}
+
+gen_keys() {
+	if egrep -q '^[[:space:]]*Protocol[[:space:]]+.*1' "${SSHD_CONFDIR}"/sshd_config ; then
+		gen_key rsa1 "" || return 1
+	fi
+	gen_key dsa && gen_key rsa && gen_key ecdsa
+	return $?
+}
+
+start() {
+	local myopts=""
+	[ "${SSHD_PIDFILE}" != "/var/run/sshd.pid" ] \
+		&& myopts="${myopts} -o PidFile=${SSHD_PIDFILE}"
+	[ "${SSHD_CONFDIR}" != "/etc/ssh" ] \
+		&& myopts="${myopts} -f ${SSHD_CONFDIR}/sshd_config"
+
+	checkconfig || return 1
+	ebegin "Starting ${SVCNAME}"
+	start-stop-daemon --start --exec "${SSHD_BINARY}" \
+	    --pidfile "${SSHD_PIDFILE}" \
+	    -- ${myopts} ${SSHD_OPTS}
+	eend $?
+}
+
+stop() {
+	if [ "${RC_CMD}" = "restart" ] ; then
+		checkconfig || return 1
+	fi
+
+	ebegin "Stopping ${SVCNAME}"
+	start-stop-daemon --stop --exec "${SSHD_BINARY}" \
+	    --pidfile "${SSHD_PIDFILE}" --quiet
+	eend $?
+}
+
+reload() {
+	checkconfig || return 1
+	ebegin "Reloading ${SVCNAME}"
+	start-stop-daemon --stop --signal HUP --oknodo \
+	    --exec "${SSHD_BINARY}" --pidfile "${SSHD_PIDFILE}"
+	eend $?
+}
author	Mike Hammill <mike@kth.se>	2011-02-15 21:56:41 +0100
committer	Mike Hammill <mike@kth.se>	2011-02-15 21:56:41 +0100
commit	0eba14190c0d1a4050632302e07f6fc4c767e404 (patch)
tree	98594b73bd3cab8ad2f24e84356cf79687b3dba5
parent	Add Roy Marples's patch. (diff)
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